COMPLETE WORKS OF
DR. K. C. VARADACHARI
VOL-VI

VISISTADVAITA- METAPHYSICS,
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
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PUBLISHERS NOTE

Sri Ramchandra Publishers in its continuing endeavour to promote books on Philosophy are now proud to present the Volume VI of the Complete Works of Dr. K.C.Varadachari dealing with the Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Visistadvaita.

The earlier five volumes have dealt with the Philosophies of Sri Ramchandra’s Raja Yoga, Vedanta, Vedas, Upanisads, Nyaya, Samkhya and the Mystico Religious Consciousness of the Alvars.

The present volume deals with the Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Visistadvaita and is unique for the fact that such a stupendous scholastic work covering major tenets of the system has not been undertaken by any other scholar, though we understand that Prof.P.N.Srinivasachariar the mentor of Dr.K.C.Varadachari along with Sriman Kapisthalam Desikachariar were instrumental in inspiring this great philosopher to do service to Bhagavad Sri Ramanuja the only person having the title Bhashyakar. Dr. K.C.Varadachari’s work in this volume clearly shows us his capacity for being Critically and Incisively Analytical, Sympathetically Synthesizing, and integrally instructive all at the same time.

There are various points of view even as the number of Jivas or individuals. It is common to characterize Visistadvaita as a philosophy comparable to that of Spinoza and its point of view as Sub Specie Eternitatis. However Dr. K.C.Varadachari’s view in these works is more comparable to the Leibnizian point of view of Monadus Monadum or the view of the Center towards many Monads located in the concentric circles around the Centre. This particular approach of Sri Ramchadraji’s in his theory of Rings about which the readers may find more information
perhaps attracted the Philosopher towards the path of Sri Ramachandra.

The works in this volume were originally published as far back as 1928-1944 and some of the reviews hereunder provide us a glimpse of the huge intellect of Dr. K.C. Varadachari.

"The book under review is a model in lucid exposition of abstruse and knotty questions of philosophy and does a great service to Ramanuja's system of expounding his Theory of Knowledge and his pratitantra of Sarira-Sariri Bhava – an Organic body-soul unity – in the language of Western Philosophy and supporting it by quotations from Western Philosophical literature, ancient and modern."

-Sri A.V. Gopalacharya- THE HINDU 12.3.1944

The Pilgrim in its review in Sept. 1951 says the following about his book.

"Dr. K.C. Varadachari is the foremost of the scholars of this generation who has undertaken to interpret Ramanuja to a wider public than Indian. He is a worthy representative of that school of worthy scholarship, balanced judgment and sincere endeavour, to know the whole truth”. “A wide familiarity with the currents of modern Western Philosophy and a critical scholarship of the literature of Visistadvaita, coupled with a capacity to weigh justly and conclude wisely makes this book eminently fit for the modern Philosopher and Theologian.”

Sri. P.N. Srinivasachariar the President of the All-India Philosophical Congress held at Lahore in 1943 after reading the works in this volume remarked that "The book as whole shows that the writer has Philosophical gifts. We may concede to Dr. Varadachari's thesis a real originality as being an examination of Ramanuja’s Epistemology from a thoroughly modern point of view and this task was one not only demanding philosophical
competence, but also instructive in regard to the history of Philosophy. The authors undertaking is instructive and he displays substantial knowledge of the trend of occidental philosophy and ingenuity in reinterpreting Ramanuja so as to present a coherent picture.”

All the above reviews we hope give to the reader a taste of the richness and depth of the subject concerned in this book and we do hope that the reader take advantage of the value of the book.

Sri.K.C.Narayana was a direct student of Philosophy under Dr. K.C.Varadachari specializing in Visistadvaita and studied the original texts of the system under his guidance. He has helped us more particularly in this volume in selecting the various section of the three books mentioned above and has edited the volume and has also obliged to give his foreword for this volume. We sincerely extend our grateful thanks to him and members of his family for having provided the material for this publication even as they have done for the previous volumes.

April 2001
Hyderabad

R.RadhaKrishnan
Sri Ramchandra Publishers
THE AUTHOR

Dr. K. C. Varadachari was born in a small Agrabaram Village near Tiruchanoor a temple town of Sri. Padmavathi Ammavaru on 14th August 1902, in the asterism of Moola and Vrschika Lagna. His father was a resident of Tirupati Town belonging to a traditional Sri Vaishnavites family. The family tradition is very ancient and has its origin in the Nallan Chakravarthy a contemporary and a close disciple of Sri Bhashyakar Srimad Ramanuja of 11th Century A.D. His great grand fathers’ grand father came from a village called Karumbur a village near Kanchi of Lord Varada.

He had his school education in the then Mahant Hindu High school up to the Matriculation Standard. His contemporaries in the school include Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. He did his F.A. and B.A(hons) from the Christian College, Madras. He had consistently a distinguished educational career and had he not opted for B.A.(Hons) Philosophy which in those days was considered a prestigious course to do he would have been an Agricultural Scientist as he got admission for B.A.(Agri) also. He was a gold medallist of the Madras University in his B.A.(Hons). He was a Research Scholar of the Madras University and later a Research Fellow of the Andhara University then located at Guntur. He joined the Christian College as a Lecturer in Philosophy. His first book Metaphysics of Sri Ramanujas’ Sribhashya was published before he did his Ph.D. He married in 1926 from the distinguished family of Patrachariars. His wife’s’ uncle was Rao Bahadur Narasimhachariar who was District Judge in the then Madras Presidency. His own father was a senior Police officer in the Govt of Madras Presidency. But he participated in the freedom movement along with his cousin Sri Ramanujam who was a pioneer in spreading the Ragi Malt culture and home made table salt apart from many other products of beauty. But he was
won over by his father and the uncle of his wife and continued his research. He took his Ph.D. from Madras University in 1932. After being a lecturer in the Union Christian College, he worked for a brief period as Lecturer in the College at Alwayee. Later he worked at Lingaraj College, Belgaum. In 1939 his father retired from Govt.Service.

At the same time Sri Venkateswarai Oriental Institute was started by the T.T.D. The most revered Vedantacharya of the day, Sriman Mahamahopadhyaya Chettur Narasimhachariar Swamin was the first Professor of the Chair of Visistadvaita and Bhagavadvishaya in the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute. He invited Dr.K.C. Varadachari to join the Institute and thus he moved into his native place where was to work till his retirement in the S.V.University in 1962.

During his tenure at the Oriental Institute and later he developed close association with Sriman D.T.Tatachariari along with whom he has written many commentaries on the Upanishads notably Isa, Kena, Katha and Prasna. From the Oriental Institute he was transferred to S.V.Arts College when it was started in the early 1940's as Professor of Philosophy. Later when the S.V.University was started he was appointed as Reader and Head of the Dept.of Philosophy. He retired from the S.V.University in 1962. He had delivered University Lectures at Madras, Mysore, Travancore and Utkal. He is a popular broadcaster on the All India Radio Madras, Vijayavada and Visakhapatnam. He was President of the Metaphysics Section of the Indian Philosophy Congress in 1947 at Banares. He was President of the Religion Section of the All India Oriental Conference 1965 at Gauhati. He was the Pratap Seth Lecturer on Vedanta of the Indian Philosophical congress in 1965. In 1965 he was invited by the Madras University to be the first occupant of the Sri Vivekananda (Centenary)Chair of Comparative
Religion, Ethics and Philosophy.

His specialisations are Visistadvaita, Integral Metaphysics, Logic, Yoga Psychology of the Minor Upanishads, Comparative Religion, Mysticism and Rajayoga. He has written profusely on the Visistadvaita system of philosophy of Vedanta, Sri Aurobindo and later on the system of Rajayoga propounded by Sri Ramchandraji Maharaj of Shahjahanpur, U.P., India. He was a regular reviewer to the Hindu for more than three decades. His important works include Metaphysics of Sri Ramanujas’ Sri Bhashya, Theory of Knowledge of Ramanujas’ Philosophy, Living Teachings of Vedanta, Idea of God, Aspects of Bhakti, Visistadvaita as Philosophy and Religion, Introduction to Logic, Sri Aurobindo, New Darshana of Sri Ramchandra, Commentaries on Ten Commandments of Sri Ramchandra, Commentary on Efficacy of Rajayoga, Commentary on the Philosophy of Sri Ramchandra and many more. He has profusely written articles on the subjects of his specialisations which run to over 300 articles and his reviews are on over 400 books.

His life was not limited to academic excellence. He had personal contact with great saints of the day, namely Ramana Maharshi, Sri Aurobindo, The Mother, Jiddu Krishnamurthy and as already mentioned with renowned scholars of Visistadvaita Vedanta. He was sought to be emulated by Professors of Philosophy and Psychology like C.T.Krishnamachari of Christian College, Dr.Boaz of Madras University, Dr.G.Srinivasan of Mysore University and many more. He had close association with Sriman Yamunachariar of Mysore University apart from many others.

Swami Sivananda of Rishikesh whom he never met personally yet wrote about him as “With disarming simplicity and effortless dignity that characterises his written works Dr.K.C.Varadachari has consistently and persistently yoked the services of his philosophical acumen towards the errors of a purely intellectual approach of life
and has sought to defend and advance with adequate persuasion and power the claims of higher and spiritual values both for the attainment of deeper philosophical insights into the nature of the individual, the Word and the Ultimate Reality as also for the perfection and integration of the individual personality in a scheme of living that results in the fullest enjoyment of the prizes of this world and the gifts of the world beyond."

Dr K.C. Varadachari’s talks on the system of Sri Ramchandra’s Raja Yoga carry a depth of understanding of the subject and deep concern and commitment to the persons to whom they are addressed. In his own words, as recorded in his diary, his understanding of the system led him to remake himself in a new way. His approach to the system and the subject is best expressed by himself.

"Thus I found myself made to abjure the old theoretical ways of approach. I had to remake myself in a new way. I had to take stock of my whole past. All sectarian and caste conceptions had to be rethought. Philosophies help bind people to set notions. Thus I was to meet the challenge of the New.

It happened that I should meet Shri Ram Chandraji. Firstly his views were clearly different from my whole past.

(i) The conception of the Ultimate as Zero was quite against my philosophic inclination. Having failed with the positive concept it is time to experiment with this - Is it likely to be true? The zero has to be understood as the Beginning or Origin of all possibilities being nothing of what it becomes.
(ii) The concept of Invertendo shows how the deformation of evolution is natural and the power inherent is Zero (nirguna). I began understanding the meaning of Vivarta. All flow necessitates the inversion and it is natural.

(iii) The formations of the descent are clearly on this principle of inversions.

(iv) The vast Brahman extends up to our knowledge of it. Thus Truth, Consciousness and Bliss themselves are attributes which get transcended in higher approaches. Saccidananda are not the Ultimate Reality, they too being terms of knowing - Sankara too gets transcended.

(v) The individual is continuous with the Universal and the Ultimate, and is not abolished. The Pralaya or mergerse is cosmic and supracosmic and then all are withdrawn into the Ultimate.

(vi) The individual ray of the Ultimate has created for itself an organic organisation of physical-vital, mental and supramental centres and organs. These may well be the knots which have demarcated the several systems known as the physical, vital, mental or the bonal, muscular, circulatory, alimentary, hormonic, nervous, supranervous, and psychic etc. They have become
autonomous in a sense but have to be opened up for higher control. This is possible only by bringing down the highest power of the Centre and not merely the higher power just above the human. It is the necessity to mould the lower in terms of the highest through the higher which has also to mould itself to receive the highest. That leads to going beyond Sri Aurobindonian Vijnana - moulding of the mental, vital and physical.

(vii) This is done by means of the transmission or descent of the highest consciousness or condition (Zero) itself into the lowest region of the human heart or the organism as it is.

(viii) The yogic process is this transmission from the Ultimate which alone can shape the entire being, of the abhyasi for the experience and realisation of one’s own physical, vital, mental, and supramental levels - called by Shri Ramchandrajji, the Pinda, Brahmanda, Para Brahmanda and Central Regions working under the direct force of the Centre”

He was Director of the Sahaj Marg Research Institute started at Tirupati in 1965 and continued in that capacity till his Maha Samadhi on 31st January 1971. It is not all that certain that prizes of this world were got by him, perhaps he never bothered about it; but surely he got the gifts of the
Beyond as was attested by Mahatma Sri Ramchandraji Maharaj of Shahjahanpur, U.P. According to Sri Ramchandraji Maharaj he has attained a state of negation and was in total mergence with his Master.
FOREWORD

My right to write a foreword for this volume is First and foremost that Dr. K.C. Varadachari was not only my father, he taught me tradition and later the system of Rajayoga as amended and modified by the Master of the day Sri Ramchandraji Maharaj of Shahjahanpur. I studied under his feet Visistadvaita full two years and even had the privilege of being a student who was respected by him for my understanding of the concepts of Dharma/Dharmi bhuta jnana. Later I was asked to help him in writing Alvars of south India published by Bhavans. In his last days when he was not able to complete the assignment of writing Western Philosophy for Translation into Sanskrit by Sanskrit University, Tirupati he asked me to complete the work, which was duly done.

In his work on the Metaphysics of Ramanuja’s Sri Bhasya he dealt among other topics the nature of the soul and incidentally with the nature of consciousness. In the second part of this volume dealing with Epistemology we will find him explaining the concepts of Dharma-bhuta jnana and Dharmi bhuta jnana. Sri Ramanuja’s unique theory of Illusion and Dreams as a way of knowing is the most challenging to understand and Dr. K.C. Varadachari does yeoman service in clarifying this point of theory of knowledge.

The other doctrine which is more important than the doctrine of Dharma-bhuta jnana and is unique to Ramanuja’s system and is the cardinal principle of his system, is the Sarirasariri bhava. In his personal life he not only believed it but practiced it in toto, which is the one reason which has led him to yoga from the beginning. He used to lament that the treatise on yoga by Bhagavad Ramanuja is not available except by way of mention by Sri Vedanta Desika. He used to feel that the system would not have got into the routine rituals had the tradition of Bhaktisara & Nadamuni Alvars and Bhagavad Ramanuja was
preserved. He also used to cynically observe that people who want externalities and not things connected with Dhahara Vidya.

Many scholars find a tinge of Aurobindonian philosophy in his interpretation of the system of Sri Ramanuja. This is not true. It is because of Concept of the Organic Mind or Logic that Sri Ramanuja philosophy expounds has a similarity with that of the Aurobindonian philosophy of Integral mind. The third part of this volume viz., Logic of the Organic mind deals more clearly with aspect.

The fourth part of the Volume gives the theory of Visistadvaitsa as a philosophy and also as a religion, this is one of his most mature and profound interpretations appreciated by scholars like Sriman R. Ramanujachariar, M. Yamunacharya, D.T.Tatachariar swamin. Prof Devasenapati, Prof. T.M.P. Mahadevan and many others irrespective of their alliance to other systems of philosophy.

Dr. K.C. Varadachari firmly believed in the Idea of God as expounded by the system of Pancaratra and believed till he came to the system of Rajyoga of Sri Ramchandra in the thought conveyed by the only poem written by Sri Ramanuja in praise of the Lord of Tirumalai hills i.e “Akhila Bhuvana Janma sthema Bangadilile vinata vividha dhuta vrata rakshaike dipite sruti sirashi vidipthe brahmani srinivase bhavatu mama parasmin semusi bhakti rupa.

When personal experience which he was seeking was had by him in 1960’s he did not hesitate to switch and He used to say to me that he came to Tirupati through Lord Srinivasa and the Lord of the Seven Hills brought his Guide to his home and that is the vatsalya of Srimannarayana

30.4.2001

K.C.NARAYANA
THE METAPHYSICS OF SRI RĀMĀNUJA'S

SRI BHĀSYA
THE METAPHYSICS OF SRI RĀMĀNUJA’S
SRI BHĀṢYA

INTRODUCTION

The system of Rāmānuja occupies a significant and paramount place in the History of Vēdāntik philosophic thought. Starting from the Vēdic fountain, to use the orthodox phrase or metaphor, the rivers of interpretation flooded unrestrained in the very division and diversion of Sāmkhya, Yōga, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsa, the Jaina and Buddhistic schools till finally every one of them was accepted and rejected in turn by the Philosophic Mind, and in exhaustion turned to the solacing grounds and surging oceanic expanse of the Vēdāntic thought. But neither did it find there what it vainly sought after, for wave within wave, and inundation after inundation revealed an unlimited and illimitable depth and interior. It could not (dropping the metaphor hereafter) sullenly closet itself to the fundamental assumptions, for never were they easy. It was alluring: pleasing in the extreme was the quiet rest in the initial
revelation of the Vēdāntik aspiration in the Advaita of Māyavāda. But such a rest was apparently very shortlived. It was bound to be so, it could not be otherwise. It promised potencies of immense magnitudes and it heralded the death of ego-centrism in life, its bitter and garnering fruits, in the ocean of a pure chaste and illumed and absorbing Experience of the Eternal Absolute Bliss. But the demand of the world was not replied; after all the lure to thought was the world from which and for which it sought to exalt itself. So in its effort to conquer what it would enjoy, it could bear no divided rest, nor bear with quietude the hymn of hate against life in its' furious on march of time; it wanted to subdue rather than deny, to accept rather than reject; for power needs acceptance and overcoming, possession and glory, not the puny and impotent way of surrender and gloom, quietism and feebleness. But the lure was strong and remains strong, not only was the recoil from life real and psychological, its votary was a great man, a pure and magnificent flower of Humanity-Śaṅkara.

But something ought to be done, that was the will of the Zeit Geist. Truth accepts no divided rule between itself and unreality. Understanding could be satisfied, if life would not be thwarted by mere denial. It may be called true and real and not a mere dream, for in as much as it exists should it not be called real and true, for, what is the criterion of reality but existence as it is for us?

It may have the attribute of significant meaning but yet there is no need to reject finally unity or identity, Ēkatva, with or immersgence into the Absolute from whose loins it sprang. This reconciliation the Great Bhāskara and Yādava
Prakāsā, the samucchayavādins, sought to do. But for all the efforts of these two Vēdāntins, Existence would accept no halfway house. It said that it shall be treated as either an inmate, a genuine entity in the family, an organ of the Absolute, rather than be treated as a ghost (or a pitri) whose reality is affirmed as a ghost and who ought to be satiated by such routine ablutions as it deserves, but for all its importunities never be a real entity—it can claim only that much of existence—that is, of an ineffectuality. Thus the half-hearted concession of the Bhēdabhēdavādins was not accepted. It strained to be counted as an entity, real absolutely and without any reserve or not at all. It was perhaps better to be treated as eternally unreal rather than be treated as real and unreal by fits and starts. In Rāmānuja it found its leader, its voice and effectuality. It would live as one of the parent, in Union (ekābhava) with its lord and God, rather than make the parent assume the ineffectual existence of the relations which he certainly would become if they are declared to be unreal. The inchoate utterances of the Vēdic Realists found its logical culmination and echoes in the System of Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja was the first to claim eternity and reality of the World in Vedanta (for Vyasa mentions that the world is real in his commentary on the Yōga-Sutras). He was the first to recognize the fundamental unity of Truth, Goodness and Beauty. As it was expressed “they are the three-fold cord by which our wagon is hitched to a star.” Of course we can neither entirely unify these three systems of value nor entirely separate them. To repudiate any one of them is fatal. As Dean Inge says “it leaves us with our ideals in the
air, and with the bastard faith of fideisme.” For him the same logical Absolute, the demand of the intellect, is the moral Governor and the religious God or Personality and the Mystics lover. This integral union of functioning in triple phases of the same ultimate reality in the sense of highest Perfection, as Person, as Governor, as God and as the Ultimate Truth and Existence in which everything finds its residence and suffusion, Ṛāmānuja stresses in his philosophy.

It is a mistake to say that one of these phases can possibly be unreal; unreal because they are so different from each other, and because activity seems to be an effort and restrained by time and causal sequence, and further appears to be based upon imperfection. But the fault of such an argument lies in this very patent fact, namely, that they are considered to belong to one same category which they are not, as they cannot be compared at all with each other, belonging as they do to different kinds of valuing. The proposition that only the logical Absolute is real, and that the Moral Ideal and the spiritual God are unreal, does not sound true mainly because the comparison is not between the same kind of ideal or valuing but between different kinds of valuing.

In this thesis the metaphysical system of Ṛāmānuja will be traced. It is considered in three parts for the convenience of study. The first treats about the theory of cause (on in other words, the cause-effect continuum); the second about the evolution of the universe or the process as in space-time continuum; the third about the ontological status of the ultimate reality or to use the well-worn phrase, the
Substance. But the Vedic substance is no scholastic category that goes by that name. It is a mistake, perhaps unpardonable, to treat the same as the scholastic substance. Nor is it a tertium quid. It is not the passive tabula rasa either, in which somehow the element or perception is inhaled or introduced or the element of change predicated. It was a great day for Indian philosophy when activity was reckoned to be the core of existence rather than the mere passive spectator. The parallel in the west was the Leibnizian theory of the Monad as the active existence not merely the passive substance of the Cartesians. The merit of such an acceptance in Indian philosophy goes to Ramanuja rather than to any one else. There is something radically wrong in the conception of Intelligence or the Conscious Principle or Spirit as a passive entity (as the Samkhyaans and the Mayavadinans held), but whose activity (a fact of experience) is a mysterious and unreal attribution due to a third entity unreal by itself. Experience, qua experience, knows no such grand passivity and the life of the Spirit or even of the finite mind or self is a bubbling stream of overflowing creative dynamism. Life, or activity belongs to spirit; but matter is no vanishing entity, unreal in its core or even imperfect, one is tempted to add. "Perception does not grow into (knowledge or) reflection, and in so doing lose its specific quality as a mode of knowledge.......Perception makes its own unique contribution to the life of the process. There is no substitute for it, and no way of supplanting it or superseding it in its own kind. ......No conceptual activity whatsoever can conjure a single perceived fact or perceptual act into existence as a form of knowledge......The deeper
apprehension, the greater knowledge is a new creation of the energy of the mind, as distinctive in its order as that of perception, and as distinct in kind as one organ of perception is from another.\footnote{Baillie. Aris. Soc. Pro. Vol.19 “Stereoscopic character of knowledge.”} But in cognitive activity the mind takes up an attitude of superiority in order to hold the percept fugitive and under its control, which act only leaves the mind to reflect upon the signs and symbols which it has created to represent such vanishing experiences of the objects. In a word, mind in its reflective and energetic experience signalises its superiority or transcendent character “Over the limits of perceptual fact by contriving mere perceptual symbols to correspond with and meet the abstracter aims of reflection”, but with this specific aim that what it attempts shall have its active response in the sphere of actual perception or matter. For direction the latter has none, even of the Unconscious. Sāmkhya is wrong in throwing the direction on the unconscious. All activity is founded upon a content upon which it can perform. Activity, qua activity, exists nowhere. It is sheer abstraction to claim that the percept is not the beginning and the primal necessity of reflection, and there is the organic connexion between the operations of perception and conception. Experience for us means to be factual, and though this factuality need not be always sensorial, yet it can be called perceptual, as something “given”.

Yet there is need for pointing out to certain criticisms at the very outset against the concept of a substrate behind activity, or an object for it to influence as mere “scholastic” modes of thinking as one prominent writer on Indian philosophy has thought it necessary to style it. It may be so, here it is not wise to enter into any theorising as to its logicality or not, but only to call attention to the views of Rāmānuja and leave them there for what they are worth. But one is tempted, all the same, to retort that one is content to know and understand experience (in its actuality and purity) rather than jump with an understanding that clings to no basement, and descends nowhere but ascending to the pure regions of vacuity and therefore of lightness which in clarion calls, it trumpets as the REALITY, but all the while calling for the help it does not find (due to its own diseased reflection) in experience or reality. Content with this remark, what we seek in experience are principles, ultimate and real, their absolute relations, their function in reality as we know it, meaning by experience every kind of cognition and perception, be it from the spiritual and mystic revelations downwards into the unconscious and sub-conscious levels, but valid all the same, because of their ultimate non-contradiction with normal experience. The hope of every philosophical attempt has been and is, if it be worth its name, the ultimate analysis and synthesis of all experience, giving legitimate hopes that may be attained by us in our effort to master
nature which somehow we feel fetters us. This is what Rāmānuja attempts to do in his Philosophy which we shall trace taking as his authoritative statement the Vedanta Sutra commentary known as the Śrī-Bhāṣya\textsuperscript{1}.

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{1} All through this work the Translations given are that of Thibaut and wherever there are the pages noted they refer to that translation.
\end{quotation}
THE THEORY OF CAUSE
OR
CAUSALITY

In any metaphysical enquiry, the origin of reality or of the actual, is a most important problem and on that depends all speculation of an ultimate category or substance. Causality as a law is a synthetic principle and not an a priori truth. In the order of experience no inherent necessity can be demonstrated. In the uniformity which is observed with which sequences of ‘perceptions’ take place or rather regular connexion between causes and effect no inherent necessity can be demonstrated either. Yet the causal law is a condition precedent and necessary for the existence of thinking beings. The necessity, however, is logical and not sensorial. Causality, understood thus, means regular succession of antecedent and consequent, such that a specific change in one thing at one moment is followed by a specific alteration in the same or another thing at another moment. This implies continuity and connexion between cause and effect, and we should like to believe, although we cannot always show, that causes are related to effects in such a way that the causes produce, determine and explain the effects¹. Novelty accordingly means, a hitherto

unobserved potential in the cause, or relation, which formerly did not occur. Vedanta says, the effect is nothing but the cause modified and in consequence the effect is known when the cause is known (completely), the desired knowledge of all things resulting from the knowledge of one thing is possible and appropriate¹. This belief in the logical necessity of the intrinsic (organic) relation between cause and effect is known as Sat-kārya-vāda. Those who deny this intrinsic thought necessity in the relation between cause and effect and maintain that there is production of a radically new order of existence from its cause and disparate from it, throw a far heavier strain upon our belief. Even they cannot assert that there is no capacity (Śakti)² on the part of the causes or collocation of causes to become an effect or effects. In which case, to become an effect would mean nothing other than passing into another condition. “Activity applied to a cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which inheres in that cause.” Thus Asat-kārya-vāda is wrong and in the last resort is simply an illogical defence of novelty as if novelty means illogicality. In the light of the principle of organic or intrinsic relation, novelty is equally and more logically explained. As an argument Asat-kārya-vāda is self-contradictory; as an assumption strictly pushed to its logical conclusion it leads

¹ Śrī Bhāshya 1.1.1.
² Nyāyaîkar Vaiśeṣikas do not agree to the postulate of Śakti, but Rāmānuja says that even if they do not they have to postulate 1.1.3.
to Sat-kārya-vāda. The cause-effect relation, expressed synthetically, is one of Unity-in-distinction or difference.

The cause of the world must be one, which contains or has within it, the potentiality of the world or all existence. The first cause (which indeed we have to postulate and cannot help postulating) must be something; it cannot be nothing. If non-existence be at the beginning, then, that which arises from Śunya must be another Śunya.\(^1\)

Tucchādūptaḥ tucchamēvakāryam syāt. The Buddhistic doctrine of absolute momentariness, which perhaps (as Rāmānuja hints) Buddha taught as a disciplinary measure in order to abandon the changing flux of experience, so to devote oneself to the fundamental issues of moral life, which unfortunately they have converted into a metaphysical creed, led them into either mere Representationism or its consequence and cul de sac, Solopsism, or else to the final consummation of Scepticism and Nihilism\(^2\). Further on the doctrine of absolute momentariness the origination of the world cannot be accounted for, kṣaṇīkatvapakṣe, for immediate cessations of experience (existence) after appearance mean that before the effect had been or could be, the cause is not and in that intermediate stage, there is neither cause nor effect nor even a passing of one into the other. Thus there can be firstly, no effectuation or passing

\(^1\) Śrī Bhāṣya. II, ii, 19.25. 27 and 30.
\(^2\) Vaibhāsika, Yōgachāra, Saunāntika, and Madhyamika Schools. Cf. Indian Phil., Radhakrishnan
into one another, secondly, there is nothing which can become something, *ex nihilo nihil fit*, thirdly, this is not true to experience at all, for we do not see cessations of existence though we certainly experience the passage of one form into another form or avastha. The Cause or the First cause, therefore must be the material from which and of which this world is an effect. The effect is a process, and not a particular state, and the whole process must in a sense be treated as the effect of the cause. Only then can any definite knowledge be gained as to the nature of the cause. And if we do maintain that the cause is the ultimate potential of all these Real differences, then we cannot know the whole except through the knowledge of the highest evolute or the last term, that is the Ultimate Spirit or Brāhmaṇ-as-completely-manifested in the evolutionary unfoldment. Sāmkhya and Yōga schools accept Sātkārya-vāda. According to them, "the effect is an entity, because a non-entity can never be brought into existence, because of the determinate relation between the cause with the effect because everything cannot be possible by any and every means, because a competent cause can do only that for which it is competent, and lastly because, the effect is non-difference from the cause.” (Sāmkhya kārika 9.61.)

From this they infer that the world-cause is that which is the

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1 Śaunaka “what has existed is alone brought into manifestation; how can a substance which has not subsisted begin to subsist”. sad eva niyate vyaktim, asatas sambhavah kutah  * Sri Vishnu Dharma ch 104*
material substance, subtle, unintelligent, the inferred Pradhānam. This material substance is capable of revealing its potentialities of differentiation in the very subtle form of three qualities or guṇas of sattva (harmony) rajas (activity and passion) and tamas (passivity, darkness and evil). These three guṇas are in equilibrium. But by the Sannidhānam or transcendental nearness to the Puruṣa, being thrown into in-equilibrium, it evolves its effects in the serial order of Mahat, ahaṅkāra, the subjective organs which reveal the beauties of the world to the passive spectator, namely, manas, the five organs of sense and five organs of action and the objective nature namely, the subtle ground (tanmātras) and the five elements\(^1\). All these are material categories (tattvas) and only the Puruṣa the intelligent inactive witness, the inferred separate being, who constituting the spiritual entity and principle, explains the somewhat characteristic property of intelligent unfoldment in the creation of the universe, and even a purposive direction of its thrustings; for the Prakṛti capable of activity by itself evolves the world for the experience and delight of the Puruṣa, and not for her own sake as she is non-intelligent\(^2\). These two entities, or rather final principles, are the ultimate reals. Though in a recent exposition of Saṅkhya theism\(^3\).

\(^1\) Mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtīḥ mahādātadyāḥprakṛtir vikṛtiyās sapta I
sOdāśāṣca vikāro, na prakṛtir navikṛtīḥ puruṣah II

\(^2\) Sam. Karika 17

\(^3\) Theism in Samkhya. A.K.Majumdar Modern Review feb-mar 1927.
the dependence (parārhativāt) of Prakṛti on Īśvara is sought to be proved, the orthodox opinion had been that there is no God for Sāmkhya, and even if there be one as in the Patanjala-Yōga doctrine, he is not an immanent God, not a God that real theism requires and demands of Him.

The ultimate cause, causa materialis, is Pradhāna, and the causa efficiens or rather causa instrumentalis, is the samyōga of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, where the Puruṣa is a mere unimplicated spectator (sāksī) unnecessary to the whole process, but necessary at least, in the sense of being a spectator of the drama for the drama to be. In Samkhya, then, non-implication of the Puruṣa as its sorest point, as all activity, even of conscious or cognizant activity (Buddhi), is relegated to the unintelligent principle Prakṛti; which cognises and unfolds, for the sake of an un-enjoying (nirāśraya) intelligence, which is mere intelligence, just as a dinner table is kept full of excellent dishes for the enjoyment of one who cannot enjoy. Thus Samkhya is unsatisfactory not in so far as its evolutionary process is concerned (I. iv. 3), but in so far as that system has no real place for intelligence and where I declares it to be necessary, it is most unnecessary, and that exactly is the sorest point involving self-contradiction. The inference which Saṅkhya draws that the Puruṣa is, whilst it maintains that there is no implication of Puruṣa in the process is illogical, and founded on the false principle that he is chinmātram, mere intelligence, which might be shrouded by and destroyed in character by, perhaps, mixture or alliance with matter, or else for a further reason, that if the Puruṣa is at any time implicated in the process he could never get out of it. The
latter reason the Samkhyanas present as the why of their not accepting the implication of Puruṣa in the material unfoldment. If we can show that the cause of the world, i.e., the causa efficiens is really an effective intelligence than the Samkhyan śāmyōga, and that the intelligence is implicated though never destroyed or transformed in character as intelligence it is, then we would escape a logical and empirical pit-fall. Matter can never have the power to intelligent activity, indeed, for any activity. It is also maintained that the laws of periodicity of evolution and involution cannot be accounted for without referring them to an intelligence law giver. Matter exists for another, and has its root-ground in another, for which it exists as a dependent existence. It is “paravaṣya,” subject to another or to the Highest Brāhmaṇ or the Para. Matter’s existence is dependent on an intelligence which enjoys it and guides it to its own ends, and gives it the dignity of an actual effective existence or reality. In Saṅkhya however, we are face to face with an un-reconciled dualism between matter and spirit. And the causal sequence also stands without explaining the origination or otherwise of the spirit, or matter. There are two causes standing in the mid-air.

Nyāya-Vaishēṣika accepts like Samkhya, this clear-cut dualism between matter and Spirit. It postulates the material substance in the form of atoms (ānus) which are of four kinds with exclusion of the atoms of ākāśa, which is conceived to be the underlying substance of the ether of
space.\textsuperscript{1} There are also infinite number of spiritual points (atmans) which are capable of consciousness in conjunction with matter or the world made of material anus or atoms, in combination at the will of Īśvara. God thus becomes an effective causa efficiens of the universe. But even this bringing together of these material and spiritual entities is actuated by an immanent principle of adṛṣṭa, which is said to be in action in the primary motions on the part of the atoms and of the manas. (II-ii-11.) अग्रे द्वियं चुम्ब मानयमन्मणमणमणमणार्णीक भविष्यथ्युष्कारिता. But in bringing this principle of Adṛṣṭa as quite different from God, just like the principle of Justice or Pre-established Harmony of Leibniz, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is giving no real efficiency but instrumentality to God which because there is intelligent arrangement perceivable in the world, is brought in to be an omnipotent power to effectuate the mutual putting together which the principle of Adṛṣṭa is incapable of doing. Thus it follows that once creation has been set in motion, the world will go on as a clock, Īśvara being no longer necessary. Such a God is not of the world, such a God is the God of Deism, an external agent. However compared to Samkhya, the efficient cause of the World in Vaiśeṣika is more effective, because centred in an intelligent being unlike the former’s material causality of the unintelligent, and the

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. Hindu Realism; J. Chatterjee says that atoms, is not the correct translation of anus, which are points having neither spatial or characteristic features. Hence an apparent comparison with Democritus is not sustainable.
slender causal instrument is of mere nearness or samyoga. All the same, the defect is quite apparent in this theory also; not only is there no immanence, it is a mechanical evolution, having no value, where if at all, Īśvara would interfere with the process constantly enough. “But in the world of creation, the things do not appear to be produced at any one moment by any particular person at any particular time,” (I-1-3.) since it is a process. In the case of its being constantly interfered with, the Occasionalism of Guilenx will be the resultant as a western parallel. And this none can admit, who believes in the immanent teleology of the Universe. “The constant interference on the part of an external (creator) cause is wholly opposed to the notion of divine immanence in things,” and unless one is going to lift this mere externality to one of transcendent immanence in the processus of creation, it will ever remain an unsatisfactory solution of not only the causal problem but also of the notion of God as divinely immanent in this creation of His. The value of the denial of mere blind teleology of Prakṛtic creation, and the refutation of mere externality of the intelligent creator as in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, lies exactly in their refutations; for Īśvara must not only be the immanent but the transcendent cause of the world. The reason, however, for the Nyāya postulation of the External creator lies in the dictum that the effect is different from the

1. Cf. Humes “Essay on Particular Providence and a future State” where he refutes Providential Cause since such a cause is no where possible.
cause and is absolutely a new and disparate production, hence the non-implication of Īśvara in the world process which is of the character of an ‘effect.’ Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is based on Asat-kārya-vāda and on mere difference.

We have already shown why the intelligence is non-implicated in the world-process in Samkhya-Yoga, because it accepted identity between cause and effect. This truth is what the Vedanta of Rāmānuja and indeed all schools of Vedanta accept. This of course, is, as will be showed, only one half of the theory of Causality according to Rāmānuja. Matter is the ultimate constituent of existences in Saṅkhya, and spirit is a necessary appendage. Saṅkhya realizes that even the unfolding of Prakṛti in its own right, is reasonable only if it be for the sake of a sentient subject. The object exists for a subject, this is a truth that Saṅkhya realizes and is fully aware of. Vedanta wedded to no such absurd dictum of pure difference as Nyāya, tries to justify the view that the material (Upādana) and efficient (nimitta) cause of the world is Brāhmaṇ. Vedanta accepts Sat-kārya vāda or the intrinsic and organic relation between cause and effect.

Considering first Advaita in respect of this special problem, Advaita postulates that before the world began, no difference was manifest, everything was shrouded in mṛtyu or Death. Not that there was a mere void, Śūnya, for then causes and effect were in their seminal condition of

1 See conclusion
unmanifestedness. Of course, this is exactly the position held by the Saṅkhyaṇs. Causes and effects are eternally existent. All causes in their causation destroy their previous manifestation in introducing their present manifestation, for the same cause cannot exist in two forms at the same time. But the cessation of the previous manifestation does not mean the cessation of the cause itself. The clay for a moment leaves its lump form, and passes into the pot-form, but does not cease to be clay all the same. And further, the effect is also an eternal existent, for the effect form does not accidentally emerge into existence but is eternally existent for if the effect is not potentially existent in the cause no amount of exertion can bring it forth and through “no activity can the non-existence of the effect become existent, as little as the son of a barren woman can be made existent by any effort”1. Thus it follows that the effect is identical with the cause karaṇadanaṇya tatkaryam, and consequently the whole world is an effect of Brāhmaṇ, as such they also are identical. So far as the former half of the statement is concerned we agree, but as to the transference of this relation between the World and Brāhmaṇ, whilst maintaining that Brāhmaṇ is real and the world (effect) is unreal, considered even in a transcendent sense, we are not disposed to agree. According to Saṅkara (whose attachment to monism was incomparable) with his peculiar monistic bias, ekatva or oneness is real, but plurality or

1 cf Deussen’s Philosophy of Vādanta
nānātva is unreal, and is due to avidya, or in other words, Plurality is the unreal effect of the Ekam or One, the real cause. This plurality, indeed, is the effect produced by Māya, or the principle of division and difference which are illusions and is the power of the Lord or Īśvara. "Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brāhmaṇ is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearance of animate and inanimate beings. Māya thus constitutes the upādana, the material cause of the world, or if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that Māya belongs to Brāhmaṇ as a Śakti—we may say that the material cause of the world is Brāhmaṇ in so far as it is associated with Māya. In this latter quality, Brāhmaṇ is more properly called Īśvara, the Lord."

This leads to the following positions by parity of reasoning:

1. If this principle of individuation and differentiation, which is also the principle of illusion, has any residence it must be in Brāhmaṇ. And if Brāhmaṇ is mere consciousness (chinmātram), then it may even completely hinder its shining out, even through distorted ways, not to speak of the annihilation of Intelligence or consciousness itself.

Śaṅkara Bhāṣya. Sacred books of the East, Vol. 1 introduction
2. Though it be held that this power of Brähmaṇ, is not the same as Brähmaṇ himself, according to the rule the power of the existent is not the existent, even as the power of the fire is not the fire. Yet it must be admitted that this power and the ground of this power are organically united. But is it so admitted, for such an admission would involve the serious deduction that Brähmaṇ is imperfect, not what he is represented to be, the unconditioned pure, existence uninvolved in Process? This process though it be due to Avidya.

3. If this Śakti be Māya, and that again in turn be due to Avidya, it means in other words, characterizing Brähmaṇ as essentially unknowable since the whole world we know, of, is poised on illusory principles. It may even lead of the indirect utterance that if the plurality that we know is unreal, the metaphysical mania towards a very unadulterated ēkatva(oneness), is also an unreality. In so far as the undifferenced Brähmaṇ is real, so far and so far only, the differenced Brähmaṇ is real. That this sometimes is the opinion of Śaṅkara also can, very well be granted.

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What really follows from such an assertion is that for Advaita, the cause alone is real, the effects are unreal, and what is that but the recanting of the Sat-kārya-vāda which says that causes and effects are eternal at least that the effect, Kārya, is sat or real and true. In reality what the advaitins of the Māyavāda type assert is Sat-kārana-vāda and not Sat-kārya-vāda. In which case, there is no causal problem for Māyavāda at all.

The school of Bhāskara, on the other hand, which tried to mediate between Advaita of Māyavāda and Rāmānuja, says that the cause as well as the effect is real, and that there is identity and difference (bhēda-abhēda) between them, but it believes that the effects are due to limiting adjuncts (upādhis) which condition the one cause. The multiplicity of the world (the effect) is due to upādhis. Brāhmaṇ is the Sole Real and absolute existence. Brāhmaṇ appears as many individuals due to the principle of individuation, just as ether contained in a pot is different from and yet identical with ether outside being continuous with it. There is thus identity (abhēda) demonstrated between ākāsa and Bhatākāśa.

But the argument that refuted the previous theory refutes this also, in spite of the fact, that this really follows Sat-kārya-vāda. There are Bhāskhara’s theory as in Advaita, two entities, Brāhmaṇ the cause, and the Upādhīs

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1 cf Study of Patanjali. Dr. S.N. Das Gupta.
which make it differenced as against Avidya and its consequent Māya in Advaita. The upādhis are not explained just as the indescribable Avidya and still more indescribable Māya, are also unexplained, though in both the cases they explain the differences or multiplicity. And just as in the other case, the upādhis must have their abode in Brāhmaṇ, if not so their abode is nowhere. And since release consists in getting rid of Māya in the one case, and upādhis in the other, in the former case, Brāhmaṇ the intelligent would suffer from illusion and ignorance, as in the latter, Brāhmaṇ the unlimitable and the unlimited, the indivisible would be limited and divided, and in neither case, can there be release if the eternal (sanātanah) Avidya and Upādhis have their seat in Brāhmaṇ, and if not there ballasted from reality where would they reside?—If knowledge of reality and release is the aim of all spiritual effort as they themselves claim, then there is no getting out of the bond of Upādhis or Avidya with the help of these theories, not to speak of a logical explanation of the problem of truth and reality, which overtly or covertly deny relations and qualities to the Absolute. Bhāskara no doubt grants Saguṇa Brāhmaṇ unlike Advaita and refutes in his Bhāṣya the Māyāvādin and his Nirguṇa Brahma-vāda.

From what has followed from the above;

1. The unintelligent cannot be the cause of the world (II.iii.1.) The intelligent alone must be the cause of the world, it alone is the ‘womb’ as the Sutra says. (I.iv.28. and Mun.up. I.i.6.) for by no means can the non-intelligent explain the process, its direction and
final end. Brāhmaṇ according to the deepest instincts of mankind, or rather shall we say, the firm-ground intuitions and religious ideals is nothing less than the entire cause, namely, the material or immanent and efficient or transcendent cause of the world. If Brāhmaṇ were merely an operative cause of the universe like the Naiyayic Īśvara that is the God of Deism, or the mere remover of obstacles being himself all-perfect and all governing as in the Patanjala Doctrine, the knowledge of the entire world would not result from the knowledge of Brāhmaṇ; not any more than we know the pot when we know the potter or vice versa. यदि निमित्तकरणेव जगतो जग, तद तादिनात्त्र समस्तेः जगदिव्याते स्यतुः नवें कुलालिदि विज्ञाने डगादि विज्ञायते. Brāhmaṇ, just as the God of Spinoza, further is the immanent cause of the universe and because there is glory and beauty revealed in the process of unfoldment, there is evidence of and end which can only be that of an activity of Spirit. Ends to which the universe of process thrusts to are not to be relegated to matter, or energy “which are mere entia rationis,” but to spirit or world-reason. And no evolutionary process can be explained without the concept of end. So much so even the sutras suggest that the world is for the sake purely of Iīlā of God, Lokavattu Iīlā kaivalyam (II-I-33) All Philosophical explanation must look to the concept of end, be it ever so much as an attainment or self-revelation of character. Perfection of character in the beings animate consists in the
enlargement of their sphere of consciousness or rather intelligence so as to attain and appreciate in greater degree the entire relations and end of the world process. The destiny of the World or Jagat is spiritual—is Spirit. Brähmaṇi is thus the goal—the final End. And as Nature in entirety as with the souls depends for its being on Brähmaṇ; understood in the light of the concept of end, forms his mode or body (Sārīra).

The relation between cause and effect is organic and intrinsic and sat-kārya-vāda is right and it is the postulate that is acceptable to logic. The acceptance of this position is the thorny spot in the Advaita of Māyavāda and the bhedabheda theories, which when strictly applied leads the former to the thrilling anti-climax in the swing of the pendulum of chit-svarūpa Brähmaṇ. Indeed Brähmaṇ according to Advaita, is as unreal as Māya. It leads to the Śūnya anirvacanīya if not of Madhyamika metaphysics. If this relation, that is, Sat-kārya-vāda should be loyally adhered to, and if a static Eleatic Being should be denied, then, the effect is as real or as unreal as the cause; and if He be really the cause by which we mean the ultimate reference of all things and real by himself, then the reality of the World is equally established: The totality of cause (Brähmaṇ with un-manifest Nature) is identical with the totality of effect (Brähmaṇ with manifest Nature).

Yet regarding the perfection of Brähmaṇ, the cause, though equally as real as the effect, is yet superior to that of the effect or Nature on its power of transcendence. All
confusion arises from the confusion between the different conceptions of reality and perfection as Prof. S. Alexander writes in his ‘Basis of Realism.’ Physical things are as real as mind but not as perfect. When we speak of degrees of Reality we must be careful to ask whether we do not mean degrees of perfection. And in differentiating between the reality and perfection of a thing we really apprehend that the cause has more perfection than the effect. In order to make clear that such indeed is the view of Rāmānuja, it is well to show an instance. He says that dreams are not unreal. “The conscious states experienced in dreams are not unreal; it is only, their objects that are false; these objects only, not conscious states, are sublated by the waking consciousness.”¹ He further says that not only dreams but even perceptual illusions, mirage, and hallucinations are as cognitions true. “The cognition of silver in the shell is a true one.”² The difference between their perfection and those of the conscious states lies in their non-utility and their non-coherence with normal life and experience. The sublation of those experiences consists in their actual utility or non-value, and not in their experiential character.³ 

1. Śrī Bhāṣya l.i.1. (pp. 75 and 119-124 : trans.)
2. Ibid (pp. 120).
3. The thing we determine to be unreal because it is sublated; the idea is non-sublated, and therefore real (76 p), cf. Outlines of Phil. Russell p. 66.
perfect, since its meaning is only had through a mind, and
its value which makes it a truth dependent upon logical
cognition and valuing—not that its existence is dependent
upon mind and least of all minds, is its existence slain or
even transformed in character by mind that is knowing it, or
owning it? No. In the former case of knowing, it attains
meaning or value, in the latter case of owning, it lives under
light of higher function or perfection but never loses the
character of the ‘that’ that it is. In a word, “the reality of the
consciousness though more perfect, does not interfere with
the reality of material constituents on which it is built.” Our
knowing act does not make the object, and does not distort
the initial presentation, the ‘that’ to make it the ‘what’; on
the other hand, knowing only lets the cognising subject be
‘aware of’ and ‘enjoy’ the ‘that’ as it is, nothing added to it
unless it be said that to elicit meaning or to express the
expressive ‘that’ in terms of ‘what’ it is to the conscient
mind, were an adding, which is absurd. We apprehend
reality not mere phenomena, the physical mechanism being
intended as it were for the apprehension of and enjoyment
of nature and of God in nature.¹ To deny reality, to nature or
fact of experience or sensum is, in other words, as already
hinted at, to deny God or spirit its most characteristic phase
of enjoyment, namely, the world. Spirit is the immanent
drive in all creation, physical and spiritual. Without a

¹. “The entire world (is) and object of fruition for the individual
souls in agreement with their respective good and ill deserts (Śrī-
Bhāṣya I-I-1 pp. 124).
purposive direction, the universe would be imperfect, let alone its non-value and uncomprehendable nature. Spirit is the superior distinct, transcendent to the process in which it is immanent because of the greater perfection over nature which it alone possesses and utilises. Spirit is permanent, and permanent because we apprehend that in all the varying and perhaps transient beauty of its dependent i.e., nature, it inflicts its purpose and final perfecting impulse, which is not that of a want or of an achievement, but that of an enjoyment of its perfection on its own right through the individual souls or finite minds as their antaryāmin or inner self. Spirit is prior to nature, because it is the last expression of nature or rather its destiny, and first because last, original because expressed in nature which per se as object has no value, but seeking valuation as the Karmabhūmi, the field of activity, throughout the long run of progressive evolution for the sake of spirit. In this organic relation between nature and spirit, nature is not belittled nor spirit imperfected; it is an affirmation of the superiority of Spirit. It is only an assertion of an essential unity in creation which implies non-contradiction between complementary elements; a war between matter and spirit is certainly not

"What is the cause of experiences pleasurable and painful, is not the mere dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the influence of Good and evil deeds, and such subjection is impossible in the case of the highest self to which all evil is foreign. (I-ii-8 pp. 265) It is this character that claims the Brahman as the transcendent-immanent, and superior distinct."
the way to escape from the beauty or purposive direction of nature to give it the name of an ‘effect,’ in the language of Nyāya-Valīśēśika, or a Kārṣya, a work or process of manifesting Beauty and Goodness, from which character alone we, at any rate, infer God.

Rāmānuja seeks from his realistic point, to justify the relation between Absolute spirit and Nature and the individual souls who are its dependents, as one of cause and effect. The relation between cause and effect is organic and intrinsic. The organic relation between mind and body, or spirit and body closely applies and obtains in the relation between cause and effect. There is no spirit without body, for then, that is ineffectual; nor a body without spirit, for then, the body is inconceivable. To make his meaning clear, Rāmānuja clearly enunciates that a body is whatever a spirit absolutely controls, sustains and enjoys for its own benefit. “Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its purposes and which stands in an entirely subordinate relation, is the body of the soul” अत्तोयस्य चैत्यस्य यद्यथ स्वाल्पन स्वार्थं नियत्तुम धारणितुम च शक्यं, तत्त्वायत्तरेकवर्त्तम च, तत्त्वं शरीरश्चक्षणस्त्रययम् (II-I-9). This triple functioning on the part of the body and the triple complementary exercise on the part of the spirit is the crux of the relation. In this sense, property would be, as it were, an extension of the body and could be not illegitimately called the body of the owner. The body is, as much as property, the extension of personality. In the light of this above definition, Rāmānuja draws his original conclusion that the cause is the soul of the effect, and the effect is the body of the cause. But be it noted, only in this particular
peculiar sense that to be the ‘cause’ is to be capable of conditioning another existence which then will be regarded as its ‘effect.’ Thus wherever there is an operative centre for a force to manifest or wherever a will manifests, that may be considered to be its body then. The manifestation of power and evolution takes place in nature, and through minds functioning in nature, under the ægis of Spirit. “The world and minds are the body of the Spirit.”

This position is substantiated in the following upanishadic passages.

“He of whom the earth is the body, of whom water is the body, of whom the fire is the body, of whom the mind is the body, of whom ether is the body, of whom, death (mrityu) is the body, he is the inner self of all, the divine one, the one God Nārāyaṇa “(Subāla Up)” He who dwelling within the self whom the self does not know, of whom the self is the body, who rules the self from within, He is thy ruler within, the Immortal“(Brih. Up. 3-7-3-22).

Rāmānuja says, that the relation between Brāhmaṇ and the Universe is an eternal relation, and any one term cannot be stressed without stressing the other term too legitimately. Brāhmaṇ is the cause, and is the conditioner

1. अस्तस्वर्गा चिदचिद्दृष्टया तत्प्रकाशम् ब्रह्मः.
of the effect, namely the Universe (jagat), for its being what it is. Without his volition (ichha) nothing can take place (I.1.3). The undistinguishable darkness (Tamas)\(^1\) of Pralaya, the whole or the One Ekam. Is the condition of the reality. It is the condition when these manifestations are drawn in even as the tortoise legs are drawn in, and is so subtle to be never a fact of experience, where the sentient souls are suppressed from valuing according to their relative largeness of intelligent activity or consciousness. This inferred state or avastha of Brähmaṇ is undistinguished and undistinguishable by us. It is the absolute sleep of nature, and is a consequence of the involutive impulse of its Lord. The will to manifest on the part of Brähmaṇ, is the condition that lets this evolution start its usual run. “That which is Being, i.e., this world which now owing to distinctions of names and forms bears a manifold shape was in the beginning one only owing to absence of distinctions of names and forms” सदेवसोम्य इदमुपर्वसिद्धैत एकत्ववादित्यम or even there were no other beings functioning, Nārāyaṇa was the only existent. एकः परमेश्वरः ब्रह्मां न व्रत्स्य न नक्त्रत्राणि नापो नायिन्सधे नसूर्य; स एकाः कोकतत्त्व ध्यानास्तथ्य, (Mahā Nārāyaṇa Up. 1.1.) The differentiation which takes place in beings animate and inanimate, is an effectuation willed at a

\(^1\) तमसि च स्वश्रीरस्त्यापि पृथ्विधिशक्ताहि सुहम्ममशापत्या व्यास्मत्रेकनाथयत्र सति
तथागृहृतशाश्वारेव ब्रह्म पुर्ववादित्तक नामरुपनिमिश्चक्ष्याविशारिव स्थायति
शाक्तायक्रमेण जगच्छरस्त्या आस्मान परिशास्तिति सर्वपूर्वोपालेषु परिशास्तिः

Bhāṣya, I-IV-27.
“determinate” beginning by the spirit or Brähman, who is the complete owner or ruler of the Universe or Jagat, and guiding nature which is in its furled or coiled state of potential such that distinction could not be forecast on its unevolved surface. For Rāmānuja the effect is the cause made manifest, distinct with the evolution of real differences and emergences and plurality, that is, distinct with names and forms. For such an evolution, the effect is dependent on its cause; it is sustained by the cause since the effectuation is not like a particular painting; it is a gradual unfoldment, a process in time; since, the primal state—an inferred potential—contains not only the possibility of the present “this,” or “now” and the “then” and the “had-beens,” but also the “hereafter,” the final goal, that is itself as completed in actuality. Whilst treating the “now” and the “then” as imperfections you cannot by any means treat them as unreal. They are imperfect surely, but unreal they certainly are not.

According to the definition already given, the body (Sarīra) of the cause would certainly be the effect; of the dependence, of the sustenance, and of the enjoyment, of the Cause or Spirit in it. The activity of real enjoyment is an action of real manifestation of self or self-expression. Rāmānuja maintains that the activity of manifestation is an activity of divine impulsion born out of his own glory and not merely one of such character that makes others say that such a God is silly. God, if not a cynical player of an unworthy game., Further such a manifestative impulse is to make the individual selves realize the glory of the world and of Himself, the perfect, in and through them. For him, as for
the several selves, to be is to manifest; in the one, it is a manifestation of divine glory and eternal values through the selves whom he helps towards a greater approximation to perfect functioning and appreciation of reality; for the other the whole functioning of the universe, its unfoldment of nature is for the gradual evolution of their spiritual character; in a word, this universe or Nature (Prakṛti) is the Sphere they shall more and more subjugate and utilizing spiritualise, and use the power behind themselves and behind nature. It is at once the barrier and the help towards their perfection. It is a “vale of soul-making.” It is because of the Divine mercy of God that the world of souls becomes emergent so as to attain perfection and nearness to the Divine.

According to Vedanta of Rāmānuja, the cause of universe is ultimately Spirit and matter, for as the statement goes “Brāhmaṇ only, and with it Prakṛti as rule by Brāhmaṇ, is the cause of the world” and not any one of them without the other. In the beginning then, the two primary entities of matter and spirit were manifesting themselves, the spirit controlling the matter. (Śrī Bhāṣya 1-iv-22) पररेव ब्रह्म जगत्कारणम् प्रकृति रिति. Samkhya is right in postulating Prakṛti to be the ultimate material cause of the universe, the impulsion or the efficient cause however, being the Spirit, which latter is not accepted by Samkhya as it does not accept the organic unity of matter with Spirit or Brāhmaṇ, in which case the ultimate causality would devolve upon the owner of Prakṛti or Brāhmaṇ, and not on Prakṛti merely. The spiritual origination of the world could be satisfied, not by any amount of Bergsonian biological imagining or Fichtlan Dialectical Anstoss, but only by the acceptance of
matter to be nothing other than what it appears to be namely, the material of which the world is made. The spiritual origination if it means anything at all, is only in this conception, or rather, the misapplication of the causal category with regard to the relation of those factors revealing mere dependence and in no way derivation of the one from the other. The spiritual prius if it means anything significantly is because of the initial directions and purposes revealed in the process. The physical beginning as the quotation from the Śrī Bhāṣya suggests is only the Spirit Matter and not any single entity among them. The Logical prius involves, however, two views: (1) the inference of physical potential at the prius, (2) the inference of end or goal, the full expression of spiritual purpose as in the potential physical prius. The spiritual expression as the prius would be the teleological potential which the Brāhmaṇ without his modes is, the physical expression of the prius, however, would be the material (upādha) potential which the Brāhmaṇ with his modes or Prakṛti is. The teleological cause also is Brāhmaṇ or spirit alone and is therefore the efficient cause also. Brāhmaṇ-as-with- Prakṛti, forms the material cause. And in a more definite way should it be held that of the substantial modification of the three entities that pass into another condition, the most modifiable entity in very nature (Svarūpa though not in Svabhāva as triguni ) is Matter or Prakṛti.¹ The appropriate materialism of Samkhya.

¹ Bhatta’s Hymn the ILord. II. 31 cf. Pillai lokacharya Tatvta Traya III. 30. God is the material cause for what is possible to an
lies in this fact, that the real modification of natures occurs in material constituents and not in the spiritual substances viz. the subjects whose change in nature is not substantial but only in the range of consciousness, which further is not the characteristic of the highest because of the superiority and intelligent nature of the Brähman and o the fact of the eternity of his perfect nature. Effect, the Bhāṣya defines, “as its substance passing into another state.” कार्यतः हि नैगीक्षेद्यव्यवस्थास्थानात्तरायति. From this point of view even the subjects do undergo a change of state or avastha. The soul which becomes activistic or kshētragna and contracted or expanded in the relative range of consciousness” is also from this point of view an effect,” ‘with this difference’ from the Prakṛti which undergoes a substantial modification in nature so as to be unrecognised from its ultimate or original natures, “that the other condition which is represented by the soul is of different kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things such as ether and so on. The origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects and the latter or eternal”.

The ruling element of the world, that is, the Lord finally, who has the sentient and non-sentient beings for his modes, undergoes a change in so far as he is at alternate periods the embodied in all those beings in their alternating

magnificent spider, which while keeping its immovable, becomes, through its body the material cause of cobwebs by evolving etc, cannot but be is possible to the lord.
states. The two modes and he to whom those two modes belong thus undergo a common change in so far as in the case of all of them the causal condition passes over into the different condition.”

उबयप्रकारविशिष्ट नस्यन्त्रेशे तदवस्यतदुभय विशास्तारपवकारो
बवसि; कारणावस्याया अवस्यान्तरपवक्तिरूपौ विकारः प्रकारह्ये प्रकारणो च
समानः;

(ll-iii-18.)

The subtle chid-achd-Visiṣṭa Brāhmaṇ passes over into the gross chid-achd-Visiṣṭa Brāhmaṇ. Though operating with changing contents which reveal his own effectuating purposes, namely, perfect love, perfect beauty and perfect goodness, He is not in any way hampered by exemplification in process or evolution of these eternal values which form His essential Svabhāva and He remains ever the constant unchanging principle “just on account of His being their inner ruler and self,”

परमात्म तु त्योस्वच्चशारीरभूतयोनिज्ञन्तरयात्रमभूतस्तददपुरुषाशैर्वकारेष्ट (ll-
iv-27.)

“The creation of the world by God is not an arbitrary fiat of God though it must not be understood to mean anything than a free act of God. It is not anything that he might act or refrain from acting at his pleasure, “for, as Śrī Vedanta Charya also says, the evolution of this world is a very fundamental act of God without which he cannot be true to his nature as the Lord or Iswara. His redemptive impulse, his superiority of Nature, his perfection and power, in a word, all that makes for power and ideal and perfect, demand this expressive functioning on his part.
In the words of Ulrici, we can say that “In truth God is not first god and then creator of the world, but as God he is creator of the world, and only as the creator of the world is he God. To separate the two ideas from one another is an empty abstraction, affirming at once an unmeaning difference which contradicts the unity of the divine nature. Hence just as God does not become creator of the world but is from eternity creator of the world, so the world too though not eternal of itself exists from eternity as the creation (or act) of God.” This passage expresses the same view as that of Rāmānuja and refutes such metaphysic as it placed on mere absolute difference of the Dvaita and such unreal metaphysic as the Sankarite abstractionism and cloudy monism of the western idealists. Rāmānuja affirms the eternality of the Prakṛti and individual selves which constitute the universe or Jagat in their subtle or gross form, as eternally bound in an organic union (without which relation of absolute dependence they would be mere abstractions), to Brāhmaṇ. This proves the eternality of cause and effect, also in this way, that all the expected consummations or “compossibles” would be potential in the initial condition of the undistinguished.

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1. Isha Up. Comm. Śri Vādanta Desika.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION
OR
COSMOLOGY

The historical perspective and method for unravelling of
the origin, or rather, the enigma of a determinate beginning
of the world is certainly actuated by a true scientific impulse.
If the beginning (becoming) of the world has really been
infinite, no amount of history will bring us nearer to its origin;
"it is vain to sound the bottomless abyss of the past with
the puny plummet of science". But if we do grant that
things had an origin (in time), and their history a beginning,
then we escape from the implications of the false historical
method, which states that 'becoming' or change only
exists, in which case, search for understanding evolution is
vain and futile. If there had been no beginning, there
certainly could be no end, and no end to where we arrive at
the end—no perfection, and hence no meaning in evolving.
The vindication of a determinate beginning and a real origin
as the presupposition of any historical account, commits us
to the doctrine of a beginning of the world, atleast, of the
present order of things, and gives us a hope of attainment
of a perfected order at the End. All real efforts at a
metaphysics yield the conception of a unitary principle or
substance, from which all creation proceeds towards an
attainment of a perfected End. The effort at such a
conception is nothing more than an effort, and if the historiological impulse were anything, then we can prima facie accept and not criticize, except for the purpose of demonstrating the strict logical sequence of evolution, from the assumptions basic and integral to that system, and in our case of the Vedanta of Rāmānuja.

It has been explained in the previous chapter, that there is non-difference between the totality of cause and totality of effect and what takes place is only a revelation of behaviour of the cause in time and space because the sūkṣma cidacid-viśiṣṭha Brāhmaṇ passes over (parināmayaati) into sthūla-cidacid viśiṣṭha Brāhmaṇ, the undifferenced becomes differentiated into names and forms (nāma-rūpa).

The cause of the world, has been said to be Brāhmaṇ,\(^1\) in so far as he is the Lord (Īśa), sustainer and controller (niyantar) of the Prakṛti (matter) and the jivas, to whom he stands in the relation of soul (śarīrin), and to whom they stand in the relation of body (Sarīra). In this sense of eternal relation, and ownership and this ownership being never disjunctable (aprathasiddha) Brāhmaṇ, the supreme Spirit, is the absolute cause of the Universe (jagat), and not in any other sense. (Liv.1). Cause and effect area as eternally related as soul and body, and it is a unity in

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\(^1\) kṛi Bhaṣya i. i. 2**Janmadyasya yata**
difference. Identity is a misleading expression though not wrong. If we prefer to use that word at all, we must be careful not use it in the meaning of Advaita; further, our way of putting it has a synthetic note about it, which surely, the causal relation is. It is a cause-effect continuum.

The original state or condition of Brāhmaṇ, or cause is stated to be at some places, as Sat, or mere Brāhmaṇ with none else, or it is stated to be Asat. "The highest Self, which in its nature of unlimited knowledge and bliss, has for its body all sentient and non-sentient beings— instruments of sport for him as it were—in so subtle a form, that they may be called non-existing; and as they are his body, he may be said to consist of them (tanmaya)." (Liv.27).1 "Because the whole body of other things is spoken of as Asat or nonexistent on account of particular attributes not being manifest, of being absolutely dependent"2 The truth of the statement that there was Asat only means, that the universe was in a such a condition of absorption that they, as it were, were not. It certainly was not a Śūnya.3 Then

1 Śrī Bhāṣya I. lvi 27.
2 Madhva Bhāṣya II. i. 18.
3 "Nor was there Asat; there was gloom." Rg. Veda X.129.

Others say, Non-being this was in the beginning. (Ch.Up.VI.2.1) This passage has to be taken as a refutation of the tenet of primitive absolute non-existence., a refutation undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from that which is. Sankara Bhashya (I.iv.15)
his involutive power being manifest (saṁhāra ichha), He alone was.

Thus God through his willing the creation as also involution, and of the complete control he has eternally upon them, becomes by these two facts, the upādana and nimitta kārana of the universe. The Samkhyan evolutionary hypothesis is accepted by Vedanta and wherever it differs from it, it is only when it is absolutely necessary for its metaphysical theory.

Samkhyan evolutionary theory postulates matter or Pradhāna as the mūlam (origin or source) or the first cause, out of which all nature (viśvarūpa) evolves due to its own immanent desire to please the Puruṣa, to whom it is near. Its three guṇas are the eternal constituents of every one of matter’s categories viz., Mahat (also known in Saṅkhya as the Buddhi the instrument of ratiocination in the monadic evolution) Ahaṅkāra (which with the manas and the jñāṇendriyas from the Antahkaraṇa), tanmātrās and also the gross elements. So much so, samkya is also known as guṇa-parināma-vāda. Except Prakṛti which contains these three guṇas in equilibrium, in a very subtle condition, the rest of the categories are in an un-equilibrated condition due to preponderance or lessening of the guṇas over each other, hence they are known as Vikaras or modifications. Prakṛti first passes over into mahat on its contact with Puruṣa, consciousness of willing (ichha-śakti) being manifest at that stage in matter. It is the initial drive in the original matter to distinguish itself, standing thus as the cause of ahaṅkāra, the particular principle of individuation.
or centrism, a tendency visible in all matter. At this stage, perhaps as B.G.Tilak says, it can be compared to be the beginning of the Naiyyayic atom or Aṇu¹. This ahaṅkāra represents a definite cleavage-product standing as the vast triple-divisioned chaos of atomic bed. Here we have three kinds of ahaṅkāra viz., Sattva, (Called the Vaikārika), Rajas (called Taijas), Tamas (or the Bhūtādi) respectively forming the three kinds of self-assert tendency. And with the rajasic and sattva ahaṅkāras there is splitting of the general evolution into two branches viz., the subjective and the objective, which latter, is mainly the tamasic product and perhaps a little of rajas. Deviating from the main line, ahaṅkāra (sattva and rajas) develops manas and the ten indriyas of sense and action. Splitting from the main tree, the Bhūtādi of the tamasic cord develops the five subtle tanmātrās, which in-turn evolve the five gross elements of ether (ākāśa), air (vāyu) fire (agni) water (apas), eārth (annam or Pṛthvi). The last five gross elements standing in no causal relation to any others they are called viṣayās or vikṛitis. By the intermixture and combination of these five elements according to the blind teleology immanent in Prakṛti, the world of nature, a beautiful enjoyable but changing creation, evolves. This, in short, is the Saṅkhya theory of evolution. Mūla Prakṛti is not an effect of anything. Buddhi, ahaṅkāra and the five tanmātrās are both effects and causes of other things, the eleven indriyas

¹ Gīta Rahasya: B.G. Tilak (Telugu. Trans. 235 Chap. VIII)
including the manas, and the five gross elements are effects, Puruṣas are neither causes nor effects of anything, they are mere chinmātrasvarūpa sākṣins (mere witnessing intelligences or consciousness).  

The Vēdāntik view of Rāmānuja, however is, that Prakṛti being subject of the will of Brāhmaṇ and standing in a dependent relation to him as body (Sarīra), is an effect of his, in which case, the primary denotation of the word Mūlam, would go to Him and not to Prakṛti, the dependent existence. The term Avyakta, thus, would apply to the causal condition of Brāhmaṇ, who controls, sustains and enjoys the creation (I. iv.2.) Further of this dependence of matter on Brāhmaṇ, which Samkhya does, not admit, Rāmānuja refutes it only in so far as it does not admit the ‘paravasyata’ on Brāhmaṇ is concerned, and by no means intends to deny Un-evolved matter and its manifestations or modifications in themselves. Pradhānam, if it has got any ends to subserve which Samkhyaans assert that it does, then it is only in this dependent relation as fulfilling his ends, as his body, that “Pradhāna and so on are capable of accomplishing their several ends” (I. iv. 3) Otherwise, the different essential natures of them all could never exist nor

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1 सूलप्रकृति रविकृति महदाब प्रकृतिरिवृक्तिभिन्नस्वतः  
 शोदश विकारो मन्वस्ति उपूर्व !!3!! (Sāmkhya Kārika Verse 3.)

2 B.G VIII 3:21, Śrī Bhāṣya l.iv.23.

3 Śrī Bhāṣya l. iv. 3.

4 Śrī Bhāṣya ll. i. 9
act, much less their activities (II. ii. 1-5). Further, the activity of prakṛiti would have to be construed as something like the blind schopenhaurian will, or the Von Hartmannian Unconscious, which can never explain the intelligent evolution of the world. And only a pessimist will deny the intelligent unfolding of the world-process to whom the intelligence is only a very novel and out of the way product and not the reverse, and intelligence would be as Haeckel conceived and as the behaviourist conceives it today, only as due to neurological and cortical reaction to environment.

Though one has to suffer for anthropomorphic beliefs one is bound to hold, and which as Prof. Schiller says, everyone is confined to, the only alternative being to prefer a good one to a bad one truth is “in the beginning” was spirit; neither temperament or whim, not feeling or arbitrary will, lies at the root of (Creation) world-process, but Divine Intelligence, the Logs is the prime ground of all things. Reason as the rule and not reason or chance as the exception in this world we can understand, but the reverse we cannot comprehend. Regularity is found in nature as there is spirit, world-reason in it. The process of nature takes place according to strict mathematical principles—more geometric as Spinoza would say1“.

1 Philosophical tendencies of the Present day. L.Stein Vol, iii pp. 429-430.
Thus it is for Vedanta, Brāhmaṇ is the first cause, the ultimate category from which everything evolves. The evolution of the world in the order of unfoldment is spoken of\(^1\) in various ways in the Upaniṣads, “From paramātman ether; from ether air, from air fire; from fire water; and from water earth were generated”. This sequence of elementary distinctions of the Bhūtādi is due to the subtle Prakriti manifesting more and more grossly (though not wholly as it is infinite)\(^2\), in its descendent wave, and finally attaining the grossest form of earth, water being subtler than earth, fire more than water, air more than fire and ether of Space more than air, and Prakṛti is subtler than all these Paramātman and ātman are subtler than Prakṛti, being spiritual. It is that the manifestations in sequent order are due to more and more qualitative differentiation of the sensum according to the capacity of the Sūkṣma indriyas to evolve gross physical organs, to stimulate the functioning of those organs of sensation\(^3\).

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1. आत्मना आकाशसंभुतः: आकाशादयः, बायोरिधिः अप्रेतायः।
   आः: पूर्विविः पूर्विव्य ओषधिभयोज्जतम्। Tatt. Up. 2.1

2. Saṅkhya says that even whilst the Prakriti evolves it does not completely pass over into another condition. A fragment of it alone manifested as the sensorium. Bhagavad Gīta agrees with this.

3. Speaking on the subject of the number of organs, the Sutras mention them to be eleven only. Now we are aware of only five organs of sensation and we do have organs of activity. What is maintained is that even though we may evolve more powers, senso eminental, what really takes place is that they may be more perfect
Brāhmaṇ is the cause of Prakṛti's movements as it is inert per se. First he wills the evolution of Mahat or, the cosmic greatness (it is held that this should not be treated as the Buddhi the material category as consciousness is not a material entity but the characteristic attribute or mode of the Intelligent Self). Then the second aspect is that of cosmic will to be distinct and the evolution of the five primal cosmic elements of ether of Space, air, fire, water, and earth. Some people say there were only three elements: fire, water, and earth, leaving ether of space out because it is not a substance but that in which things move. This grand cosmic adjustment is prior to formation of any individual bodies or things or even worlds. This is called the general creation (advaraka srishti).

After this general creation has taken place, Brāhmaṇ keeps the seed which contains the cosmic soul (which is the aggregate of individual souls who are yet under bondage or influence of karma which has not been consummated by them in the prior creation) into the cosmic waters. And out of it is born the Golden egg, and from it

but a divine vision must yet be a sensation of light, a divine hearing an auditory sensation.
the Cosmic Deity who is also known as Hiranyagharbhā, is born. And from Brahma issues the whole sadvāraka srishti the special creation. As the Rg. vēda says हिरण्यगर्भस्मसनात्रे भुतस्यज्ञात् पति रेक आसीत्. The Taittariya text says “first arose water,” which could only mean that of the gross pure creation that was the first, the rest being more subtle manifestations. “Even before water there was Puruṣa,” is another text. (Katha. Up. 2-6)1 From this Puruṣa, first tejas, water, earth, and through their intermixtures all other things came about (Ch. Up. 6. 2. 6). Again it is said that from Puruṣa the five elements rose in order (Taittariya. Up. 2-1) The last statement of the Taittariya Upanishad is accepted by Vedanta Sūtrās (ll.iii. 1-15). Thus Maṇu says “: In this water was placed a seed (bijā) and from that arose Brahma, and from him and world arose.” And further it is even said “that on subjective side the Pranās, Manas, the indiriyās, and the composite elements were born.

तस्मादेतद् ब्रज्ञानन्यमयायात्, एतस्माजाजायात् प्राणो मनस्स्वर्न्दियाणिचिं खं वायुमान्तिरापः प्रक्षेपं विश्व धारणे।

There are several statements in the Upaniṣads which speak of water or air as “thinking”, “seeing”, or “brooding” and out of it issue the next category or categories. It is quite true to reason to suppose that He who is in water, whose body is the water or in air and possessor of it, willed the evolution of the next category and produced them. The

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1. Adbhyaḥ pūrvamajāyata
indirect and somewhat anthropomorphic if not animistic attribution of thought to the elements is not wrong at all, once we grant that there is spirit working through nature and souls, realizing itself through these its own ends of delight.

Summarising the whole group of statements and placing them in the best possible perspective we have:

Firstly, a theory that never denies the Saṅkhyan evolution of the categories, indeed there is an acceptance of the evolution of the categories according to the principle "Guṇāguneshu varante," in which case, we have the twenty-five categories. And as the Vēdāntists accept Brāhmaṇ as the cause going one step further than Saṅkhya, there are bound to be twenty-six tattvas, but the categories are considered to be effects, as such Brāhmaṇ is not counted as an effect, in which case, it reduces the number of categories by one. The number of tattvas thus remains the same in both. This theory is explicitly maintained in the Yatindramāta Dīpika (4th chapter). And it is also hinted at many places in the Bhāṣya.¹

Secondly, there is the other theory which holds that out of Brāhmaṇ, the elements in order, were manifest. And that Brāhmaṇ placed a seed, and entered along with the individual soul (some add with Śrī or Lakṣmi, the eternal

¹. Śrī Bhāṣya;
partner of God) in the primal waters which developed in to the golden egg and out of it arose Hiranyagharbha, and after him and under his cosmic supervision, the whole creation of names and forms, beings and things developed. The panchekarana or trivritkarana takes place only after Brahma is born. Panchakarna is described as follows: the five primal elements being mixed in particular proportions as to make all distinction of natures in the world. The five original elements were taken and one half of each was regarded to have been kept in tact; the other half was regarded as being divided into four equal parts, four such parts form half, which in combination with the other half produced the transformed evolute of the original element; therefore every element is in every other, the distinction lies only in the preponderating character of one element which gives it the specific name it possesses. For example, water contains all the five elements within itself but that the preponderance of water tattva makes it known as water; so also every other phenomenal entity. In this creation (vyashti srishti or special creation) there are no absolutely pure tattvas, but all are mixtures of the five elements and the preponderance of one entity in a substance determines as against every other, its characteristic name and form. The Vedanta Sutras however, do not find any reason to go beyond the Chandogya Text of trivritkarana or the intermixture of the three elements which arose first.  "Each

1. II.iv. 17-19, ŚrīBashya
element is indeed of a three-fold nature, owing to primary tripartition; but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails—so that each element has a distinctive character of its own—a definite designation is given to each”

“In the scriptural account of creation preceded by intention on the part of the creator, it is said that each of these elements was made tripartite constitution of all things is apprehended by perception as well. The red colour in burning fire comes from (primary elementary) fire, the white colour from water, the black colour from earth—in this way Scripture explains the three-fold constitution or nature of burning fire. In the same way all things are composed of elements of all kinds”. “The elements possessing various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination produce living beings, not having in anyway mingled. Having combined, therefore with one another and entered into mutual associations—beginning with the principle called mahat and extended to the grossest elements—they formed an egg” etc., Having entered it into these three beings viz., fire, water, earth, with my self which is qualified by the collective soul let me differentiate names and forms,¹ i.e., let me produce gods, and all other kinds of individual beings and give them names and to that end.

¹: “Having created that (Hiranyaksharbham, Golden Egg) he entered into it; having entered it he became “Sat” and “tyat”. (souls and things) Taitt, up. II. 6.,”
since fire, water and earth have now mutually combined let me make each of them tripartite and fit them for creation”. The former says Rāmānuja, is the meaning, of the text “that divinity thought, let me having entered these three beings with this living soul-self, differentiate names and forms—let me make each one of them tripartite.”

Thus the primary tripartition took place before Brāhma was born, as he is also born from the egg, Brāhmaṇ himself being the cause of the original tripartition. Further upto the creation of the Brahmānda (mundane Egg) the creation was immediate and after that, mediate.

To render these two theories of creation, synthetic complimentaries of each other, we have to show that they are not contradictory but complimentary and implicative of each other. We have seen that even in one of the passages extracted from the Śrī Bhāṣya that the mahat and the other tattvas are recognized. Our only aim would be to show that the primary evolution consists of cosmic extension or growing vast (typified by the Mahat) and a cosmic attempt to differentiate on the side of Bhūtādi (since the sūkṣma organs can only develop under the stress of the environment and reveal themselves in the bodies of souls,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\] Śrīrinivasa thinks that Trivritkarana implies Panchakarana prakriya, and adds that others posit a septiplicatory process by combining Mahat, and Ahaṅkāra, Yat, Dīpika pp. 77.
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\] (Yat, Dīpika pp. 85)
the which they cannot do, because the souls are not yet brought into contact with nature at all for them to assume bodies according to their karma) forming the primary elements which form the place where Brāhmaṇ places the seed to develop into the Brahma and wills the panchekarana or trivrtkarana. After Brāhmaṇ enters the cosmic waters with (and not as the advaitins hold) and seed containing the individual souls, the individual contact between the souls and Prakṛti, is established, the Brahmānda with its world within its bosom, gets established in sequence. In this special creation, each soul attracts to itself such forms as God wills, which of course, is dependent upon his karma and according to the function he is to do in this world of creation as an instrument of God. The individual Buddhi and antahkarana and Manas with the prāṇa are latter and belong only to the sadvāraka srishti. In either case, what is true of the general creation, the macrocosm, is still true of the microcosm; the major tripartition yields to a minor tripartition or even a septiplicatory partition as the Yatindramata Dīpika suggests, and yet count as we may, there remain only these twenty-five categories.

The Bhagavad Gīta accepts the view that Apara Brāhmaṇ to be the lower and the individual souls as the higher. It clearly accepts the Samkhyan categories in the verses;

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The diagram affixed would fairly show the evolutionary process according to Śrī Rāmānuja.

Time (kāla) is not a myth, but a real entity, being as eternal as nature itself; not that time is nature, nor nature time, but that they are coeval. The processus of volution are both timed, and the involutive or evolutive Will (the samhāra and Srṣṭi) manifests itself or takes place accordingly.

In the world of process everything takes place according to time and cannot occur as whim would have it. Time is the master. It is maintained by Rāmānuja that released souls are masters of time and everything happens as they will, according to their will to enjoyment, (Bhōga). Though the respect for cosmic will in them would be dominant enough to make them desist from exercise of will to defeat the ends of time.

At the end of the present kāla (period) of evolution, which runs for a particular finite period, the involutive impulse of Brāhmaṇ manifests itself, and the whole process gradually withdraws into the primal state passing though the very stages of descent, as it had ascended, finally resting in
that very subtle condition (Tamah)\(^1\) when it is indistinguishable from Brähman, when the souls which have not been released are in such a fragile contact with matter such that they could not function, the released souls enjoying the absorption of meditation signifying an essential unity of indistinguishableness of experience, in kaiṅkarya (service). Indeed in a passage, Time is said to be Brähman\(^2\), in the cosmic process coeval with nature willing nature's performance in time. The whole creation first takes place subtly in the kārana mahat before it takes place in the gross or the actual. The idea passes, in a sense, from will to fact, from potential to actual in nature.

The gradual evolution of tattvas from the subtlest Tamah, into the grosser and more defined forms in the advāraka srishti, yield to still more defined and individual forms in the sadvāraka srishti, the properties of each element partaking that of the other; thus, evolving the most complicated developments in the constrution of the individual organs. The gross organs are a sequence of the contact between the subtle organs and the gross exterior on which they are subsequently built. Thus it follows that when a soul is born into this world it has a potential store of all the organs (antahkarana, consisting of the intellect, manas and the ten organs,) which manifest grossly according to the ability of the soul (which is others known

\(^1\) ŚrīBhaṣya I. I-1 (.125). cf. B>G. viii. 18.
\(^2\) Bh. G. xi 32.
as karma or adṛṣṭa, of the soul) as man, god or animal or plant or even stone\(^1\) (III. I. 24)

And when the unreleased soul leaves its body, it carries with it the sūkṣma Sarīra or sheath, which clings to the soul as the determinant of the next birth and the tendencies which would manifest themselves then. This sūkṣma sarīra, also known as the linga Sarīra, is also material, being formed by the sūkṣma organ and the prāṇās (the rajasic cleavage which forms the driving force in the organisms), and has a deeper stamp of habits upon it which form the prenatal tendencies and the peculiar constitution or mental make-up, not to be explained as the hereditary accretions of the individual. It is indeed a psychological fact that there is not only an adaptation of the bodily organs towards stimuli, but there is equally an adaptation of the psychical or mental attitude toward the same stimuli, and the mind as well as the body, tend to repeat the same responses and attitudes in the event of the same or similar stimuli recurring, unless by a volitive impulse that habitual adaptation is broken. In that direction alone lies release from material complexes and mental attitudes and material environments. In this sense of physical events binding us from free activity by causing habits to be formed, we can say that action binds, and added to the law of cosmic Justice, makes the definition of karma as something which binds. And only when our actions are divine i.e., according to the will of God

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\(^1\) Yat, Mata Dīpika
and tuned to universal ends or offered as gifts or service to God, do they lose the sting of bondage; Karma then never binds, न कर्म तीप्ते नरे (Isha. Up. 2).

It is this Sūkṣma or linga Sarīra that hinders the self from its own natural and free volitive impulse and self-luminosity.

It may not be out of place to briefly sketch, the difference between Advaita and Visiṣṭādvaita with respect to this cosmological problem. For Sankara, as already remarked, these worlds are unreal effects of a real "cause" manifested due to the influence of Māya and ajñāna. It is certainly true to assert that individuals suffer from ignorance of their true status, but that God or Brāhmaṇ should lend himself to this imperfection of Māya or ignorance in order to manifest these unreal worlds, even for the sake of his own enjoyment, seems too unreal a theory, of the fact that the enjoyer of the play himself loses the consciousness of his status, despite the assertion made, that the category of Brāhmaṇ is uninvolved in the process and they the category of Īśvara is not affected by Māya which, in a sense, creates him."

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1. Bhāskhara in his refutation of the Māyāvāda says that the attempt to make the Īśvara at one time the involved or (samsarin) of the universe, the first-born of the Brahman, and at another time the overcome of the māya just like Brahman, the person who is infinitely better than the ordinary individual, is making Īśvara the contradiction
The Un-differenced Being overlaid by Māya, or by wearing the Māya-cloak, Vikshepa Shakti of Māya becomes the Īśvara, full of predications which not real, i.e., not applicable to it per se; for Brāhmaṇ is Nirguṇa. They are only the way our intellect visualizes or describes to itself the character of the illimitable Brāhmaṇ. Īśvara as the wearer of Māya (Māyavachinna) is master of Māya and does not become deluded by the same. There is only one Māya as such only one Īśvara. All qualities (guṇas) are interpreted to mean by Advaita, as the combination of the guṇic triplicity of Prakṛti. But as Rāmānuja says, there is difference between the guṇic triplicity and general term quality (guṇa), interpreted to mean Viśeṣanas.

When Brāhmaṇ is over-laid by another kind of Prakṛti viz. Avidya, He appears as the infinite Jīvas who suffer of himself. There is no more spurious and illogical explanation of the Absolute or Īśvara than this. According to him it appears that the Brahman is the Īśvara and with his two types of Achetana-shakti and Jiva-shakti creates the worlds, the former being really eternal, existing till pralaya, the latter a vanishing distinction, that will be absorbed at the end of his gradual evolution into the divine. Thus he argues for krama mukti. Cf. Phil. Bhāskhara. P.N. Srinivasacharya. Madras University Lectures 1927.

1. Sākṣi cētākevalō nirguṇasya
2. Panchadasi, 1.16.
Māyābimbo vaśikṛtyatasya sarvajña Īśvar
3. "ajamokam"
4. Panchadasi 1.16.
from Māya and avidya. Multiplicity, variety and every differentiation is due to this avidya (malina-sattva-pradhanam). And it is this avidya that makes individual ahamkāras. This avidya again is a not a single entity but many and of different kinds, and because of that alone are there so many individual souls, subject to Māya, having, however sufficient individuality to run through a series of lives.¹ Individuality(Aham) is thus characterised as material category and identified with the Samkhyan Ahamkāra and treated, here unlike, Sāmkhya, as a vanishing distinction, which the Purushas certainly are not.

The third branch of Ajñānam is the Tamah Pradhānām overlaying itself on the nirguna-chit-svarūpa Brahman, who it must be carefully borne in mind, is not involved in any of these transformations or generations, gives rise to the sukshma and sthula creation of things ( vrtti-avachchinna and vishayavichinna chaitanyam) conditioned by the vrittis or acts and states and vishayas or gross nature.

Accordingly there is no svarūpa-bhēda ( difference in nature or essential character) between Jivas and Brahman and indeed, just as the sun seen in different lakes or mirrors

¹ Perhaps at that stage, if we conceive avidya as a real upādhi (not unreal, as advaita conceives it to be) the distinguishing of Brahman into jives by such upādic limitation would compare with Bhāskaras’s theory, for to him the difference is real, and their relation is one of identity and difference; And further for him too the Brahman is Mere Chinmātrasvarupa(intelligence or consciousness).
appears as so many, Brahman deflected and reflected by antahkarana (ahamkāra and other instruments of cognition or understanding) and tamahpradhānam appears as so many jives or subjects and things or objects respectively. They are identical in essence.

Sri Vidyāraṇya describes this in a metaphorical way. Just as a picture during its production undergoes four stages, Brahman also undergoes four transformations. First in the case of a picture on a clear pure white cloth is spread on a particular ground (anna rasam), then it is dried. After that colour (maśī or a particular colour background) is painted over it. It is only after that, the picture is painted. Here the Suddha-sattva-Pradhānam, which is otherwise known as Māya, as the first fruit of Ajñanam or the higher phrase of “prakriti” is laid in contact with Brahman, the Sākshi (witnessing) chaitanyam (consciousness), also known as the Akhandā sūdha chaitanyam (the infinite unconditioned and indivisible consciousness). It gives rise to Iśvara, who thus becomes the antaryāmin (inner self) of all creation and its sustainer. And through contact with malina (having Rajasic and Tamasic) division of the self same prakriti (which can be compared to the maśī of the illustration) the jives are made manifest. And by connection with the malina pradhānam, the Virāt-rupa of Brahman, as Nature, is manifest. All the while, during these changes (vikāras) the Brahman is merely passive on whose surface (apparently) alone beat a million waves turbulenty.

Thus creation, according to Advaita, is due to this imposition of ajñāna (Prakṛti) and its evolutes Māya and
avidya, which as the first and second (sattvic and rajasic) gives rise to Īśvara and jives, whilst the last or the tamasic evolve gives rise to the organization of Nature, it being subsequence to the first influence (tirodhana) of Māya, under the will and control of Īśvara.

The above sketch is enough to show the difference between the two systems and how far they are removed from each other. The difference seems to be mainly in the conception of the advāraka srishti; the rest, namely, the sadvāraka srishti, taking place according to trivitkaraṇa or panchikaranā and Śāmkhyān tattvic evolution.

The evolutionary hypothesis of Rāmānuja, is based on the scriptures and the Pāncarātras, which describe that there are four vyūhās of God or four attitudes of God, one as the Lord of the jives in the aggregate i.e., Sankarshana; the lord of the Mahat as the Pradhyumna and the adhisthāna Puruṣa of the Manas, as Aniruddha. Vāsudeva or Nārāyaṇa being Brāhmaṇ is himself the Supreme. A criticism of the theories of vyūhās is out of the scope of the present subject and the Śrī Bhāṣya though it defends the Pāncarātras whilst criticizing the other orthodox schools, does not give any actual support to it in its pages.1

Summary: Śrī Rāmānuja, then, accepts the reality of process, and of intelligent process. The Intelligent Cause or

1 Sr Bhāṣya. II. ii. 42-43
spirit is always present in the process as the antaryāmi, in all beings, and every blade of grass contains him whilst none can exhaust him; as such he sustains creation by his immanent presence and transcendent governance. The derivation of real distinctions by a real imposition, as in Bhāskhara, or by an unreal imposition, as in Advaita theories, only try to escape the vital problem of Discontinuity or multiplicity, with the help of the specious simplicity achievable by denying any reality to it or declaring it to be a real though a passing or vanishing phase. In Reality we never come across, as Śrī Rāmānuja is not tired of saying, continuity, or shall we say, a bare ‘that’, an uncharacterised ‘somewhat’. Every presentation even the bare ‘thatness’ has got a distinct character making it recognizable as a ‘that’.¹ Even presentationally we cannot achieve the continuum of bare presentation. That discontinuity is as vital as continuity or Unity cannot be denied, whether we treat one of the terms as true or false. And in so far as we cannot but bring them under one or the other, why should we not recognise that the problem is a real one and that the terms cannot be unless they are real, and that is precisely the reason why our problem is not and cannot be solved unless we get rid of these subterfuges of thought? It is better and it is a logical desideratum that, as Bergson says,

¹ ŚrīBhāṣya I. i.1
"We must accept a strict dualism between matter and Mind"\textsuperscript{1}.

There is one way of escape, however, from the atomicity (aṇu character) of matter, only if we allow a dubious theory of infinite souls which occupy and hold to themselves different bodies and that the generations of these vortices of subtle electrons are formed by the initial impulsion of the vast ether of space to distinguish itself. These material differentiations then, must be due to the first will of God, and the different kinds of bodies, from stones onwards to the highest gods, due to the conjunction of the souls with those material atomic structures. There is a single reign of law in matter which the Veda calls Rta, which varuṇa exercises, which is the same for all, from the atom and electron to the steller spheres in the far distant skies. There is in the electron the same degree of un-predictableness which we find in the living beings. As to what conclusion we have to draw from such observations we don't know with the little knowledge which we at present possess. If it means the Leibnizian monadic organisation of a universe, then, perhaps, it may explain; but as to how space and time could at all be dismissed as mere "veridical hallucinations" or "confused perception" or "ideal categories of thought" we can say next to nothing. But if we accept that view then, we will have to explain them away in precisely the same way as he (Leibniz) did. But according to Śrī Rāmānuja, as

\textsuperscript{1} Matter and Memory: H.Bergson.
already stated space and time (kāla) are real.¹ For him there are three kinds of souls, the ever-free, the realised, and the bound of all degrees featuring in the stones, trees and the insects, animals, mammalia and vertebrates consummating in the man whose self-consciousness is a distinct feature of his and gods who also strive for freedom. The ever free souls(nityas) are engaged in the conduct of the evolution in their multitudinous ways in various strands. For the view that all evolution started from the amoeba is not exactly correct. As Bergson in his Creative Evolution says that though the initial beginning was from such a source as that, due to a variety of reasons or survival of the fittest, by mixture of the germ-plasm with other species, by the influence of the environment, by the emergence of new types, by the sudden creative activity or Spirit or intelligence due to no actual observed influence, we have posits three major cleavages of evolution, determined by reflex-activity of intelligence by the instinct activity of intelligence by the intellectual activity of intelligence. But Berson whilst envisaging a still higher type such that of intuitive activity, does not say that there had been such a development as he does not find it in himself. Somehow there is an unexpressed view that man so far is the highest in the emergence of intellect. This latter is mere prejudice. If the highest in each of the lower developments is almost indistinguishable from the lowest in the just above it, so also

¹ 'Time is real. If one wishes to save the concepts, progress development and freedom, one must accept time as real'. L. Busse
we who are aware of the intuitive must accept the evolution along different lines of the intuitive beings who are striving for the perfection of their natures. The perfect are those who fully conscious of the purposes of the Intelligence which is cosmic life and Being. This awakening to the Life of the spirit is that which defines a Free soul, and they are then greater than all the Devas of the world. For intuitive character of a being does not at the same time mean the ability of knowing the purpose of the highest. These perfect beings are of the nature of the highest, and take new bodies and forms which are necessary for the fulfilment of those purposes. They form as it were the spiritual hierarchy, fulfilling the legitimate function of the world. To whom work is worship, and service of Life is the Goal. To them as to the Highest, there is no bondage, in the sense we mean, but is an exaltation of glory and power, their expression is unique and perfect.
THE THEORY OF BEING
OR
ONTOMETRY

The concept of substance or Being is to what the first chapter led. This concept is very important in Philosophy and has been dismissed often as a concept only to be renovated in newer guise. Substance in the ordinary empirical usage would mean anything which has sufficient persistence in individuality or integral being. According to philosophy, however, substance, giving its logical definition first, "is that which can only enter into a proposition as subject never as a predicate or relation." A metaphysical definition is, "substance is that which is in itself, and is conceived by means of itself, that is the conception of which does not need to be formed from the conception of any other thing." Between these two definitions, the former of Leibniz as modified by Bertrand Russell, the later of Spinoza, there is very little difference. Substance is the ultimate entity which is identical neither with its predicates nor relations, which is at the same time not devoid of these predicates and relations, both of which are real. The relations are as real as predicates. The latter definition, the definition of Spinoza, is professedly metaphysical and the concept of Substance is accordingly that of an ultimate Being which is the ground of the attributes and modes. Thus the ultimate relation between the substance and its attributes is a relation of an intrinsic (immanent?) nature. So much so, the attributes or modes inevitably lead to the concept of substance and the substance leads to the
concept of its modes. For, to be is to manifest to itself through its modes and attributes. They are intellectually distinguishable, that is by the intimate abstractionism inherent in all scientific thought, but not disjunctable by any means from existence.

The attempt at arriving at a substance without its attributes, because of the arbitrary dictum thus attributes lessen perfection,” that to determine were to limit and to circumscribe, that to define were to use expressions which are essentially an exaggeration of what we know of that which cannot even be known, is a preordained logical failure. Spinoza, however with his rationalistic bias tried to subsume the attributes under the grand General idea of Being, but when he had no sooner reached his goal, he could not stay there, as he could never derive the attributes and modes from the mere being. Thus God was, in the one case, condemned to be a mere aggregate of subsumed particulars or modes, or facts, grouped into two causal series, or else, in the other case, it was a mere existence neither a unity of concrete character nor identity of anything. As Rāmānuja points out “if Brhatva constitutes the logical genus, Brāhmaṇ becomes a mere abstract generic character inhering in the Tīvara, sentient souls, and non-sentient matter, just as the generic character of horses (aśvatva) inheres in concrete individual horses and this contradicts all scriptural teaching (according to which Brāhmaṇ is the highest Concrete entity).” एवं तत्त्वनिर्देशस्तु भावनिर्देशस्तु वहापोथि विद्विन्दस्तु भावनिर्देशस्तु सामान्यामिति सकलप्रभुदितिविद्वहारिव्रोध.

But in Spinoza, as in Śaṅkara’s philosophy, “substance is reached by precisely that same process of dropping all
limitation in the way of determinate qualities which gives us the Abstract. The consequence is that the derivation of less ultimate from more ultimate is beyond” their reach: in which case, the less ultimate must be treated either as mere phenomena though bene fundatum or veridical hallucinations or that they are real but impossible as far as logic goes or could envisage of derivation from a more ultimate being—a profession at once of the impossibility of knowledge. In the one case, Śaṅkara’s position results, in the other, an atomism most distended and chaotic. The former (Śaṅkara’s position) suffers more though more “logical”—if perchance to treat an entity as hallucinatory is the same thing as “deriving” from reality. But to be fair, Spinoza (who resembles Bhāskhara more than Śaṅkara), “rejected the bait of the specious simplicity obtainable by denying the reality of matter or of mind or of God.” To him entities are real and not mere unrealities. The world is really a universe. “It is organically one, it is complete, everything real (divine or human etc.) is it, or within it; and it is rational or orderly.” The substance, Spinozistically conceived is either, a systematic organic universe, well-ordered, divinely governed, of whose many-sided attributes we know only two, viz., extension or material energy, and thought or mind-energy; or else it is a mere static being, a pseudo-universal, because non-concrete, undetermined and unknowable. In the former case, the substance or God is

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the mystical conception passionately achieved and exemplified a real concrete universal principle which is so integrally related to Nature and beings (the typification of material and mind-energies?), and in the latter, a barren entity that is ballasted from all actuality, as such an abstraction. But yet the philosophic concept of concrete substance, a unity at once real and universal, will not be achieved so long as the relation of substance to its attributes is not established. The tendency to monism is a real logical requirement of thought and the logical need and the psychological and religious groping at a concrete unitary concept of substance has converted a theoretical need into a metaphysical indispensability. What then is the Substance that will satisfy us?

There are three entities of which we have real knowledge.

A. Our own existence of which we are directly aware and intuitively certain; a proposition which all intuitionists justify. Not only that, while the laws of our thought persist, they compel us to admit that operari sequilar esse. It is the principle on which the possibility of consciousness and unity of knowledge depends. It is the soul which forms the fleeting series of impressions, thoughts into a continuous system of experience, thus making a continuous and connected consciousness possible. The Buddhistic denial of such an operari sequitar esse, and their affirmation of the fleeting states as constituting the false idea of a self, is a self contradictory statement, for how can memory, recognition and recollection take place without an identical
focus and self for which there is memory, recognition and recollection? (Śrī Bhāṣya I.i.1.) Further it is the one self-evident fact that we cannot get rid of by any amount of doubting as Des Cartes quite realised, and the Vādāntik assertion of the reality of the Ego (aham) or Atman is founded on this impossibility of getting rid of the self evident ‘Selfness, even whilst we can get rid of asmita (egoism).

B. The existence of God of which we are self-evidently certain if not intuitively, conceive it as we may, either in the Cartesian way as more intuitively certain than ourselves or even as Kant held that it might be legitimate as a ‘regulative idea,’ which we can no more disprove than we can prove, or else even as a logical requirement of thought as the ultimate ground or Substance.

C. The knowledge of the world or material things and objects through sensation which if they have not the certainty ourselves and God posses, is yet practically certain. It is on account of this category that all philosophy is divided into two primary groups of materialism and mentalism or else Monism and Pluralism of either type of Materialism or Idealism. Matter as the third entity can never be got rid of by any amount of intellectual subterfuge. It demands that it must be counted as an ultimate category. A real monism that is at once concrete, real and universal must be achieved between these three entities of which the second viz., God or the ultimate substance should hold the first and third in an intimate unity within itself suffusing each one of them with his presence. Our Conception of God must rule out every trend of Deism and affirm a substance
that is the ground of all existence. Our God must be an immanent presence, rather than a far-off transcendence. The distinct and seemingly opposite categories of matter, which forms the world of Nature distinguishing itself as the mental and physical nature of individual selves, and Spiritual entities, finite in themselves, which operate in nature and for whom, in a sense this world exists, must seek an intimate relation in the way of modes or attributes of God, the ultimate religious moral and philosophic Being and Ideal. These three entities¹ may be expressed to be the Enjoyer, the enjoyed (the World) and the Ultimate inspirer, (Bhoktha, bhogyam Perithārancha matyā).

The ultimate substance being thus intellectually conceived, the nature of Being as conceived by Śaṅkara shall be first considered, as it features such a large part in the tirade of Rāmānuja against false interpretations of the Vedanta-sutras, and also as it is for us philosophically important, standing as it does for a very pure Monism.

For Advaita, the ultimate substance is consciousness, which alone is Truth, Intelligence and Eternal and One only, सत्यं ज्ञातं अनन्तस्मृतं त्रहा which all mean the same thing. This Brāhmaṇ is mere experience or anubhūti, or Samvid. The primal substance is neither the individual nor the objects of cognition, but an all-embracing consciousness, which is never absent, for of its absent, for of its absence we can

¹ The resemblance to lock is surely marked here.
predicate nothing, nor of its non-existence can we speak with any sense of intelligibility, as it is consciousness alone that must make such a Judgement, which it cannot do if it was not. Samvid is thus One all-embracing consciousness which is the same throughout, whatever be its content, either illusions or objects or dreams or real knowledge itself. It is permanent, for by no means can it be held that it was not. Consciousness being thus impossible of disproof and since it is self-luminous (svayamprakāsa) we can never prove its non-existence (abhaya) which would involve self-contradiction. Anubhūti does not need a perceiver of the same because it could bend itself to survey itself. Further to be an object of cognition is to be a material entity (acetone). But if it is not an object, is it a subject? No; it is neither subject not object but a passive spectator. Indeed, we may say, that it is that absolute consciousness or experience where subject and object have no meaning; it is unrelatiend and all relations between subject and object are unreal, and do not pertain to the ultimate substance. The objective world which manifests difference and relations between subjects and objects and between things and things, is generated by avidya (ignorance); as such not only things but subjects, who are intelligent selves, are all unreal as such having as their cause or condition obtaining an eternal avidya and Māya though the reality about then is Brahman who is conditioned by upadhis. Consciousness is un-originated as we have already seen it to be the permanent behind the fluctuating differences and changes and as being never absent. Difference or multiplicity, and qualities, which define in a way plurality and relations, it has none, because differences and qualities are due to an
overlaying of Avidya on Brähman and also such a statement of relations pertaining to Brähman leads to infinite regress. The Sastras or Sabda speak only of an un-differenced (niravayava) Brähman. What exists is pure Being, attributeless un-differenced consciousness. Śrī Śaṅkara’s view is that in the initial perception of a thing, a perception which is not adulterated by practical thought, or by thought which imposes its own ideas (samskārarūpa upādhis) on the thing sensed, is a presentation absolutely un-differenced; it is a mere ‘that’. This quiescent background in the presentation continuum, which later in Savikalpaka prathyakṣa, attains practical life and movement, is a mere ‘that’. It is the unchanging unqualified, indeterminate and passive Witness. This consciousness on which background—as we cannot in any of our experience get rid of consciousness and cannot prove its absence—is illuminated the fleeting perceptions, is the ultimate Substance. The realm of the objective is a huge categorical make-up. Thus to Śaṅkara, it would mean that the empirically real, which we shall call the Actual, is unreal though it is a manifestation or phenomenon of the noumenal and the real is never the actual; in the sense of only ideally present is it actual in any sense. In which case, Truth or सत is ideal and real, the actual is unreal because it is actual. The close western parallel which Parmenides is, is further accentuated accentuated in latter times of the modern day in Immaṇuḷa Kang in whose philosophy we find the phenomenon-noumenon relation is mysterious but all the same present. Between Phenomenon and noumenon we can never point how one is originated from another, and as
Kant himself confessed, regarding the causal relation we cannot affirm anything between noumenal and the whole realm or totality of Phenomena. We know that the Phenomena is an "a prior synthesis". Śaṅkara, however, does not leave it at that. For him, it is due to an eternal ajñānam (darkness) overlaying itself on the shining and self-luminous background Brāhmaṇ, which is the passive intelligent spectator of the whole thing, the various apparent manifold creation of objects and things and egos arise. The clouding or overlaying is due to Māya, a mysterious power, not describable as real or as unreal. The real is thus experience which is not "involved" in the unreal manifold, yet "really" appearing as manifold. That Absolute Experience, which is known only by those who give up this multiplicity, is best described as true (satyam), meaning by that not-false, jñānam because it is not ignorance and matter, Anantham (eternal) meaning by that not-perishing and timeless. All positive prediction it refutes, because every qualification means reduction of quality, and reduction of it to the level of the definite and the differenced. This unknowable, however speciously concealed under the name of the attainable, transcends all limiting categories of Thought; but does not such a being thus standing undefined, equally give itself to non-being because we never come across such an entity and cannot speak about it? Does not such an attitude

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1 Cf. Chapter II.
perilously descend to Śūnya-vāda against which Śrī Śaṅkara so ably lifted his banner of revolt?

Rāmānuja refutes this conception of substance of Advaita, categorically in his Mahā Siddhānta of Śrī Bhāṣya. The theory of Consciousness as Substance is a very faulty conception, because the subject of experience is not consciousness but a conscious subject—a subject who possesses consciousness as an instrument of functioning in the act of cognising or knowing.

2. Consciousness is not that which subsists in all states (avasthas), for consciousness is an activity of the knower or subject and is set in action only when the subject requires it, i.e., when the subject engages itself with an object or reacts to stimuli.

3. Consciousness is not eternal, because consciousness, as stated in the previous objection, is an interim activity and by no means absolutely required throughout existence. (Of course the modern psychologists hold consciousness to be a stream, but it no more explains the specific function of consciousness as a cognitive act always). It is only when he functions, consciousness is present. "As this quality is not however essential but originated by action, the self is essentially unchanging" (I. 1. 1 pp63). And consciousness itself is evidence of its nonpresence (abhava), as when we speak 'I am conscious', 'I was awake' or 'I was asleep'. Further consciousness is a knowledge-activity of the Subject and makes the object present to its subject. Consciousness is active only in the compresence of subject
and object and is not manifest otherwise, though by no means absent as a potential function or quality of the subject. The quality of being a knowing-subject (not of being conscious) is not absolutely essential (tachca na svabhadaka) to the individual ego (र्वक्षे); it I that, whenever it engages itself with an object, as such whenever this kshetrajna-condition i.e., of being a knower, takes place, consciousness manifests itself as a projection of action, just as the shining rays of light or brilliance proceeds from lamps, Sun, and gems.

In its passivity, there is no particular action not even of cognition, no engagement with any particular object or objects; it is a dull awareness. So much so, this dull awareness of the non-cognitive period in the action of cognising (whose sphere is unlimited per se) due to this particular engagement with a particular object, becomes focussed and fused with its immediate presentation or sensum. Or in other words, “owing to this influence of Karman (work) it becomes of a contracted nature as it more or less adopts itself to work of different kinds and is variously determined by different senses.” (I. ii. 1.)

But the subjects as knower, must be an intelligent entity, as consciousness is possible only to an intelligence (chetana). In other words, Consciousness as an attribute or quality of a conscious subject, is quite different from the subject whose nature is conscientness or intelligence.
Because intelligence is seen in every presence of consciousness, the latter being the quality of the intelligent subject, it is false to assert that consciousness is the substance and that intelligence is its nature. Nor could it be said that because of the sameness of consciousness in every individual, the individuals are foci somehow concreted by matter (ahaṅkāra?). The sphere of knowing of a conscient subject when not limited or contracted by samskaras or actions, is the whole of reality. But as we are, we so determined and the possibility of that total experience is attained only when we leave the centralised point and achieve or rather fulfil the world-actions with the consciousness of the perfect. The unbiased decentralised or acentric vision does not distort reality and its meaning like a lens not corrected for spherical and chromatic aberration, thus projecting distorted and coloured image but gives the perfect vision or representation of the whole.

4. That the eternal stretch of consciousness (anubhūti) should be capable of being deflected by different ignorants (avidhyās) to give rise to the individual existences and egos is inconceivable. For consciousness, conceding to it an eternal stretch of same intensity over every object, would appear to be defined objects of various types just as the spectral colours, when thrown upon similar objects or identical things, reveal multi-coloured and different things with various names, but it certainly could not account for the persistence of the egos though it would give rise to the particularisations of tensions and toes. It would, in the best interpretation, reveal fleeting existences rather than permanent objects. The reason given by Advaita for the
inference of different infinite ignorants (avidhyās) whose very existence is dependent upon the presence of the egos, and is an inference drawn by their presence, and also that their (egos) presence as the resultant of the deflexion or splitting of the one-Consciousness into foci of different tensions and colours by avidhyās which are final entities (sanatanah and anadi), is indeed a specious and spurious circular reasoning.

5. Consciousness cannot claim the status an intelligent existence, though it is an activity of an intelligent subject, as such might rightly be called unintelligent (acēthana), in the sense that, whatever is not-intelligent is unintelligent. It is capable of manifesting objects to its substrate but it cannot reveal itself to itself for we know of a subject becoming self-conscious or self-luminous (chidrupa hi svayamprakāśata), but never of consciousness (chaitanya) becoming self-conscious or having self-consciousness (prathyaktva)\(^1\). It is on the objects however, that we find this consciousness displayed and not usually in the subjects and it is this fact that makes all solipsists and subjective idealists affirm that all objects are the product of the consciousness. However,

\(^1\) Śrī Bhāṣya. l. l. 1. "Of this consciousness… it would be difficult to prove that at the same time it is itself agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is an action." एतत्क्षेपत्यथि नस्यास्वप्रयथिः कबलश्चाप्यवापि अस्त्य सक्षमकतस्य कन्तुधमं वशेषत्वं कर्मस्वत्त्वकृत्तवंपि पुष्पितमिद।। It is svayamprakāśa but not svasmal prakāśa.
Consciousness is an indispensable function of the intelligent subject forms its ground or substance, as such constitutes in a sense, its essential nature or invariable appendage (aprathaksiddha ralation) and an indispensable expression and function, a function terminable, contractable or expandable at the will of the subject in and by his capacity of function. The only necessity for consciousness is the presence of this relation(object) and function. Consciousness, infinite in scope, can be cut off, or screened according to the limitation of natural upādhis or karma; of nature, due to its evolution, (ādibhautika); of karma, due to activities (adhyātmaka); both of which are mutually dependent because the body assumed by the ego is according to its prior-habits or habits and complexes formed in a prior life.

The first cause, it has been said, cannot be anything other than a world-intelligence or Spirit, in so far as we recognise order and harmony amidst the warring elements of nature. The final substance or Being is also intelligence or Spirit, which sustains nature and makes it what it is. This Intelligence is independent of every and any other existence in so far and only in so far as it is no controlled or sustained by any other entity. It is svatantra; it is that which forms the ultimate ground of all existence. There cannot be any other

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1 Wm. James on “Does Consciousness exist” says. “I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it stands for a function
ruler. He alone is the sole ruler. (I. i. 1.). The ultimate self is not a pure un-differented non-personal consciousness; nor is the individual self or subject of all experience a vanishing focus of consciousness. The self, we have defined, to be intelligent by nature (Svarūpa) and intelligent in functioning (in its viśeṣana), for to act or to be capable of intelligent activity, is a quality or attribute of all intelligent actor or agent (kartha). Action as already pointed out, no more than the rays of light is the source of light, is actor or even witness (sākhṣin).

It is held that beyond the mere subject and mere object there must be a category which holds these in a synthesis, out of which can issue by some un-definable mysterious means, (say, Māya- Śakti or avidya) these two entities. They seek once more by intellectual means, to synthesize all these differences in order to form a real non-dual (not unity). Being into which, in reality, these are dissolved and obliterated. Such a method can never yield a true conception of the real. For one could understand the need for such a triadic synthesis, if the two, subject and object, are really opposites which need to be held in a unity which is different from both of them. Even accepting that this ultimate category should be an eternal stretch of mere consciousness, calling it the ultimate substance, is certainly asking too much of what is really a function or entity.¹ At

¹. "Function is an entity, because it is something that can be thought about. It is a category not a substance." Dr. A.N. Whitehead
this rate of synthesising, we would be thrown upon an absolute, absolutely unknowable, an entity which would be neither spirit nor matter, neither subject nor object, non-subject and non-object, not Being and non Not-Being. What it is, can never be said or thought. But such an unknowable, despite what its supporters may claim for it, as the culmination of thought and feeling in a real Mystical Being, is at least not enable logically.

Spirit and matter, subject and object are no opposites but distincts and the further term emerging in the one case, would be Activity and Consciousness, in the other; activity, when spirit rule, controls, and sustains matter and fashions it to its ends; consciousness, when the subject is in compresence with its objects or object.¹ It is not true to assert that to be an object of consciousness or rather a

says by lifting the sting from the word “entity” as applied to consciousness, which as Wm. James said is not entity by which he meant the substance which Absolutism and subjectivism asserted.

¹ “Every fact of consciousness is made up of at least three moments; every such fact depends for its existence upon the presence of an ego, of a content of consciousness, of a relation between these two,. . . Every fact in reality with which I am acquainted is not merely a fact, it is also owing to relation of “having in consciousness” a content of consciousness, in other words, the Ego exercises towards it the function of becoming conscious”. N. Lossky’s article in the Ency. Of Phil. Sciences on the “Transformation of the concept of consciousness in Modern epistemology and its bearing on Logic.”
conscious subject is to be unintelligent per se.¹ For the intimate capacity of a subject is to be conscious of itself, in which case, it would be itself unintelligent according to such a dictum, which certainly is absurd. Rāmānuja says that you should not define that as ‘being of the nature that light is present without exceptions’. It is true that the conscious self which stands in the particular determinate relation of object to another conscious self, may be passive to its subject at that moment, but it cannot even be legitimately claimed, that that other self is not treating the knowing-consciousness as its object at that moment. Thus whatever stands in an objective relation is an object and that need not be necessarily non-intelligent per se, and that it is intelligent in at least one case, will be showed presently.

The inability to dent objective relations to the Spirit or intelligence must force us to assume a different postulate. The relation of Subject-object, and spirit-matter, anyhow subsists and ought to subsist even with regard to the ultimate Being as far as logic goes. To deny this, were to accept in some way or other the defeat of thought in its


We do not apprehend other centres or selves as unconscious.

“Mere being i.e. Brahman, would hold the position of an objet with regard to the instruments of knowledge, and thus there would cling to it all the imkperfections indicated by yourself (Sanakara) non-intelligence, perishableness and so on” I. i. 1.

The general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object is, in fact, untenable.
pursuit to know truth. Out of this impasse can we not seek a path out, if we assert that though there is a difference of nature between matter and spirit, object and subject, they are held in unity by one of the terms? And further, is it not quite apparent that once we grant that, the superior in nature or character between them must naturally therefore be called the sustainer in the relation? The object is not object until and unless it is sustained and enjoyed by its subject. The functional importance of the subject (which is intelligence always) in the relation ought to be recognised, as much as the functional importance of the superiority of intelligence or spirit over matter. They cannot destroy each other, but they are bound to unity and this unity is achieved by the superior between them assuming control and direction over the lower, using it for purposes which it alone knows. Matter has no ends\(^1\) to save for itself and can have no ends as it is unintelligent; it is fashioned towards ends by the spirit which holds it captive and pervades it as its self\(^2\).

\(^1\) But Sankhya holds that the purpose of Pradhana is first infinite and then to explicate the person from the process of involving that the entire philosophy could also understood in its primitive bearing as a near cousin of Vedanta where lila is explained rather than in the later sutras of the Samkhya karika.

\(^2\) Śrī Bhāṣya i. i. 1. (pp. 92) "The world is HE". The identity expressed by this clause is founded on the fact that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishnu) pervades the world as its self in the character of inward rulers; and is not founded on the unity of substance of the pervading
In knowledge-relation, the subject because of the character of knowing, is superior to its object, and the object as the object of the knower, is sustained by the relation and made one with its subject, a unity or relation at once integral; and consciousness is the incident activity which is the expression of the nature of intelligence it is.

The three entities (tattvas) (By entity meaning whatever can be thought about, as Dr. Whitehead remarks) are involved in knowing, namely, the knowing subject, the known object, and the act or function of becoming conscious, which function brings about the relation of unity between the two terms. To stress the knowing act or function, because it appears to be the back-ground on which the subject and object seem to be differenced, more than the knower and the known, as if these are the secondary inflexions of it and within it, were to assumed too much from the date we have in actuality. Indeed, it seems to be a perversion of this fact.

In the first place, Brāhmaṇ is the ultimate inner self, antaryami of "all beings," holding both nature and finite selves in an absolutely dependent relation or rather effect-relation (cf. 1st. Chapter). As the ultimate inner self, Brāhmaṇ is the ultimate knower of everything, because he

principale and the world pervaded." तदात्मायमत्वायिन्संयंस्तत्तत्त्त्वत्वा व्यातिकृतम्; नेतृ भ्राम्यव्यापकाय स्त्रैंकृतृतम्.

1. Antaryami Brāhman (Brīh. Uj.)
is the ultimate intelligence pervading everything, act and function, destining them to the ultimate goal of perfection. Unexhausted by any, being over and above each and every existence, He is the transcendent and immanent ground of their being what they are. He is the concrete universal, the real Absolute. He is the ultimate subject or knower, which does not mean the unqualified non-personal Śākṣi chaitanyam, but an infinitely intelligent personality. If on the other hand the essential nature of first Brāhmaṇ itself constituted the running subject, your mind really coincides with the one field by us". Brāhmaṇ is not jñānam but jñāni.

The secondary subject is the individual subject, the finite knower; and it is only when the knowledge of the ultimate substance (Brāhmaṇ) and that of the individual knower agree and are not varient, the individual’s knowledge is perfect and whole with regard to an object. If however, the individual knowledge is different from that of Brāhmaṇ (a fact of comparison that in the very nature of things, perhaps, impossible) which however, is very easily seen in the practical ineffectuality in and for life, the individual knowing is vitiated by egoistic and pragmatic considerations and becomes erroneous. The effort to which the finite selves are bound to by the dissatisfaction which the present knowledge gives tem, is enough to show that their knowledge is wanting in that self-appreciation or self-evidence characteristic of reality’s own appreciation. In fact, reality seeks this characteristic achievement through the finite selves or centres moving towards the divine consummation of perfection which is the potential characteristic of itself and the actual character of the Deity.
Between the primary Kṣētra-jivañja and the secondary subject just to use the expression of Leibniz, the relation is interesting. Here the objective would be the secondary subject in so far as it is being held in relation as an object by the supreme subject on whom it is dependent for very power, by whom it is enjoyed, directed and perfected. By being thus held the individual subject does not become a material entity; on the other hand, at the same time he perhaps holds as his object both nature and God himself. But does not this mean, it may be suggested, that God would lose his dominancy and would be a dependent entity, on what is essentially a finite entity even according to definition? No; for in so far as there is relation shown between two entities, whilst it no doubt reveals dependence of each upon the other, it does not point to any imperilling of nature of the superior amongst them. As already hinted at, that whatever stands in an objective-relation need not be acētana (unintelligent) even at that moment, for in the case of two spiritual subjects, it may happen that each is holding the other as an objective, but that does not show any dependence except of relatedness. But in this relation between a finite subject and God as object, the superior in the relation is undoubtedly the object and not the subject, as such the object controls the subject. It is the ideal which standing in the objective-relation transforms and spiritualises the subject whilst holding him all through in relation as the primary subject. He is in fact, in some cases it is patent, that it is matter that holds the subject captive, in which case ajña (delusion) is the result. God at the supreme person and as the supreme subjects is dominating the monad always. This would clearly reveal that the finite
monad (Jīva) is organic to God, as much as God is organic to the Jīva or man. In his relation to nature, or the Universe, it is with the power of knowing and the capacity of dominating in however little measures, the Jīva holds the partial phases of nature in subjection, in so far only and in such relative degree as God wills it or according as his perfected evolution permits; in either case, it is measured by the greater expressive presence of the Ideal or the ideal person who rules him by its or his interiority and superiority over the Jīva.

Nature or Matter is mere object, absolutely subject to Brāhmaṇ. The objectivity of the selves and nature towards God, the ultimate subject is an assertion of their reality. For, to be objective is to be real, as much as, to be subjective is to be self-evident. As such in this mutual relatedness of function as well as in substance, objective and subjective, and of the greater evidency of the subjective which controls its objective, the subjective can be, not illegitimately, claimed to be the core of the relation. The subject integrally related with its object is the real truth. The individual sentient self is organic to nature and to God, and nature and God are equally organic to the individual self. So also between Nature or matter and God, there is an inseparable (aprathaksiddha) relation. Brāhmaṇ is the eternal subject, Sākṣi, which means not the pure objectless impersonal consciousness of Advaita, but the knower, the subject. “By a witness (Sākṣī) we understand some one who knows about something by a personal observation (Sākṣāth); a person who does not know cannot be a witness”. Accordingly, says Rāmānuja, “a knowing subject only, not
mere knowledge (consciousness) is spoken of as a s witness'.

When the substance is thus conceived to be the subject as qualified by its object, the conception of the object translates itself to one of a mode in relation to the substance.

All philosophy aims at a definite synthetic and synoptic conception of reality. And if the qualified or rather defined, it is what it means, Being were declared to be a false representation of what is essentially undefinable and if it be suggested that even definition is an outrage against its perfection, then, for the reasons already put forward, we have to search as to where the fallacy in that objection lies. The classical dictum of Spinoza that 'all determination is negation is perfectly true, because to define certain characters to an object or thing, were to negate their opposites and other characters or qualities to the thing. The proposition is self-evident. But does negation of those other qualities mean lessening of perfection of the thing? Truth negates false, but can we in any sense expect that to negate the false were to lessen the perfection of thing which we define as true? Perfection can only mean maximum of positive qualities and never negative qualities as well, for negative qualities are not qualities but mere abstractions of the positive, concrete in no sense. Sankara would not allow any definite character to the Absolute except in negative terms no denote, perhaps, its positivity, which he recognises it to possess, but would not at any rate, allow positive predications of which we know and infer from the
nature of the world, even in its accentuated quality. But we know of no mind except a human mind at least in its basal quality, for as was said elsewhere, a divine vision must yet be a vision, a divine audition must yet be an audition. Śaṅkara maintains the Absolute to be a conscious witness Sākṣi, but would not allow it to be a subject; it is the ground of all experience of subjects and objects, but it is not at all ‘involved’ in its operation; it is not personal; it is pure, having no object and no relation. Spinoza’s dictum combined with its false rider, which is not always true, yields a qualitiless substratum, a mere Being, of which no one can tell anything, ‘into which all are dissolved and in which none can exist’, because to touch its fringes were to lose identity, dual and individuality; but individuality is false and is due to Māya, a mysterious power; but identity with what shall it be identical or with what shall it be non-dual.

But there is no substance apart from its attributes or relations or qualities. There is nothing of the nature of self-contradiction either in the nature of modes or relations or qualities to make use assume the impossible postulate that this world is inverted truth or essentially false or even unknowable in constitution.

The substance without its attributes and qualities, the dharmi without dharma, a guni without gunas, are distorted
representations. The fact is that they are distinguishable but not separable. The nature of substance though definitely distinct from that of the attributes or modes is yet distinguishable from that of the attributes. The synthetic Unity (is it a priori?) between them, namely, substance-attribute, subject-object, spirit-matter, is the initial reality and not a resultant of the synthesising mind; it is the reality that we recognise, yet disjunct and accentuate whilst distinguishing.

Here it is useful to distinguish between modes and qualities as it would help us to arrive at the view of Rāmānuja more exactly as to the relation obtaining between the Substance and its modes, and also as to the nature of the substance itself.

A Mode or attributes is that by which we come to know the Substance. I prefer to use the word “mode” as against Spinoza’s use of the word attribute, as a “mode” is any dependent existence of that on which it is dependent; whereas the attribute which Spinoza defines—a definition at

cf. Vaiśeṣika and Bhāskhara also hold that qualities cannot be conceived apart from its substance; Dharma dharmi abhedat. Cf. A substance although it is nothing apart from its qualities, must not therefore be “distinct from its attributes.” In fact, a substance is not to be identified with “any or all of those qualities” which constitute the nature of substance nor with the “aggregate of its qualities or any system formed of them”; cf. Nature of Existence: Mc Taggart. Bk. II ch. V.
once vague though useful—"is that which understanding perceives as constituting the essence of substance." Taking this to mean nothing other than a realistic definition (Kuno Fischer gives a Kantian colour), whatever mode or attributes (giving the logical general-concept of the modes, for the two primary abstract concepts of Thought and Extension) leads us to interpret or infer the character of the ultimate Being of which it is a function or dependent existence or expression, would lead us to speak of it as its attribute or mode (prakāra). Thought and extension or energy, as Spinoza would call these two secondary ultimates, or Prakṛti and individual Jīvas as Rāmānuja would call these two substantial entities, alone reveal to us the nature of Reality, though we must be careful to add that these two entities in turn seek existence and accomplishment, only in the ultimate existence or Substance or Spirit.

This Highest concrete entity unlike the Spinozistic substance, is the Brāhmaṇ and no generic thing. The ontological search leads us to the concept of their cause or ground which is a unitary substance and is both actual and real, as also ideal and perfect, to which all creation moves as its end. Rāmānuja holds that these modes form an eternal dependent relation as prakāra of Brāhmaṇ, whom Brāhmaṇ in turn animates as their self. Thus whenever we speak of matter and its energy or activity or evolution ¹, we

¹ Śrī Bhāṣya ; l. 16 ; l. 1. 23, 24, 25. & 26.
are in reality speaking of the self or spirit, who directs its evolutions on such lines as to yield the greatest benefit or greatest expression. Whenever we speak of the individual finite selves and their activities and realisations, we are at the same time implicitly expressing a knowledge about God who sustains them and directs them, helping them to the ideal or perfection. The energies of men and of matter are all sustained by their relation to Brāhmaṇ. These two entities standing in this inevitable and inseparable (prathaksiddha) relation to Being or Brāhmaṇ who is the ultimate spirit, form as such, his modes or expressions of Power, and find their realisation in Brāhmaṇ and no where else.

In so far as these two entities form inseparable relations and eternal relations, for we can never dissolve matter or jives (minds) however much we may spiritualise or etherise or exalt matter into nullity, for even then they must stand in that objective relation forming the ground of material phenomena or sensation continuum; nor the individual selves or monads, however much we may diffuse them or

\[^{1}\] Śrī Bhāṣya: I, i 31; i, iv. 22, & 11 iii 41. “action is not possible without permission on the part of the highest” cf. Keno Up. 3, 1, 11, & 4.

\[^{2}\] Śrī Bhāṣya: “When a thing is apprehended under the form “this is such and such”, the element apprehended as “such” is what constitutes a mode; now as this element is relative to the thing, and finds accomplishment in the thing only; hence the word also, which expresses the mode finds its accomplishment in the thing”. (pp 227)
exalt them into mere thrills on the ocean-lap of spiritual existence of Being, or channels or foci of the vast powerful flood of God’s Sakti. We cannot deprive the souls of their specific individuality even in their highest identity in functioning, which because of the fact that they can never be disjuncted or dissolved into a single source, must by that fact from a unitary existential relation, integral and organic, with Brähmaṇ. Brähmaṇ thus becomes the only one without a second ruler and self; which only means that these modes are not modes of any other entity,¹ as there cannot be any such. What so ever they exists in this single (Ekam) intelligent eternal ruling principle, sustained by that immanent principle through its bliss (ānandatva) the world of nature and jives; though them Hew reveals His blissful blessed qualities of love, knowledge etc (Kalyāṇa-guṇāh).

An attribute or mode constitutes whatever stands in an integral inseparable absolute eternal dependent relationship with its substance. Thus a dharma or whatever stands in this relation and is sustained by another entity would be called its mode.² Consciousness would as such, be also called a dharma of its substrate or the intelligence of which it is a function, for “it is that which stands forth or manifests

¹ Śrī Bhāṣya i. i.1
² “The body is in reality, nothing but a mode of the self, but for the purpose of sharing the distribution of things, the word ‘body’ is used in a limited sense.”
itself through its own being to its object its own being“\(^1\) or it is a function\(^2\) of the ego.

Anūubhutitvam nām vartamānadaśayām sarvastyaśiva svaśrayāmprati prakāśa mānāvatvam svasatyaśiva svaśayasādhanatvavam.

As such it is known technically to distinguish it from its substrate which is also called Jñānasvarūpa, “Dharmabhūta-jñānam.” Nature or matter is a function of the absolute intelligence of the unitary relation immanent between them. The Dharma or Dharmi is distinguished by the superiority or inferiority, imperfection or perfection, of that between which dependence is to be shown. The superior or the more vital in the relation being called the Dharmi, and the lesser as the Dharma of the former. I identify for convenience, Dharma with a mode, an entity, and not a quality (guṇa), which stands as an absolutely dependent existence forming an integral relation with that on which it depends. It follows thus, that the worlds are predicates of the Being.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Śrī Bhāṣya I., i.1 cf. Stma sidhi. Yamuna
\(^2\) N. Lossky, Enc. Phil. Sciences.
\(^3\) God is called Sarvadhar,
yathodkandu garvṛṣtam parvatāsu vidhavartīḥ I
ēvaṁ dharman pṛtka paśyamsthānēvānuvidhāvatīḥ II
2. Quality.\(^1\)

A substance may be conceived to be different from its absolute relations or modes, (though it is essentially an intellectual effort and it is this distinction that is the cause of our ignorant activities) even then, we can sketch its nature, Svarūpa, as distinct from its modes. Whilst some things stand in an inseparable relation to a particular thing, as such constituting what are called its modes, it may possess individual qualities expressive of its perfections. Brāhmaṇ as the ideally perfect, as the absolute Spirit is all intelligent, great and powerful, merciful (dayamaya), omniscient and omnipotent etc.,\(^2\) which qualities (guṇas) cannot be deprived from their substance; shall we say, that just as when all the qualities of redness, volume, weight, and every

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\(^1\) cf. Śrī Bhāṣya, I. I 13 where it is maintained that quality is not mere quality but always in co-ordination with its substance. A reference may be made to McTaggart’s chapter on Quality in his Nature of Existence, where he analyses the whole subject. It is in my opinion the nearest approach to Rāmānuja’s view. But this chapter was written prior to any reference to that book.

\(^2\) Cf. Yatindramatadipika pp 83.

Sarvajñātava sarvaśaktitvādayāḥ srṣṭayūpayuktādharmaḥ vassallab souśīlya soulabhāyādaya āśrayaṇāpayuktyuktadharmaḥ : kāruṇyādayāḥ rakṣāṇāpayuktā dharmaḥ

In Rāmānuja’s system, Īśvara or Brahman is He who possesses not only these powers, indeed those powers are a consequence of his being the Self of the Prakriti and the Purushas and they his body (sarirabhuta).

Śrī Bhāṣya I. I. 1.
sensory predication is removed there is nothing left, so also, these qualities make it the being it is. It is these guṇas that constitute its adjectives and perfections. Substance is not a mere "that" or an undetermined "somewhat", to which the qualities, the "whats", are added afterwards. These guṇas characterise it as the highest superior and lord over its modes. Nothing exists except as qualitatively determined; existence and nature are in the strictest sense inseparable (aprathaksidda) and its existence as such is determined by the systematic unity of its qualities, expressed through its functions. Qualities represent the order and kind of existence of the existents. But it is also true that the relations determine the quality of the whole.

A further distinction between a quality and an attribute or a mode (dharma) is that a dharma is an entity, which can, in a certain measure, be realised apart from its dharmi, as its extension or function, just as the rays of light may be perceived as apart from its source, though we certainly infer it to have a source or ground. It is an entity (dravya, sometimes translated as substance, meaning, having substantiveness) a function that may be perceived or realised even when we do not see the substance of which it is function. Thus it is not absolutely necessary in practice, to inquire about God whenever we perceive Nature or individual jives. But a quality as quality cannot be seen elsewhere than in its subject of which, it is a quality or guṇa. The object cannot be except with its qualities and qualities cannot be seen except in their substance. Consciousness, as a function of the Ego, and as an extension of the ego, stands in a unique relation to the Ego, seen only during the
activity of the Ego. Consciousness however is not a mode though it is a function, for the function assists the functioner to know or enjoy other objects, whilst it acquires no such tertium quid to make known itself to its substrate. For the acceptance of a tertium quid involves infinite regress. This is the radical distinction. But the character of the Subject as an Intelligence, is seen nowhere else except in the subject himself, though that intelligent quality is attributed only as a result of conscious function, as such constitutes the nirupita-Svarūpa-guṇa or viseshana of the subject. God is conceived to be omnipotent and omniscient because those are inferred to be his nature as seen in his ‘functions’ or modes. The quality of a ‘mode’, we can speak of, just as when we say, that matter is unintelligent or that nature is blind, or that it is the existing ground of material things or perceptions, and the absolutely dependent and the eternal objective that never knows to be a subject. But we cannot define the quality of a guṇa except as a perceived exemplification in the things and it cannot be abstractly defined. Redness is redness and is a simple sensation of a specific wave-length of light; it cannot be described in any other simpler way. We can only reiterate that quality as its quality. A relation is ‘between’ somethings; a quality ‘in’.

I use between something and not between “things”, because whilst a relation is truly between two or more things, yet it sometimes happens in introspection that it is “between” itself; that is what is meant by Pratvaktva. A relation can never be reduced to a quality, a”between” into one of “in” or “of”. It can equally never happen that
and 'of' something. We can technically call the mode as the Svarupa-nirupaka-dharma, and the quality as the nirupita-Svarupa-guṇa or vishshana, the former points to the essence of the thing, the latter to the discovered feature of a thing in addition to the former.

Having made this distinction between a dharma and a guṇa (it is however unfortunate that neither Rāmānuja nor his commentators have given specific terms for differentiating between these two, which they certainly do and must distinguish from one another), a qualityless substance is a nullity; an attributeless or mode-less substance or existence an incomprehensibility. These relations are absolute as there can be no separation of these to form any others. The Absolute Brāhmaṇ thus, by being the sustainer (dharayitum) of the modes, reveals himself as having these relations within himself. Variable relations, however, subsist between the individual intelligences among themselves and in their relations with partial phases of Nature. Thus the so-called external relations subsist and obtain in the case of individual selves

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a quality can be reduced to one of relation. A mode is that which stands in a relation; it is a substance standing in an asymmetrical dependent relation with another substance; a relation of a ‘substance to its quality is asymmetrical since a substance cannot inhere in a quality.’

I have no authority for calling them so; on the other hand the view maintained by some others seems to be different. Any way I had a justification as in the case of Dharma-bhuta-jnana. Hence this.
within their own commune, and in their relations with things of the universe. It would be meaningless to hold that external relations obtain between the Absolute and its modes, as if the modes are not sustained by the Spirit that bathes them. Absolute relations that are impossible of sundering or varying are internal, because immanently ground in their very nature, as such, are eternal relations within the bosom of reality; the variable relations are external relations, between the reals. Brähmanaḥ does not rest upon external relations, for it would mean that there can be a bare being without qualities and modes, or else it would mean that it is dependent upon something other than itself for very being. And both these explanations are absurd. On the other hand, dependence is for the individual selves or jives, and for Prakṛti, which have external relations as between themselves.

Relations per se do not reveal any dependence except in this way that to be dependent is not to forsake. In philosophy the tendency of every idealistic method has been and is always to show dependence upon the Subject and Spirit and to stress the independence of Spirit and subject. But such a dependence and independence is only relatively distinguished by the superiority of that between which these terms are used, and is merely puerile when this independence is condemned to an absolute subsumption or as unnecessary to that on which it is dependent or to which it is related. Every phase and effort of the subject produces only such phases and reactions on its objects, as such, the subject might legitimately be called the absolute destiner of its objects. But to be an absolute destiner or even a
destiner is not the same thing as to be absolutely independent of that which is destined. Independence does not mean unrelatedness nor does perfection mean non-qualifiedness or non-determination. The independence of spirit or ultimate being or God, consists in its supreme power of destining, in its exaltation and in its perfection, over and above the dependents, in a word, because of its infinite transcendence whilst it works or exhibits itself through them as an immanent goal. The Ideal that works through the individual finites imperfect as they are, does not get lowered by such a working; it only shows its own virility and superiority over every obstacle which are not obstacles, or rather only apparent and seeming obstacles if at all.

The establishment of the intrinsic relation between modes and the substance, in other words, the assertion of reality to individual selves and the sensuous nature and their unitary relation to Brahma or the ultimate substance, is the establishing of the reality of the substance itself. Neither bare singularity of Advaita, for identity can obtain only between two real (and be it noted, not unreal) entities, nor even the absolute plurality which Dvaita owns, could be real, till a real synthesis at once logical and true to experience between unity and multiplicity is achieved. And this is achieved by Ramanuja through this conception of unity which organically holds the multiplicity within itself and gives it the character of truth. Whilst reducing the relation to one of model relation, just like Spinoza, there is here no abstract general concept which the Being of Spinoza certainly is, which makes it impossible for him to guarantee to the modes any individual existence, not even could
Spinoza derive those modes once he has refunded them into their source or ground (for out of the abstract how could the concrete issue at all? a fact that Spinoza quite realised)—Rāmānuja does not dissolve them into he abstract Universal, but whilst keeping them real, subsumes them as modes or real functions which never are dissolved but are only kept back from functioning during the periods of Pralaya, in the same way as consciousness is suspended but not extinguished as a function of the intelligent subject, as it is the characteristic expression, attribute and function of the intelligent subject he is. We cannot at any moment except under delusion or illusion, disjunct the relation between these triune entities so egregiously as to call them disparate or unconnected entities. The possibility of delusion arises only in the case of less perfect entities viz., individual monads, from the non-perception of these absolute relations and the upward thrusts of Spiritual life, and from the non-perception of their real dependence upon the ultimate unity of power, life and truth which is Brāhmaṇ. This possibility of accordance with separate activities or individualised activities which Brāhmaṇ seeks fulfillment in and through particular Jīvas blurs the sense of the whole and the One, which is natural to them, in such wise as to induce in them an atrophy of real thought, in such relative degrees as is necessary for the consummation of the ideal or goal which God wills and to which creation moves, and accelerates in them an activity of crystallised and centralised egoism (ahaṅkāra and mamakara).

The Nature of the Modes.
The Jīvas: There are infinite eternal spiritual or monadic entities. These are eternal, Rāmānuja says, not in the sense that “all has itself in that” or “all this indeed is Brāhmaṇ in which case, that general enunciation would mean that even ether and created elements would have to be conceived as eternal,” (II. iii. 18) but in quite a different sense that its character changes not, but merely “passes over into a different condition”, from inactivity of deep sleep to the activity of līla-period. Thus though an effect, the individual self or jīva is unproduced. “The intelligent one is not born nor does it die.”

2. The soul’s essential nature is spiritual, that is, it is a knowing subject. It is essentially a knower (I. i. 13) “Different from this self consisting of understanding (Vijnana), there is the inner self consisting of Bliss..... The soul, in the states of bondage and release alike is a knowing subject.” It is ‘not mere intelligence as sugata and Kapila hold’ nor ‘is the soul, as Kanada thinks, essentially non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, which intelligence is merely an adventitious quality of it”. (II. iii) “He is a person whose self is knowledge.” But because it is a knowing subject, it does not mean that it is omnipresent. For it ‘passes out’ and ‘returns’¹ as such infinitesimal, a monad,¹ (II. iii. 20.)

¹ “By that light this self departs either through the eye, or through the skull, or other parts of the body” “all those who pass
It is the Brāhmaṇ that is called the infinite and “great not the individual.” “The individual self is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of hair divided a hundred times and yet it is to be infinite”. And how it could be infinite is explained in the next sutra by saying that it knowledge is infinitely extendable or pervasive, comparing such a feature to the scent (gandha) of sandal ointment which spreads all over the body refreshing it when it is applied to a particular portion of the body alone, (II. iii. 24) or just like a source of light spreading its light all through out space. (II. iii. 26) “By such a residence of the soul in the heart of the physical body (is it the sūkṣma body?) with the help of the examples of sandal paste and flames which extend their scent and light though resident in a particular portion of space, through their qualities of scent and light throughout the body and space, (II. iii. 25 & 26) proves the capacity of a real nature of the soul to shine, and to know reality in full through its essential quality of consciousness (dharmabhutanana) and to control and sustain its body.

away out of the world go to the moon” and “return from that world to the world of action.” Brihad Up. 4. 4. 2.

Introduction to Pāñcarātra O. Schrader pp. 57.
Svarūpam aṇumātram syāt jñānānanda kailakṣaṇam I
Trasareṇupramānasa te rasmikōṭīvibhusit II

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3. The designation of knowledge as self, e.g., “He is the person whose self is knowledge”\(^1\), is made only because it is an essential quality of the same (I. i 13.; II. iii. 29 & III. ii. 28). “Since knowledge is an attribute which I met with wherever a self is, there is no objection to the self being designated by that attribute. vi\=j\=nanasya \=y\=avad\=atam bhavidharmatvav\=at\=ēna tadpadē\=s\=ō na doṣa since in fact that quality contributes to define its (self’s) essential character. svarūpa nirūpaṇadhatvādityār̥ṭḥ. Similarly, the intelligent highest self is called ‘Bliss’ (anandamaya), because bliss is its essential quality as ‘knowledge’. It cannot be maintained that it is mere consciousness.

This idea has been refuted so often and need not be refuted as many times again. But it has a real ground, because the observation that the different individuals have got the identical character of conscious subjects, gives rise to the plausible inference that they must have been plucked from one vast stretch of consciousness due to some mysterious power or limitation, say, avidya or upādhis. But the inference has got merely an air of plausibility, and is not founded on facts, nor is it conducive to logical explanation.

\(^1\) “That which consists of understanding (vi\=j\=n\=āna) is the individual soul, not the internal organ (budhi) only; for the formative element. Māya (consisting of vi\=j\=n\=ānamaya) indicates a difference (between vi\=j\=n\=āna & vi\=j\=n\=ānamaya). As vi\=j\=n\=ānamaya can be explained as jiva, we have no right to neglect māya, as unmeaning (I. i 13.pp. 213 & 214).
of the relation between genus and individual, or concept and intuition. As will be showed in a succeeding paragraph, the whole misconception is due to this reversion of explanation which Platonically treats the ‘idea’ as the more perfect, and the individual as merely the ‘manifestation’ of the ‘idea’, which exactly is not the case. For, the concept is dependent on the intuition and not vice versa. If dependence is to be shown at all, the dependence is not on the side of the individual, in as much as there is the dependence of the former on the latter.

The fallacy of deriving the individual from the single source as Intelligence, is patent for a further reason. For whilst “substance is an individualised unity of concrete characters”, when we “abstract from the original characters of two exactly similar substances, we are still left with a purely numerical point of difference, i.e., with a diversity of ‘matter’. Thus ‘matter’ is ‘signed’ with quantity i.e., it exists in numerically diverse portions and thus serves as the ultimate principle of individuation”.¹ The individuality of each of these entities is a certain peculiarity, which whilst it expresses or gives expression to purposes identifiable with those of others or even of that ultimate intelligent being, yet holds its own individuality which cannot be identified with any original character (whether quality or relation), “marking it as numerically distinct from any other even exactly similar entity”. Leibniz held that each monad though similar in

character in being similar, was not identifiable with the rest even in the case of ‘identity of indiscernables’, for he held (perhaps a belief) that ‘two different subjects A and B cannot have precisely the same individual affection; it being impossible that the same individual accident should be in two subjects or pass from one subject to another.” So much so, Prof. McTaggart remarks about the principle of identity of indiscernables, that it really is the ‘principle of the dissimilarity of the diverse.’

Every one of us has got individual experiences which cannot be communicated to others. They form our private or individual subjective. Our dreams, even our emotions and perceptions, let alone the spiritual experiences, are our very own. Further “the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself and can explain the presence of unconscious and non-conscious states and acts, if it were only admitted that there are infinite individual selves who experience such states. If it were mere consciousness there could be no unconsciousness or veiling at all.” (II. iii 32). And also, if there were not so many individuals there must either be a wholesale veiling or wholesale emancipation. But as Samkhya showed, such is not the

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1. Phil. Review. Jan 1927. art. On Principle of Individuation: Idea of God. 264. cf. “finite centres may ‘overlap’ indefinitely in content ex termini, they cannot ‘overlap’ at all in existence: their very raison d’etre is to be distinct and in that sense, separate and exclusive, focalisations”
case; and therefore there must be infinite souls (Puruṣas or jivas). And since as Rāmānuja states the soul always abides in bodies (merely sūkṣma or gross and sūkṣma, for when the soul leaves its physical body it carries its linga Sarīra with it, and has even in the realised condition a pure sattva śuddhasattva body capable of being utilised in every way by the soul) which only shows that for enjoyment or activity, a body is absolutely necessary, and there alone can consciousness take place not elsewhere. Aśmāk śarīrasyāntare vāvasthitat vādātmanasta traivopalabdhdināryatreti vyavasthāsiddhiḥ. (II.iii.32)

In passing we may refer to the small discussion which Rāmānuja engages in with the Bheda-bhedavadinśa. (191)

a. Refuting the view of the Bheda-abheda vadins that the individuals souls are identical and different from Brāhmaṇ at the same time and are real though vanishing distinctions ultimately, an argument that strongly recalls the Bosanquetian theory, Rāmānuja carefully analyses the question thus: “You (Bhedabheda vadins) have maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference to the same thing viewed as effect and individual. But that this view is untenable, a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show.” He analyses in proceeding to show its untenability, the concept of genus and individual. He had in an earlier sutra (I. i. 1) suggested “that the species is the form of the individual”. vyaktēstu jātrākāra jñāti tadaśrayatayā pratītiḥ. He states again in other words, that “genus constitutes the mode and the individual that to which the mode belongs”.

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It is not a "fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its
generic character bears the character of Unity in the same
way as the admittedly uniform idea of an individual; but
whenever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the
form "this is such and such", it implies the distinction of an
attribute or mode and that to which the attribute or mode
belongs". (I. i. 4.)

b. He says "the difference belongs to the individual and
non-difference to the genus; and this implies that there is no
one thing with a double aspect" And if it be held that in one
way a thing is non-different, and in the other, different, that
is "the difference and non-difference belong to the thing
possessing two aspects", then "we have two aspects of
different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be the
substrate of those aspects, but this assumption of a triad of
entities proves only their mutual difference of character not
their non-difference. And even if we concede that the non-
contradictoriness of two aspects, constitutes a
'simultaneous difference and non-difference' in the thing
which is' their 'substrate', how he asks, 'can two aspects
which have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different
from the thing, introduce into that thing a combination of
two contradictory attributes" viz., (difference and identity)?
"if," he proceeds, "the two aspects on the one hand and
the thing on the other, be admitted to be distinct entities,
there will be required a further factor to bring about their
difference and non-difference, we shall be led into a
regressus in infinitum" (I. i. 4. pp. 194)
By this argument which Rāmānuja thinks is complete and most effective, the theory which holds that the Absolute is by the limitation of avidyākamakarmanā, the three logical, moral and spiritual limitations or upādhis, sliced into the several individual selves, which at the end, become restored into the original substance of the Brāhmaṇ, is absolutely demolished. This slicing into pieces or khandas in order to get at the jivas (souls) and things, is the only way by which the limitation might be successfully achieved, which method however, opens, the gates of atheistic materialism of Charvakas, for matter alone is capable of being thus cut or sliced and never spirit, for it is exactly spirit which brings unity into existence, as such, itself akhanda. Rāmānuja shows that once we refuse to acknowledge the specious simplicity of Māyavāda or advaita, we cannot halt at any half-way house of Bhāskara-vāda but must accept not only the reality of selves as Bhāskara does but further admit that their existence is indissoluble into any simpler-substances or substance. For Bhāskara, the world exists from the beginning of the creative impulse as distinct and indissoluble into its original source till the pralaya; in this he agrees with Rāmānuja. But then, we must note the difference, namely, that Bhaskara does not admit the reality of matter as the eternally related and subsumed entity but only as the creative prakrit-shakti of God and also a spiritual entity in its essence. In a word, until the reality of all the three entities, matter, souls, and Brahman, the person who hold these former in an integral unity within himself, are all recognized there can be no way out of the impasse of solipsism and contradiction. "And it is false to maintain that the individual self and the highest enter into any real union
(absorption), for one substance cannot pass over into the nature of another entity or substance. \textit{Paramātmanōyogaḥ paramārthi itiṣyate mityata idanyahamyahi nāī tadyantāmyataḥ} (Vishnu Purana 2-14-27)

Further there must be distinct selves seeking perfection, and if such a postulate that is self-evident for spiritual life, is declared to be unreal, then the power of agency in actions ethical, is lost; there can be no moral life or even such a thing as spiritual achievement. Rāmānuja says that the fact that one "knows" qualifies him for action. \textit{jñānaprasāre tu kartutvamastayēva} (1.1.1). Thus the finite self-hood, if it were a vanishing distinction, would, firstly, give no joy and certainly no satisfaction; secondly, such a distinction is perceived; thirdly to declare it unreal is to cut at the root of ethical and spiritual and religious aspiration. If it should merely mean that the "I" is vanishing distinction and an unreal existence and deserves to be so annihilated in the Absolute, who shall exist to say, Rāmānuja pertinently asks that he hath realised the absolute or he's that?

To therefore distinguish between spiritual entities and their attributes or quality of "knowing" which constitutes their essential nature is quite valid, as it does away with the apparent simplicity underlying the advaita theory of reducing all finite selves into a vast experiences with the help of an inexplicable Māya or avidya which creates these focalisations on its bosom. without involving it at all -mere individuality-less foci and imperfections of all all-embracing Ānubhuti.
To be for a subject, is to know. In which case, the natural extension for a subject’s cognitive activity when uninterferred with by any media, would be cognition of the whole of reality. Our problem then would be, not what we know, but why we do not know what we out to know? How does this limitation arise in the sphere of our cognitive area? And why life being what it is, the function of the self implies a necessary and natural residence of it in the body? And if the quantitative or spatial reference apply not to the soul’s size (as it seems inevitable that we cannot but speak of it in such a way) how does it habitate the body and hold its strings in direction and function of the organism in all its actions without whose residence or presence, (unless we are going to hold along with the Charvakas and the Behaviourists of the present day, that there is not soul or self or even a conscious spiritual subject, all action, even intelligent action being due to the interactions of the cerebral cortical spheres with the stimuli transmitted through the neurones to it) no activity could be possible? Self, conceived in the Spiritual sense or the Leibnizian sense of qualitative infinitesimal (as the quantitative and spatial applies to the atoms), should have an operative centre in the body through which it animates its particular body, dominates and enjoys itself in it, and realises its own true nature as a subject action in conjunction with an overflowing intelligence it discovers afterward, an Intelligence it
recognizes as the final destiner and goal of the physical and moral and spiritual order.\(^1\) (II. iii. 39-40). The question of exact residence is perhaps a matter of belief and Vedanta along with Yōga, keeps it resident in the heart, operating from that central point both the head as also the limbs.

Logically speaking, the individual finite existence of the self is a primary certainty. The individual selves also exist in

\(^1\) Rāmānuja recognizes though his attack on the nirguna Brahman of Advaita, that a bare being is a nonentity and is a meaningless concept. So also a mere point of bare existence is also meaningless. (II. iii. 34). The individual self though it apparently appears to be such a bare point of existence when not in conjunction with the nature during the pralayakala, is not such a bare existentiality. The functional attitude is available to such a focus depositary which the self is in reality, only when such an attitude is encouraged by being in a relational attitude of subject-object (samyoga) with nature which forms the world of realisation of ethical observance and action and its conscious commerce with God or reason expressed in such an objective system. It is this relational attitude and dependence on nature and God which makes it the real self it is, that rescues it from being the bare point of mere existence identifiable with any material atom. The individual self, thus possess the triple character of jnatripta, and lobrttvta bhoktritva of cognition, conation and sensation or enjoyment. But its independence all the while remains and in no case is it sundered even by the highest, for that would remove the character of the soul as a spiritual and moral entity or individual. Its continued identity is the independence that it possesses in its own right. (II. 3. 41). These characteristics constitute the “partial similarity”, their dissimilarity however, consists in their diversity of state or function.
the same way as independent entities, a fact of the inferential existence, as even the most barefaced absolutists and nihilists have to accept, and which all idealists worth their philosophy maintain, or a fact of direct cognition as the Intuitionists hold. This fact of recognition of other individual centres of consciousness is inferential it is claimed, but there is no other reason for that opinion but the prejudice against realism. And accepting it to be such, there is no reason to hold it to be mainly inferential. Perhaps the fact of calling it mainly inferential-necessity is a logical necessity as well, not only on account of the actual cognition of other bodies made up in the same way as our own, but it involves a mixing up of each of our private universes if there is an identification of the different private universes, which is not the case. As Rāmānuja maintains, there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual experiences of each of us, our enjoyments and realisations only if concede to the infinite (uncountable) selves, reality, eternity, and immortality. (II. iii. 48)

4. The individual soul is a part of Brāhmaṇ

The specific term part, amsa, leads to the question of the relation between whole and part. If the part were to be treated in terms of extension and the whole too treated in the same way, then we would be confronted with the problem whether the whole is extended and material, and Brāhmaṇ being conceived as the whole, is material.

Rāmānuja therefore defines a part: 1stly, it is not a part of extension (beginning with defining firstly with what it is not) of Brāhmaṇ as all imperfections would belong to
Brāhmaṇ. 2ndly, nor is it a piece of Brāhmaṇ as Brāhmaṇ does not admit of being divided into pieces (khandas) (II. iii. 42).

3rdly, defining it in terms of what it is, it is a part in the sense “that it constitutes one place (desa) of something nd hence a distinguishing attribute (viseshana) is a part of the thing distinguished by the attribute.

Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand towards each other in the relation of part and whole (amśāṁśibhava), yet we observe in them an essential difference of character. And “as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it”—an attribute sustained in the relation by it. As the Śrī Bhāṣya passage runs, “Lustre is an attribute not to be realised ‘apart from the gem, and therefore is a part of the gem;’” the same relation holds good between generic character and individuals having that character, and qualities and things having qualities, between bodies and souls. In the same way, souls as well as nonsentient matter stand to Brāhmaṇ in the relation of parts (amśa) (III. ii. 28). And whenever difference is declared, it is this difference in character (svabhāvavailakshanyam) a definite spreading out of this relation between substance and attribute that is made. Whenever on the other hand, unity or nondifference is declared “they are based on the circumstance that that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance they distinguish and hence are fundamentally valid” (II.iii.45) Abhēdanideśastū
prtviksadhanaḥ śeṣanānām viśeṣasya paryantatvamāśritah
mukhyatvēnōpa padhante l

In the sense of attribute-nature (viseshanatva) which is
one of essential dependence for sustenance for its very
being upon a substrate which is its ground, the individual
self is a part of the substance which is whole and full in itself
and absolutely indivisible.

So also the world and Brähmaṇ stand to each other in
the relation of part and whole, “the former being like the
light the latter like the luminous body, or the former like the
power and the latter like that in which the power inheres, or
the former being like the body the latter being like the soul”
(ll.iii.46)ēvam prabhāprabhāvadrūpena śaktisaktimadrūpena
śararitmbhavēna caṁśāṁśibhavam jagabhahaṇōḥ l

It is clear from what has been stated that this
interpretation of the relation between whole and part, is
peculiar to this system alone, as it alone translates that
relation to one of substance and attribute. Spinoza had,
however, done like-wise; but here unlike there, no method
of conversion has been undertaken. There is a suspicion in
Spinoza’s system whether when he deduces more
geometrico, he is thinking of a part or mode as a khanda
(piece). Rāmānuja obviates any such difficulty by his
specific interpretation of the relation in the way sketched
above. The advantages of the interpretation of Rāmānuja
are patent and decidedly more than others. The attributes
have relations, integral and vital with the substance, just as
a part has got to the whole, for where can a part be except
as a part-of-the-whole or an attribute except as an
attribute-of-a-substance?—yet that attribute could be called a part (amśa) without impairing either the perfection of the hole of which it is a part or amśa, or losing its own specific individuality as amśa. The connection has not got the defect of de-spiritualisation of the Spirit, which we have somehow accepted to be the whole, and yet it does not dematerialise matter except in the sense of making it a fuller external expression of spirit’s activities, making it yield to the stress of the spirit, in making it the nature it is. Nor even does it throw all individualisation or individuality to mere continuity of the unindividualised. Whilst guaranteeing to individual selves and Prakṛti (Śakti) an individual eternity (though they are, to a great extent in the former case, and entirely, in the latter case, different from their substance) they could yet be called “mamaivāmśa” as the Gītā passage runs (XV. 7).

Whilst the comparisons hold legitimately (holding of course, that they are no other than mere analogies) yet there is underlying them a suggestion of a spiritual notion of the relation of part to the whole, since it does away with the faulty conception of part as material part or even as a spiritual part which can be extinguished (as Bhāskara held) in the absolute’s vast bosom when it attains fullness of perfection gradually. Rāmānuja himself condemns any other notion as mere ābhasha (mere argument); for the arguments which seek to prove the being whose nature is absolutely uniform light i.e., Intelligence or consciousness but differentiated by limiting adjuncts (upādhi) is fallacious, for “obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light means destruction of that
light,” (II.iii.49) Prakāśaokasva rūpasya prakāśtirōdhanaṁ prakāśanāsa ēvēti prāgevōpa pāditam II. And further this arguments would ruin the conception of spirit too fatally. But in the sense argued above, the finite is not derived from the infinite since by such a derivation the finite could not be, if its aggregation with the rest should give back the infinite again. The presence of the finite would be the death of the infinite as an actual or acting existence and vice versa. The conception of Rāmānuja of the part is a spiritual relation as contradistinct from spiritual derivation between whole and part. It is not a derivative relation at all. In which case, not only need the souls alone be the parts (because they are spiritual entities), but also matter, which stands as a dependent existence (as a mode or dharma of the spirit), whose Svabhāva is so observe to that of spirit, can be a part. The souls are finite, and as finites they could continue to exist even though they may attain to the infinity of knowledge, and that does not mean loss of infinity to Brāhmaṇ. There is no subterfuge employed here to arrive at the finites through either the imposing of a real or unreal upādi or māya, as real differences are explainable by a direct vision and experience viz., of the perceived integral relation between and the souls and nature, which can easily be translated into one of whole part. But the merit of realising this simple procedure is entirely Rāmānuja’s contribution to Philosophy. Further this relation alone is relevant to the discussion of the eternity of he individuality of the ego. Matter also thus, as already pointed out, stands in the relation of a mode and amśa of Brāhmaṇ.” “The material embodiments like those of man etc., possess equally with generic and other qualifications, the character
of being entirely dependent on the individual self, the character of being serviceable only to that self and the character of being a mode of that self. So also the individual selves with their embodiments form the body of the Highest Self and possess the characteristic of his modes." "This subtle matter stands to Brāhmaṇ the cause of the world, in the relation of a mode (prakāra) and it is Brāhmaṇ viewed as having such a mode."

Viewed thus, the primary fact that emerges out of this discussion is that the attribute can be conceived to be the body of the substance; secondly, that, as such, it can also be considered as the part of the substance; thirdly, that the part need not on the above two scores, be of the same nature as the substance of which it is an attribute, indeed, that it can be of a very obverse nature, provided it satisfies the definition of a body or attribute or part, and that of being absolutely serviceable to its substance or subject.

Recapitulating the chapter;

Substance is Spirit and the ultimate ground and cause (cf. 1\textsuperscript{st} chapter.) The concept of substance in Rāmānuja 's Philosophy is at once concrete, universal, and real. It is concrete because it is not a generic chapter or a general idea or a formal attribute, but an actual and acting presence qualified by qualities of perfection. It is not an abstraction from existence, every other thing which exists outside it alone is an abstraction. In one sense, it is that which guides the process towards the highest emergence of perfection in the time-series. It is not abstracted from existence either by being made into a passive background on which is
superimposed the fluctuating veil of Nature or Prakṛti, not is it abstracted from reality, existing as an inferred idea, essentially timeless, because having no actuality. On the other hand, it is concrete, because, whilst standing as the eternally unchanging (in constitution qua spirit) permanent, it functions through the universal process, which it holds in absolute dependent relation, enduring as a dynamic existence at once compelling everything, though never compelled.¹ It is timeless because it controls time, and eternity means enduring through out time sarvakāla vartamānatva hi niyatvam, and uses time to execute its own purpose and ends, which, at best, are a revelation of its own Bliss and a movement of Ananda. Having its own purposes and ends and having the power to achieve them, this Absolute Intelligence is the supreme Person, or personality, and we may agree with Bhāskhara in maintaining it to have no specific form, or with Rāmānuja in holding it to have a perfect form. (Sarvakalyāṇaṅguṇa mūrtitvam)

It is universal, because whilst holding in absolute-relation every existence, souls and matter, it is neither coerced nor exhausted by any one or all of them. We might more rightly say, that it is not only universal but that what in the universe could exhaust him, is nothing. The Absolute, some maintain, would consist of God and the world in which God is immanent, while yet transcending it. This Krause calls

Panentheism. This might be what we can call the Brāhmaṇ of Rāmānuja, but I am not quite sure whether some others would so take it. But that it is not pantheism one could very well affirm.

It is ideal, in the sense that it is always Spirit, perfect and compelling from the universe or nature absolute obedience and making it the universe, it is. As it guides all nature as an immanent presence towards the final end which is perfect enjoyment and perfection to all the souls. It stands as the teleological goal—as the Ideal that reveals itself more and more fully in the process through its predicates. This idea of the Absolute is a “rational ideal; it may be without a flaw”. But as the section on the Sastrayonitvat (l. i. 3) suggests, such a God we cannot prove anymore than we can disprove, but in its use, it is “regulative”, and perhaps, the Sabda that so proves him is only appealing to the regulative truth and intuition.

The substance is qualified, as such, true to experience; it is integrally related, therefore, it is real, and as it is distinct from its relations, it is pure and dominating, so as to be called their ground and substrate, and the only one, in the sense of ole ground and owner and ultimate substance. The qualities of the ultimate substance, though possible exaggerations of our own conceptions of beauty, power, goodness, and mercy (daya) are by no means unreal, but really attributable to Brāhmaṇ. However inadequate they might be in themselves. Badarayana himself confesses agreeing with Badari and Asmarathy, that such attributions are only to make it possible for us to conceive the ever
unexhaustible and inexpressible infiniteness of God, between Nature and God, between Nature and the Jīvas, are real. Relations bind only when the dominancy of the objective is characterised by a gripping impotency on the part of the subject, though, even there, the subject does, however inadequately fashion its object. On the other hand, when the subject completely utilises and values its object, then the subject is no longer impotent but is the lord of the object. This measure of potency determines the superiority of Brāhmaṇ, the Absolute Kshetragna or Knower, over the individuals, which measure they do not attain even in their most perfect stage, for they cannot be capable of starting or withdrawing creation (I. i. 2 Janmadasya IV, iv, 17 Jagadvyāpararvarjam samāno jyotiṣa). Though they are then capable of equal enjoyment (IV, iv 21) and attain to equality, samatvam, with the highest. The individual souls are also capable of equality of perfection in union, the individual effects all things like divisibility when released. Imperfection cannot cling to Brāhmaṇ, in the shape of contact with nature or with bodies in its incarnations, for as the passage runs “connexion with one and the same body is for the individual source of disadvantage, while for the highest Brāhmaṇ, it is noting of the sort, but constitutes an accession of glory, in so far as it manifests him as Lord and ruler” (III. ii. 13) ēkasmi tṝvadēhasamyogo jīvasyapuryārthā parasya tu tadbhavam niyamnupiśyart dīptiyōgāṁ.

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1 Dravida Bhāṣya
The relation of substance to its predicates or the modes is made to give the cue to every other relation, viz. subject object, soul-body, whole-part. The part need not be of the nature of the whole, the whole may be spiritual, the part may be material. The whole may not be conceived in terms of extension, the part then could not be derived; as such the part should not be conceived as a khanda or piece of the whole, but only as its inseparable (aprathaksiddha) conjunct.

That which determines the character of the part is its entire dependence on the substance, though khandatva does obtain in the limited sense to material things. Dependence determines amśatva superiority determines substantiveness, viseshya, and wholeness. This absolute dependence being the character of Nature (jagat) and the Jīvas, they constitute as such the parts of Brāhmaṇ.

Concluding, the ultimate substance is One only, it is Intelligence not mere consciousness (aṇubhūti or samvid). The substance is a qualified personality. It has got internal relations as within itself between its modes nature and jivas which form its prakāra. These prakāras are aprathakṣiṇḍhā or inseparable. Brāhmaṇ is the one supreme existence. God with his predicates or God as with his worlds and

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1. Nyāya Siddhanjanam: Vēdanta Charya.
2. cf. Rāmānuja's Conception of Jiva as a Prakara of Īśvara. Prof. P.N.khrīnvāsa Charya.
selves in the real ultimate truth (satyam), not an unrelated bare being or Consciousness. This Ultimate Being stands as the Ultimate Synthesis, the Real Unity, and is the Absolute, real, universal, and Spiritual. He is not something unknowable but something eminently experienceable. He is inexpressible in words, for “from him all speech turns away”, but he is the cause of speech. He is a patent wonder not an unknowable. “Religion is lost if it sinks into the morass of the unknowable infinite in which it can have no foothold,” as a Philosopher says, and Rāmānuja being essentially a religious man, finds that in the last resort, the creed that condemns man eternally to a limitation of knowledge is false. His Brāhman is eminently knowable, lovable, and reciprocative.

“He is the inward ruler of all-the antaryamin”.
CONCLUSION
I

In the first chapter can be distinguished two broad views of causal relation which can never be identified with each other, though that chapter has left it without drawing out clearly the manifest differences between those two. Śrī Rāmānuja himself does not set forth clearly his two views as distinct from each other, and perhaps, identifies one view with the other, as will be showed, in order to yield a unitary conception of Brāhmaṇ as the sole cause.

The first view maintain that there is an identity between the causal totality and effect-totality, the only difference being the difference of condition (avastha), the former unseemal condition of reality (avykta) becoming the manifest actual condition; the undistinguished into names and forms, passing into the distinguished by names and forms. This reality considered as the totality is not Brāhmaṇ merely, but Brāhmaṇ as with his modes (cid-acid-viśiṣṭa - Brāhmaṇ). In which case, the assertion of the total cause as being equal and identical with and having in potentiality all the physical manifestation of the effect within its own bosom, is expressed by the statement “there is non-difference between cause and effect. Kāraṇadanyātkaryam. The upādana, material cause thus would be the Brāhmaṇ with Prakṛti, its absolute dependent.

With the help of this view, Rāmānuja is enabled to accept Satkārāvāda, as also the synthetic relation implied by such an acceptance, that causes as well as effects are as real or as unreal as their effects or causes, for the
effectual state is merely the manifestation of the causal or a distinguishing of the cause into names and forms (nāma-rūpa vibhājana).

The second view, however, is not the same as the former, because the causal condition of the totality of existence is distinguished as within itself as constituted by three entities, viz. Brāhmaṇ, the intelligent finites (jivas) and Matter, the latter two being regarded as the effects of the former. This means that the causal relation is again introduced in the relations subsisting between the entities which compose the whole of reality. But such an application of the causal law is manifestly different from the causal view propounded in the former. The former view, as already pointed out, takes the whole of reality as passing into another condition, the latter view, on the other hand, holds the causal view to mean that conditionedness means effectedness. The former view leads to the conception of the upādha karana of the universe or the material cause; the latter view leads to the conception of the transcendental conditioner or effector of changes seen in the primal elements or constituents of the whole, viz. the changes of contraction and expansion of the range of consciousness in the individual selves as seen in the evolution of different grades of existence, such as the lowest forms of life in the unicellular organisms up to the highest forms of life as typified in the conscious beings, men and gods, if any; and the drastic changes of the raw matter or prakṛti as seen in its infinite splitting or cleavage into infinite forms of physical and physiological organs which form the bodies of the selves. According to the latter view, the cause is not the
totality that passes into another condition, but merely the
external destiner of changes, the transendental enjoyer, and
the immanent sustainer of them both, being their
conditioner. He is the condition of their being what they
are.

In this sense, and in this sense only and with the help of
this second view alone, is Rāmānuja enabled to equate the
causal relation to the soul-body relation and not otherwise.
The definition which he gives what a body is, extended to
every one of the other important relations viz. while-part,
substance-mode or attribute, and in every case, pointed to
obtain and satisfy the definition of the body. Thus
Rāmānuja manages to reduce all relations to one typical
and unitary relation or conception of soul-body. (śarīrī śarīra
bhāva)

This second view also helps him to postulate reasonably
the unchanging nature and incorruptible perfection of the
Brāhmaṇ, who is their Cause in the second sense. He is
unchanging, because he is the external destiner as also the
internal moral governor and the immanent sustainer of the
process and also because, Spirit is incorruptible and cannot
undergo such drastic changes of complexion as matter
does, it being merely the purposive volitive ideal of the
process of matter's changers, and perhaps, throughout its
play or (strivings) it always maintains the character of the
demiurge in nature. And in so remaining unchanging, He
persists as the incorruptible overlord of the process,
destining with Hiss character of Spirit He is, the unfolding of
nature.
By combining both these views, Rāmānuja seeks to make Brāhmaṇ both the immanent cause, according to the first view of the totality passing into another condition, as also the transcendent cause as illustrated by the second view of the whole creation. He finds sufficient reason for maintaining that at the beginning ‘He alone was’, because no one can distinguish, not only historically in the beginning or cause the distinguishing of names and forms, but even logically, no one ought to disjunct the inseparable relations (aprathaksiddha) from one another, and treat them as two separate entities, that can be described to exist apart from one another. For wherever there is a body, there is present its soul, and we do not make any definite judgment, such as ‘there is a body’, ‘here is the soul or mind’, as if they are wandering terms; on the other hand, we only judge ‘so and so is there’, a judgment that gives the higher among them a specific name and means by it the related both.

Brāhmaṇ according to the first view, then, is Brāhmaṇ as integrally related to the jivas and the Prakṛti which form its modes, and for the reason aforesaid can be called He, though correctly speaking, we must speak of it as “He as qualified by his modes” alone was. In the second view, Brāhmaṇ is distinguished as the superior to every other term, as such the most perfect, the omniscient and omnipotent, full of perfections and auspicious qualities, standing as the intimate self, antaryāmin, of all. Also the final end of all is he, he being the most perfect being. The second position does not leave Brāhmaṇ as merely a copy of the God of Deism or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who is the mere maker of the world. But God is regarded to mean the
religious ideal, near and dear to all selves because of the relation which subsists between God and the modes which constitute the Jagat which relation is not such a slender one nor even a dispensable one. When this fact is once realised and valued, we are at once shunted up to the first position that at no stage of evolution, in its causal or effectual condition, was there any separate existence for either, nor was the relation wanting at any time, since they (God and the universe) were bound to each other in an eternal organic bond forming a unity existence. Atasasyavādā cid-acid-sthutaya tatprakāram brahma.

The second section describes the process of differentiation according to the Ramaṇuja theory, the monism of the theory being shown by the unity of control and direction of substance or spirit. And the modes of such a spirit can never be deduced from such a spirit or even conceived to be so derived from a unitary source as do the modern zoologist viz. Haeckel, etc. Even the biologist philosopher, Bergson, does not find it difficult to postulate a unitary principle such as Spirit to be the ultimate from which matter and the rest take their source, even though their cleavage takes place according to the three major currents or phases of reflex, instinct and intelligence. But Rāmānuja finds it difficult to accept such a single-source derivation of the triune entities of matter, finite intelligences and Brāhmaṇ
from any other source or from Brāhmaṇ itself. He rather sees that instead of taking such risks of deduction, he could as well make the two others as not derived but as dependent and completely subject to the Highest among them, namely, Brāhmaṇ. And with the help of the definition he had given of what a body is, he could make all the triune entities assume a unitary appearance or unity. The deep concrete of his theory made it an impossible assumption that he could ever dissolve or attempt to so dissolve, or surrender to the siren-song of metaphysical abstractionism of Buddhistic metaphysics or to the intellectual mores of Pure intellectual Monism.

The real evolution or change consists in the attitudes that primal matter assumes and the forms it takes when in contact with the individual selves, which in turn are willed to assume contraction of consciousness for the purpose of action in the world. Such actions are destined by God at the beginning of creation, so that there may be a real evolution in the bodies of the finite individuals and a corresponding enlargement of consciousness in them and a beautiful manifestation of perfection in Nature. The knowledge, namely, that they have a superior to whom they have to be loyal, who is also at the very moment the imponent of moral law and the intimate self of ours, is

*Cf. Yādava Prākāśa’s Philosophy which resembles Bergson’s just as Bhāskhara’s resembles Fichte’s.*
requisite to the individuals to be more able to control nature and thus be more perfect.

This obligation to fulfil God's will is (when understood) the transcendent moral law and spiritual word, and when not understood, is the fate or Karma. It is out of the scope of the present thesis to attempt to sketch anything like a definition of what karma means, as it is allied to the ethical problem rather than to the metaphysical. However, it is well to suggest here that there are two meanings for that word, one which means action, and another which means the result of actions and the perpetuation of cosmic justice due to such actions or action. Fate means the latter view, which signifies the perpetuation of such divine justice resulting from our actions, good or evil. As to the bondage resulting from such actions good and bad, it is, as already pointed out, the stamp of material environmental adjustments, when considered in the material sense; and considered in the moral sense, the bondage is the infliction of greater suffering on the individual who has acted irrespective of the cosmic law, which cosmic order causes such cosmic repercussions and reactions to effect the individual. Thus these organs of ours are not our own make or creation, but only the make of our actions or karma, our environment, however, is due to the cosmic reaction and make-up accordingly. These organs are not self-determined, but they are rather determined by the actions that have issued from us in this or prior life or lives, which have been motivated towards selfish ends and by desires equally egoistic and selfish.
The differentiating take s place in the Saṅkhyan order till
cosmic elements are formed in order, and in their
combinations is paced the cosmic seed, which contains all
the bound selves under the cosmic governance of Brahma
or Hiranyagarbha (as he is the first to issue from the cosmic
eff). Then the gradual unfoldment of animals, plants, men
and gods etc take place as also the panchekarana-prakriya
or intermixture of elements in specific proportions to form
the various actual elements and things.

The third section defends the realistic thesis that
substance is no bare being but is always substance as
qualified by qualities and modes or relations. It is not mere
consciousness, nor experience devoid of distinctions of
subject and object. It defends the thesis that subject and
object are coeval and one cannot be merged or derived or
surrendered in reality, so as to lose self-identity of its own
nature. They are a Unity in distinction.

Consciousness is the function of the ego and cannot be
treated as the ultimate of which the ego is a centralisation
or focalisation. The ego is the spirit or intelligence;
consciousness is the activity of the cognising subject and is
found whenever the subject cognises. It is the sphere of
consciousness that is limited, as has been more than once
hinted at, and never the ego itself, if it be limited by the
overlaying of Māya, in case it be mere consciousness. The
range of consciousness is the experiential limit of the
subject, and it has got potentiality of infinite extension or
knowing capacity.
From the considerations such as the above, it follows that the substance is characterised by two properties, i.e., modes and qualities. Modes are the related terms of a substance, dependent on the substance for very being. These predicates or ‘modes’ are distinguished from the qualities by their having in turn qualities or guṇas, which might be the same in kind as that of the substance, or of quite a different kind. These modes, prakara as Rāmānuja calls them, are mode because they are dependent on another and are not independent in behaviour though they and independent in existence. Or more correctly, a mode has a specific individuality in existence, a certain distinguishable character, it is an entity (dravya) making it an other though inseparable existence. The definition of mode is its lesser perfection as a thing and dependence which follow such a lesser perfection, making it the mode of such an entity as can control, and direct, and guide, because of its inherent superiority of character over its “others” or modes. Quality is this inherent determiner of character of superiority or inferiority of the terms. It is that which is the measure of perfection, or grade of attainment. The qualities of Brāhatva, omnipotence, and omniscience determine the superiority of Brāhmaṇ over the modes viz., finite selves and matter (Prakṛti), the former, because it cannot compete with Brāhmaṇ, so far as the cosmic controlling power is concerned, which power is the special prerogative of the Highest or Brāhmaṇ, a fact that determines Brāhmaṇ’s greatness; the latter, as it is by essential nature unintelligent, as such exists to be utilised by God, or Spirit or Intelligence, the Supreme Person.
This same fact also determines its wholeness and indivisibility, akhandatva, because a part, considered spiritually, is merely the extension of the spirit and not cut-out portion of the spirit. It is merely a specific function or focus of activity of the spirit in its self-manifestation. The part is thus an absolute dependent of the whole, and not necessarily a piece of the whole, as in the case of material portions of material whole. This explanation gets the advantage of not being culpable of the injustice against matter by dematerialising it or against spirit by materialising it. It secures the general principle, that matter can be at once a part, amsa, of spirit and yet can exist as itself i.e., as matter.

Thus the identity expressed by such clauses as 'The world I He are founded on the principle that Brāhmaṇ or Vishnu pervades the world as its self, in the character of its inward ruler; and is not founded on unity of substance (vastu or dravya) of the pervading principle and the world pervaded'. For one substance (dravya) cannot pass over into the nature of another substance.

\[\text{Jagaccas idam ca tādātmyamantayaumirūpeṇa matyāmyārthi kṛtam na tu vyayāpyayapāryeva kṛtam}\]
\[\text{Paramātmātmānyogah paramārthḥ itiṣyate I Mityet chhanya haṃya hi naiti tadhanya tayat II}\]
In concluding and evaluating the philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja, we have to analyse the method and the positions which Rāmānuja holds.

The method of Rāmānuja is ontological and not epistemological. It does not start from the question of a theory of knowledge, but only from the character of the Existent. Neither does it hold that what is perceived only exists, but what exists is perceivable, and the character of the existent is not something added, conditioned, or manufactured by the knowing subject. Nor is it a method that thinks that subject-object relation is the starting point in any ontological enquiry. The epistemological conclusion is only a portion of the ontological and supports the ontological.

Rāmānuja is an idealist in the sense of accepting Spirit to be the ultimate substance, and not in the sense that Idea is the ultimate. The “Absolute Idea” theory suits the Neo-Hegelian writers, and the Transcendental Idealism suits the epistemological mind of Kant and Sankara perhaps.

Rāmānuja accepts no triadic synthesis of the Hegelian system. And one can confidently assert that no system of Indian Thought accepts such a thesis, antithesis, and synthesis movements. But he independently accepts the theory of distincts of Signor Croce, though it is also quite apparent that there is no such circular ideal progression of the distincts. There is implication without transition and ascent maintained, though one must not think in an
epistemological or logical enquiry as that of Croce, refuse such an ascent or transition in thought as well as life.

The substance Rāmānuja accepts, is the substance of ordinary conception, a “thing” different though never apart from its qualities, even the aggregate of qualities, which form its “nature”, since qualities as qualifying in turn qualities would lead to infinite regress, which is the case, even in the case of relations where the terms of the relation are reduced to relations. The qualities in the aggregate define the “nature of the thing” (Svarūpa) though we must definitely hold that the “thing” is the substance which is related in quite a different, perhaps, more definitely immanent way than the relations. There is no substance which has not qualities and relations. And as relations are “between” things, atleast between two things, there follows that there are bound to be many substances. But the Monism which Rāmānuja achieves is peculiar to his system alone as it reduces all the many substances to the level of a unitary existence called the Brāhmaṇ in which they move, and live and have their Being. The relations which characterise Brāhmaṇ is “with” his modes, which form with him the unitary reality or Existent. And for the reasons adduced already, with the help of implication of distincts under the superior, the Higher among them is called the Truth, which means also the reality and truth of the lower as existing with the Higher as its mode, amsa or Prakara, or Vīṣeṣhana or Sarīra.

Unlike Berkeley, Leibniz, and McTaggart, Rāmānuja holds to the reality of Nature or Matter more definitely
though he is cautious enough to assert, and herein is his best known and cardinal point of his system—that the relation between the Absolute Spirit and Matter is one of soul and body; the Pervading and the Pervaded stand in the relation of “Sariri-Sarīra bhava” or Soul-body relation, which relation is never absent at any time. It is this relation and the qualities of pervading, sustaining and enjoying and other infinite derivative characteristics of omniscience, omnipotence issuing from the characteristic of spirit, which is Truth, Intelligence and Eternity, Satyam, Jnanam, Anantham, that make Brāhmaṇ really Existent as substance. Therefore is Brāhmaṇ Saguṇa and Savisesha, where characteristics of relation and qualities are in force.

Therefore the whole trend of Rāmānuja’s enquiry is founded upon the character of the existent which is reality, and not a something called Reality, achieving or self-fulfilling or self-fulfilled at an end. The ultimate is spirit as controlling supporting and enjoying matter and individual selves, and as the existent is never anything without this relation, it stands to argue that spirit is the soul or substance whose predicates are the worlds and selves. The relation thus becomes an immanent relation not convertible into quality by any means but absolute all the same. The relations as between the different individual selves (which are substances also) and matter are external relations.

But the method is not inductive essentially as might be seen, it is a priori, meaning by such an assertion, that the initial belief starts from the Sabda or the Scriptures which include all the range of mythical and Philosophic lore and
the Pañcarātra agama, too. The meaning of the priori then is not western in any sense as before experience, though that too forms a portion of the way of inquiry. But the ontological method seeks help or refuge or verification from the “Character of the Existent”, and therefore Ramanuja whenever he asserts the reality of experience, of relations and qualities, calls upon the enquirer to look to perception-date and sense-date and even goes far enough to assert that whenever there is a hopeless rift between our experience in its purity and that of the Scriptural statement, it is our experience that ought to count. But all the same, he is content to affirm that the Scriptures are not contradictory to experience at all, if only one interprets them naturally.

III

In evaluating any philosophic system that claims truth, it is necessary that we should pay less heed to its special theological views, which may be true or false or merely fantastic and imaginary, whilst they may interest us by their novelty or freshness as such. Our aim consists in evaluating its logical satisfactoriness. But this initial statement is not meant to mean any thing against the religious and ethical ideals that, in fact, form the bed-rock of life, and without which there can be no endeavour towards logical reconstruction of experience at all. Far from such an obnoxious limitation of the sphere of philosophising to mere consistent intellectual formulation of partial phases of reality, as defined by the causal sequence, and evolution, and ontological status of Being, and whilst never forgetting to
value a truth for its truth-claim, we should always correct our truth-valuation by its ethical and religious results and consequences, and seek to satisfy those demands of the soul, more demanding, indeed, than even truth. For as Lotze says, "the beginning of metaphysics is not in itself but in ethics".\(^1\) Consistency every or any system may have, but consistency is not everything either in logic or in ethics: for whilst a theory may be a consistent formulation as far as it goes, it may not be true, though it is certainly true to assert that truth is and should be consistent. So also everything that is useful is not true though truth must need be useful. Truth must satisfy, and has an intrinsic character of satisfaction. Value is the corrective to Truth. In such relative degrees as any philosophical system achieves the world-view in all its diverse real phases, and formulates its theory consistent with such a world-view, it approximates to reality. And further, as Śrī Vedanta Desika somewhere\(^2\) very finely puts it, no system can claim reality or truth because it a view or belief that has been prevailing from time immemorial, and deride another view because it is a thing of yesterday; the only test that can determine truth is when it has stood the test of experience, just as gold when

\(^1\) "There is nothing more real than what comes in religion ....The man who demands a reality more solid than that of religious consciousness knows not what he seeks". Appearance and Reality. Bradley. P. 449.

\(^2\) Yatiraja Saptati 57 Sloka..
rubbed against touchstone proves its purity from other alloys.

Reality in its manifestation revels its potential beauty and goodness and sustains itself by its truth-character. Reality manifests itself because, to be is to manifest. It manifests not on account of any want of perfection which it seeks to attain, nor in the way that evil and falsity make themselves commendable and appreciable. Evil and falsity have a borrowed and disguised character which by an 'effort' seek to attain a dignity they essentially have not. Reality, on the other hand, does not seek by an 'effort' to be; it self-realises itself, it appreciate itself in its own manifestations. Its existence cannot be challenged, nor can its self-appreciating process, which the universe of manifestation is. Its appreciableness and commendability, its truth, beauty, and goodness, is its very positive character; its value consists in itself. Reality thus having such character of intrinsic value, cannot be said to have no effective existence. But to have an effective existence is to be self-manifest. Evolution is this outward and extended character of reality in its self-manifestative activity. Its living is its evolution or manifestation of beauty and goodness. Thus value, or intrinsic value, is the fire-test that truth has to stand, before it can claim truth. Truth and value are intrinsically bound together. Virtue is knowledge, said Socrates, and Rāmacaṇḍa agrees with him in holding that not only is knowledge virtue, but that knowledge is power. From being to expression, from truth to goodness, from knowing to activity, is the inevitable transition. To gain knowledge is to give to activity a divine positive intrinsicsality
of truth-character, namely, goodness. The practical expression of a theoretic truth may be defined to be goodness. The attempt at the knowledge of reality (Brahma-jijnasa) is made, not only because such an effort is intrinsically valuable as throwing open to us new vistas of experiences, but also because, it is the only way by which one is enabled to live a good life, a life in tune with the infinite reality, its purposes, and infinite ends. (I. i. 1.)

A denial of life and its values or value, involves a denial of reality and its life, and such a denial is not only a self-contradiction but a self-stultification. It is based on an increasing anxiety to get rid of life, a tendency towards morbid quietism. It is a moral revulsion which over-emphasized translates itself either into sceptisism or nihilism or mysticism or all of them in quick succession, because thought cannot rest content in any or all of these. Such is the transition and evolution of Buddhistic thought which ran through all these above phases culminating in Advaita, its last phase and logical product. It is thus life that in its movement leads to such typhoons in the thought-sphere. It reveals how far the practical revulsions may determine the logical, and defeat its purposes, but that does not imply the non-utility of truth or the unreality of the practical.

Any theory that doubts the truth or reality of the life of spirit, or its worth, treating them to be either as unreal or phenomenal or subjective and imaginary, firstly, has involved itself in self-contradiction, because it is an affirmation of the impossibility of knowledge, which affirmation is itself an affirmation of the knowledge about it;
secondly, has involved itself in self-stultification, because it is an affirmation of the unattainability of real goodness or worth, which evaluation is itself a valuation. Thus once we grant that thought (our thought) can know reality as it is in itself and does not make it or distort it, and that reality is expressive, because of its fullness, and for the self-same reason, exhibit or self-manifests itself to itself through selves or minds; and once we grant also that truth has got intrinsic value, which means a value not dependent on any one mind, nor many minds, that I, neither individual-subjective nor social-subjective, but universal or general-subjective, as valuable in its own merit, and that the effectivity of truth is its capacity to aid a greater realisation of ourselves, and that Truth is not only achievable but worth achieving, since it gives a positivity to activity, and power to the act or volition, then we steer clear off the clogging channels of scepticism and self-contradiction.

Activity binds only when it is done through ignorance of the laws of the world, through ignorance of God and his will. As the famous Isha Upanishad verse runs 'action cling not to man, na karma lipyate nare and one should seek to live a hundred years doing action. Kuvainēha karmāṇ ājīvīṣetu šatasamaḥ' And later on, the same Upanishad goes on to say that through Avidya (meaning by that action) one crosses over death, through Vidya he gains immortality. There is nothing that should make us shirk from action. Action, not knowledge is the final effort. Knowledge leads to perfect action, and action directed towards knowledge gives perfect knowledge. They are mutual dependent, forming an ideal circular progression leading to the actual spiral ascent
of individual life leading to perfect knowledge, and therefore, perfect action. Yogaḥ: Karmēsu Kauśalam

Such considerations as the former, lead to the view that a pure monism such as the static Absolute of Advaita is unmeaning and contradictory of experience, since all process I rules out as unreal and fictitious, and all activity, even of manifestation of itself and its perfections, is declared to be an activity of egoism, as such upadaic and unreal, and cannot and ought not to be predicated of the Absolute. But wherein lies its worthiness or commending character? It cannot commend itself to itself, since it cannot commend itself except by its ‘expressing’, the which it does not; nor is such an Absolute commending to me, because do not know it at all, because all attempts at knowing it are unavailing and distorting. Perhaps one can as well ask who is to see and who is to know? Advaita which denies life of the Absolute, or in other words, denies manifestation of the reality except under the condition of distortion and imperils very life, it’s value and the value of the moral striving and religious realising of the individuals. All true activity, as is the manifestation of perfection or potential capacity, as seen even in the case of an artist or sculptor or poet, is an activity of self-appreciation, or if we remove the sting behind the word, is an activity of self-love. The relation between Being and manifestation is further an organic one, and intrinsic. That being the case, to deny this organic bond between manifestation and manifestor, or the relation between the universe and God, in order to accentuate he contrast of the Brahman’s worthiness with that of the world or Jagat, and to deny the worthiness and
reality of the universe whilst recommending the knowledge of God, is to ask us to appreciate that which has no intrinsic character of appreciableness or self-commendability. A monism achieved through such a simple method of denial of reality to the world, is certainly not a real monism but a mere singularism. Such a singularism which the identity implies, is absolutely uncommanding and untrue. Unity does not mean singularism or inerlia.

Truth has got value, and value is the corrective to abstractionistic Absolutistic biases. That is on criterion of truth.

Thought can know reality and can represent reality in terms of thought. That is a position that all real idealism accepts and all realism ought to accept if it should escape the solipsistic and sceptical alternatives. Knowledge is not any thing unconnected with experience but is what which is true to experience व्यवहार्युण सान्तप्रथम. Ramaṇuja takes his stand firmly on experience as we know it and does not go beyond it, except when called for by the scriptures, which along with the orthodox schools he fully accepts. But whilst accepting them, he yet thinks that the texts must be interpreted in a way that is consonant with the experience that we aware if, and in the way which reason could accept. And if scriptures are trust worthy, they must, inspite of temporary ex-aggerations of unity and multiplicity, express a fundamental synthesis of both, and any interpretation worth its name should conduce to express the synthetic view which must be at once rational and real. Such a synthesis, Ramaṇuja achieves by his strict logical method.
Ramaṇuja could not understand how knowledge could drive out activity, or even that activity is inferior to knowledge, for in the one case, it is precisely knowledge that gives power or worth to activity, and in the other case, knowledge is organically united to activity. The intellectual impotency to grasp the essential synthesis of knowledge and activity, of gnana and karma, leads to the Sankarite dualism or rather contrarism between them, which postulates that to ‘know’ truth (सत्य) were to sublate activity or to cease functioning. Experience reveals on (a priori) synthesis which is characterised by the dualisms of spirit and matter, minds (souls) and bodies, unity and multiplicity, etc., which when accentuated into clear-cut distinctions of disparate character, leads us to treat them because of their disparate character, as opposites rather than as distincts, yielding thus, as Hegel sketches, a triadic movement rather than a dyadic ideal transition. But Sankara and Kant do not ask us to abandon “our conceptions of the natural world, nor even, in our daily, life cease to believe in it; we are to be idealists only north-northwest or transcendentally; when the wind is southerly we are to remain realists......” as Santayana remarks.

IV

The principle of Negation in Śrī Ramaṇuja’s Philosophy.

To Ramaṇuja more than to Sankara, one must believe from their works, the full meaning and implications of the Principle of Negation was very clear. In the consideration of the principle of negation, which is a very vital problem in knowledge as Bradley and Bosanquet in recent times have
shown, we have to take note of contradiction and contrariety. "All determination is negation," and "all negation is determination". The Spinozistic axiom as well as the Hegelian corrective dictum are true. To negate certain determinations is to assert or affirm their contraries. Bare negation is meaningless\footnote{...If ....being of nature of opposite to non-intelligence and so on be not admitted as attributes of consciousness (an\u0928\u093f\u0928\u094d\u093e\u0902\u0924\u093e\u0930)—whether of a positive or negative kind—in addition to its essential nature it is altogether unmeaning proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the like, \textit{Sr\i Bh\u0939\u093f\u091c\u093e\u0930\u093e\u0924\u094d\u0930\u0940} i. i. pp. 55.}. The defect of Spinoza as also of Sankara lies exactly in this, that by denying all determinations to Being, they intended to make Being all perfect. Unfortunately the Hegelian principle did not appeal to them. What Hegel was to Spinoza, Rama\u0140\u011fu\u012bj\u0101 was to Sankara. But this comparison between Hegel and Rama\u0140\u011fu\u012bj\u0101 holds only so far as this particular proposition holds, and I must think it breaks even a few steps later as we shall show, that whilst Hegel resembles Sankara in merging activity and though in a final synthesis by treating them as opposites, Rama\u0140\u011fu\u012bj\u0101 resembles Signor Croce by adopting them to be distincts and reals. But to proceed, Spinoza did not see that determination of character does not always mean to limit the perfection of the thing so determined. Instead, to define being is to establish its truth, is to make it be what it is, and that certainly is not to make it imperfect.
Our thought, says Croce, in investigating reality finds itself face to face not only with distinct but opposite concepts. The latter cannot be identified with the former. The logical category of distinctions is one thing, and the category of oppositions is another. Where one enters the other disappears. The opposite concept is slain by its opposite e.g., fancy and intellect, true and false, activity and passivity, life and death, being and non-being etc. It is impossible to confuse the two series, so conspicuously do they differ." .....

"The opposites are abstractions, the distinct are real." The unity of distinct is as much a reality as the unity of opposites. The distinct that in order supersedes that below it, is implied in the existence of that under which it is subsumed, indeed, the higher organically implicates the latter's existence within its own being. The utterance of truth implicates the intuition which gave birth to it. Truth does not slay its existence or ballast it; it raises, lifts it to the logical status. Likewise when we speak of spirit we have inevitably implicated matter which is possessed by it./ Matter or presentation is passive, but surcharged with spirit, it is truth and activity at the same time.

If follows that in every negation, two ideas may be involved, (1) either the abstraction of the same, or (2) the affirmation of every thing except this or other than this. Thus when we speak of non-truth, it may mean, firstly,

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1 What is living and what is dead of the Philosophy of Hegel. (pp 8-32) and Logic Part-II.
falsity (an abstraction), or secondly, practical activity, or even feeling or intuition. Thus we see that to deny truth essentially does not mean to affirm falsity alone. It may mean assertion of its being of quite a different order of existence, as beauty, or intuition, or goodness, or usefulness. Croce, in criticising Hegel for confusing the two un-confusable series, says that in all definition of truth, intuition or representation is organically implicated, and this implication is not of the kind of implication of an abstraction which is an ‘overcoming’ and slaying of falsity, but an implication of a real thing within itself. No knowledge can arise without an objective presentation or intuition. Only after such an experience had taken place, can its truth be as much as questioned, and the minute the truth-value of the same be questioned, the aesthetic intuition is lifted to the logical status of a truth. Here the intuition is a real existence as much as the truth which implicates it and organises it. And all activity of the practical, viz of utility and morality, is poised on this knowledge or truth, distorted in the former case, and true, in the latter case. It would follow that there is an ideal history of implicative process of real experiences and things under higher ones, a circular movement as it were from aesthetic intuition to logical truth, and from truth to activity, and back again to the aesthetic which is thus grasped and used.
To Sankara, the world is a hallucination, a world, it is unreal, (let us not make much of its "phenomenal reality") and will be slain when truth is known and reached; indeed having no worthiness the world has nothing of value; and though it is sometimes held that the world without Brahman is alone treated to be unreal, yet the main stress is always about its unreal nature. There would be no quarrel if it were held and that consistently, that without Brahman the world cannot be, for that exactly is what Ramaṇuja seeks to make clear by his analysis of experience and by his peculiar conception of the relation and metaphysical unity of Brahman and the world as soul and body (Sarīra-Sarīrabhava). But Māya of Sankara is founded on ignorance, as such is overcome by true knowledge, in which case, the world of names and forms would pass away as some far-off dream, dreamt in moments of ignorance (avidya) and when under the influence of avidya (prakriti). Matter, Māya, avidya, which all signify the same thing, would all vanish at the rising of knowledge, and would be completely annihilated so far as that person is concerned who has achieved the highest knowledge or Unity leaving only pure consciousness which alone is real and eternal. The former are all eternal unrealities because, abstractions,

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All mystics which Sankara, Ramaṇuja and others are, are very much more concerned about the value of the world as against their idea of value. The world is to them of insignificant value. It is a question of value that makes the problem of Maya efficient but it also is not the question of reality.
though real phenomenal entities, functioning from eternity (मिस्याभूतं समातनं) and slain by truth, yet persisting because mysteriously involved, and existing in the shadow of reality. They certainly are not related to truth in any way, not only because they cannot continue except as false impotent existences, but also because, for Sankara, relations can obtain only between real entities and there is only one such real entity; and further, relations themselves are inexplicable and lead to infinite regress, the other entities must therefore be unreal yet existing entities.

To Rāmānuja, however, the world is real, but its reality is subsumed and organically implicated in the existence of God or Absolute Spirit, just as the body is originally implicated in the existence of mind or spirit, and is dependent upon it, and without that dependence nothing could be. They are mutually dependent, but the higher distinct is truth and is one only and is Spirit, as such the dependence is of the lower on the higher. The relation being between real entities and a unitary conception being made possible, Rāmānuja sees no reason why any trouble should arise, and why reality should be denied to any real entity. 'What is, is real, because it persists.' ¹ This mutually dependent relation between truth and intuition, spirit and matter, knowledge and activity, is fully stressed by Ramaṇuja. To make it still more clear that Ramaṇuja does not confuse the 'two unconfusable series' as Sankara

¹. Śrī Bhāṣya. I. i. 1.
seems to have done, and that the full implications of the principle of negation were completely appreciated by him, it is necessary to point to certain passages in the Śrī Bhāṣya.

Avidya is interpreted to mean ignorance by Advaitins in the already quoted famous Isha text. But the text would be meaningless if it were interpreted in that wise. By ignorance one cannot cross over death. Ramanuja on the other hand, claims that such an interpretation would be not only meaningless and absurd, it would contradict every other text. "Whether we view non-knowledge (avidya) as a positive entity, or as the antecedent non-knowledge (abhava) of knowledge, in either case, it comes out as wheat the word indicates, viz. non-knowledge (avidya). Non-knowledge means either absence of knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or that which is contradictory to knowledge; and in any of these cases, we have to admit that non-knowledge presupposes cognition of the nature of knowledge. Even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require the knowledge of the nature of light; yet when darkness is considered under the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes cognition of light." Ramanuja after sketching the above meanings and implications of the word Avidya, proceeds to explain that, that in the Isha text the word "avidya" means only works (niyamita karma). "The non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being the means of overcoming death,

1. Śrī Bhāṣya i. i. 1. (pp 110. Trans.) cf (p. 71)
can only mean that which is ‘other’ than knowledge, viz. prescribed works. Thus Ramaṇuja treats works as ‘other’ than knowledge. Further he goes on to say that “knowledge does not destroy a real thing”, because it is absence of knowledge or the wrong knowledge that is destroyed by knowledge. And criticising Advaita which holds that ajñāna is a positive entity, he adds that “ajñāna which is a positive entity cannot be destroyed by knowledge; just because it is a positive entity like jars and similar things”. Further he does on to suggest, that knowledge is incapable of destroying the emotions and affections. “Fear and other affections are not destroyed by knowledge; they rather pass away by themselves being of a temporary nature only, and on the cessation of their cause they do not arise again.” Thus he holds that ajñāna as contradictory to knowledge cannot be a positive entity, and it is a positive entity only when interpreted to mean other than knowledge or works.

So far the direct references in the Śrī Bhāṣya itself. We can now safely refer to the other work of his, equally important as Śrī Bhāṣya, for further substantiation of the view we have expounded as being the real view of Ramaṇuja. In commenting on the 17th and 18th verses of

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1. Ibis (p. 18) cf. Vedṛtha Samgraha of Śrī Ramaṇuja.
2. Ibid (116p)
3. Ibid (114p)
4. Śrī Bhāṣya l. i. 1. (116.)
the IVth chapter of the Bhagavad Gīta, Ramaṇuja means by the three terms, Karma, Vikarma and Akarma, action, manifold duties of life (vividha karma) and Gnana. In the former instance of the Isha text avidya is interpreted to mean vidyetarar; now in the Gīta passage akarma is interpreted to mean karmetarar (other than karma). One should take that whenever the term is used as contradicting or negating a particular concept, it does not essentially follow that the negation means the opposite. In every case the immediate needs of the passage (prastuta) must be consulted. It is, however, the special way of interpretation which no other commentator,¹ either ancient or modern has followed. Bal Gangadhar Tilak in his Gīta Rahasya means by akarma, naishkama karma or karma that has lost its egoistic craving force.² Śrī Arvinda Ghosh³ translated in his Isha Upanishad, Avidya a Ignorance, which is a consciousness of multiplicity merely, without the consciousness of unity underlying the multiplicity. I personally think the interpretation of Ramaṇuja beings with vivid force the nature of negation, and also that wherever a negation is used between two real entities, there is no other way of interpreting a text except in the way of recognizing it to be a district. In which case, the principle of distincts

¹. It is true that Śrī Sankra means in the Isha passage by Avidhya. Karma, but he does not explain so clearly, and further his Karma is due to Ignorance.
would lead to a subsuming process by the higher of the lower yielding synthesis of distincts.

Ramaṇuja is a anakarmasamuchayavadin, it may be claimed, and there is no reason for us to deny uch a characterisation of his philosophy of life and conduct. But unlike Bhaskara, who is pre-eminently the anakarmasamu chayavadin, he holds to a personal theism, and as his commentary clearly shows, he holds that in the unity of these two, ana and Karma they somehow transform themselves into Bhakti or Love, and that is the highest achievement of Unity with the Brahman and is the Goal of the खङ्घु.

We have shown thus far that this system has almost analytically soled the problem of Philosophy by its clear and lucid explanations of the moot points in logic and epistemology, idealism and realism and the problem and meaning of negation, and perfection and reality and their infinite grades, and the inseparable synthesis of life and knowledge. In a word, the problem of the one and the many that masquerades in an immensity of colour and variety is solved by the acceptance of the synthesis in life of mind and body, matter and spirit, in the fusion of experience, not that experience is the ultimate thing or entity, but that these two, matter and spirit, mind and body, find in the activity of creation a fusion that is inseparable and at once involved in the higher fruition of experience and
enjoyment for both the entities.¹ The philosophy of Ramaṇuja is at once realistic, empericistic, idealistic, and pragmatistic. It is founded on the bed-rock of religious craving and logical knowing. Even if we remove the mass of scriptural evidence that Ramaṇuja marshals to prove the validity of his theory and the orthodox character of his system, yet there is substantial ground for recognising the truth-value of his system to be very high. This is an appreciation as much as one could grant. If one who is impatient of the views expressed of the future of the soul after death and release which the last adhyaya of the sutras and most of the Vedantic writers suggest, would but turn to the former chapters of that work and focus his attention on Ramaṇuja’s criticism of the theory of consciousness, and his distinction between attributes and qualities, and his spiritual explanation of the relation between whole and part, as also the relation between matter and spirit as soul and body, and his appreciation of the Theory of Distincts, these facts are enough to grant to the author a very high place in philosophy for all time. The method of the author is very vigorous, synthetic, and finely alive to the wholistic view of reality. It ballasts not existence from life or “reality,” countenances no quietistic life nor denies the manifold experiences of real life and its functions that need fulfilment, and that much is enough to grant it the palm in philosophy. The worship of the “God of religion” is the “intellectual love”

¹ Rahasyatraya Sara of Śrī Vedana Desika
of the Being that Spinoza so rapturously spoke about, and the "intellectual sympathy" with reality. It is this kinesis of feeling, religion, and thought, that all real existence demands. To understand in thought, to feel it in the soul, to act it in body in all their intimate triple unity is the action of the highest, and that is what the finite wants to grow into, and that is the goal and the ultimate destiny of the individual personality. After all, the goal of evolution is the realisation of the highest type in the lower, the ascent of the lowest to the highest, the descent of the highest in the lower, the release of the lower into the higher worlds of realisation (for God is the bridge, setu, as also the goal), he is the means as also the end of the evolution of the individual, as the Sutras suggest. The highest self may be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being realised; "the self cannot be reached by the Veda, and so on; he whom the self chooses by him the self can be reached or gained" (II. ii. 34). The goal of knowledge, of all striving after truth is a realised individuality, it is not a mere stereoscopic presentation of the totality of the universe or World's, like the vision of Arjuna as in the eleventh chapter of Bhagavad Gītā, though that might be incidental (As it was incidental) in the experience of the conscious individuality of ourselves. It is the constant power to act like Gods, the fulfilled individuals, to remain the free expressions of the Highest truth or reality or Spirit, call it what you like, as possessors of a power of reflection and insight which would enable us to realise our place in relation to their beings, and to grasp their meaning by the free activity of thought. In a word, the aim is to be perfect conscious channels of force, and of the activity and will of God, the Highest Brahman. To know in
that sense Brahman is to become Brahman, to become at one with him, at unity with his will. This is the destiny of knowledge, this is to know, and to become Brahman, where knowledge, and achievement are unified in a vital experience. This is truth and being, logic and metaphysics, finding solace in the bosom of reality recognised as a vital experience.

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**APPENDIX**

On the concept of 'Species' and 'particulars' and the Concrete Universal in Ramaṇuja's Sri Bhāṣya.

The idea of species or genus or concept, and intuition or individual or particular, have been the moot point in all philosophies in the East as well as the West. Towards the unravelling of this problem so far as the Śrī Bhāṣya is concerned only slight hints are thrown out, and those scanty hints are enough to reveal to us, the real opinion of the author regarding this problem.
To trace the history of the ‘concept’ in the West, we have to start with Plato, to whom the concepts or ideas have a real but non-existent character, or more truly, the ideas for Plato are the archetype of the individuals and have a one-to-one correspondence, living elsewhere from the actual. They are more real because less pliable to change; that is, to put it more bluntly, less existent, and more universal because absorbing or rather subsuming a very great, if not all intuitions within it or under it, as the ‘idea’ God does. Further, from this idea, the actuals take existence. Plato had treated ideas a causes of things and the highest of them as the ultimate cause of all reality and of all knowledge.\(^1\)

Aristotle had made the idea or concept the ‘form’, and the individual the ‘matter’, and rightly opposed the separate existence of ‘form’ somewhere else as Plato had done; the existence of ‘form’ is no where else than in the ‘matter’ and there is no ‘matter’ without ‘form’, though here he falters just like Bergson, as he maintained quite unjustly to logic, that Absolute ‘form’ or God could exist without ‘matter’, or ‘spirit’ without matter.

When we come to Scotus Erigena, we find that he postulates that ‘God is the supreme unity and that by a process of evolution from the general to the particular, the individual things were produced by him. First come forth

\(^1\) Pheado 96 et sqq.
the highest genera, then the lower and finally individuals. God alone truly is; he is the essence of all things; they do not exist outside of him, but he is their very substance.¹

Spinoza’s “fixed and eternal things”—the idea—are universals, abstractions, but universals treated as though they were in some sense concrete things. (Spinoza’s view was that Being is the highest concrete entity, for out of abstract the concrete can never arise) and are real causes. The highest universal being that from which every individual character has been deprived was of highest perfection, because least limited in universality. To be limited means, to be limited in universality to the exclusion of some qualities (even negative) which a true universal must subsume. This line of argumentation culminates in giving rise to a Being that is an abstraction.

The concrete Universal and abstract Universal.

The identification of concrete universal with an abstract universal no one should tolerate. I agree with Prof. Fullerton when he says that “the attempt to make universals (abstract) causes, yet, keep them universals (abstract) has been the source of much vague and loose reasoning.”² I also agree with him when he says that “it is simply the attempt to make them concrete and abstract at the same

¹ Ueberweg’s Hist of Philosophy Vol.1 sec. 90
² Spinoza; Prof Fullerton’s trans. (brackets my own)
time.” Causes are always concrete, and can never be abstract, and the so-called universals or ideas or thought or generic characters are not concrete at all, being so, how could they act as ‘causes’ of individual concrete existence? To make generic quality or even thought or concept, the cause of the actual individual is simply meaningless. When a ‘form’ is said to be the cause of ‘matter’, thought said to be the cause of intuition, we are left with a doubt whether these reasoners could not derive the impossibles from the absolutely non-existent or sunya. To produce a concrete existence, a concrete alone could be capable; to even will a concrete existence, only a concrete existence would be capable. This ‘ideas’ as Aristotle clearly understood, are not anything but the ‘form’ coincident and inseparable from ‘matter’; they are the specific ‘forms’ of the individuals, and there could be no causal relation between ‘form’ and ‘matter’, species and individual, for the attempt is to make ‘form’ or species something concrete which they essentially are not, the which they must be, if they out to the causes at all. It is meaningless to speak of ‘causing’ as if there is an actual ‘evolution’ as Scotus Erigena definitely suggests, between ‘form’ and matter, or even between spirit and matter, except in the sense indicated by the first chapter, viz. the conditioning relation or inseparable (aprathiksiddha) relation of dependence between the higher and the lower distinct in the relation, for they belong to two distinct orders of existence. Concepts belong to the sphere of ‘thought’, the particulars to the sphere of ‘fact’, in spite of the fact that thought or concept finds its ground nowhere else than in the ‘fact’, the species in the individual, and no true logic
should attempt to keep them resident elsewhere than in the fact or sensum. Benedetto Croce realised this fact so clearly that the concept is, he maintained\(^1\), resident in the fact, as such only is it concrete; it is universal, because being in each and every ‘representation’ it is not exhausted by any one of them.

But such a concreteness and universality is due to either the inseparable residence or immanence in the ‘fact’, and such a residence or immanence is merely an organic bond, or rather, it is the nature of the fact itself, as Croce would maintain and as Aristotle suggested, and that is merely nothing. Laws or the body of truths, called mathematical laws, and now, perhaps, we may add the physical laws of the world, despite the relativity theory of today, are “recalcitrant to such a mode of treatment as connected with concrete reality” and cannot be “confined to brute fact”, for they “are completely and unconditionally true, independently of their place in this or that particular mind…”\(^2\), though “truth is not truth if it be not real.” And though “they are brought into some sort of relation to and bearing upon reality.”\(^2\) In a sense and in a very concrete sense, being independent of particular minds and things, they are truly abstract, and only concrete in this sense of always in function as ‘form’ of all things. To give concreteness in a sense, is to take away the implicate of

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\(^1\) Logic part I. sec. III.

\(^2\) Philosophical Problems, Lindsay.
universality in some sense or other, and to give them the universality is to tinge them with the air of an abstraction of thought. All the same, it is concrete, that we can admit. Let alone the concepts of Pure Mathematics, even the very Crocean concepts of time, space, quality, development, final cause etc., are eternally necessary for anything to be or to exist. They, like the Kantian categories, are very necessary for the world of experience to be. In a word, these are "formal" categories that have to be eternally and cannot exist elsewhere than in the things for them to be. Neither could they themselves be considered apart from the world which they form, (I dare not put in the word "manifest" as that would mean more than what one could grant), for ballasted from existence they could not be, not to speak of being true concepts.

Thus the Crocean "concept" does not escape the "formal" character, though to do justice to his concept, formal character is not limited to cow, horse, etc., and such like generic "ideas", but is truly universal and immanent in the real and in A Priori Synthesis with the intuition. In the formal constituent of reality, it resembles the generic character, which character is a surface similarity. The "concept" is a fundamental universal formal character; the generic character is a similarity of "Form" between a large number of particulars. In either case, they being merely the form of the individual, are not concrete. In fact, the concreteness of the concept is a borrowed character, because of residence in the fact and not in itself though Croce would stoutly oppose such a characterisation of his concept. This is what Ramañuja says, when he defines, or
rather accepts the definition, that “species if the form of the Individual,” and does not “manifest” the individual as the absolutists and Platonists suggest. Therefore in the last resort, the universality of the concept is not and cannot claim the concreteness that is claimed by its votaries; it is an abstract character, and the attempt to make it the “cause” of the individual is justly condemned by Prof. Fullerton.

Spirit or intelligence is no abstract entity; it is concrete to its core and inmost essence. Its universality is a universality that goes along with its concrete character. It is no borrowed character. And how?

Existence has different meanings according as to whether we predicate it of the body or mind or spirit. “When we say that a body exists, we mean that it adversely occupies space, during some intervals of time, when we say that a “mind” exists we mean that it is an activity enduring through continual change. There are no spatial outlines which limit minds and prevent their interpenetration.”

Thus spirit has the pervasive character or the interpenetrative capacity, which is the same as the capacity to utilise, to subsidise every material entity, it knowing no spatial outlines and temporal barriers. The spirit, or “mind” (to adopt the western terminology) is the active principle, be

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Prof. W. Carr: The Theory of Monads.
it ever so much as an active pacific principle (as it is in the case of withdrawal from activity), which endures through all the changing directions or contents, never essentially undergoing transformation of character or annihilation of itself due to absorption in matter. Change in substantial character it never has, as is the case with matter, for its nature is to inflict its purposes through all the changing flux of experience or matter as it evolves in time. Thus it has been said by Ramaṇuja that “the origination and so on are the characteristics of the material objects and do not belong to the subjects” or souls (which are the spiritual entities which have the pervasive capacity) and “the latter are eternal”. Spirit or intelligence is thus characterised by activity in its own nature, and in its direction, it is intelligent. This character of the spirit determines its pervasive ‘presence’ or existence is that of an entity rather than of a concept; its residence in ‘matter’ is not like its ‘form’, which ‘form’ is an idea, a volition of the intelligence itself and these ‘forms’ or species may be as many as there are things, and we have said also that there are a few ‘forms’ to which everything in existence must conform and they form the body of ‘true concepts’ or ‘categories’, universal in range as distinguished from the species or generic ‘ideas’. The concreteness of spirit is not mainly in its residence, but in its power to use, to change, to construct and to manifest itself, in matter, or existence or intuition. The concreteness of the species or concept is only its ‘presence’ as against ‘manifesting’ of the spirit. Mere ‘form’ is certainly not capable of “manifestating” the individual; on the other hand, spirit is capable of ‘manifesting’ the ‘form’ in matter. Whilst
it may truly be said that the individual soul is incapable of “manifesting” “forms” in matter, in its released state it may do that with the help of the will of God. The supreme spirit is that which “manifests” the “forms” and through them his own purposes; it is that which is called the creative activity of evolution. And his pervasive capacity as Antaryāmin of everything that exists determines the concreteness to an extent that is not merely “formal” but supremely organic. God or spirit pervades the individuals, persons and things, in the same way as the metaphor goes as “oil pervades the seed”. From Brahma to a blade of grass आब्हासम्बपर्यन्त्तम everything has its self in that. His transcendence again is not limited to the non-exhaustibility of the “formal” character by any of the “representations”, but more fully in the sense of non-exhaustibility of activity and power. And more truly, therefore, than what Croce means of his Concept, “every blade of grass represents God, but any number of images however great it be, does not suffice to represent him”, the spirit or God suffuses all things with fullness of power and sustaining capacity which even in their aggregate, they can never posses. The transcendence implied by the statement of unequal power, perfection, and fullness of auspicious qualities as applied to the Highest Spirit or God, in the sense of his being the Sole Self, who controls, sustains, and uses every existence for his own purposes absolutely and without reserve, is a transcendence quite different and alien to the transcendence of the concept over the individuals. If this fact is once recognised, there can be no “vague and loose reasoning” of which Prof.Fullerton rightly charges Spinoza for trying to make spirit or God the grand Idea, or
else the inexplicable synthesis of Matters and Thought, the Universal, the Cause. But such a concrete universal is God only and absolutely and there can be no other ‘pervasive’ principle. In a word, the absolutely concrete universal, at once cause of the ‘universals’ (formal characters) and the universe is one only (Ekobahunam), and He is the highest concrete entity of which the world (jagat) with souls and Prakriti are modes, they being of less pervasive universal power as Rāmānuja through out his Śrī Bhāṣya maintains. Universals there are many, but the Real concrete Universal is only one.

As the Śrī Bhāṣya definitely states its position, “If Brahmatva constitutes the logical genus, Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic character inhering in the Īsvara, sentient souls and non-sentient matter, just as the generic character of horses (asvatva) inheres in concrete individual horses and this contradicts all scriptural teaching (according to which Brahman is the highest concrete entity)” (Śrī Bhāṣya III. ii. 28), and that is nothing other than Absolute Spirit. एवं तत्त्वज्ञानस्वद्वाधाराणीक्षरो विगंगतिद्वद्वृतौनुसारानुवृत्तमान समानययमिति सकलक्षणस्मृतिमित्वायवहारविरोध.

We have pointed out that the real concrete universal is Spirit, and that is the Absolute. The individual Jīvas or spiritual finites in that case would be, that they (Brahman and Jīvas) are both absolute and concrete, in this peculiar sense that these souls or selves cannot have the same extensive pervasive capacity, Śakti, as he highest or God, nor the same universality of Absolute, though the Sutraṣ admit the universal knowledge to be capable of attainment
by the Jīva, though they warn that the jīva cannot have the ultimate power of using the world as it likes towards its own ends. Further its abstraction, as also perhaps we may add the abstraction of the prakṛti, consists in their being incapable of coming into contract with each other, and therefore their remaining ineffective against their own existence, (that is what it means, for to be is to persist or act), as contact between the two entities alone makes them, the souls¹ on the one hand, become cognising centres or kshetragnas, and the prakṛti on the other hand the evolving Śakti of Brahman under the immediate direction of Brahman, till the Absolute wills their out-going or emergence from the passivity of the Cosmic Night. But it must be clear that this abstract existentiality of these two modes of God (that is what Rāmānuja calls the two existences) is not the same as the abstractness of the "formal" elements or concepts, nor their "concreteness" either. The concreteness is there in the selves in essence or by Svabhāva; but that concreteness is not universal as we have pointed out; this concreteness is individual; but be it noted neither is this concreteness of the same kind as that of the sensum or Nature or Prakriti which we recognise as the Existence, which lives under the light of the pervasive principle of the Highest, its own existence being an "adverse occupation of Space". That these selves even though having the same kind of concreteness as that of the
Brahman do appear to be in the Prañayā condition even as the stones, as the Atomistic logicians of India, the Vaiśeṣikās, say, is the denotation of their incapacity o exist in their own right as pervasive principles unless endowed with the stronger flow of elan vital of the highest. They are impotent enough to be inactive but potent enough to subsist as impotent, but all the same never merged in existence, though to be correct, their existentiality as existence would be meaningless. Understood thus, we could understand that existence is a predicate as Signor Benedetto Croce affirms in his Logic.

When we consider that existence as we understand it, that is as existing in temporal and spatial systems, for that is what we should call existing, we have to grant the formal elements and the generic characters the ballasted existence of abstractions. Existence would means to them a different order of existentiality from that of the things or sensum. We would be forced to distinguish between existentiality and existence as applied to things, and ideas and formal elements that make up the form of the universe. The ideas exist as the volitional thought of the highest at all periods of time (anādikāla) Unless these infinite multitudinous generic characters, the amazing variety of forms, are present in the thought of the highest, how could they be capable of being manifest in the world of existence or pass from existentiality to existence? The infinite totality of generic characters, or Ideas to use the Platonic expression, the eternal truths of the constitution of the universe true of every system of the universe, the destiners of the different order of existence, are all at the beginning in the thought of the highest. So
much so, the Vedas which are said to be the eternal truths were first in the thought of the Brāhmaṇ, and when the world was called into existence, the Vedas were, a it were, put into operation, and the world was constructed in the same serial order and not in any other order. These Ideas or Sabda are eternally in the thought of God or Spirit. “In the beginning was the word and the word was God.”

The way of the realisation of the ideas in the thing or matter may imply a descent may imply a decent of them into the world which only means coming into contact with matter as Plato postulates, or it may be that it is evolutionary, or it may be that every grade of existence evolved in ever so many grade so as to seem that the previous grade of existence begot the next in the series or that the Brahma by a single act of volition set all these to evolve in the spatio-temporal system in a series. Sabda thus are the eternal truths or ideas, which includes every generic character “röpa” every ‘concept’ (tattva), and finally every ideal (puruṣārtha), and all these eternally exist as a sabda and only in the periods of pravṛtti realise their existence in the world of experience. Their existence is true, but belong to quite a different order and kind.¹

¹. There is a parallelism between our knowledge of universals and our knowledge of other minds or selves. But a distinction is necessary because their order of existence is quite different from that the concrete existences of the selves. “We cannot contemplate a universal (abstract) in and for itself apart from its relation to particulars
We have pointed out that the real concrete and universal existence is only spirit, and cannot pertain to any other thing of existence. The nature of the individual finite existences of things on the one hand, and the individual finite intelligences on the other, would be that they are both abstract and concrete at the same time, in this peculiar sense, that these souls or Jīvās cannot have the pervasive capacity with the same universality or intensity of the Absolute, but are really so capable of becoming relatively in so far as ‘knowing’ is concerned, and not in so far as using the whole world is concerned. The things have an abstract character in so far as they exist apart from and cannot have the pervasive (vyāpakatva) capacity is considered. They are, as much an a priori Synthesis as the form and existence which we may agree in calling along with Croce as the History of Spirit. In some such sense perhaps Sri Rāmānuja accepts the intimate relation between the Concrete Universal and Sabda—an inference based upon his consistent acceptance of the three Continuums, namely, cause-effect, Substance-attribute and the psycho-physical or mind-body.

and we cannot contemplate a mind apart from a body of some sort. "But the reason why we cannot do so is different in the two cases." A universal cannot be perceived apart from particulars, because its very nature as a universal implies a relation to particulars, while there is nothing in the nature of mind, so far as we can see, which renders its connexion with a body logically necessary: the connexion is simply an empirical fact." N. A. Duddington. Knowledge of other minds. Aris. Soc. KPro. Vol. 19. (p. 165).
In commenting on Ramanuja for this criticism of the Bhaskara theory, it is but legitimate that we should point out that whilst his criticism questions the foundations of the qualities of a thing taken as entities, cannot be legitimately compared to the individual thing itself, and that we should rather maintain that the individual is a thing not to be reduced into the ideas of relations which the non-difference or difference involves and which, as he justly points out, leads to the infinitum ad regressus, by called into the bargain the unknown entity called the bare substrate into which these two aspects are introduced—we are forced to aske whether after all Ramanuja did justice to Bhaskara? For whilst we can agree that ‘similarity’ or identity of constitution might legitimately be said to be the identical character, and the distinguishing character that which marks out the thing as sembent with or distinct from other things in general, we do not see the absurdity underlying such an identification of predicationary attribute as an introduction of entities into the substrate called the necessary third entity which, Ramanuja suggests, should bed presumed. Further, one does not easily understand why the two so-called contradictory attributes cannot inhere in the same thing, for after all, the individual, as Ramanuja himself says, is the primary entity, and the similarity of character is said to be merely the attribute of such an entity. The difference is not an attribute at II but merely the numerical point of difference in the existence which cannot be dissolved at all, a difference which is all the same difference, in spite of the identicality of nature between the several entities. As such, the argument is futile because it is the statement of real fact of existential individuality. So
much so, we are led to ask whether Ramanuja is speaking of the two words that have opposite connotations or whether the two words apply to two references of different kind between two objects and might legitimately (a question of comparison being involved in such a reference of identity and difference) be referred to the same entity, in which case, no contradiction or infinite regress, anavastha, could take place. Ramanuja instead of entering into such dialectical disquisitions, might have refuted the school of Bhaskara by pointing out the fallacy underlying the assertion of non-eternity of the selves, and that single argument would suffice to make the theory of Bhaskara unacceptable. The criticism of Ramanuja of the Saptabhangivāda of Jainas needs must also be surrendered for the self-same reason of being merely futile and pointless.
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF
VISISTADVAITA
FOREWORD

My friend Dr. K.C. Varadachari asked me to write a foreword to his book “Rāmānuja’s Theory of Knowledge.” I gladly comply with his request on account of my interest in the subject and my desire to express my appreciation of the scholarly contribution made by the author to the Philosophy of Rāmānuja.

Dr. Varadachari rightly begins his study with the thesis that Rāmānuja is a synthetic thinker who reconciles all conflicts in the pr and seeks to do justice to the facts of physical, moral and spiritual experience. He expounds Rāmānuja’s theory of knowledge in a succinct way by repudiating all rival theories and removes the misconception that Viśiṣṭādvaita is qualified monism. Realism and Idealism are only partial views and their defects are removed by the Organic theory of Rāmānuja. In the sections dealing with Perception he clearly brings out the truth that the physical object and an undifferenced consciousness is unthinkable. The Veda is free from all defects as it deals with eternal truths intuited by the Rsis and forms a single organic unity. Consciousness is an attribute or function of a subject or self and every cognition is of a real thing and even appearances are real. There are degrees of perfection and not degrees of reality. The theory of aprathaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa is an eternal and intrinsic relation and not external and it is misleading to say that Rāmānuja’s theory is an adjectival theory of the Absolute.
Epistemology is based on Ontology and the central concept used by Rāmānuja to explain it is Śarīra-Sarīri-Bhāva or the relation of body and soul which is called by the author organistic and personalistic. It harmonises the physical, moral and spiritual orders of Reality. The physical order is ever changing and it serves as the common field of all our activity. The selves undergo changes only in their consciousness and not in their nature. The unifying principle is the indwelling presence or Person that is the source, controller and goal of all beings. Thus physics is related to metaphysics and metaphysics has its basis in religion. The self is not God, but belongs to God who is the supreme Subject of Knowledge and the Object of love. In Mukti, the self regains its universal knowledge and attains fullness and freedom.

Dr. Varadachari has thus clearly brought out the central truths of Epistemology of Viśiṣṭādvaita and shown its integral relation to metaphysics and religion, and it is fervently hoped that the author will soon publish the other aspects of Viśiṣṭādvaita and complete the work which he has so well begun.

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INTRODUCTION

In my earlier work on the Metaphysics of Sri Rāmānuja’s Śrī Bhāṣya I dealt among other topics with the nature of the soul and incidentally with the nature of Consciousness. The soul is a sentience-point or an intelligence that is utterly finite, that is capable of being aware of itself without the mediation or functional activity of its consciousness, as is seen to be the case in states other than the waking and the dreaming. The soul's consciousness is inevitably used when it knows objects other than its own soul-nature. This is true even in relation to the soul knowing its own body. This indeed is the reason for considering the body to be other than the soul which possesses it and utilises it for its own purposes. This consciousness is to the soul what the rays of the sun are to the Sun, which reveals at any moment the objects to its own substrate and reveals itself along with them. Anubhūtitvam nāma vartamāna daśāyām svasattayaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānātavam. Svasattayaiva svaviśayasaśdha natvam vā. Thus it is svayam-prakaśa but not svasmai-prakaśa. As a function of the soul or knower it is known as jñāna. It is unlike a quality for it is deemed to be a dravya for it is capable of expansion and contraction or in other words capable of modification (avasthāvad dravyam) even as the rays of the Sun. But it is not a substance in the sense in which the soul or Atman is a substance.
The consciousness as a function is incapable of being considered as a body (śarīra) of the soul, since even though a dravya in so far as it undergoes modification, it does not fulfil the conditions laid down for its being called a śarīra, since it is an attribute (viśeṣaṇa) of the sentient soul through which alone a body is utilised, controlled and enjoyed by its substrate. Śrī Venkatanātha writes on this point most clearly: "Yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyam yaccheṣataikasvarūpam ca tat tasya śariram: atra......cetanasyetī caitanya-viśiṣṭatayā pratisam bandhitayā nirdeśāt dharma-bhūta-jñānasya śarīratvam nirasyaate. Na hi jñānam jñāna-viśiṣṭasyādhayaśeṣabhyutam (Tattva-muktā-kalāpa, p. 531.)

The other doctrine which is more important than the doctrine of dharma-bhūta-jñāna and is unique to Rāmānuja's system and is the cardinal principle of his system, is the śarīra-śarīrī- bhāva. Throughout this thesis I have sought clarification of all the diverse problems implicit in his Theory of knowledge with its help. What is essential in a constructive exposition and criticism of any school, is not so much the ability to refute other systems and the presentation of the thesis as emerging from these discussions but the necessity to show the synthetic Organic or integral theory in its largest development. I have in this thesis attempted to do it in respect of his epistemology and have shown how it is closely inter-related with the metaphysical and religious issues which confront us almost every minute. This is the first time such an attempt has been made.
This work was accepted for the Doctor of Philosophy degree by the University of Madras in 1932. It is substantially the same, though certain parts have been considerably expanded and appendixes have been added.

I am deeply thankful to the authorities of the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute and the T. T. D Committee for having included it in their Sri Venkateswara Oriental Series. To my Professor P. N. Srinivasacharya who kindly wrote the foreword to this work, I offer my heartfelt thanks. To Sri P. V. Ramanujasvami, M.A., Director of the S. V. O. I. And General Editor of this Series, I wish to express my gratitude for his special interest. To Sri D. T. Tatacharya, M.O.L., Curator of the S. V. O. I. who helped me in correction of the proofs I owe sincerest obligations. A word of thanks is due to the Manager of the T.T. D. Press, for having supervised the work and seen to its publication early despite many difficulties.

K. C. VARADACHARI
CHAPTER I

THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION

The Philosophy of Sri Rāmānuja like most other systems of thought in India is based more on Religious experience, metaphysics and ethics, rather than on epistemology. Epistemology came in to substantiate the conclusions of metaphysics arrived at through psychology. It is undoubted that at a later critical period as evidenced in Buddhistic schools and Advaita the psychological approach had more and more yielded ground to transcendental a priori thought construction. This transcendental approach is considered by some to be well grounded, and it is claimed that our experience must yield its place to the transcendental deductions of a priori philosophers. That logic should legislate for our experience is certainly an important thing and cannot be denied. But logic itself should find its feet on the ground and cannot and should not soar in the sky without any let or hindrance or control of fact. Thus the viciousness of the a priori usually consists in its consistent rebuttal of the evidence of experience.¹ Nor could experience be considered to be only of a particular kind. Experience is manifold, and the truth about experience must embrace all facts falling within experience. The doctrine of nihilism will result if any particular segment of experience alone is accepted and the rest denied. Universal propositions founded on the basis of partial

¹ The revelational a priori is different from the Kantian a priori
applications will find logical collapse. The critical method is all for the best, but with the best of intentions the critical methods of early Buddhists and of Kant have floundered hopelessly in the ocean of fact. There is no other alternative to the criticist except to end in that wonderful night wherein all cows are black, or else simulate a phantom dialectic and claim reality to a non-existent spirit.

A hard headed or rather tough minded policy of discrimination of experience in all its manifold expressions and even when they refuse to fall into a scheme, to seek to discover that unity which is their reality, is the first and foremost need of a philosopher. A realistic outlook, a scientific bias, a matter-of-fact attitude, so to speak, an intention to know things as they are ere they are reduced to the forms which they are not, and a definition of the limitations or condition under which any proposition can apply with validity, constitute the fundamental approach of the common sense realist. Yathārtha Jñāna is the main aim of all philosophizings and if we know things as they are in themselves and as they are for others, then we may be said to know really. All propositions avail limits. Does this mean that there are no universal propositions? As in science, we say that given the conditions or the limits so to speak, the proposition enunciated is universally applicable. No one will deny the truth of this. A universal panacea for all troubles, despite the claims made for its existence for example the philosophers stone which will disclose all truth, under all conditions, and at all times, is an imaginary thing, a fiction, necessary, as Nietzsche will say, for making man strive to attain the impossible. The impossible, even if it be a monster, a non-existent impossible will have to
be considered to be possible, if life is to be bearable on this planet of revolutionary ardor.

All metaphysical search, then, is after the concept of the Real, the total. Knowledge of Real is possible; and this total reality is not self-contradictory and discrete. It is a comprehensive explanation of this Reality that is being sought. Knowledge about reality turns out to be a real knowledge of itself. Reality is the source and substance. The causal and teleological, and the cosmological factors about it have examined in an earlier work. There are several theories of knowledge. Epistemology deals with the how, that is, as to how we apprehend the real. It investigates the apparatus of knowing and the structure of thought. It is psychological in approach as well as logical. The criterion of reality has to be formulated. The nature of the subject, and the nature of the object, the nature of their compresence have to be understood. They all depend on these three factors. Some philosophers seek to reduce these three, to one homogeneous existence. Some retain only two, and dispense with the third. Even if all the three terms are retained, their natures are altered. A self evidency test is applied by some; an extraneous test is applied by others in regard to the truth of the cognition. Some combine the extraneous and the intrinsic tests into one.

These theories as already remarked are results of metaphysical assumptions of certain utilitarian and scientific interests. Thus usually epistemology which is said to be the creator of metaphysics, is really a hand-maid finding reasons for the systems adopted. External reality, which is the objective world of transient phenomena, apparently reveals no
dependence upon the mind perceiving it. This is what has led
to the assumptions of realism but by no means the only factor
about it. Reality is more than consciousness or the cognitive
relation. Consciousness further is the function of the subject
who perceives the outer objects. The momentariness of outer
objects, which is certainly not the truth about them, does not
vitiate their existence outside the perceiving mind and does not
make them unreal in any sense. Such being the case,
epistemology, if it is not to be speculative but scientific, has to
accept the dictates of the system of metaphysics of realism
and science, or in other words of Common sense which is the
admitted and tested evidence of trained experimenters and
observers of experience.

In pragmatism epistemology has a higher function. It
becomes the interpreter of facts given in experience that have
been tested and verified. It seeks to explain the facts
presented to consciousness and affirms a relativistic truth, a
truth that is progressively being amplified and enlarged by
growing experience, and incidentally capable of being modified
and corrected by future experiences.

In idealism, consciousness or knowledge seeks to
become all important and absorbs at least seeks to absorb
entire reality within itself.

The question for us is how far idealism is justified in
claiming supremacy for Consciousness over the object and the
subject. Does idealism prove that truth and being or
knowledge and existence are identical? If this question is
object to on the ground that we never know anything apart
from knowing and therefore that they are identical, then, what is the process of knowing or of being? An idealism that takes for granted that reality and truth are identical on the basis of that consciousness is reality and truth, such as that of Yogacāra Buddhism, subjective idealism of Berkeley, and to a certain extent Absolute Idealism, surreptitiously uses epistemology to prove reality is consciousness only, that reality is psychical stuff, is mere consciousness not either a consciousness of anything or belonging to any subject. Nowhere do we in reality or in experience come across this kind of experience, except in the sophisticated Experience of Absolute Idealism. It is therefore important that we should criticize epistemological idealism as something fundamentally unsound because it pleads for subjectivism and an absurd unreal objectivity which it cannot dissolve, much less explain. Likewise, there is another kind of epistemological idealism which claims that One undifferenced Consciousness (Experience) under the stress of illusion of diversity fulgurates or differentiates, or appears to do so in an unreal manner, into subjects and objects. This is epistemology that has ascended to metaphysical status. This also therefore is what we have to criticize if we would save true metaphysics. Sri Rāmānuja undertakes to point out the defects of the epistemological absolutists. Epistemology must be realistic, founded on the tested experience of the ordinary man, enabling him to understand the true nature of knowledge as well as truth, in order to be able to function in the ordinary universe of action.

¹ avibhāgopī buddhu-ātmā viparyāsitadarsanah
grāhya-grāhakasamvittibhedavāniva laksyate.

Dharmakirt: quoted by Yamunācārya: Atma-siddhi
and to struggle to realize of the highest values of life, paramapuruṣārtha.

Epistemology determines the validity of the system of metaphysics accepted, but on that account it should not be construed to be fit to override the facts of the metaphysical order. All facts fall within experience in one sense, and all have to be known in order to be accepted as real. That there may exist other things than what we experience, and that a higher consciousness may know more ourselves, and the highest consciousness might apprehend all things at once, might all be agreed to on the basis of inference and ordinary experience of relative knowledge. To go beyond these limits and to affirm that experience is something over and above, and other than all that; we in ordinary cognition introspectively as well as observationally find to be the fact, is to construct an epistemological metaphysics, as spurious as, if not worse than the naive affirmations of the materialist. That is to say, in the construction metaphysics it is necessary to take into account all types of experience, all types of cognitive relationships and not merely the more abstract relationships subsisting between the knower and the known in the act of cognition by the knower, which is made to yield an abstract cognition or Consciousness.

Science taking its start form perceptual experiences (undoubtedly the only type of experience that we can have of reality), arrives with the help of the laws of self-consistence, and the methods of inductive inference at the conception of the whole reality on a realistic basis. Undoubtedly an idealistic interpretation of reality is possible as evidenced by Mach's
efforts, and even necessitated in certain respects. The mass of evidence, in the other hand, has not been able to get rid of contradictions with idealistic interpretations of experience. Whilst materialism has sought affirm merely perceptual reality and ended in a solipsism which is the characteristic feature of subjective idealism also, the realist has been trying to arrive at approaches to reality through the twin concepts of unity and difference, subjective and objective, of permanence and change, of perception, hearsay evidence, memory and inference. In thus trying to seek guidance from these twin concepts and in granting them fundamental solutions, realism has emerged as a type of organistic view. It is true that mere organism can never explain reality. Nevertheless between the several types of organistic explanation we can select that which is non-self contradictory and which converges into one focus, so to speak, the partial views due to one sided interest and experience.

Organistic theory is typically the common sense view but with a difference. The ordinary type of common sense view of reality that has been expounded by Reid, Hamilton and others, and in modern time by Prof. Joad and Dr. Stout has not culminated in the organistic view, whereas the realistic view of Prof. A.N. Whitehead has definitely taken the organistic explanation. We might even hold that the Holistic and other evolutionary and emergent theories cannot but accept the organistic theory, though, as far as we know, they have not made up their minds on the issue. The common sense view is definitely not what the plain man in the street- that peculiarly unavailable creature made classical by Berkeley-thinks. It is what an expert in observation of reality finds to be the most
acceptable, not what a speculative and adventure-some philosopher or scientist schematizes or geometrizes. There is enough scope for a fundamentally correct view; of reality without the sophisticated idealistic arguments which have sought to reduce experience to nullity and vacuum and illusion on the basis of principles of abstract non self contradiction, infinite regress and possible invalidity of memory and testimony. There are varieties of the above and in the above; there are apparent self contradictions in the abstract which turn out to be perfectly compatible in experience; there is an infinite regress which does not vitiate the conclusions; and there is testimony which is unvitiated. These can be perfectly explained in accordance with the facts of experience.

Experience itself needs definition. Epistemology must investigate the conditions and limits of each principle and criticize the sources of knowledge and understanding, and all the facts of every order must be considered so as to make them fall into a view that is fundamentally self-consistent, efficient and all-embracing.

Śrī Rāmānuja starts from a metaphysical view and seeks to make out that his is a metaphysics that reconciles all conflicts according to every pramāṇa (source of knowledge)¹. The cognitive relation is inquired into in all its manifold phases, such as cognition of objects, cognitive religious functions in

¹ Trividham pramāṇam, pratyaksānumānaśābdabhedāt Nyāyapariuddhi, p.36. cf. Prajñāparitranā: quoted by Nyāya Pariśuddhi, p. 38 (Memorial ed.)

Svayam siddhis tathā divyam paratyaksamanumāgamah I
Pañca santi pramāṇāni jaimini-vyāsayehṛdi II
regard to the supreme cause, Being, Reality, Self, and Destiny (paramapuruṣārtha). In arriving at the central and basic concept of organism, Rāmānuja traces the tenets of the several schools of thought and shows their weaknesses and their untenability. Rāmānuja thus first and foremost is a samanvaya (synthetic) thinker who seeks to do justice to the facts of the spiritual, moral and physical orders as well as to the facts of realism and idealism. Undoubtedly this tendency to syncretic or synthesize is traceable to the period of the Upanisads themselves, and to the Vēdānta Sūtras. The intention of the author of the Vēdānta Sūtras was to give a synthetic presentation of the views of the Upaniṣads and Brāhmaṇas and the Veda about Brahman’s nature, and attainment. Rāmānuja accordingly claims to interpret the Vēdānta Sūtras on the lines laid down by earlier commentators.

II

What is presented in Perception is not Consciousness

Rāmānuja takes up perception which is first source of right knowledge. Perception belongs to the realm of external events which are changing and perishing constantly. It is an admitted fact that objects perish or undergo change constantly. The question of duration may be left over, though this is all important to the schools of Buddhism as well as Advaita. The external world of objects is the world of space time (kāla and deśa), and is perceived by the self through its mind, which is its mukha or face, when its sensory organs come into contact with it in the forms of sound, touch, form,
taste and smell. These sensations are of very brief duration in as much as they are shifting and changing and are non-existent in the absence of the objects of perception though they are preserved in consciousness in a somewhat accentuated form of memory (jñanakāra). Śankara held the view that what is presented in perception is not the stuff of sensations, not sound, nor smell, nor form nor taste nor touch but principally pure consciousness itself. “In the beginning there is nothing beyond what is presented, what is said and is felt, or rather felt simply. The present perception which has not been influenced by the sense organs or their functions, reveals only knowledge or more correctly consciousness alone. Thus the essence of all objects is pure consciousness. The forms and sense characters are merely modifications generated by sense organs due to karma and ignorance. In that pure apprehension which is initial uncorrupted and unmodified by any element of karma or ignorance or kalpana, ratiocination, what is revealed is pure 'isness' which is undifferenced and unqualified. This is true being. All that exists purely as this stuff. In order to prove this thesis, the element of change or even momentariness of all things is a necessity forced upon any theory of modification by reason or understanding (kalpana). If this is accepted then the Advaitic theory lands itself in buddhistic psychology of perception and it can never get rid of this allegiance. Sri Harsha had undoubtedly found this to be the case, and affirmed that it is not all a fault to accept even the buddhistic theory, if it did prove to be right, as he felt it to be.

But the ordinary advaitin, or more correctly the māyāvādin, could find a way out from the theory of
momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) through the orthodox schools instead of the heterodox. Indeed it appears that Advaitic theory was a powerful effort of the orthodox to win over the majority of the Buddhists to the Vedāntic fold, and in this Gaudapāda and Śankara played the most prominent role.

In order to prove the theory of kalpana or modification and therefore falsification or illusification, Advaita snatched upon the Nyāya-Vaiśesika distinction between two kinds or rather stages of perception the nirvikalpaka, indeterminate, and the savikalpaka, determinate, perceptions. The nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa reveals, according to Śankara, “a permanent reality and not a momentary isolated this... as in the case of buddhas theory of nirvikalpaka”, but according to Nyāya-Vaiśesika it is non-definite, confused knowledge which awaits determination and definition and distinctness.

Rāmanuja undertakes to show that what experience involves in perception is never a mere ‘is’, the so called permanent behind the momentary ‘this’, but always a well formed isolated event which can only, because of these characteristics, point to a ‘this’. Nor does it mean that the activity of knowledge is merely an ‘is’- the metaphysical reality of a psychical stuff. Nor can it be ever identified with consciousness as such. Between the Naiyāyic nirvikalpaka pure ‘is’ of Śankara’s theory, there is nothing in common except the name. Thus where Śankara is prepared to see one problem alone, Rāmanuja sees three.

They are (i) The Naiyāyika nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is not definite knowledge and hence is neither true nor false. Nothing
can be said about it without further investigation and looking into, and the test by pragmatically action becomes necessary.

(ii) The Naiyāyika nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa may be identical with Sankara's nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa but it is not anubhūti, the undifferenced consciousness or Pure Experience void of subject or object.

(iii) The act of cognizing may mean the fundamental functioning of consciousness, but what that consciousness reveals is neither consciousness merely, nor is it merely that which cognizes, namely the self. It is always an object, self or non-self.

Rāmanuja's theory is an elucidation of these three points.

III

Two Kinds of perception

There are two kinds of perception, the determinate and the indeterminate. The indeterminate perception is that in which is present a mere 'is' or pure being, according to Śankara. According to Yogacāra, what is presented is a momentary existence, sva-lakṣaṇa or pure particular. Against this view, Rāmanuja holds that 'non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object (in so far it is) destitute of
some difference but not all difference'. The apprehension of a mere 'is' without any difference whatever is in the first place not observed to take place, and in the second place, it is impossible. All cognition can be stated in terms of 'this is such and such'. The true distinction between non-determinate perception and determinate perception is the apprehension of the first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class, while the later is the apprehension of a second, third, and so on individuals. "Determinate perception is the extension to the perception of the generic character of a class-manifestation in a certain outward shape", which connects this act of perception with the earlier perception of the individuals of the same class. "Such extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other hand, not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual, and perception of the latter kind thence is indeterminate."

1 S.B.I.i.1. Nirvikalpakam-nāma kenacid viśeṣeṇa-viṣaytasya grahaṇam sarvaviṣayā rahitasya
2 S.B.I.i.!(Thibauts trans)
According to Rāmanuja every kind of perception involves (in a psychological interpretation) the perception of a structure or form (samsthāna) along with qualities of colour, touch and etc., Even the most initial perception reveals some form or structure (samasthāna) which is jāti (for generic character is nothing but structure).¹ The apprehension in nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception is the apprehension of structure or jāti that gives rise to the judgment of difference or unique setting. This means that all perception is, firstly an apprehension of a rūpa, a form or samsthāna-ākarā, and secondly when it is connected with some other recollected or memory, the form becomes the mediating class-concept, a universal, jāii. Jāti is the extension of the rūpa especially when the rūpa is available in more than one thing. The apprehension of a relation of identical form in two things which have been observed is called determinate perception, since it determines the nature of the thing in relation to other things around it. This extension of generic connection in several things and the judgment thereon may give rise to judgments of difference as well as uniqueness, but no less than the second, the first perception displays the structure or form as an inherent characteristic of the thing perceived. Form is the structure of a thing and is perceived in the most initial perception, such as, ‘this’, ‘that’. Form is a category in perception and there is no perception without form. Every is or ‘this’ is a formed is

(sarūpa) and a samsthāna višeṣa (a structure-event). “Even if perceptive cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment the generic character that constitutes on the one hand the difference of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character of the thing itself. And thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in a second moment.” Every perception thus is a structure event, and is an individual occurrence. It is not a mere mass of feeling, undifferenced and inarticulate. It is consciously perceived and articulated and is never to be confused with mere feeling. Even feeling is not altogether free from quality; awareness, even whilst it is almost soaked in feeling has yet a quality. Perception even in its most elemental and initial character is a perception of a form, however vague it might be. It is only logical relationship and comparison that makes for determinate perception. It is the sensation of modern psychology which later on becomes perception. Modern Gestalt theory in Psychology whose special attention has been directed to perception, has adequately and amply proved that even the most elementary sensation is a perception of gestalt, samsthāna-sthiti or rūpa. Thus it is clear that a perception of the most primitive character which is said to be nirvikalpaka, is in reality defined, relatively less of course than the savikalpaka but nonetheless defined, by

1 S.B.i.i. 1 (p.44) cf. Nirvikalpakasya saviseṣavisayatām darṣayati: Tātparyadīpikā.
2 Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa
structure and colour etc. (nirvikalpakamapi saviseṣavishayameva).\(^1\)

The refutation of the Nyāya theory of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (as interpreted by Advaitins) lies in the fact that there is no sensation or perception which is not characterized by some form (rūpa) and colour even if it be a mere patch. But we can conceive of the first point of awareness as sensation, indeed very pure, in so far as it is characterized by any definite quality; it is that awareness when the consciousness is reduced to extremest poverty, as Bergson says\(^2\); and we can in modern psychological parlance, call it sensation as distinguished from perception which involves discrimination and exploration and comparison and all the other activities of constructive correlation of the mind. Sensation that is the undetermined unutterable matrix of perception, is something on which the mind has not operated in any manner and has not schematized it in any way and has not made it or reduced it into the set patterns of objects which it pragmatically deals with. The unique quality of the sensation becomes in perception overlaid with construction of the mind and as such unreal. Sensation, nirvikalpaka, that is, that which is not compared or schematized by mind, is thus the unique first contact of the object with the mind. The main question then resolves itself into what that first moment should be like. It is, as has been well said, the point instant when there is barely sufficient activity of consciousness to apprehend the object.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) śatadūsani by Sri Vedānta Deśika, 11\(^{th}\) refutation.
\(^2\) Creative Evolution p 293
\(^3\) Cf. Buddhist Logic: prof Stcherbertsky Vol 1. p 151, who quotes Dharmakīrtis view on this Nirvikalpaka prayaksas "That sensation is
Such a state of consciousness alone facilitates the awareness of the sensation, a sensation from which withdrawing we shall not be able to state at all as to what it is like.

According to Rāmanuja, there is nothing wrong in accepting two steps in perception a first moment namely the sensation, and the second moment the perception which is a product of discriminative activity (vikalpa) including comparison and inference: nirvikalpakam eka jātiyadravyeṣu prathamapindagrahaṇām. Sensation is not to be reduced to the almost non cognitive state, the state of rigidity of mind-body when no comparison or construction(vikalpa) is possible. Nirvikalpaka is either a state of cognition or it is not; it has either an element or object of consciousness or it has not. If it is, then even as such it is not, then the alternative is that it is not at all. The genetic theory of perception is utilized to discredit the very cognition. The contradictory contrast between thought and sense, which is said to be the highest peak of ancient as well as modern philosophy (more truly of idealism from Parmenides and Plato, to Hegel and his followers), is utilized to demonstrate the correctness of the illusory theory. Once such a contradiction is raised no power on earth can rescue that view from ending in that thorough going illusion whose culmination is to be found in Nirvana and

something quite different form productive imagination can be proved just by introspection. Indeed, everyone knows that an image is something utterable (capable of coalescing with a name). Now if we begin to stare at a patch of colour and withdraw all our thoughts on whatsoever other(objects), if we thus educe our consciousness to a condition of rigidity. ( and become as though unconscious) this will be the conditions of the pure sensation..”.

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Nihilism. The savikalpaka jñana is what we seek in knowing. It is undoubtedly a product of mental activity liking present experience with the past. As visnucitta has said it is influenced by samskāra and udbodhā. If nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is merely the reaction of the sense-organs to the object.¹ Savikalpaka is the discrimination which expands that sense-knowledge. It is that which relates that fragmentary experience to the total reality and educts its relations to it. It is synthesis as well as analysis, comprehension which follows on apprehension.²

We find that the importance given to the nirvikalpaka as the ding an sich, thing-in itself, svalakṣaṇa, as the real; are extreme statements which seek to reduce the error arising out of the subject's previous cognitions and habits of interpretation. Thus having turned unduly critical of mind itself, idealists have inevitably reduced all cognition into illusionary imposition, all reality into chimerical display of causality that cannot apply anywhere. Prof. Dawes Hicks takes a standpoint very much similar to Rāmanuja's views on the nature of Perception. There is no place for mere sensation in a dynamic consciousness. Even the sense-organs are operating only by the will of the cognizer. There can obviously under these circumstances be no mere or abstract sensation. "Cognition is essentially the same in all its forms, both in its lowest and its highest levels. There is no break in its development. It is from the beginning a process of separating, distinguishing and comparison (distinguishing differentiation, discernment and comparison of features, characters and marks, which are to be

¹ Kevala - cākṣurādi-indriya-janyam nirvikalpam N P p.43
² cf. The Authors "some problems of Indian Logic" J.S.V.O.I Vol 1953
found in the object). Cognition includes an act of synthesis, but this synthesis is not a putting together of the parts of the object. It consists rather in holding together different views of awareness. The essence of an act of cognizing is a process of distinguishing and comparing features which as given are already synthesized and not any creative synthetic activity exercised on the given manifold of experience”. Ramanuja’s view on perception is identical with the above. Whether as a pure sensation or as definite cognition, the object is not constructed, but what are in it are edued, to use the expressive phrase of Prof. Spearman.

Every cognition from the simplest sensation to the most highly correlated perception, is more or less mediated and the distinction drawn between knowledge through acquaintance and knowledge through description cannot be deemed to be absolute indeed if it is not denied.

IV

Nyāya Nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa and Nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa of Advaita

We shall next consider how far we can assume that the Nyāya Nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa, sensation, is identical with the sensation of Advaita.

In the first place supposing the Nyāya Nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa is capable of revealing the mere ‘isness’ of a thing undifferenced and undefined, is it the same as the sanmātra of

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1 Hundred Years of British Philosophy; Rudolf Metz p.513.
Advaita? The latter 'isness' is the isness of consciousness of ānubhūti, experience or samvid, and is not the mere 'is' of Nyāya the atomic structure of material presentation in its mass-character. The tertiary compounds made out of binary atoms alone are the perceptible matrix of all objects. Their combinations and arrangements make objects. These are being perceived. The 'isness' of this character is different from the psychical 'isness' of Advaitic idealism. That which is perceived is the one case is pure matter of the thing; in the other case, it is the pure expansiveness of consciousness without any limitation or name or quality. The latter is the pure consciousness alienated from the impressions and recollections and associated tags of individual ignorance, which overlay all cognition of objects. Every savikalpa-pratyakṣa is a relational knowledge wherein the matter of the object is pure consciousness, and the form and name and relations, which constitute, what for us are outer and inner objects, are constructions of the mind itself on that original matrix. It is thus absolute for this theory of Advaita, and incidentally of Buddhism which was the parent of this theory, that savikalpaka pratyakṣa should be wholly erroneous from the ultimate stand point; whereas for the realistic schools, though Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa might become erroneous due to the over-burdening impositions of progressive symbolic relations, or due to the application of thought for the limited purposes of conduct and efficiency in a particular manner, it is not something that is fundamentally false; on the contrary, it is that which is fundamentally true, because it is that which has been arrived at through careful observation and comparison, and

1 cf. Kants a priori synthesis.
experimentation. Knowledge in order to be true should be
definite, and well defined so that it leaves one in no doubt as
to what is true, and as such unambiguous and clear.
Therefore savikalpaka-pratyakṣa can become a pramāṇa, a
source of right knowledge. If, on the other hand, it be
uninformative, nebulous and ambiguous, it can never be a
pramāṇa. It is thus self contradictory to hold at that rate that
pratyakṣa, determinate or indeterminate, is true at all. Other
sources of knowledge indeed have to be approached.

Knowledge is definition, and definition can have and
has a place, as we have said, in sensation understood in the
sense of nirvikalpaka. We have already described the qualities
of this sensation. But Śankara’s Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is said
to transcend the definitions of true and false. Says Sir
Radhakrishnan “Since indeterminate perception does not
transcend immediacy, is dumb and unanalyzed, is what James
calls ‘raw unverbalised experience,’ the distinction between
true and false does not apply to it.” There is certainly nothing
against accepting this statement which goes to show that it is
immediate, that is, that it is almost a reflexive type of action,
pratibimba. As we have said the most initial sensation can
only be definite, with relative indefiniteness, but it is something,
a ‘somewhat’ and not a mere ‘that’. But the implications of
sensation do not go only that far. Advaita holds that the
sensation presents, firstly, non-difference; secondly, that it is
unqualified; thirdly, that the stuff presented is homogeneous
consciousness where there is no distinction between subject
and object; and fourthly, that it is unutterable, anirvacaniya. It
is of course, a true claim to make that we shall never know the
infinitude or the illimitability of truth, but that is not equivalent to
saying that it is unknowable and unpredictable. Unspeakable, it might be, but it is not unknowable. It is one of those claims of intuitionists who do not wish to see that definition is the fundamental nature of right knowledge, since definition precludes all watering down of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle. But even these laws can be overcome through imagination. Intuition comes to birth as result of enquiry, and imagination helps this enquiry; in limiting all imagination by the principle of non-self-contradiction we might arrive at new angles of vision, and achieve a synthesis that shall not possess the cast iron moulds of mechanical logic. Direct intuition has universal significance, because it is synthetic apperception, definite in knowledge and essentially communicable in some manner, if not in words, in symbols that the mind in its multi-dimensional nature might grasp. Religious consciousness might be touched to the core by it and reveal essential significances inexpressible in words. But to mistake direct apperception of intuition for the initial raw unverbalized immediate sensation of mass feeling is fundamentally wrong, and vitiated by inner contradiction, though forsooth it is impossible to refer any inner contradiction to it. Thought might not be adequate to express the tension of the spirit, and the rich concreteness of the sensation might be made to live an unreceptive life when the mind becomes rigid in its reception and as if unconscious of it. But sensation is the tension of the organ which is impugned upon by the object. Its liveliness, it owes to the object. Intuition is equally lively, but it is unambiguous and definite, and the complaint about its inexpressibility is due to the finiteness of the subject and its distance from integral truth and its limitations. The
claim that intuition is sensation is untrue and such an experience does not exist.¹

The activity of thought (vikalpa) on the content of sensation modifies it, so to speak, and makes it a percept. It is not a merely additive function that thought has for it makes the perception organic with the world of experience that it already knows. But by no stretch of imagination can it be said that this sensation is mere consciousness, samvid. Even Kant who made the region of Pure Reason almost universal, could not surrender the realm of brute fact, so much so he held that conceptions without intuitions are empty. This has a nature indeed different from the cognizing consciousness. By no stretch of imagination can it be argued that we see in sensation a barren "that"; even if it be true, it can never be consciousness. Consciousness does not get any place in sensation, since from it every effort of consciousness has been sedulously withdrawn. Consciousness gets a contact, and establishes a relation between the sense organs of the embodied self and the external object. Without this relation there can be no cognition. An obsessed idealist thinks that all things are merely states of consciousness or streams of states of consciousness and just psychical stuff. To find reasons for

¹ Cf. Modern Philosophers: H. Hoffding. It is true that Benedetto Croce accepts intuition as equivalent to sensation even as Kant does. But they were aware of the difference between an intuition of sense and intuition of reason. A confusion on this point has led to the view that all of us are intuitive in an elemental manner and that all experiences are intuitive. To what logical faults this doctrine may lead one need not be canvassed here. It is absolutely true that every idealism has ended in a dualism between the absolute and finite. Ergo the truth lies in dualism.
this unfortunate deduction through introspective psychology he has to invent a theory of phenomenalism or categorical make up and conjure up a power of ignorance that makes a world of appearance and creates a permanent subject. The material of this world of appearance has finally to be found in the creative activity of the subject, the storehouse of all these impressions or rather psychical imaginations, the ālaya-vijnāna; and thus there exists nothing else except series of states, and a storehouse of psychical impressions which might well be called the self in a phenomenal sense according to Buddhist Yogācāra, and in a noumenal sense according to Advaita.

The ‘that’ in sensation is not of the stuff of consciousness. Though whatever is perceived is a consciously perceive object, it cannot be spoken of as consciousness itself, or as a formation of consciousness. Experience is a conscious experience, but experience involves also an experience of a ‘that’. The ‘that’ might persist or might not persist in the outer world, be it a momentary existence or persistent thing, but so far as the inner memory is concerned it belongs to consciousness and exists as psychical stuff or knowledge. At no time does it give up its reference to the outer object. Though it is a representation in one sense, in perception itself it is not the representation that we perceive but the object itself directly as standing out there. The representation in memory at no time loses its outer reference and projection, but on this account it cannot be said that representationalism is accepted. It is the given, and between
this and the undifferentiating (undifferented) consciousness, there is nothing in common.¹

It is an ingenious device to ask for a sanction of Nyāya for the Advaitic conception of nirvikalpaka as the core of reality. Even if it were an independent conception, which it is not, since this is undoubtedly buddhistic, it is an unprovable assumption. As Rāmanuja says there is no barren sensation, a sensation without an attribute of form, rūpa, and colour even if it be merely a patch of light. The concept of an undifferenced sensation as a limiting phase of consciousness might be conceded; but without the qualifications attached to its appearance, it is an impossible experience, if not an unreal abstraction.

V

Consciousness and Cognition

The next point we shall discuss pertains to the nature of the act of cognition and the nature of consciousness which is claimed to be a homogeneous substance, the known and the act of knowing rolled into one.

I.1.3: Atyantātindriyatvena pratyakṣādī pramāṇaviṣayatayā brahmaṇās sastraikapramāṇakatvāt utkasvarūpam brahma. The Brahman is altogether beyond the senses, and so does not form the object of any means of proof, such as perception etc. and the satra alone forms the means of proving Him. Kena Up. 1.
Consciousness is a function of the knower revealed in the act of cognition. It is realizable as a function of the knower, necessary for the purpose of life itself, and it is inseparable from the existence of the knower. Every act of cognition reveals more or less simultaneously three terms; the object, the subject and the cognitive relation. It is found that it is purposive in so far as it bears the message of the outer existence to its owner, the self, whose function it is revealed to be. It is thus a dharma, a function, a quality, dynamic, purposive, and essentially belonging to some self. It is not found apart from its substrate, the self, whose function it is. It reveals its owner as well as itself in the act of cognition, as also the object. Yāmunācārya writes that perceptive consciousness is that which reveals a thing through itself at the time of presentation. He defines consciousness as svāśrayasya svasattayaiva prakāśamānatvam svaviśaya-sādhanatvam vā anubhūtitvam. Rāmanuja accepts this definition of Consciousness as stated by Yāmunācārya. “The essential nature of consciousness — consists therein that it shines forth, and manifests itself, through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or that it is instrumental in proving its own object to its substrate”.

In the above definition one important feature is that cognition which is perceptive refers to the moment and not to

\[\text{Siddhiraya : p21}\]
\[\text{Siddhiraya : p23 Pratyak śasamvit svasattākāle svaviśayasya śadbhāvam sādhayanti}\]
\[\text{S.B.I.I.1. “Anubhūtitvam nāma vartamānadaśāyām svasattayaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam...” (cf. Thibaut’s p.48)}\]
the part or the future. This limitation of cognition to the present moment has a fundamental reference to the conditions of time and space, refutation of which has led to the other schools into pitfalls.

This consciousness is awareness of something be it ever so much as a mere structure or a jāti. It is not bare awareness without content or with non-existence as content. It is not either a form of consciousness that we perceive or consciousness merely that does not reveal even the subject. That which is perceived is a real being, a sattā, as we have already said, which is objective, and is never a mere cit. Even if it were another embodied being, a cit encased in a body, it is as an object that it is being perceived and not as one’s self, whatever identity in jāti the subject and object might here possess. A sanmātra thus can never be identified with one’s own cinmātratva in perception. So far from conscious mind being owned by experience, it is experience that is being owned by conscious minds, just as the light owned by the flame rather than the flame is owned by the light. Prof Dawes Hicks says that “so far from conscious minds being owned as F.H. Bradley conceived, by experience, the fact rather is that experience is owned by conscious minds, if, indeed it is permissible in this context, to talk of ‘ownership’ at all”¹.

¹ Philosophical Bases of Theism : Prof. Dawes Hicks : p.31
Yogi -Pratyakṣa and Consciousness as Object

A further contention is made that in the higher states of Consciousness we perceive the highest experience as a mere mass-feeling and that this can be attained by the practice of yoga (trance). In aparokṣa experience (immediate higher experience) we are told that we do experience the Undifferented Consciousness, nirviṣaya, nirabhilapya, anirvacanīya consciousness, as the substrate of all phenomena.

In Yoga there is a state of consciousness is called the fourth, turiya, in which there is said to be the realization of the unchanging Self.¹ Gaudapāda, one of the most profound thinkers undoubtedly influenced by Buddhistic Yogācāra school, in his Kārikā on the Māndūkya Upaniṣad maintains that this state reveals the dissolution of the subject-object relation in an all embracing consciousness.² It is in this state that the purest and the undifferented identity of all reality, its singleness or monism is realized or known. Difference is the stigma of all phenomena and is the cause of perishability or mortality. The real is neither perishable nor difference nor causal prius.

¹ Buddhistic thought does not accept a permanent self, though it might accept an ālay-vijñāna, a storehouse of impressions which also is a momentary thing.
² Ajāti-vāda of Gaudapāda
THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION

Yogi Pratyakṣa (this aparokṣānubhūti) has nothing to do with this turya-consciousness of the Maṇḍūkya. "Although such a perception—which springs from intense imagination—implies a vivid presentation of things, it is after all, nothing more than a reproduction of the previously perceived and does not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge; for it has no means of applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously."¹ It is on the other hand a source of error.

What we find on analyzing Yogic experience is that it is most often nothing more than a hallucinatory self-projection of one's own memories and previous experiences gaining the vividness characteristic of perception, due to internal stimulation. It is a product of over-wrought imagination which might lead to erroneous judgment, and in any case it cannot be an instrument of pure knowledge. The realization of the turya state may be the state of realization of the limitless expanse of consciousness divested of all limitation of body and mind and all contradiction which thwart the apprehension of the real. Consciousness perceived in this manner in turya may be taken to be not the substance of all things but rather as the attribute of the individual who has been freed from all its limitation -- nirūpādhika-jñāna.

Yogi pratyakṣa can never real reality as such, since it is imagination. It can never be real.

¹ S.B.I.3. Nāpi yogajanyam: bhāvanaprākārṣaparyantajanmanas tasya visadāvabhāsatve pi pūrvānubhūtaviṣayasyasmrītramātravān prāmāṇyam
This conclusion ought not to be taken to mean that Rāmanuja does not accept any experience such as that. Yāmunācarya himself affirmed that the proof of divine existence can only be through Yoga; that is, Yoga-praxis leads to or grants the divine perception. God in His infinite grace endows the vision which the normal eye cannot have.¹ This indeed is different in kind from the pratyakṣa that is said to be caused by Yoga. The super sensory perception is granted by the grace of God as a fruit, so that the individual might perceive the entire organic character of reality even as the visions of Bali and Arjuna. Bhagawad-prasāda-labdha yogi-pratyakṣam divyam². Thus this also is yogi pratyakṣa but it is a free gift of the Divine to the individual. This is the real intuition in relation to the external world when the individual is fit to receive this grace tat yuktāvasthāyān manonmātrajanyam³. This is perception by the mind that has become an eye divine(divya-cakṣus).⁴

It is a fruit of disinterested service of the Divine, a fruit of freedom from vacillation and dejected consciousness. Whatever it is the Divine Knowledge (gnosis) or the integral or complete knowledge of the world, does not make much of a difference. It is the attitude of absolute disinterestedness in imagination, coupled with complete union with the Divine in all activities that can lead to the true knowledge about any object. Constant remembrance of prior experiences cannot be a

¹ Siddhītraya: Isvarasiddhi
² Nyāya Parisuddhi; from Śrī Viśnucitta
³ Ibid., p.39
⁴ स्रव्यांतोपि ना स्रवण्टि, जानान्तोपि ना जानाते, पाश्यान्तोपि ना पाश्याति पाश्याति ज्ञानाकाष्टुषाḥ
source of knowledge. \textit{Bhāvana balāja mātram jagat kaśtri-}
\textit{pratyakṣam pratikṣiptam}. In either case, real knowledge is
available through the disinterested pursuit of truth, or truth
pursued for its own sake. This truth is many-faced and
undoubtedly infinite, and includes an integral aspect which
grants it the unity of singleness as much as it does the
manifoldness or plurality.

This knowledge is available to all freed souls after they
are liberated from their physical bodies which they had
inherited: \textit{vivukta-vastrāyām tu bāhyentriya-janyā--mapī}. When
the individual by his consecrated devotion to the Highest
God earns his freedom to know everything, which is said to be
\textit{svarūpāvadhāraṇam}, (an individual possessing capacity to
know the entire world and merge\textsuperscript{3} himself in the Divine Lord
who is the self of all other individuals too), then he gains the
divine vision, the capacity to know the infinite mansions of the
Divine. A new body that does not hide or interfere with
perception but grants fullest freedom, knowledge and bliss,
becomes his; a divine body is at it were worn. Thus \textit{Divya-
pratyakṣa} is not an impossible thing. Indeed it is the truth of
the individual consciousness when it is liberated from the
trammels of the sensory organs. But this is not the
imagination intensified by praxis of Raja and Hatha yogas.

Thus we find that despite the fact that there is a variety
of perception different from nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka such
as the perception through the divine eye or mind, it does not

\textsuperscript{1} Nyāya-Parisuddhi p.40
\textsuperscript{2} Nyāya Parisuddhi p.39
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid p.38
even give a proof of the bare being the nirvisaya consciousness or experience. The subject object relation can never be reduced to mere experience. The object can never be made into a function of the subject, that is mere consciousness. The subject cannot be dissolved into its attributes or functions, though the three are inevitably implied in all perception.

It has been suggested that intuition reveals a bare or pure consciousness meaning by intuition something different from perception. Rāmanuja considers this problem in detail. For our purpose it is not necessary to enter into the meaning of the texts. Suffice it to find out the logical basis of these experiences themselves.
CHAPTER II

INTUITION AND SRUTI PRAMANA

In the previous chapter we have seen that Rāmānuja contends against Advaita and other schools who hold that experience is all and that it is proved by perception and that the "that" revealed in perception is quality less and without any differentiation or having any parts. In this chapter further consideration of the Aparokṣajñana which is said to be super Perception involving no mediation of inference is made.

Rāmānuja holds that inference involves the discriminating activity of the knowing mind; and surely no one denies that inference involves subject-object relation, and plurality. All that is sought is somehow to get over the limitations imposed on us by the discriminating intellect. Nor does inference show anything more than the interrelationships subsisting between individuals belonging to varying times and places and types and causality. Indeed our ratiocinating mind functions according to the laws of thought seeking synthesis of diverse facts no less imperatively than it seeks to analyse the given in perception. Its content then is nothing more than what is perceived. Perception involves an elementary recipience, whereas inference disposed towards synthesis of the given involves greater activity of the mind. In this greater activity is involved the whole group of activities which we designate the personality, its wants, desires, memories and affections; its total being carves out of the given only such parts as stimulate its needs. Danger indeed lies here; and all faults of reasoning
have their source in this. Thus the given is likely to be vitiated by the mental conditions. A pure mind devoid of all these conditions might be expected to know the real all the same. Savikalpaka involving, as it does, the activity of mind however slight, is vitiated; so also is inference. The pure perception got through effort of the activity of the mind in yoga, leads to an immediate perception or more correctly, sense-organs are not the agents of this perception or experience.

Rāmānuja refuses to recognize any distinction between perception and uparokṣa in so far as they are experiences. Perception does not grant illusion; nor is granting of reality the prerogative of immediacy or non sensory cognition, as such. Rāmānuja does not use the word aparokṣa, his word being divya-pratyakṣa. Sankara creates a dualism between the practical and pure phenomenal and the transcendental, aparā and para, and it stands for a new distinction between reality of the external world of matter and the Reality of the self. In reality aparokṣa can only mean the perfect consciousness unlimited in range and intensity due to purification of the mind and prāna (vital consciousness). If we grant that pratyakṣa gives us only the knowledge of events which are transitory and changing, and thus gives us knowledge of the external world of constant impacts between elements and actions on a huge mechanical scale, consciousness; which is pure, gives us not only the knowledge of the particular perishing existences but also the true and unique nature of their real relations with one another. Divine perception is an apprehension of the whole, of which these crashing atoms and movements are parts. Consciousness in its limited condition, gives us knowledge of discrete data of the external world without any significant
connections or unifying formula of inter relationship. The self same consciousness in its fully expanded condition gives us a fully articulated definition of reality throbbing with significance, and all fall into a unified picture as it were. Thus, consciousness, however veiled is not a giver of illusion. This is the basis of the satkhyāti theory of Rāmānuja.

Thus facts of the objective world are given to an embodied soul through perception: relations, general and particular, between these facts, are inferred or seen by the activity of thought or intellection, vikalpa and with the help of vyāpti, invariable concomitance and memory. The highest knowledge is attained neither by perceptions through sense which are particulars nor by inferences which present generalities as such, but only by super sensory perception or intuition.

To achieve even this, the 'Words' of those who have already achieved and known have to be consulted and followed. Intuition even though natural to the individual, is feeble and has to be strengthened by practice of dis-interested devotion to knowledge and to the highest purposes of the divine. Such then is the difference between the perceptive knowledge and intuitive knowledge, which we designate as insight into reality for it is neither influenced by vyāpti nor karma nor vāsana nor by vyavahāra nor disease of the sense organs. If a more clear cut distinction has to be made, we may say that the external reality is perceived, whilst the internal or the spiritual is intuited, defining external and internal as the two aspects of a thing distinct indeed from the internal and external to the subject who perceives or intuit.
Rāmānuja refuses to recognize the three degrees of reality of pratyakṣa, anumāṇa and śabda, or in advaitic terminology, pratyakṣa, parokṣa and aparokṣa since that would mean that we are trying to impugn the reality of each in turn, especially the reality of the data given in perception. Further it is a distinction without a difference. An identical consciousness is operative in these three phases, and in each of these three phases some aspects of the real are exhibited.

It is true that perception is of a fragment of reality, a snatch and a patch, nothing more. It does not reveal the constitutive principles of knowledge or reality. It supplies, it is true only snapshots, but even then snapshots do exhibit certain elementary relations and configurations, and these induce so to speak other extensions of the relationships with the help of principles governing perceived invariable concomitances and similarities. But the limitations under which inference suffers are serious when we consider that it has to build a superstructure on the basis of these snatches and patches of perceptive data. Relieved from the immediate, contemplating the wide range of similar phenomena mediately or in imagination, undoubtedly there is facilitated the understanding of the principles of truth. And predictability becomes more and more sure and exact. But there are limits to this. Rāmānuja points out that despite the amount of expansion in our knowledge that intellectualizing reason or understanding might make, it can never lead to the knowledge of the highest perfection which is the limit supreme of intelligence itself.
That there is a Transcendent above the experienced has never been denied by Rāmānuja. The Transcendent can be known and experienced: this also Rāmānuja claims to be possible. But he does not admit any opposition between the consciousness that knows this and the consciousness that knows That. He avers that whilst reason or understanding infers correctly about other thing it can never infer correctly about the Whole and the Supreme Transcendent.

II

Parā vidyā or Parā jñāna

Rāmānuja accepts the idealistic view that the essence that subsists or supports the whole of reality is spiritual and not material. It is the immanent principle of order, and must be considered to be the active pervasive principle of reality all over. It is the absolute permanent in the changing world. Thus the truth of all existence must be sought in this essence, supreme rasa. It can be said to be the cause of the entire universe or the primary base of the cosmological arguments of the theists. An inference from the nature of experience to the existence of God is said to be sufficient proof for the existence of God. Rāmānuja contends that all arguments based on cosmology and teleology are grounded on comparisons and analogies available in the fragmentary creative activities of finite beings and cannot lead to the proof of the omni-causal, omni pervasive omni-potent being at all. Further such arguments prove a substance not a personality and a spirit. The Spinozistic proof without teleology led him to substance. The
cartesian proof, ontological though it was, was grounded on nothing more than belief. The teleological principle cannot prove an omniscient being. Kant's famous criticism is perfect; all these proofs at best may reveal the upper limit to the notion of cause nothing more, never a real existence.

The Nyāya argument is that God could be inferred from the conception of the most perfect intelligence required for the sake of explaining the order and design of the world and its motion and arrangement. Due to anthropomorphism inherent in common sense, the inference from the appearance of order in human creations leads to the inference of a supreme creator other than the mechanical movements of the atoms. At the back of all creation there is intelligence. This in substance is the argument of Udayana. Adrṣṭa, the unseen force, is a natural potency, not an intelligence like the Nous of Anaxagoras. Thus neither karma nor adṛṣṭa can explain the design, though they might explain the moving and acting. The world has a plan which no material entity, mechanical movement or inner necessity like adṛṣṭa can explain; therefore God must be postulated as an existent being, as the supreme cause of creation, whereas the atoms and adṛṣṭa are the material and instrumental causes.

Rāmānuja maintains that these proofs are not sufficient to prove the Divine. They may prove a very capable creator not the all-creator. Rāmānuja holds that God cannot be proved by perception nor by inference which depends on the former, though inference may gather in many more perceptions into its reckoning. It cannot go beyond the given in the experience. And God is not given in perception. Continuity and extensity
INTUITION AND SRUTI PRAMANA

might be inferred to a great extent but one cannot infer the existence of a supreme Intelligence. The cosmological argument cannot prove the existence of God: it may prove that it is necessary for the existence of the world that there should exist an intelligence, superior to any we know. It cannot affirm its existence though it may necessitate a presumption. And presumption is not proof. That is why it is said that the existence of God is proved by vision of Him, sātṣatkhāra.

Inferential idea cannot involve existence. Existence depends on the conditions of space-time, desıkāla-ākāra: the existence of God transcends the conditions of space and time. God thus cannot be known through ordinary perception or by inference. Nor do all ideals or ideas involve existence. Existence is a predicate. The sky flower cannot have existence though it is an idea. It exists as an idea. Such ideas do not have a place or time. Others exist at some places and some times. Fictions such as horn of the hare and sky flower or son a barren women, involving intrinsic contradiction, are ideas outside space time and causal conditions.

The Divine being thus is outside the pale of the pramāṇas of perception and anumāṇa and upamāṇa. “Whom he chooses by him He is perceived”.1 “Not by austerities nor yet by mere jñāna nor yet by works, but by the grace of the Divine only can the Highest be known, understood and entered”. Then alone does the Perfect Being become for the individual a real being: till then it should be content to believe in it as a regulative idea- a demand of practical reason or

1 Katha Up. 1.ii.23, Yam evaiśa vṛntute tene labhyah
morality, and only possess a precarious existence as an idea constantly getting modifications as to its satisfying character as the most real and most perfect. That there is a higher demand on us, the parama-puruṣārtha, which means the demand to conceive of and perceive and experience the actual existence of the Most Perfect, even here and now, apart from which we have no place and being, entails the faith that fulfils itself as vision, as intuitive realisation of His bring or Existence. The moral demand and the religious imperative compel our cognition to struggle forward beyond the immediate sensory and the mediate inferential towards the Vision that comes from Grace.

III

Why should śabda be accepted as absolute authority

The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is a variety of tarka, reasoning. It assists the śabda pramāṇa. Its main topic is the discovery of the correct apparatus by which we could arrive at. Vedic truth. It is more interested in the truth that we have known through communication through sound or rather hearing(śruti), than through the other ways of knowing, like pratyakṣa, anumāna and upamāna. The pramāṇas pertaining to the latter three are discussed at length by the Nyāya schools of thought. The schools of Nyāya and their metaphysical and practical allies the Vaiśeṣika, Yoga and Buddhistic schools, did not seriously consider the nature of the śabdapramāṇa, the authoritative utterances received by seers from a transcendent source. In most cases they were content to define śabda-pramāṇa as āpta-vacana, meaning by āpta one who is interested in the
ultimate welfare of the individual. It bears a very wide connotation since any one could be classed as an āpta, and it may not refer to the Vedas, upaniṣads and the other works which were deemed by the Vedantins to be specially of the wise, seers. All the other systems were more rationalistic in the sense that their reasoning was not based on the scriptural texts of the Vedas, though some unorthodox schools do hold allegiance to other texts of their human teachers such as Gotama Buddha and Mahavira jaina. At the best, words such as theirs represented such general tendencies of speculation as did not find adequate representation in the Vedas not to speak of their being merely snatches without coherence from the body of the Doctrine propounded by the Vedas and upanisads. It was the intention of the Vedānta Śūtras to undertake a comprehensive synthetic unification of the entire body of the Scriptural Teaching so as to enable us to know the Divine\(^1\): To the rationalists however the Vedas and the upanisads meant nothing more than one of the many interpretations of life's problems.

Almost the first question that faces us here is, why should we consider that the faults inherent in the other pramāṇas do not inhere in this śruti or śabda-pramāṇa? There is needed an analysis of the conditions of error which vitiate others and not this Traditional knowledge may be considered to yield a coherent picture of reality in so far as it has been on the anvil of criticism for a pretty long period in the history of experience. But there are differences in the traditions, for empirical traditions are different indeed from the ritualistic

\(^1\) V.S.II.4 Tattva samanvayāt
which has formed part and parcel of all religious practices everywhere. The question is which tradition has the authentic signature of truth. Antiquity by itself does not sanction truthness of a thing. The mīmāmsakas being rationalists - of course within the ambit of investigation into authority without denying the efficacy of the rituals at all - were at pains to discover the principles of analysis and synthesis, and in so doing to discover the sources of error. There are therefore, theories of error formulated by the mīmāmsakas in addition to the absolute claim they make for the śabda-pramāṇa. We shall consider at another place in extenso the theories of perceptual and other types of error. Here the point to note is that the śabda is claimed to avoid the triple sources of error (kāraṇa-daśāh).

Nyāya Vaiśeṣika has given us the clues to the determination of what is wrong with perceptual knowledge. It has found the causes that lend to misapprehension due to the non-correspondence with reality. The defects are due to factors of senses or the mind itself, but these defects can never be known or perceived except by a reference to reality directly through action, a reference that is incapable of being made via representation or comparison. This practical test is indeed extraneous to thought but it is not by any means extraneous to reality which is amenable to both thought and action in a synthesis of conduct.

Thus everything is known not only as to what it looks to the eye, but also as to what purpose or use it can be put to, and for which it is adequate. Thus the causal principle and teleological nature of every object get proved, for they are
implicit in each and every object of reality. To separate this twofold nature the thought from the practical use or content or nature of each thing, is to divorce reality of its worth and value. Illusions are resolved by the dual test rather than by any one. Indeed the cognition enforces the conduct in relation to it, is a preparation for action or use.

With regard to the theory of Prabhākara which upholds that non-discrimination, akhyāti is the source of error, we have to say that it does not prove or explain all error. The anyathākhyāti - theory of Kumārila does not either. Whether there is any one theory which exhaustively explains all error on the perceptual level of experience without taking in, in some form, both the theories of error afore-said, is a matter of grave doubt. Error in perception in the first place is due to non-discrimination and in the second place is due to the mistaking of one thing for another. In the first case, more and more discrimination will get rid of the error, but in the second case, nothing less than the practical test will avail to dissolve the error in perception. Verification of the perception is necessary to avoid error. That is to say, to act in an erroneous manner leads not to the predicted consequences or known results but to some other results and consequences. Action becomes a failure and that decides the truth about a thing's existence or rather nature, svarūpa. It is true that the best cure for non-observation is more observation and careful observation. Such a thing is fruitful when there is nothing wrong about the sense organs themselves as well as with our mind which is liable to fluctuations of attention and interest, grasping greeds and potencies. When however, the sense organs are not in good condition, the test of svatah pramāṇya, self-evidence, will be
found to be indeed inadequate. But metaphysically speaking almost all the theories of Indian Philosophy hold that the sense organs are products of *karma*, action, and are imperfect veiling agents, making things appear otherwise than what they are. Coherence of facts continuously derived form faulty conditions might get a coherence of a sort, but that does not vouchsafe that that is the only test of reality. Reality is finally to be lived and experienced. As Rāmānuja said, for the universal vision of double moon (timiradoṣa) on a particular island, there is no cure, even as the irremovable categorical blue spectacles of Kant can never make us perceive reality as it is in itself. As Bertrand Russell argued we can create any number of self-consistent systems of philosophy none of which bear any semblance to reality at all. The criterion of self-evidence or: self-consistency cannot avail us in these cases. Nor would it be possible to arrive at truth if every one spent a fevered existence.

However much then this might satisfy us in so far as we seek to arrive the theoretical consistency without going forward towards objects themselves in order to testify to their

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1 In Buddhism the sense organs delude by making things which are momentary, appear permanent, the atoms as having form which they do not possess, in hypostatizing objects which are inside as outside, in shewing the non-existent as existent. In Jainism we have the karma matter distorting perception. In Advaita –Vedānta there is again the action of karma and Māyā which distort the one consciousness into the appearance of many. In Rāmānuja’s doctrine too this karma is an effective contracting agency which limits the ambit of perception, though it does not distort it. In Sāmkhya and in Nyāya also Karma plays an important role as an illuding or distorting device.
truth or otherwise, truth would remain an idle dream. To contend that knowledge must he full and complete before action can take place is as sane a possibility as that a man should know swimming before he learns to swim. Action and knowledge mutually correct themselves in order to facilitate greater and greater knowledge. A healthy interaction between conduct, experience and experiment, is a necessity forced upon any theory of truth.

So far then as our affirmations go, knowledge is its own testimony, provided the instruments of our cognition are all in a healthy condition, undiseased, sane and unemotional. Mīmāṃsa accepts the theory of self-evidence with the conditions we have enumerated, namely, that there should he no error or mistake in the nature of the several instruments of cognition in perception.

The senses and the must be freed from all defects. Is this condition fulfilled by any other person? Such knowledge is true only of the Veda according to Mīmāṃsa. If the source, that is the object itself, is vitiated by ambiguity, that is, if it has a plausible or possible similarity with other things as in the case of snake or rope or mirage, then the knowledge that follows upon that perception is uncertain, indefinite, frustrating and invalid. We would be forced to settle this ambiguity only by a recourse to fact, a reference which could only be by way of conduct. Thus if in the case of akhyāti, non-discrimination, more observation, carried out fully and scientifically cannot lead us to definite truth though it may lead us to some ways of knowing other than the purely cognitive, in the case of anyathakhyāti, we have to find out more and more fully the
defects of sense-organs and the mind, and the ambiguity in the objects nature itself in order to get over the illusion. By doing so we arrive at the causes of error. Again it is a fact that error is a fruitful source of correct knowledge with regard to the objects other than those that we contemplate or seek to know about. Thus error leads to discovery of the properties of objects, that is to say, to knowledge as in the case of the illusion of a bent oar in water.

Thus we find that one valuable principle emerges even out of the consideration of the incidence of error, that is, it could occur only at three points: the subject, the object, and the organs: in the subject, so far as emotional samskāric or karmic or vāsana-propsenities lead to non discrimination or partial observation of the given (object): in the object, in so far as it might possess ambiguity, that is to say, superficial similarity that could at first look lead to identification with another object (the fallacy of upamāṇa): and in the means, in so far as they have defects, natural or due to conditions of perception in the sense-organs.

In a similar manner we are enabled to discuss pramāṇas such as inference, and show that vyāpti, invariable concomitance, might be either superficial or intrinsic. Error would have to be detected in the pakṣa or in the hetu or vyāpti, or the example. The pakṣa is the subject, the example udāharaṇa is the means, the hetu is the objective reason vyāpti. Unless all these three are free from defects any true conclusion is impossible. Fallacies of pakṣa (asiddha), of Hetu ('vyabhicāra), or virodha, of ādbita and satpratipakṣa, could all be seen to refer to defects in the three elements of cognition.
Thus we find that in regard to the Sabda-pramāṇa we have to reject or rather select our well wishers on the basis of certain conditions we have laid down. All verbal testimony cannot be considered to be intuitive śabda, just as all friends and well-wishers cannot be considered to be wise; the testimony that we get must be free from the initial errors of means and source. The source must be pure and perfect: so also the means must be pure and perfect. Such śabda is true and perfect. Such is the Veda. By the grace of the Divine granted to the Rsis their visions are super sensory, untainted by the sense-organs and karma. The objects of the śabda, are untainted and true- and pure. Further to know them it is necessary to be in that receptive mood of mind wherein there is no confusion, no obsession, no inattention and no defect. Rsi-minds were in a high stage of yoga due to tapas. The truths themselves and the rituals taught were all not creations by an intensified Consciousness, but were seen to be the: truths of eternal existence, and not man-made śabda which is the Veda, is uncreated even by God, therefore the causality of an imperfect. Being for their existence is ruled out. Therefore they form a perfect document.

Such, in brief is the view entertained by the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the validity of the which is pure in regard to the three possible sources of infection; the subject, the object, and the means. Other śastras owe their origins to human beings, temporary historical figures of humanity or even master minds. But they are vitiated by lack of perfect truth.

Śankara accepts śabda as valid testimony. But he
pleads that it leads to the knowledge of the absolute pure being which is the undifferenced consciousness\(^1\). Śabda is; most close to intuitive cognition, and as such is superior to perception. “The śruti depends on direct perception (in the sphere of transcendent knowledge) for in order to be an authority, it is necessarily independent of all other authority; and smṛti plays a part analogous to that of; induction since it also derives its authority from an authority other than itself.”\(^2\)

This śabda consists of two types of texts it is said, and Śankara dichotomously divides these into the transcendental texts and the phenomenal texts. This is in the realm of knowledge texts; for there is a division into knowledge texts and ritual texts.

Rāmānuja accepts the supremacy of the Śabda even

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\(^1\) Māndukya Up.7 “The wise think that the fourth (caturtha) which is congnizant neither of internal objects nor of external objects (in the distinctive and analytical way) nor at the same time of the one and the other (viewed synthetically and in principle) and which is not (even) a synthetic whole o integral knowledge being neither cognizant nor non- cognizant is invisible (adṛśṭa and equally imperceptible by any faculty whatsoever), non active (avyavahāra in its immutable identity), incomprehensible (agrāhya since it comprises all), indefinable (alaksana since it is without any limit)- unthinkable (acintya, incapable of being invested with any form), indescribable (avyapadeśya, incapable of being qualified in any particular attribution of determination), the sole basic essence (pratyaya-sāra) of the self (ātma, present in all states), devoid of any trace of development or manifestation (prapañca upaśama, and therefore absolutely and totally liberated from the special conditions of any mode whatever of existence), fullness of peace and bliss, without duality; It is ātma(itslf, beyond and independently of all conditions; (Thus) Must it be known”.

\(^2\) Śankara Bhāṣya quoted by Rene Gnonon; Man and his becoming
like Śankara: he does not however admit that it teaches an undifferenced Consciousness; he does not accept the dichotomous and mutually exclusive division into transcendental (para) and phenomenal (apara, vyāvahara) texts, nor does he consider the two-fold division into knowledge-texts and ritual-texts to be mutually incompatible. They are all one coherent structure, a single organic unity.¹ To divide them in this manner can never lead to synthesis but to division which will constantly be at war with experience as we know it.

Śankara dichotomized the texts as pertaining to two different and even antagonistic teachings such as Karma and Brahma, sauguṇa and nirguṇa, as phenomenally and transcendentally real instructions. Śankara relegated karma and sauguṇa to the phenomenal realm of Māyā or Avidyā which is contradictory to Jñāna and Nirguṇa. Rāmānuja holds that this dichotomy to be false and unwarranted, as it does not really show his allegiance to the unitary teaching of the Veda or its total worthiness. If it is conceded that Veda refers to two contradictory teachings we should seek a criterion that shall distinguish between them for our purposes. That would imply that a criterion other than self-evidence (svatah-pramāṇya) would have to be framed. It means thus a refutation of self-evidence, and is a subtle way of entering into scriptural thought through reasoning which is valid only within the limits of actual sensory experience (pratyakṣa).

¹ Rāmānuja claims that Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā are one śāstra. Śrī Bhāṣya, l.1.1: Mīmāṃsāśastrām- "Athāto Dharma-jīnāsa ity ārabhya " Anāvrttiśabdādānāvrttiśabdāt" ityevam antam sangatīviṣeṣeṇā viśiṣṭakramam
It may be difficult to unify the divergent trends of the Vedic and upaniṣadic instructions. Classification into vidyās, ways of knowing: has always been welcome but dichotomous division is unfortunately not the path towards synthesis. Samanvaya. We have to discover a third principle from which or within which, these two phases might get a realized unity. But such a unity which holds within it two opposites is irrational and cannot be substantiated. Further if Hegel is appealed to help us in this predicament, we can remark that such an outlet is ruled out for Śankara, even if he had recourse to it, as some modern interpreters of Śankara are wont to, because the matter on which the discussion revolves does not belong to the perceptual or inferential order.

We have admitted that classification and definition are the means to understanding the several trends of thought in the Upaniṣads. But we have to note them not as contradictory to one another or annulling one another but as helping to make for an integral realization of the nature of Brahman, the ultimate reality.

Further, the doctrine of negation as affirmation is crucial to the understanding of the classification. Dichotomy believes, only in the opposition of its two terms or divisions and never admits distinctive synthesis. The use of the negative an or a or na only leads us to suppose that the qualification is to shew that the thing so qualified is other than and not the opposite of. This interpretation is valid in regard to the scriptural texts in general, because the insistence is that they form a synthetic or integral body of unitary instruction. Examples of this are furnished by the terms A-Vidyā which means karma.
Asambhūti which means immortality, A-karma which means Vidyā, A-sat which means Prakṛti and Na-iti which means the Transcendent.

Again on the same count the karma and jñana portions of the Vedic literature or Śabda are a synthetic body of doctrine. This is substantiated by the teaching of the Upaniṣads themselves as evidenced by the Īśāvāsyopaniṣad which teaches that by the one (karma) one crosses over death, and by the other (jñana), one attains the Immortal; thus once and for all disposing of the argument for irreconcilable dichotomous divisions of the texts.

Considered in this way, the true instruction contained in the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads is not at all about a non-dual consciousness, but only about a true Being characterized by qualities of the highest perfection. In other words, the instruction contained in the Upaniṣads is regarding the Supreme Personality.

Intuition is a fundamental type of cognition capable of apprehending the true and true only, when an individual is freed from all ignorance and karma and when he is freed from his body (deha) that is a product of karma. And Vedas alone can and do speak the voice of intuition fully and adequately. If the acceptance of śruti is to be valid, it must be valid on the ground of its experiencability in some manner by the individual. Thus the validity of the Śruti finally depends for its sanction an
the experience and Vision of the Divine by the individual.¹

According to Rāmānuja, the śrutis are eternal.² They are of non-human origin (apauruṣeya). "The superhuman origin and the eternity of the Veda really mean that intelligent agents having perceived in their minds an impression due to previous recitation of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters and so on, remember and again recite it in that very same order of succession. This holds good both in regard to men and the highest Lord of all; there however is that difference between the two cases that the representation- of the Veda which the supreme person forms in his own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on any impression previously made."³ In other words, the Vedas are universal truths of intuition or fixed immutable principles by which the Lord manifests or creates and governs the moral and physical orders of the universe. The world of the Veda so to speak is the unchanging permanent. The Lord alone is capable of spontaneously generating it.

¹ In śrī- Rangarājastava it is claimed that Divine experience is more truly a vision than perception is. The jaina concept of vision is more or less similar to the above position. Purification of the body by the fruits of karma leads to vision or perception, pratyakṣa. According to them however sensory vision is not perception.
² S.B. l.iii.29; etad eva ca vedasyāpauruṣeyatvam nityatvam ca--- cf. Adhikaraṇa Sārāvali I.l.3 "The Veda not having been made and being therefore perfect, its testimony is implicitly accepted, like the statements of a friend returning from a distance. Where any of the statements conflict with what is known from other sources, they are rejected. Similarly if the Veda makes a statement conflicting with sense perception, it should be understood in a sense as mere praise".
³ Ibid. Yat pūrvapūrvoccāraṇakrama-janita-samskāreṇa tameva krama viśeṣam smṛtvā teneiva kramenoccāryatvam.
Since Vedic principles form the body of truth, they express the fundamental nature of the Lord. Creation being the real activity of the Lord, the order manifested by Him and His creation is of a fundamentally identical nature, though not of an eternally recurrent nature in so far as any particular individuals and instruments are concerned. There is no eternal recurrence in the Nietzschean sense, though there is an eternal recurrence in the order of the unfoldment and enfolding, creation; and dissolution. In fact "He chooses the makers of the mantras" who 'see' the hymns and transmit them loyally.

Thus valid insight is approached and realized through the practice of the ways of knowing prescribed in the scriptures such as madhu-vidyā or dahara-vidyā etc., which are meditations on the Supreme. No other way is possible. In every case inference fails to establish the real and the perfect creator of the Universe.

IV

Cosmological Argument and God

The Nyāyā cosmological argument for the existence of God is disproved by Rāmānuja on the ground that the world is not of the nature of an effect in the same sense as jars, pots and cloth made by intelligent beings. Nor is it an effect in the sense that it is made up of parts or displays the connection with or control by an intelligent being as is the case with a body controlled by a mind. Nor should it be said that there must be an intelligent being to fit the several parts in an order so as to be a working or living tissue of existence. All the arguments merely reveal that the world is a product of the
individual soul or self and not of a universal or perfect being. We do observe that some persons of great yogic attainments or who are liberated are capable of creating some things and performing miracles too in many ways. “From all this it follows that the individual souls only can be causal agents; no legitimate inference leads to the Lord different from them in nature”. Tanubhuvanādi kṣetrajñakartrēkam, kāryatvat ghaṭavat, īśvaraḥ kartā na bhavati, prayojanaśūnyavat, muktātmavat, īśvaraḥ kartā na bhavati, aśarīrvat na ca kṣetrajñanam svaśarīrādhiṣṭāne vyabhicāraḥ, tatrāpya-nādessaṅkṣmaśarīrasya sadbhāvāt, vimatīviṣayah kālo na lokaśunyaḥ, kālatvād vartmānakālāvat-iti. The body, the world, have the individual souls for their (producing agents): because they possess the character of being produced effects (even) a pot does: (2) The Lord is no agent (in the act of creation) because he has no purpose (in creation) just as released souls (have not): (3) The Lord is no agent (in the act of creation) because he has no body (just as those same released souls have not).” And this reasoning is not fallacious in being too widely applicable to the case of individual souls getting to preside over their own bodies, because, in such a case also, there is the (previous) existence of the beginningless subtle body (in association with those souls). (4) Time about which there is difference of opinion, can never have been devoid of (created) worlds because it possesses the character of being time, (even) like the present time.”(S B I i.3) All theses arguments and many more that pertain to the embodied nature, active nature, & etc., remind one of the paralogisms of pure reason that Kant utilized to show the inapplicability of causality beyond the realm of the phenomena. All transcendental applications involve inner contradiction. The
appeal of Kant lay in the Practical Reason and more fully in the intuition of the Critique of Judgment. To Rāmānuja it lies in the Veda, the heard-word of the sages. The ultimate word of Rāmānuja is that Veda alone makes us know about the unity of the instrumental and material and the teleological causality of Brahman. For “if we thought” says Rāmānuja, “that these texts do not mean to intimate the real existence of Brahman, the mere idea to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way”. Aupaniṣadesvapīvākṣyeṣu brahmāstutvavāyām tātparyābhāvaniścaye brahmaṃ jñāne satyapi puruṣātthama paryavasānam na syāt (S.B.ii.4). Thus whatever the śabdapramāṇa, all its ideas are eternal existences. In the case of the divine intuition all the ideas or representations that are discovered by it are existent or rather possess existence as a predicate. The test of śruti does involve the practice of its methods (vidyās). Mere knowledge without practical test of the same will not make for insight and revelation (anubhava). We must perceive them even as God perceives them: that is the promise of the equality that we shall attain when liberated from karma and rebirth. This is the vindication of the ontological argument.

V

Seeing and Being

The ‘seeing’ of the scriptures by the Divine and the individual soul grants them an eternal value according to some thinkers. Does the highest Being see all things as eternally existent or as created by Himself?
Rāmānuja says that the power of seeing and so on that belong to the Highest self are not dependent on the sense organs: “it rather results immediately from its essential nature since its omniscience and power to realize its purposes are due to its own being only”. It is because of this infinite capacity of His own nature, their beings are included in His seeing, or rather His seeing and their beings and one and the same thing. As the infinite Being whose nature is eternal knowledge and knowledge of a different kind indeed from any of the individual souls, bond and freed or eternally free. He is the source of all their being. In his case alone could it be truly said that idea (essence) involves existence. In the case of the individual souls, existence is contingent. We might also in perfect truth argue that He alone can cause or bring out anything from out of nothing\(^1\), since in Him nothing is non-existent. It is true only of the individual finite soul to say that out of nothing nothing comes, *ex nihilo nihil fit, tuccād tuccameva abhavat*. Not so with the Divine Being who could out of His own wish by a single act produce out of nothing even the material and the ultimate form. There is nothing repugnant in endowing all impossibilities of the finite being to the Infinite Being. But Rāmānuja holds that whilst there may be enough justification for such a procedure and even acceptance, it is necessary also to hold that from out His eternal Being, which indeed is illimitable, anything that comes into existence is in one sense eternally realized in His Being and therefore eternally existent. Knowledge of their eternal validity and existence is sanctioned by His nature itself and those who discover these hymns and

truths find it impossible not to credit them with an eternal independent existence, independent of any human minds and independent of time and space.

To grant to the intuitive truths existence that is eternal, is to posit a real realm of essences adopting Santayana’s phrase, different indeed from anything like the universals and floating ideas. But not all intuitive realizations can claim absolute existence and truthness since most of these are got at through efforts of imperfect individual souls. Those alone amongst the intuitive truths which have come out of the grace of the Divine can claim utter validity and peak of perfection. In the case of the Divine Lord Himself it is said that He sees them spontaneously without the mediation of sense-organs, and other prakrtic instruments.

VII

Divine Knowing

The knowledge of the Divine is creative unlike the individual’s consciousness whose creative nature as consciousness is trifling, since God’s knowledge becomes true or is true, whereas the individual’s imagination and knowledge are not always capable of becoming true¹. Rāmānuja contends that the creative nature of the finite or bond consciousness is next to nothing, and its imagination is fraught with illusory character. But this view goes against all Creative art and inventive ability that we do observe. Most probably we shall be told that God is in that case acting through the agency of the

¹ S.B.II.1 Na jīvasua sankalpa-mātrena sraṣṭṛtvam upapadyate
individual. We find that the creative feature of knowledge most fully demonstrated in the inventions of man even in the most primitive contracted state his being. The urge towards greater expression and the manipulation of the environment, have been achieved by the creative or constructive instinct of living beings. But it is an instinctive and unconscious tendency. It is only a higher consciousness that can make art creations permanent. Else all creation of man is bound to be of a phenomenal and transitory nature. Here we find a cue. Creations of the Divine are permanent, yathārthaḥ, sāsvatāḥ as the Īsopaniṣad says, and those of the humans otherwise. Consciousness in its perfect actuality is creative in nature. The question then would arise whether creation is not progressively increasing in intensity and amplitude as the consciousness more and more becomes limitless. Undoubtedly this is possible as evidenced by the siddhis. This individual attains as shown in the Yoga śāstra as also in Buddhistic literature. But the absoluteness of creation is possible only to the completely liberated being. There is yet a difference between the Divine and that individual, in so far as the creation of reality is concerned. This is the prerogative nature of the Divine only and none else.¹ Otherwise the chaos of universes would result from the creative abilities of the individuals. Enjoyment and consciousness of ability may be had by the individuals, never indeed a creation of another universe or universes. A free consciousness thus becomes a contemplating and enjoying consciousness, participating no doubt in the work of the Divine, nothing more or may even become a perfect instrument of the Divine in the governance of the world. Thus true

¹ Jagadvyāpāravarajam samāno jyotiṣā

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creativity turns out to be dependent on the Supreme Being alone, knowledge is real only in the Divine; outside Him, it is a figment of imagination, a fruitful source of illusion, hallucination, and delusion. Māyā is the power of knowledge of the Divine, but it is also the power of delusion for the unfree individual souls. In other words, it is in the hands of the individuals a power of ignorance, not of creation but of illusion, a creative power of the transitory fruits not of permanent reals.

VII

Time

Time is one of the most important categories of experience. There has been not a little of talk about being beyond space and time, kālātīta being a term that denotes existence beyond time. But is it possible for any one to be beyond time and space? There is no possibility of even conceiving of a time or place beyond time and place, since all that is falls within the same. That being the case, the concept of beyond space and time interpreted literally yields no sense. The view that God is beyond space and time means only that He never had been absent at any time or space like the human individuals. He is coeval with Time and co-existent with Space. But is yields sense to speak of Kālātīta, trigunātīta etc., when we consider the alternative interpretation that He is not limited by space or time or the guṇas of matter. The non-limitation by these entities means that He is not dependent on them but is their master, and that He exists beyond space and time. It

1 Māyā vayunamjñānam “it jñanaparyāyamapi māyāsabdam naighanāṭukā adhīyate” S.B.I.I.21. (Nirukta)
might be held that what it really means is that God is the Pure Concept or Essence which is outside existence. Even when we speak about concepts can we legitimately speak of their being outside or a priori? That they do not exist but yet are, is a very uncouth self-contradiction. Time is a series, beginning less and endless; all things occur at different stages of it. It is numerical infinity in so far as it is unlimited on either side; it is vibhu, it is never a pure finite though men divide it into dates and seconds and moments. So also space. It is also a numerical vibhu though it is never a pure finite despite the divisions that might be made in it. These two are infinites containing and subsisting or rather substan ding the finites. They are infinite mainly and thus are identical with Brahman. But they are finite to the Divine mind in so far as His omniscience and omnipresence cover them. Thus when Brahma: is said to he Kāla Time, it means His coevalness at all times with time itself. He in beyond it in the sense that He is not itself that, rather He is the master of time, who brings into being creations, vast and multitudinous, within it He is more than it. Nor is He Space. He is wherever it is and thus coexistent with it. But He is beyond it also, in the sense that He is aware of all that happens in it and in Time. So also He is beyond Matter which is also eternal, in the sense He controls it and sustains its changes etc., All that is meant by 'being Beyond Time' means that the individual is not affected by the divisions in it, which permit the judgments Now, Then, afterwards. etc... That means man becomes omniscient and eternal.

The nature of the concepts (i.e how they are and when they are known or when they are conceived merely) is rather
an intricate matter, requiring an enquiry into the doctrine of their origins. Firstly, the view taken by the Viśiṣṭādvaitic thinkers is that these concepts or class-concepts (that is to say pseudo-concepts and concepts of Benedetto Croce) are the perceived forms of things; and the perceived behaviour of things and laws are merely the inferences of unities so perceived. That these, due to more cogitation and contemplation, lead to direct experience, is also granted by them. Sākṣātkāra then is the fulfillment of the sensory perception. These concepts then are forms, resident in things perceived, and do not exist apart from the objects, and therefore are conditioned by space and time and number. But they are also remembered in the mind and persist as memory and bhāvanā, which could be reproduced separately on paper or stone or wall in the form of pictures, or images. This sensory origin of the concept is never forgotten. They do not exist apart from space and time and cannot even be conceived as existing apart from space and time. The contention is that concepts as ākāra are retained in the memory of the perceiver or knower which he utilizes for anumāna or upamāna the next time he comes across similar experience. The truth of the contention that images exist in this manner might more easily be admitted than in the case of these ideas or concepts. Since concepts are universals whereas images are particular, it may be said that Universals exist outside finite minds and outside space and thus are nowhere existent. This means that we cannot give a correct account of their being. This reduces itself to a futile explanation. On the other hand we can conceive of the Universals as the inherent laws of existence, that is, of all that are in time and space. That includes all minds, things, matter and categories. In other words, Kant's
statement that all experience falls within these two intuitions of space and time and are categorized by categories, is valid and indisputably true. The only issue is whether we could legitimately speak of a Noumenon over and above the Phenomenon we know. Though Hegel himself rejected the Noumenon, his explanations of time and space are far from acceptable to the Realist mind. The concept of Reality beyond space and Time is verily a spiritual intuition of the nature of Freedom which is the one fundamental truth of Reality known as spiritual, which is expressed by phrases such as Liberation, Mukti, Sākṣātkāra, Nirvāṇa, Beatitude & etc.,
CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

We have seen that in perception what is presented is a differenced object. What is presented even in the very initial sensation like the nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa is a samsthāna-rūpa a structure-event, and not a bare existence. Even in the intuitive perception or vision we are not aware of any identity of mere consciousness or absolute consciousness but are aware of a supreme personality, who is the Ultimate Deity or God. Even the nirvikalpaka-samādhi of the Yogi, to which appeal is made, does not annihilate the subject-object relation, since self-consciousness is yet a consciousness of the Self by itself.

With the refutation of the consciousness as object of perception, we are presented with the problem of what consciousness is? The objects are not certainly psychic stuff or consciousness-stuff, either as limited or unlimited, either fictionally or really. The fact that consciousness goes along with every object of cognition does not entail the conclusion that this invariable connection or relation is proof of the psychic stuff theory or the imaginal theory of Yogācāra.

We may therefore ask the next question as to how or rather why consciousness is more related to the subject side rather than to the object side in cognition? That is to say having shewn that consciousness can exist apart from its outer objects as in introspection, dream and imagination, we find that even under these conditions we are unable to refute the subjects of cognition. As we have already said the subject
owns the consciousness rather than that consciousness that
fulgurates into subjects and objects.

We cannot raise the function or adjective or qualities of
a subject to the level of a substance. Idealistic thought feels
chary of accepting the absoluteness of the terms and yet no
repugnance is felt when the subject and object are reduced to
a function. Even if this function becomes infinite, it can never
give up being the function of a subject.

The exact reason for this kind of epistemology is not far
to seek. Every experience makes the object come into
existence in a, consciousness and therefore it becomes
possessed by consciousness. This possession in other words
makes the object an adjective of that consciousness. Thus it
follows from another rule that the adjective can never exist
apart from its substrate, that this adjective also cannot exist
apart from the consciousness which now possesses it. This is
the rationale if it be one, for the ego-centric predicament.
Further the stream of consciousness is possessed of these
objects and their images; and all these objects reveal
transitoriness of existence. The continuity of consciousness as
a stream grants it the quality of being the substrate of these
experiences of objects. Consciousness becomes an eternal
and universal background of all phenomenal experiences.

Against such views as these, Rāmānuja holds that the
seeming absoluteness of consciousness, or rather its universal
presence has been misunderstood and misinterpreted for the
sake of a false metaphysics. It is based on false psychology.
A correct epistemological understanding of the nature of
THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

consciousness would require a more detailed study of consciousness and its processes. Perhaps it may be said that all psychology and epistemology are worthless, since they deal with the already vitiated experience or categorized a priori experience. In reply we can only say that such a wholesale illusion cannot be cured. Further there is no proof of its truth. A false understanding of psychology is bound to obsess a mind given to a mere metaphysical pursuit of reality. A correct understanding of consciousness reveals according to Rāmānuja five fundamental features.

I. Consciousness is an attribute belonging to a permanent subject and is not the pure ‘that’ or existence which is observed in nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa.

II. Consciousness is not a permanent but a transitory function, or rather it is present whenever the subject cognizes. It is not eternal in the sense that it is not always in action, for consciousness itself testifies to its absence as in the judgements ‘I was not aware, I was asleep. Consciousness is itself limited in time.’

III. Consciousness is a function of a subject Samviditi svāśrayam prati sattayaiva kasyacit prakaśanāśilo jñāna vagaty anubhūtyādi padaparyāyaṇāmā sakarmakaḥ samveditur ātmano dharmah prasiddhah says Yāmunācārya.

It is neither a stream nor an expanse nor is it made up of discrete snatches of momentary experiences like links in a chain. But it is also true that consciousness is aware of its absence, abhāva. It cannot prove that consciousness was present during its own absence, as some contend, on the principle that there must be something that perceived the absence. Subjects persist in sleep, and even in death in a state of what Dr. Mac Taggart calls “suspended animation”, where consciousness is absent or, in other words, not active, due to lack of body or lack of co-ordination. Consciousness exists as power in that state as potent, and not as act. There is valid perception of non-consciousness (anupalabdhi) in the same way as there is valid perception of darkness or black colour or nonexistence (abhāva):

IV. Consciousness is neither agent nor subject but the act of cognition of a subject to whom it is specially related as a function, dharma or višeṣana. It is not a witness. sākṣi, for witnessing implies the subject ness of consciousness. “A knowing subject only, not mere consciousness is spoken of as witness: sāksitvam ca sāksāt, jñātṛtvam eva. Consciousness is a function of a subject.

V. Consciousness is not the Absolute Brahman nor yet the atman the individual soul. Because even though one might seek to dissolve all souls or subjects into objects of the Divine Lord or dependent on His absolute existence the effort will not

entail the granting the nature of being a substance to consciousness.

These five fold objections against the monistic idealistic theory of Consciousness are serious enough. Rāmānuja shews that on grounds of actual experience and discriminate criticism there is no ground at all for asserting that consciousness is a substance or a witness or pure experience without subject or object. The true nature of consciousness reveals its polarity towards a subject to which it is invariably absolutely attached. Because this consciousness is observed in all subjects, it cannot be claimed that all these individual consciousness are fulgurations or fragments of a universal consciousness or phenomenal representations or copies or reflections of an absolute consciousness. The problem that confronts the epistemologist is a serious one, thanks to the endeavors of the introspecting idealists. A universal consciousness which has been arrived at through a process of intense cogitation and refunding is an abstraction, a fiction and not a real existence. It is a concept, a limiting one perhaps, but it is nevertheless a fiction. "Whatever else is real, the finite mind of which each one of us is immediately aware is real. Any notion of a ground of things which is incompatible with the reality of finite minds" has to be rejected as contrary to what we are bound to accept as a fact. The question whether the absolute consciousness is a consciousness only has not been faced by the idealists. A theory of consciousness; falls or lives on an adequate answer to this question.
Consciousness not a Substance

Rāmānuja argues at considerable length against the theory that consciousness is a substance.

I. Consciousness is an attribute of a conscious self who is the permanent or eternal being behind all change. The essential character of consciousness is that by its very nature it renders things capable of becoming objects to its own substrate or thought and speech. "Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents itself as the attribute of agent or as related to an object, it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself agent, as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is the agent." Consciousness is like light that reveals the object as well as itself to the substrate, svaparanirvāhaka, and does not need a third entity to relate it to itself.

II. Some persons hold that consciousness is the result of an act of cognizing or compresence of an object and the subject. This has been maintained by the Nyāya school which holds consciousness to be a product due to compresence (sannikarṣa) between and object and sense organs of the subject. Consciousness thus defined would be an epiphemomenon, distinct indeed from the subject and object, and therefore a new thing. This view might with ease be shown to lead either to cārvaka material or the idealistic theory of consciousness.
But Nyāya also holds that this situation itself is consciousness. It is contended that the object was unconscious before the cognitive situation or comprence. The latter theory makes for the conclusion that is subject is himself of the stuff of unconsciousness (jada vastu) and that he is capable of becoming conscious only through the conjunction, sāmyoga, with the object. Consciousness in the Nyāya-theory becomes thus only referable to the subject as quality that emerges in it due to the objective situation. In the absence of this objective situation it lapses into a state of non-consciousness.

These conclusions do not follow according to Rāmānuja, because the individual subject is capable of affirming himself as a self existent conscious being without any need of a sensory comprence with an object. Perhaps this objection is invalid for the simple reason that the inner sense like the manas acts in samvedanā, introspection, which connects itself with its self. The sensory contact with an object only calls into being consciousness which is by no means a product, not a new and original entity coming into being because of the relation of comprence as a synthesis of opposites, but as the act of the subject who knows the object. The theory of realism standing on the rock of asatkārya vāda could not accept the principle of inherence except as an external relation and never as a quality that is inseparably (aprathaksidda) related Nyāya theory based on intellectual atomism and rationalism multiplied entities and categories galore and affirmed external relation between all things without any distinction. So much so even consciousness was bound to be a product of a relation, an epiphenomenon in that
system. No wonder therefore that every entity and category can only be connected by another entity and soon *ad infinitum*. Yet even that system has to recognize at the hands of the new school of Nyāya the *sva-para-nirvāhakatva* of the relations. Despite this, consciousness is not adequately explained in that system. Further Memory becomes an inexplicable problem in Nyāya.

The independence claimed for consciousness is impossible. It is neither a product nor an independent entity. It is the activity or quality of a subject when it comes into contact with outer objects. It is a dynamic function, even as the Buddhist thought avers. It is however the inseparable adjunct of self which is capable of becoming self-conscious. Consciousness also reveals memories and recognizes past objects of experience. Consciousness in one of its major roles is memory, *smṛti*. It is more than this. It reveals the objects that are present before it in time and as such is implied in *pratyākṣa*. As bringing memory from the past into the present consciousness in relation to perceived objects is the consciousness active in recognition: and in keeping all images of previous experiences and perceptions it is memory that not a little influences our perceptions; and as the revelatory perception also it is this self same consciousness that is in function. In dreams too, this consciousness is present but it is only during sleep, *suṣupti*, it is absent or incapable of presenting anything to its substrate. Thus it is an inseparable function\(^1\) of the subject in all cognitive activities whatever.

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Consciousness is also *apoha* - conjecture or āhanum or future knowledge\(^1\). The subject is not a focalization of consciousness, but is the substrate of this consciousness even as a flame is the *substrate* of the rays of light issuing from it which reveals the subject as well as the object and itself too. It appears when the self is active, and is absent when it is inactive. As William James wrote "I mean only to deny that the word (consciousness) stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it stands for a function."

III

*Consciousness as attribute*

Consciousness is an attribute of a self, a quality *vīśeṣaṇa*, inseparable and intrinsic to the self itself. On the occasion of every cognition it emerges to the fore and reveals the nature of the object to its substrate. In waking life it is always and *continuously* operating, and reveals the outer objects to its substrate, and makes possible the judgments such as "I see that", "I perceive that as red", "Here in this". Whilst the *Nyāya* system holds that consciousness is a novel product, an emergent so to speak at the beginning when the souls resting in *pralaya* like stones pāśāṇavat, came into contact with objects or rather congregations of atoms, like a light that arises from a wick, Rāmānuja does not treat consciousness to be a product or an emergent at any time.

\(^{1}\) *Gitā Bhāṣya* XV. 15.

\(^{2}\) Cf, William James: "Does Consciousness Exist."
but that which is inalienably and inseparably aprathaksiddhadharma of the consciences even as the light is of the flame.

Whilst the Vijñānavāda doctrine pleads for consciousness and the stream of mental states as the only reality thus avoiding a self, that is other than the illusory permanence of the stream contents, samskāra skanda, Rāmānuja shows that this position cannot help at all, since the stream state or the so-called store house of consciousness is itself of momentary states, and thus even the samskāra-skanda can never resolve the difficulty of memory or recognition. A permanent consciousness is an impossible, notion, since consciousness is of states and objects, and is undoubtedly not permanent. There must be a basis in which these states find a permanent and this must be other than the stream of consciousness, which is discontinuous as we have seen. Thus consciousness cannot be the self, whether this consciousness be a momentary store-house of impressions, or a permanent stream or even a permanent self, since consciousness is not found to be permanent at all. Memory and Recognition impugn the consciousness itself as the self. Consciousness belongs to a self and is not the self itself. The self persists under all changes and Vicissitudes. Not so consciousness which is found to be in deep sleep at any rate, non-existent.

Rāmānuja holds that consciousness is neither transient in the sense of momentary kṣainika, nor permanent in the sense of Advaita or Sāmkhya: it is a function, dharma, dependent upon the needs and conditions of its substrate.
Consciousness as absent

Consciousness proves its own absence in the affirmation "I was asleep", or "I was not aware". In sleep the self is inactive and not only unaware of external objects but also of internal images or dreams.

Externality or objectivity is of two kinds, the one is real externality of objects that exist independent of the individuals consciousness or perception, the other is the field of memory antaḥkaraṇa, which can be surveyed through remembrance and recollection. In deep sleep both these fields are not available for inspection or introspection.

There are two views of this deep sleep. The self is functionally passive. It is mere selfness without action at all either inwards or outwards. It is impossible to consider this state to be a state of passive awareness. That the self might be self-luminous and as such be in a state of light is possible, but that there is awareness of any other objects, ideal or real, is out of the question. The Yogic description says that the self rests in the cave of the heart, that the self goes to the Highest in deep sleep. Gaudapada says that this stage is the stage of quiescence and lordship, svayam-prakāśa-īśatva; but no one ever affirms that there is cognition. It is likely that this self luminosity of the self (ātman or jīva) has been mistaken for the activity of the consciousness, its function. The existence of self along with the non-existence of the consciousness under certain conditions is possible. Hence do we infer the presence
of the self even in that state of deep sleep not because consciousness perceives its own non-presence which is a self-contradiction but because the self recollects that it was non-functioning. Further there is nothing self contradictory in consciousness inferring its own past non presence. If no self is accepted and if consciousness is alone said to exist, then it is impossible to explain the possibility of sleep, since there is inherent contradiction between existence and non-existence of consciousness at the same time. Therefore the argument for the existence of a self, other than but never separable from consciousness which is its quality, function or adjunct, gets reinforced by this theory, whilst it is a pretty definite weakness in the theories which make consciousness itself the self.

V

Consciousness neither the witness nor the self

It is a feeling of certitude of our own being aware that makes us recognize the distinction between ourselves and our awareness of objects and desires. It is usually contended that the use of the word 'I' in the sentence 'I am aware' is due to ignorance, for the 'I' is said to be merely a closely-knit system of energies, memories and desires. Further we are told following the great experienced of Buddhists, who anticipated centuries earlier Hume's criticisms, that we never catch a self when we introspect, sva-samvedana. Therefore the self is a kalpana a creation by intellect. It is usually the sense of unity of the physical body that makes us affirm a self that has at least as much unity and identity as the body. It is a practical convenience to refer this unity to the self which is just a
reflection of the unity of the body and its organs. It is because the body is tired and is incapable of perception that we say that we are asleep. Sleep is not a condition of the self but of the bodily nature. Does not Yoga say that sleep must be avoided? Sleep is a product of ignorance and is productive of ignorance. Awareness is the true nature of the self and is the self itself. Consciousness thus is self itself or rather there is no self at all but only consciousness.

All the above arguments, from diverse sources, do not make the notion of a permanent self impossible, for the self is not an object of thought but is that which can be realized in a direct vision or intuition. Try as we may it is impossible to find the self apart from the consciousness which is its function. But that does not make for the reversion of the relationship between consciousness and self. Consciousness is never the sākṣi, the witness but only the function of a witness which is found to be the experience of all individuals. If on a priori deduction is ever to be made we should say that it is necessary that the witnessing self should exist a priori and not that consciousness should exist a priori.

VI

Consciousness not the Absolute

It is impossible to identify consciousness with the Absolute, the Absolute that is the ground of all experience and life and being just because the absolute has been characterized as Personality possessing power and perfection and bliss. Consciousness is none of these but the patient hand
maid, not even a separate hand-maid. Rāmānuja views consciousness not as being in itself luminous but that its self luminosity is something that it gains by being the function of the self that is self-luminous. The self is the very stuff of self-luminosity, whether it rests in itself or the Divine Lord, or in freedom or in sleep, or whether it is active in the svapna or jāgrat: it is essential self luminous and luminous in its own nature for itself. svayamprakāśa and svasmai prakāśa.

There is one objection that might with success be brought against the theistic and common - sense position of Rāmānuja: namely, all these are perhaps true of the ordinary human consciousness. This we also admit but they are not true of the absolute Consciousness. Illusion makes all the difference. Here there may be a subject and even a self, but there there is no need for self or anything resembling it but Pure Undifferenced Absolute Consciousness. This view whilst apparently unanswerable, is defining its position from a dichotomous view of reality that is intent upon misunderstanding and denying the world of apprehension as we know it, so as to enable us to postulate and affirm (a non-existent ideal universe) (sic) that is beyond all apprehension. In which case it is incapable of speaking about it and even

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Mayi naśte pi matto nyā kācįjįnjųtiravashitā I
Iṭi tatprāptaye yatnaḥ kasyāpi na bhaviṣyati II
Svasaṃbandhitayā hyasyāssattā vijñaptitādī ca I
Svasaṃbandha viyoge tu jñaptireva na Siddhyati II
Chettuśchedyasya cābhāve chedanaδērasiddhātā I
Ato hamartho jñātaiva partyagātmeti niścitām II

2 Ibid. Čid-rūpātā hi Svayamprakāśatā. P37
knowing it in the sense of our knowing anything and what it experiences or perceives (supersensorically) or is said to be so experience, is something about which it cannot say anything, since it has itself to get dissolved in it never to come out of it again, na punarāvartate. Thus not only is epistemology impossible a fictional transaction but also Metaphysics and ordinary experience become fictional constructions, and beyond all this there is something or nothing (?) relatively speaking and knowledge becomes just approximation towards more or less unreality. In the Buddhistic schools these approximations are dynamically construed. In Advaita they are practically construed. In neither case, is reality possible within experience as we can know it. Further in these theories the constructive dynamism of thought is fundamentally of the vitiating character. Less and less of thought means more and more of Reality (caitanya).

Rāmānuja standing on the bed-rock of scriptural experience declares that more and more knowledge it is that leads to perfection of consciousness and not less and less. Knowledge it is that releases, not less of knowledge. And knowledge is not knowledge if it is indefinite and nebulous and more and more an approximation to experience of the nirvikalpaka, the indistinguishable limit of sensations. Degrees of consciousness go with degrees of perfection and not with degrees of reality. The doctrine of degree of reality is fatal to all reality. It is one thing to speak of awareness of the real, and the attainment of reality consciousness, and quite another to speak of relative reality and approximations to reality in the eternal reality.
VII

Consciousness as an attribute of a personality

We thus find that if it is admitted that consciousness is more of the subject than of the object, then “knowledge like pleasure manifests itself to that conscious person who is substrate and not to anybody else”. The self thus owns consciousness just as it does all experiences as manifested in the judgments “I know this,” “I enjoy this”. Consciousness thus is not the absolute but the personal attribute of a self, invariably associated as its function, dharma. Therefore is it known as dharma-bhūta jñāna as distinguished from the svayam-prakāśatvam or jīva or the kṣetrajña. It is creative in its perfect state of expansion (vikāsa), and in its lesser stages of perfection (sañkōca) it is not creative of reality, but has inventiveness based on the real which it apprehends, and thus is the source of illusions, which however always betray the core of the real in them to a discriminative consciousness. That is to say, in imagination, vikalpa or kalpana, the capacity of consciousness to present the real is diminished, and fantasies and fictions are created instead. To say that creative activity is not of consciousness is to deny the psychological truth of consciousness itself. This is not to deny that consciousness presents reality. Other factors than consciousness impede its presentation of the real. The creative activity of consciousness is a result of God’s own activity through the individuals who belong to Him.
VIII

Summary

Consciousness has been interpreted in various ways. In the Nyāya system consciousness is a separable attribute in the case of souls, but in the case of Īśvara or God inseparable, since, in the one case, there is no subordination to creation, and in the other case, there is. According to Mīmāṁsā or the Bhatta school, consciousness is a part of the soul whereas its other parts are unconscious. The iceberg theory of modern psychology is very powerfully recalled by these thinkers. In the Sāmkhyā system, consciousness is an independent entity and is not dependent upon any situation. Nor is it conjunct with any self as a part of it or whole of it. Nor is it an epiphenomenon as in the materialistic school. The catalytic action which it exercises on the evolving psycho-physical dynamic principle prakṛti implies its becoming powerful, as well as a power to influence the becoming of some other things.

In the idealistic schools there are four sub-schools as it were. In the first consciousness is described as perfect knowledge, as an element of the supreme reality, but it is not the whole of it. Reality is full of infinity of attributes and there is nothing to suggest that consciousness or mind is that which supports all others. Spinoza and Rāmānuja agree in so far as they emphasize the richness of content of the Ultimate Reality. Pure consciousness according to this type of thought is an abstraction and not an experience. The second type whilst accepting the first view holds that pure consciousness is a reality not an abstraction. It is an illumination (jyotiḥ) of the

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1 Hindu Realism: Jagadish Chatterjee, P.63, ft. Allahabad 1912
Lord which all must realize. What this consciousness does is to radiate the light and perfection and supreme nature of the ultimate reality which is rich in power and has attributes of the transcendental kind.

The third type reverses the previous position and makes pure-consciousness the goal of the all effort and reduces real being to an illusory abstraction or construction. Thus there is a conversion of the logical real into a figment of the imagination. No better is the theory of ālayavijñāna in Buddhistic thought. So too is the theory of Māya. The theory of the śāktas makes an adjustment in so far as it seeks to make pure consciousness (without content) as logical aspects of a supralogical Experience. In so far as this theory powerfully shews that consciousness as pure, (as described by Māyāvāda), is a logical outcome of the theory of reversion of substance-attribute relation, it refutes the view usually upheld that Māyāvāda view is the alogical culmination or the alogical highest. The śākta view holds further that the pragmatical alone converts the alogical into logical or rather imposes its logical moulds on the alogical, even as Bergson claims.

Thus two points emerge: the attributive theory of Rāmānuja is the first, and it may approve even of the second: whilst the Māyāvāda and the Śākta views are reversions of this view and hold a substantive view of consciousness. For Rāmānuja, consciousness is neither a stream nor a substance though it participates in both qualities. As a function of a soul it is known as jñāna. It is unlike a quality for it is deemed to be a dravya as it is capable of expansion and contraction, or in other words, capable of modification avasthāvad dravyam. It
is a function of a subject or person expressing his perfection and richness according to the nature of the person as a perfect or released or bond being. If consciousness is particularized and attached to limited wants and interests, it leads to the mechanical dead level of uniformity and rigidity. If on the other it is either humanized or divinized by working for the perception of the highest reality there is proportional enlargement of consciousness. Release or freedom for an individual consists in the enlargement of his consciousness to the fullest level of parity with the Ever perfect Consciousness of the Divine Lord.

Consciousness is a stream as long as it lasts, that is to say as long as an object is possessed by it. This objectivity might be physical or mental, as in dreams and in reflection. It is found that consciousness tends to be active in a mild or full form according to the state of tension of the individual in dream states.

Consciousness in the sum total of all contents to which the ego stands in a certain unique relation which may be metaphorically indicated by the verb "to have". "Everything falls within the sphere of consciousness which the ego has"...

"Every fact of consciousness is made up of at least three moments; every such fact depends for its existence upon the presence of an ego, of a content of consciousness and of a relation between the two". "The only necessity for consciousness is the presence of this relation or function. The nature of the content which enters into relation with the ego is a matter of indifference. It may belong to the psychical or
physical.”

“We must draw a sharp dividing line between the act of knowing on the one side and the object and content known on the other; the act of knowledge is always a psychical state of the subject knowing and bears the character of an event (in other words, it is temporal) which comes to pass at the moment in which judgment is formed. On the other hand, the object and content of knowledge may be non-psychical, trans-subjective, and may belong to a different point of time from the cognitive act.”

“According to our theory of knowledge even a changing and temporal content in so far as it is considered in relation to the act of knowing, may be a truth, that is, it has an eternal, identical and universally valid meaning. This result is not obtained by transforming a temporal element of the world into a timeless idea, but by admitting a specific and ideal relation between the subject knowing and the object known.”

“An act of cognition consists in a comparison. In this comparison sameness and differences are established that is, analysis is performed. In order that this psychological process may be set in motion, the presence of a certain something is necessary with which the content of consciousness can be compared.”...

“The act of judging is an analysis which seeks to lay bare the synthetic necessity of connection between the contents of consciousness ‘given-to-me’. The logical relation
between subject and predicate of a judgment is not one of identity or of contradiction but of the synthetical necessity of connection. The judgment should be thrown into the form 'Where S is, P necessarily is also.' This relation is a functional dependence.

"There exists between the elements which make up the World a functional dependence and it is this very dependence, in so far as it forms the objective side of judgment, which represents a logical interconnection an interconnection determined by a sythetical necessity of combination."

The above extracts are called from Professor Nicola Lossky's important contribution on intuitive Logic entitled *Transformation of the Concept of Consciousness in Modern Epistemology and its Bearing on Logic* to the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* Vol I, They serve to illustrate the modernity of Sri Ramanuja's views on the subject of consciousness.

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*cf. His Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*
CHAPTER IV

THE COGNITIVE RELATION

I

Cognition—a Relation

We have seen how perception has marks of difference within the presented content itself and that no amount of effort to reduce these differences in the presented can avail except to reduce the reality of the presented. In which case all perception will be vitiated so thoroughly as to be incapable in any manner of granting the real or even suggesting the real as substanting these presentations. The effort to drag in the disparity in the activities of the mind in the presented and the presented itself, or in other words between intellect and sensation so as to reverse the usual views that intellect is a better and truer instrument of knowledge than sense, is an effort that is fraught with consequences of self-contradiction and skepticism.

The consideration or the cognitive relation is what we shall find to be most important. That cognition is a relation at all may be contested. But we shall show that cognition is "product of a particular kind of relation between the subject's consciousness and the object presented to it. This problem is truly modern one; and few thinkers had missed troubling themselves with metaphysics without at the same time being confronted with this. Cognition is the fact of subject-object relation. We find that these three terms go together. The two, subject and object, are entities, whereas consciousness is the function of the subject in relation with the object. Thus the
cognitive relation does not imply merely a static type of status but a dynamic status of the subject.

Śāmkhya accepted a kind of representationalism, since it made the world material and the Puruṣa or self a passive spectator-conscious, and the act of perception receptive dynamic, receptive in respect of Puruṣa, because of impressions and tendencies, and dynamic in relation to objects. It had dynamic receptiveness also in its pure state. But how could interaction occur between the inactive self which possesses (or is) consciousness and the active matter which is unconscious? This is the most important point of criticism against the Śāmkhya theory from the epistemological side. The explanation of catalytic action is valuable and most probably explains the eternal persistence of the consciousness as such whilst it is in conjunction with matter. Even then the eschatological problem of release confronts the whole theory. If the self is active it would be involved in matter and release would be impossible. Connection with matter is therefore bondness. This is the cause of all misery. If the self be mere consciousness without volitional and emotional characteristics then the suffering endured or unendurable is a characteristic product that cannot ever touch the self or consciousness. All these criticisms show that the theory has some fatal faults despite its excellent analytic discrimination and realism about the causes of ignorance and sorrow.
II

Representationalism untenable

Representationalism is a theory of knowledge advanced by those who hold that there is impossibility of real contact between matter that is extended and mind that is unextended, or between the unintelligent and the intelligent. There happens thus a real difficulty regarding how we ever know the outer objects. Our imaginations and dreams show that they are of the stuff of experience. That knowing is a process happening within the consciousness of a self is an admitted fact. The facts of recollection and recognition lend credence to the view that what we perceive are the representations or mental copies registered within our consciousness or mind rather than the objects themselves. Objects are inferred to exist outside the consciousness on the basis of their independence to our wishes and the persistence and vividness of the copies derived from them than in the case of images in recollections and imagination. Thus truth is possible when there is correspondence perceived between the psychical (or material?) copies and the Original things themselves outside the body.

If the representationalistic theory of absolute difference be upheld between matter and spirit and their relation has to be incompatible in any direct manner, there can only be the reflection in consciousness of matter, or in the alternative of
Sāmkhya, of consciousness in matter. If not there could be a third alternative all that the mind is capable of having imprints of matter in itself and even from a distance like the photo plate. The theories we have discussed are all of the representationalistic school, and are represented by Sāmkhya and the Sautrāntika-buddhistic school. Whilst the representationalism of Sautrāntika is true to type with Descartes and Locke, the Sāmkhyān theory is peculiar. In Sāmkhya prakṛti or matter reflects the self and the buddhi which is said to occupy the status of mind or consciousness-function in relation to the self, behaves as the medium for the spirit to perceive the things of the world. Buddhi is of tenuous stuff, imperceptible to the eye though material in constitution. The stuff of representations or reflections is thus undoubtedly material though tenuous and imperceptible to the eye, and thus mediates between the perceptible matter and the imperceptible and conscious self. The images thus are not psychical stuff as in representationalism a la type- This feature does not make this doctrine any more acceptable than the other as this does not make buddhi any more perceptible than the rest to the self. If the spirit or mind or self is absolutely inactive and matter absolute active, if the spirit or mind or self is absolute consciousness and matter absolutely an 'other contact between the two is impossible and inconceivable. Either we accept the fact of their comprence and get along with this as basis, or else we have to find a meeting-ground or a solution that will make this comprence possible. In the case of Sāmkhya it is matter that mirrors and it is matter that cognizes, wills and experiences, and knowledge becomes a feature of matter in its subtle from as buddhi, Knowledge thus having been relegated to the side of matter, there is no need
for spirit, though Sāmkhya finds reasons for its existence on the basis of the purpose betrayed in the movements of the world.

Knowledge or consciousness in Sāmkhya then will not be different from its place in Cārvāka. In the other case (Cartesian and Sautrāntikan), the entire activity of reception and imprinting belongs to mind, which is said to be a tabula rasa or momentary series, capable of receiving sense-impressions from matter and getting imprinted. The contact between the self and matter is through the medium of representation a tertium quid which is of psychical stuff. But here also the spirit or mind is a passive recipient of impressions from matter. All falsifications of these impressions must be referred to the emotional and instinctive forces operating at all moments of an embodied creature’s life.

The importance here lies in the necessity for an extra-mental reality or external reality without which there call be no representations at all, but which however, could never be known to exist. As Berkeley proved there is no necessity to admit any external reality since the mind can of itself create its images, and secondly, since the objects said to exist outside can never be known or perceived at all as to how they are. All sensations are of the same worth and value and, therefore, it is impossible to admit an external reality other than what we perceive. And what we perceive are images and ideas. In which case matter is an appendage that could be dispensed with. The subjectivistic onslaught of Berkeley was followed up by Hume who shewed that the images and ideas are the ultimate reals, and there is no subject that we come across, to
whom we could refer these imaginings and ideas. The doctrine of Representationalism thus, whether Eastern or Western, suffers from the defeat of making the outer objects inferred in the sense of their being causes. If in addition to this, the doctrine of momentariness of impressions and things and conscious-states is accented as in Sautrāntika buddhistic school, then, it follows that the proof or evidence for their existence is well nigh impossible. Non existence alone is the *terminus quid* of Buddhist representationalism. The history of Representationalism is identical everywhere. It fails to explain the cognitive relation.

The doctrine of compresence is important, indeed all important, in this connection. The subject knows because of compresence with another object: it knows of its own knowing, and it knows that it is knowing, and it knows an object in the act of knowing. These facts belong to the order of experience as every one knows. Unless there are adequate reasons to mark a departure from the ordinary explanation, to deny any one of these factors is to invite criticism. A priori reasons are not as such true. Nor is it found in most cases of inference or rationality that is divorced from experience.

Śankara upholding the absolute difference and opposition between matter and mind and finding that it leads to the impossibility of any kind of representationalism of *Vaibhāṣika* or Sautrāntika, concluded like the *Yogācārīs* that the self itself can manufacture its own images which may be called māyā. The only difficulty of the Buddhist thoughtt that it surmounts and refutes is that it denies the dynamic of the momentary consciousness-stream and installs a permanent
self. The nihilistic appeal of Nāgārjuna was alluring undoubtedly, but it was a haven in which all cows were black and it meant also the surrender of the one omnipotent assurance of the experience of God which he knew and bore witness to. The eristic dialectic of Nāgārjuna, which finds its parallel in the West in Zeno, discovered the antimonics underlying most hypothesis about reality and declared that since all were infected with self contradiction, the nihilistic and the skeptical conclusions were inescapable. Śankara availed himself of all the battery of dialectic of the Buddhistic thought and utilized it to save the Self that transcends all change and movement and dialectic. The result was something similar to Kant’s philosophy but more vital and self-revealing. He built up his system of Advaita or the Non-dual reality on the experience of the Ātman or Atta. This atta or ātman is the magnus or Brahman not the individual egoistic soul formed out of samskāra and vāsana. Buddhistic psychology and sāmkhyān psychology had helped the discovery, comprising of the fourfold nature of ego, buddhi, ahamkāra, citta and manas. This ego is the unreal reflection of the Infinite Self and parades as the jīva or individual soul. It may be construed as forming screens of increasing density that hide the self from itself. The rehabilitation of metaphysics was made possible only on the basis of this acceptance. Śankara was too much of a realist to accept the conclusions of Yogācāra which upheld a fictitious store-house of consciousness, ālaya-viñāna, which is nearer the concept of ahamkāra or antahkaraṇa than the Self which is the unchanging permanent. In other words, Śankara refuted idealism vigorously when such idealism was not indistinguishable from Solipsism, but he was an idealist all the same in so far as he made reality consist absolutely only of the
spirit. It entailed the phenomenalizing of all ordinary experience of the senses; and the cognitive relation itself in so far as it betrayed the three entities at once was a phenomenal experience and could never be the truth about reality.

We cannot help discovering here, unfortunate, though it is, that just as Kant was influenced both by Hume and the rationalists who of course he refuted with all vigour, Śankara was influenced considerably by the Buddhistic free-thinkers. Kantian influence was idealistic though Kant himself gave a refutation of it; Śankara was an idealist, though he refuted Nāgārjuna and the Yogācāra doctrines. Kant’s main contention was that we do not know reality as it in itself through pure reason, though in fact we are aware of it through practice and aesthetic reason. In Kant the Noumenon need not be merely one, it may contain the many, though this is a travesty of his own thesis that oneness and manyness cannot be applied transcendentally. The Practical Reason vouchsafed for him the manyness of selves. Not so in Śankara’s doctrine. The religious institutions of Upaniṣads according to him declare the Oneness or Single nature of the Noumenon.(pāramārthika- Satta). For him absolute identity is the truth, the difference and manyness are false. This falsity is due to Māyā, a ratiocinating, emotional, instinctive factor whose nature is describable neither as real nor as unreal,- anirvacaniya.

Śankara’s Māyā is an illusory principle understood firstly, as sensory, secondly, as ignorance of true nature (rational), and thirdly as activity (or will). As sensory, it is the world of experience through the body of objects; as ignorance
it is the world of selves which seek to attain reality of being but actually identify themselves with their bodies and desires; as activity, it is the Īśvara, the governor and destiner of the world of objects and selves. It creates the vyavahārika, phenomenal world.

III

Degrees of Reality not Valid

We will now consider whether in such a theory of reality there are available degrees of reality. It is usually contended that the dream states are less real than the waking states, that the state of dream is purely individual and imaginary and that it is caused by instinctive fears, and wishes of the individual. The waking state of consciousness is said to be less real than the direct intuitive. But from the stand-point of the direct intuitive, aparokṣa insight consciousness, all the waking and dream and sleep states are absolutely unreal. There are degrees so to speak in the phenomenal and not the real. Nor is this view helped by the conflicting views sometimes mentioned that the dream-state in a higher state of the self than the waking, because of the independence from objects and objectivity that it entails. This latter is the solipsist view. Absolutely speaking, all are absolutely unreal. The doctrine of degrees of reality is a question that obtains in the phenomenal universe and not in the transcendental. There then happens another type of reality that is in sooth unreality, within which there are degrees. But the fact of unreality as such cognized in regard to the whole universe must be forgotten in that context. If we abandon then this transcendental, then what remains is the phenomenal, the only universe we know, and the criterion of truth would be non-self-contradiction; and, if another be needed, as indeed it
will be, coherence with conduct. The phenomenal will reveal layers of veiling rather than degrees of reality. This solution does not solve the problem of the cognitive. The concept of Māyā brought in to dissolve the cognitive relation is futile in fact, as it is ineffectual in metaphysics and experience. The two-kind theory of Māyā, one universal and a priori, and the other, individual and posteriori, the first leading to a transcendental conversion or veiling, the second to the individual illusions of sense, recalls firmly the two stages of a priori synthesis of Kant also, one of Sense and the other of Understanding.

Illusions are of the sense, and could never happen to the illimitable intelligence. The simile of crystal and red flower posits and does not avoid it, duality at the very start. Metaphors too entail the reality of the terms in some manner. Comparisons taken from experience may carefully be applied in transcendental explanations. The Spirit may have imaginations and creative power, and Vedānta does postulate this in the sūtras, jjanmādyasya yataḥ and jagad-vyāpāra, but it has no illusions. Illusion is the quality of the sense-experience impregnated by hasty generalization. It is different from hallucination which is creative imagination forced outside the individual by some persistent psychic demand. Thus Māyā has no locus, āśraya, in Brahman. The Māyā principle that triochoтомizes the unique one, is a fictional principle itself incapable of being an explanation of itself. It was on the ground that it is an unwarranted principle that Rāmānuja refutes it. There are neither one veil nor two veils nor three nor an infinite number. What is true is that the power of Brahman in so far as it is not apprehended as power of creation, is not
understood, so to speak, as the Upaniṣad instructs us to perceive it. It is a phenomenon that baffles understanding. Once the wondrous nature of Brahman Himself is understood Māyā His power of creation or Līlā becomes easily understandable. It is undoubtedly a curtain, yavanikā, but, not unreal.

IV

**Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view criticized**

When we turn to the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, we find that they accept the mere connection between the self and its objects. In other words, they accept the cognitive relation. The objects are known in the presence of the contact between the sense organs and the objects. A sensation is due to the rays of light in the eye passing to the object. It does not explain how we ever can resolve the problem of opposition in the constitution of the two terms, mind and matter as atoms. Representationalism, cannot avail here too. Direct apprehension does explain, but what it can explain is next to nothing but the fact of occurrence of perception. The failure to put the question on the part of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a serious fault in that system. It is the ordinary unreflective man's philosophy so to speak; or it is due to the perception of the very serious faults arising from any acceptance of representationalism. Once representationalism is in some manner accepted, there is no way out of the nihilistic conclusion via subjectivism. And yet that does not save Nyāya from being not sufficiently an anviksikī. The purely objectivistic and external observational manner of the materialist did not avail itself of this serious problem in epistemology. It is a purely descriptive philosophy and comprises a net-work of only two
kinds of relations, the external and the permanent. It is a philosophy of discrete data, somehow seeking to find integrality that it refused to realize or recognize. The cul de sac of Nyāya logic is sceptism again since absolute difference between atoms and souls cannot permit any adequate relation. The explanation of cognition that it is the act of grasping of the object by enveloping it with consciousness as quality, is that of Advaita, and that can at least explain how representations happen or copies reproduced. But mere conjunction at one point can never lead to the experience of the object as an object, nor can it ever lead to the reconstruction of all objects in memory. Nyāya doctrine clean forgot so to speak, the problem of memory. Nyāya’s protest against internal relations led to the sacrifice of all explanations of the cognitive relation.

The problem of cognition can be solved only by the acceptance of the psychological fact or the relation of mind and matter as represented in the embodied human being, far from thence we can to infer the possibility of cognition. It is true that many criticisms are leveled against psychology as a science. The cognitive relation is a real relation, fundamental to knowledge and available wherever there is consciousness; and as such is fundamental to any theory of knowledge. Disembodied beings, if they exist, might have a way of knowing, about which we can have no idea, but knowledge is a feature of consciousness which is invariably available wherever there is subject. The cognitive relation cannot be had in a vacuum without a subject and an object. It comprises three terms, and the cognitive relation itself is a phenomenon that is temporal, that is to say, it can occur with respect of many objects in succession or contiguity. It does not assume
the permanent presentation of any one object or compresence or connection with any one object, since that is not its nature, but it reveals itself as related to a permanent subject to whom consciousness as effecting the cognitive relation is an inseparable adjunct.

All idealisms end in systems of Experience. In any case they do not permit the real existence of time, space, nature and objects, though they are prepared to affirm their phenomenal appearance character. Realisms end in systems of relations and all of them finally seek to dissolve all objects into relations, or else they end in atomistic views in respect of every field of experience. An organic theory alone takes into consideration both these and affirms the unity and diversity character of these terms in cognitive relational experience.

V

Nature of relation

"The very nature of knowledge presupposes the independent existence of the reality known," and to show that means that idealism is a variety of the subjective point of view. The failure of the thinkers of the idealist and the critical school of Kant is the failure to realize "(1) the directness of the relation between the knower and the reality known, and (2) impossibility of transferring what belongs to one side of the relation to the other". This is an admirable exposition of the realistic position and this refutes all assertions that it is "possible for the characteristic of a thing to belong to it as

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"Kant's Theory of Knowledge: H.A. Prichard, P.112"
perceived though nor in itself\textsuperscript{1}. To quote from the same author, Prof. Prichard, "Knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this independence. It is simply impossible to think that any reality depends upon our knowledge of it, or upon any knowledge of it. If there is no knowledge there must first be something to be known. In other words knowledge is essentially discovery or the finding of what already is. If a reality could only be or come to be in virtue of some activity or process on the part of mind, that activity or process would not be ‘knowing’ but making or creating, and to make and to know must in the end be admitted to be mutually exclusive". The real difficulty of the Buddhist idealism and their corresponding thinkers in the West, Berkeley and even Kant, was that they ignored consideration of the world as a reality simply and appealed exclusively to its special character as a thing known. The misinterpretation of the psychology of consciousness as such and the cognitive relation made it impossible for them to discover the essential directness and partialness of the cognitive relation as such. There are other powers of the mind that do not involve the dealing with objects as existent objects. The analysis of consciousness through dream states involved them in the autonomy of the consciousness as creator, but they did not see that it did not involve this autonomy in the experience or relation that is essentially discovery or knowing, and this is indeed different from the making-characteristic or kalpanā and is in fact its negation. There is danger and undoubtedly a serious defect if imagination should play the role

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid., P. 114
of the perceiver. Such a function would be trespassing into knowing. Rāmānuja and the realists clearly admitted the capacity of the mind to delude itself because of its private wishes and desires and imaginations. But they found it to be different indeed in every respect from the knowing process, which in the words of Prof Prichard involves the discovery of 'what already is'. This is the real, and always real. The content of dream states also is also real on the principle that they are engendered in the individual dream state by the Divine Lord according to the moral deserts of each individual, because even there the cognitive relation is normal and not interfered with by the emotions and desires of the individual himself. They are not his kalpanā, but God's.

The mentalistic theory of the object owes its force also to the wrong interpretation of the object as similar to self-consciousness. The facts of recognition make this interpretation possible. But as Sri Vedanta Desika argues the self same recognition. pratyabhijña, reveals that the content of the recognition is not anything other than the outer world which is apparently not self-conscious. This; view that to be an object is to be inconscient was manifestly at the back of the Advaita theory. Though some objects are inconscient and some others are not and need not be, and indeed even self conscient brings can become objects of consciousness if some one else, the fact remains that there is the clear understanding of the position that the object of knowledge is other than and is not self-consciousness. This is directly contradictory to the view maintained that the object of consciousness, in the very initial stage of perception is cit, consciousness alone.
The doctrine that the object's existence depends on its being known, *esse est percipi*, makes the cognitive relation the condition of existence. "The relation is one fact which has two sides which are separable and are not inseparable.' The subject is always the subject of an object and equally an object is always the object of a subject", but the fact is that the subject and the object need not be subject and object all the time. The subject may continue to perceive or may not and the object may or may not continue to be perceived. The relation is terminable, and further the same object may not continue to be the object of a particular subject and it may vary its subjects *ad infinitum*. Likewise the subject may wander from object to object in a continuous effort of cognition. But it may equally desist from this perpetual effort. Action demands the cognition: the cognition is purposive therefore, and cessation from action may involve the cessation from the cognitive activity of knowing.

The fact is, relations are of two kinds, terminable or separable, and inseparable. The one is the relation between universals and particulars, substance and qualities, genus and species. The very elements of the relation dissolve when the relation disappears. "The very being of the elements related involves the relation and apart from the relation disappears." This is the *aprathaksiddha*-relation of the Viśiṣṭādvaita, and this is in one sense an eternal relation. On the other hand the relation of object and subject 'of knowing is essentially temporal.' The elements exist independently of the relation.

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*Kant's Theory of Knowledge*: H.A. Prichard p.132
In other words, the aprathaksiddha-relation is internal relation, the cognitive relation is an external relation. The relation does bring about knowledge of the one to the other and is serviceable. But it does not involve the very being of the elements that it relates. Relations are non-regressive: therefore the Cognitive relation also is non-regressive.

The theories of representationalism and subjectivism suffer from a fundamental defect. They are worried about the nature of relation itself. How could relations relate? How could they relate distinctly different entities such as a mental subject and a material object?

The first question raises a point that is not worth perhaps serious consideration. The fact is that there is the relation, and to ask for a further elucidation of the positor, is to land oneself and not the relation of the relata, in a fruitless task. Relations relate because they are relations and they cannot be either the terms they relate, nor do they require any other relation to relate them and so on ad infinitum. To say that the relation requires another relation to relate it, is to treat a relation as if it were an object-term or relatum, which it is not. To conclude on the basis of this wrong analysis - a hyper critical analysis- that all relations are illusion and that they are not available in the real, is to contradict the very possibility of knowledge. This extreme view had been held by several thinkers like Nāgārjuna, Śankara, and in the west by the Absolute idealists among whom Bradley was the master-mind.

Rāmānuja finds that the cognitive relation is like any other relation: it is external, conjunctive and direct. There is
nothing repugnant in a mind knowing its material object, and the doctrine of homogeneity between the subject and object is a false one and no tertium quid is needed to mediate between the mental and the material, in the form of a quasi-mental image or representation, leaving the subject to infer the material object outside. The important part of the whole position is that because the image is sensory it should be a part of the mind, and as such is different from the object outside but in so far as it is outside also, in the sense that it is seen as characterizing the object it is in some manner, of it. The Sāmkhya position in regard to the cognitive-relation, similar to this and it was more alive to the issue of the homogeneity of the subject and object and made the mind (buddhi) a material, tenuous and reflecting medium, so as to be the locus of the representations. The theory of homogeneity is a device brought in to get rid of the theory of direct Perception and ultimately to deny the reality of perception itself. There is indeed enough difficulty in the doctrine of representationalist cognition without any need to take recourse to the theory of homogeneity.

The embodied being is a unity, a psycho-physical unity, and in so far as this is fundamentally real and actual the theory of homogeneity is useless; and no recourse need be had to the theory of parallelism such as that held by Spinoza. The problem of direct perception or knowledge of processes is only postponed and not solved by this theory of autonomous dualism-cum parallelism.

The cognitive relation thus gives rise to the following considerations:
THE COGNITIVE RELATION

(1) It is a relation that is established between a spiritual subject and an object that might be Other than itself.
(2) The experience of the outer world is a direct transaction between the sense-organs and the outer world, needing no tertium quid, such as images or representations. Ideas are mental; not so images which have objective loci.
(3) The transaction itself is an activity of the self which senses perceive or intuit.
(4) The sense impressions are parts of the outer reality which is a continuum characterised by space and time.
(5) Space and time are perceived as much as sense-impressions are perceived by the mind which is the sensorium in this case and directly. These reveal that the conjunction of extra-sensory and the sensory in the perceived context is due to the activity of the embodied being simultaneously in both of its aspects.
(6) All that is perceived in perception is real.

VI
Criterion of Falsity

The difference between the perception and the intention of a sense-datum and the sense-datum itself consists in the essential interpretation that is laid upon the sense-datum. The illusions of sense data are not unreal. They are sensed in the manner in which they are given, and there is much truth in saying that normal senses do not lie as even Kant held. The conflict comes in perceptions which are made to stand for objects in the external world and the objects sensed that is, in their interpretation. It is undoubtedly true to
say that it is just possible that we do not apprehend all that are
in the external universe and that the nature of objects is such
that they cannot be fully known. It is perhaps also correct to
think that because we do not perceive the minutest atoms in
their- isolation but only perceive them in their constellations or
groupings, the atoms are not capable of being inferred to have
any of the forms that we endow them with in their groupings.¹
That however need not deter, us from thinking that this
perceivability or the objective nature or even the possession of
these qualities are not in the objects themselves, even as
space and time are objective perceptions and cannot be said
to be mental. The fatal objection to the mental theory of space
or time lies in its inability even to grant the necessity to
geometry and other so called sciences, which depend on the
acceptance of space as the property of objects as such and
not as perceived by us only. Those who make space merely
that which lies between any two visible objects and merely a
non-existence (that is a mental construction) cannot make this
non-existence fall into any category of non-existence. It is a
definite perception and not a, non-existence of either free
space or non-existence merely. “As non-existence is clearly
conceived as a special slate of something actually existing,
space even if admitted to be of the nature of abhāva would not
on that account be a futile non entity (something tuccha or
nirupākhya)”²

¹ Sri Vedanta Desika on the Buddhist Schools of Thought (Paramata
² S.B.II.2,23: Abhāvasya vidyamāna-padārtha- vaāthā-vaśeṣatvo-
papādanāc-ākāṣasyā- bhāvarūpatvepi nounirupākhyatvam (Ananda
Prss, Ed. Vol II, p94)
Falsity is that which pertains to the value of a judgment we pass with regard to an occurrence, what interpretation we place on the datum given, rather than to the existence of the datum itself. This datum cannot be dismissed as an illusion. It exists, and is so far as it is, real. We have to find out only as to where and in what context we shall have to place that event, discover the causes of its occurrence and discover also the intent that had the power to lead us astray. Its truth consists in what position or place it gets within the order of physical events not as to its existence, for that it is absolutely in its own right. Every fact faces the criterion whether it is a fact amongst other facts in a given context, or otherwise, and secondly what it is within itself. Thus the criterion of reality of any sense datum with objective reality of other events which is said to go along with this. The collocation or causes of diverse kinds leads to the production of this sensation and thus the causal theory of perception has in some sense to be assumed. Thus comparison is possible. Secondly, how far there are factors which are introduced by the subject himself into the object observed. "Truth can only be distinguished from falsity if there are marks by means of which the knowing subject can tell which elements proceed from the object and which are introduced by himself, the conscious subject". That this can be done also is actually seen. The part that we can within the perception itself discover the causes of illusion and also within the perception itself discover, with the help of the intent, misleading affinities are sufficient to reject the theory of general falsity and indeed can justifiably explain on the basis of common sense realism all illusions of the perceptive kind.
We find that our knowledge of objects is a direct process, not an effect on the sense-order as such but really capable of declaring the nature of the perceptual field, whether it is one's own body or any other outside our body. This possibility leads to the view that the objects of the physical world are capable of being known independently and directly. The physical objects since they do not enter into us, form an objective continuum available to all the sense-data are, on the other hand, individual, and capable of becoming defective due to the defects in the sense-organs. We may, in fact, speak of the sense-data as merely appearances of real objects or physical objects, and in perception we are aware of both, and not only one of them as in the representationalist view. And both sense-data and the physical objects are physical and reveal real events and are not merely psychical in any sense of the term.

In Rāmānuja's theory the criterion of truth is placed more upon relation between the intent and the object perceived. And this reference to an object which has value and certain determined consequences as an object amongst other physical objects alone makes the experience true or false. In any ease, being a real event it needs some explanation. Rāmānuja considers that illusions are crucial to the doctrine of perception and a real theory of knowledge. The cognitive relation is real and the contents of the cognitive relation are also real. Consciousness, if it does not know the objects directly, can know nothing at all. That it is embodied does not make it any the less capable knowing through its windows so to speak. The objects cognized are cognized as physical objects and not as mental and it requires an
extraordinary theory of projection to substantiate the theory of mental stuff. The refutation of idealism depends upon the refutation not only of the subjective nature of all ideas and impressions through the objective independence granted to them by Bosanquet and other objective idealists, but also by the refutation of the view that spirit is the object also. Matter and spirit or both can be objects. Objects of perception are material. The objects of supersensuous perception may be psychical or matter or God. This is fundamental to the understanding of the; cognitive relation.

Rāmānuja’s theory of truth and knowledge relies more upon the organic and common sense position than on any other system of thought. The distinction between appearance and reality is the most important factor in any theory of knowledge. According to common sense it means that the real is that which recommends itself plainly, 'it is that which contains the others.' The real things or coexistent things are those which could be encountered again, since "this property of being able to present the same thing twice seems to be an ultimate (however mysterious) characteristic of the world with which we have to do." The reality of the hallucination consists in its being perceived only by the individual afflicted by it more than once. The unreality of its content lies in its failing to satisfy certain canons of acceptance, or, if we prefer the use of the words its reference or intention. Rāmānuja dealing with the reality- of the illusion of shell-silver (or snake-rope) affirms that its content has not only within it the form that is identical in some sense in both but also the specific quality of likeness in matter or the substance itself. Rāmānuja relies for this on the upaniṣadic view that there in quintuple intermixture of all pure
elements in such proportions as to produce secondary elements which have one particular element in predominance whilst the rest are subsumed under its influence. This is the famous pañcīkaraṇa–prakriya, which is later than the trivṛt karaṇa of the earlier upaniṣads,

Another view is that since reality is only the container of all appearances which must he taken not only in the sense of perspectives but also from the point of view of individual differences, it is a substance with co-existing parts, each of which might be sensed apart, and as such a thing might 'look' as something and yet be not an appearance merely. It should not be forgotten that the real is not an aggregate however of all these parts or perspective looks. We consider a cube as having all its three dimensions as equal and yet it looks otherwise from other angles of vision. We know the cube to be a thing of a particular nature, and this knowing is a savikalpaka product and the sensations might be and indeed are otherwise

The thing appears in a particular form to sense or rather in sensation and it is not a fragment of the object at all. The inference as to the nature of the thing as in itself it a real inference based on the whole series of observations and disinterested discriminations made of it. The perception of silver in shell and snake in rope are merely instances of fragmentary appearances which are not unreal, but on the other hand fully real and articulate in the real thing. They however claim to be the whole thing. In other words 'we thus seem to emerge with the result however we may feel baulked by the problems of hallucinations, illusions and error, that the real is not a few selected appearances only, that everything
that appears at all is real. 90 far as the foregoing considerations reach, the IḍeBi means all that is and what is, includes all that it seems to be. In a word, all appearance that ever are are real.”¹ In Rāmānuja's own words 'What in is real'--

- sarvam viññanajātam yathārtham².

In this context it is necessary to bear in mind the important distinction that was made by Śankara regarding the phenomenal reality and error within the phenomenal, prātibhāṣika, and the transcendental which was beyond all reach of thought, understanding, and sense being a supersensuous experience. He begins, even like Kant, to speak about the distinction 'between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us, the distinction relating to one and the same reality regarded from two points of view. He ends with a distinction between two different realities, things in themselves external to, in the sense of independent of, the mind, and phenomena or appearance within it”.

This distinction is fatal to all real theories of error and no ultimate distinction can to be made between appearance and reality at all. If we do not admit the possibility of any

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² Śrī Bhāṣya : l.l.1.cf.

Yathārtham Sarvaviññanam iti Vedvidām matam I
Śrutī-smṛtibhyas sarvasya sarvātmatva pratītaḥ II
then follow 13 verses explaining the theory of Trivṛtkaraṇa of the vedic view.

na mithyārtha-satyarthā visayatva nibhandanaḥ I
Evam sarvasya sarvatra vyavahāra vyavasthitī II
apprehension of reality with our consciousness or thought, there is no possibility of apprehension of error either as against the real. The fact is that illusions are caused by the fact of their being understood to be otherwise than what they appear at any moment in a particular context or condition, and yet the real is considered to be a fact of thought and the illusion as the actual apprehension of the senses.

Further as Prof. Prichard says “Just as it is absurd to describe the fact that the stick only looks bent by saying that while the stick is not bent, the appearance which it produces is bent, so it is, even on the face of it, nonsense to say that while things are not spatial, the appearances which they produce in us are spatial. For an “appearance” being necessarily mental cannot possibly be said to be extended”. The more important defect of any doctrine that reduces all perception and perceived objects to the level of appearances lies in the fact that they tend to equate the thing as appealing into mere appearances, a defect that lays bare the fundamental difference between the two. The first shows that the 'intent' is the pointer of the sensation to the object external to the subject, whereas the other reduces this intent to nothing and makes a first-class blunder in the analysis of cognition. It is a fundamentally wrong transition in thought.

It is fundamental to all theories knowledge that the

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1 On the whole theory of this fallacious transitions in thought reference should be made to Prichard’s Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, which is a masterly analysis. Šankara and all other types of idealism commit similar mistakes. Chapters on Space and Phenomena and things-in-themselves are the most important, pp.36-102
distinction between truth and falsity should be clear and unambiguous and should not be capable of being reduced to degrees of reality on the basis of the actual fact of degrees of knowledge. Knowledge that is arrived at through thought, jñāna, and that which we get through sensation are both real. Abolish this parity then we find ourselves in the quandry of illusionism that thought itself is a deluding and illuding instrument. It is true that consciousness has sensory and thinking functions as also of enjoyment of objects. But it is thought or thinking that makes us think a thing as it is, not sensation. "For it is a pre supposition of thinking that things are in themselves what we think them to be: and from the nature of the case a presupposition of thinking not only cannot be rightly questioned, but cannot be questioned at all. It is this same point that is constantly emphasized by Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika and other realistic schools. Once deny thought the power of apprehension of the real and make it a delusive instrument and a creator of illusion or mere imagination, vikalpa, then the road is there clear for complete annihilation of all metaphysics and epistemology. To convert the power by which release is to be attained, jñāna into a power of delusive

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1 There is no right for the nihilist to take part in argumentation since there is no means by which he could. He who has himself known that are chimerical, if he does not perform activities with reference to perceived objects he has no need to refute the activities of those who seek heaven and liberation. Since even the delusion that all are unreal is itself chimerical there is no need to get over it.

"To one who affirms that vikalpa is not the source of right knowledge, there is no way of accepting the indeterminate knowledge, which in itself determined to exists by determinative cognition alone".. Śrī Venkaṭanātha in Paramata-bhanga, Ch.XI (Annals S.V.O.I. Vol 1)
imagination, is to give up all chances of liberation of consciousness.

The paradox of the whole situation is that in seeking to extend the frontiers of understanding and knowledge, the effort actually made led to surrender of its potency and existence. No wonder the Doctrine of Reason, and Doctrine of the Super-experience abandoned the one principle of reality on which they based their dialectical opposition.

VIII

Reality of all Cognitive Content

Every cognition is of a real thing. The cognitive act is real, and the subject of cognition is also real. The three terms are real and therefore the illusions that occur must be traced to certain extra-relational conditions. Intra organic defects as well as the ambiguities in the objects perceived are important in any understanding of the problem of error and illusion. Illusions are of the sense level, whilst errors pertain to the level of inferences or judgment. The failure of thinkers to study the theory of illusion from the standpoint of the physiological or embodied spirit has been at the basis of most failures. It is clearly seen that when the bodily state is otherwise than normal there have occurred frequently the failures to judge properly. Indolence and sleepiness are referable mainly to the bodily state of un-preparedness. That there is not any physiological process apart from the psychological may be easily demonstrated. The dream consciousness may be a state of the mind which is actively operating in the brain inter organically receiving no stimulus from outside, but on the
whole we find that at least no judgment is possible as to its
rightness or falsity. Indeed we can say considering the physio-
psychic disposition at that period that it is active and real
during the period of its operation. “The conscious states
experienced in dreams are not unreal.” As Bradley says ‘There
is nothing to prove that the dream world is unreal, though this
restricted world of our- must be accepted for all practical
purposes.” The dream pictures and experiences are real and
really experienced. Therefore the mental condition does
produce certain impressions which so far as they go do grant
real objects. The fact is that the conception of the real here is
that which actually occurs as a fact of perception however
much it may be private. Privacy of an experience does not
make it unreal as such, nor is public experience or experience
that is participated in by all, namely outer objects in any
better position. All depends on the veracity of the individual,
his real experience as a searcher and observer of his bodily
process, in so far as they also vibrate or reveal emotional
conditions.

The nature of dream also in so far its content is
concerned is such that it is not anything other than the images
already experienced now projected on the mind’s canvass so
to speak in such a form as to grant a retrospective emotion.¹
The jaundiced perception is a real perception. The experience
of mirage is a real experience of cognition. The perception of
continuity of a circle of fire when only a fire brand is rapidly
revolved is a real experience. The reflection of the face in a
mirror is a real fact of experience. The perception of a double

¹ Cf. Appendix II: Dreams in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja:
moon is also an actual experience. The seeing of stars when the eyelid is pressed is also as real as anything else. The rope is perceived as a snake, and a snake too appears as a rope. All these and others too can he explained. But the explanations do not abolish the actual experiences or even the perceptions. The shell looks silver we say, and having known it the shell continues to look like silver. The perception of similar structure and colour is the cause of this illusion here. The shell actually reveals the shining surface of silver. The illusion is a real fact since certain activities follow from the acceptance of the view that it is silver. Emotions are engendered by them. What is wrong in the associative reference which we have made by identifying this experience with the previous experience of silver. Illusion is impossible without prior knowledge. It is a product of wrong association of present experience with the past on the basis of a perceived similarity that approximates to tādātmya, identity. Thus we find that illusion is impossible unless two conditions are fulfilled and these two conditions are both real viz, (1) that there was prior experience and (2) that the present experience has definite similarity of the perceptual kind with the previous experience. Given these two, the illusion is bad.

In the case of the mirage the feature is identical since from a distance a sheet of water looks in a particular manner, like an experience already undergone and since the immediate experience has features which are common to reflection by water, we take it that the content of this experience is the previous experience. Memory thus plays a significant part in illusion. The common quality may be called by any name: in the above instances as silver-ness which is the specific quality or
structure form or colour, or water which is a specific quality or structure. The transitiveness of the application depends on the first experience and also on the value of the experience. Silver is more useful than shell, water more than sand. Wherever therefore this previous judgment had been made there the judgments that are passed in regard to illusory experience are governed by this predilection.

Our first judgment, then, is 'this is silver', at the initial valuation. But this cognition sublated in meaning or value by a further scrutiny or, is, by the actual confirming conduct such as we adopt in the case of gold, which takes cognition of its other qualities and history. The difference between silver and silvery quality of the shell perceived in the latter becomes manifest. Hence the second judgment 'This is like silver' or 'This resembles silver' and the further judgments 'This is not silver. I have been deceived into thinking that this is silver.'

In all these above eases what make the illusions possible are: (i) the hasty generalizations due to the activity of imagination, generalizations based upon the fundamental similarity of structure—a real fact, undisputable and absolute, since the factors that make the illusions possible are not non-resident in things which apparently cause illusion, (ii) or due to the organic defects; (iii) or speed of motion which makes it impossible for the eye to adapt itself to picture': or things moving at a greater speed than it can register, (iv) or ill health or (v) due to the imaginative activities of the individual (vi) or the will of God.
Jaundice is an organic defect,\(^1\) Mirage in due to perceptive illusion,\(^2\) and Rāmānuja’s explanation is that since according to the Upaniṣads everything is in every other thing due to (pāncikaraṇa), there arises the possibility of illusion of water from the conjunction of light and earth. This may also be due to merit and demerit. The fire-brand swung rapidly looks like a wheel and this is due to the rapidity of motion, so much so the eye could not follow the intervals from one position to another. The reflection of the face in the mirror is due to the fact of rapid movement of light from the face to the mirror and back again and this interval is not perceived by us\(^3\). We are unable to distinguish between the source of the rays and their backward movement. This is the cause of the illusion. The mistaking of direction is due primarily to the relativity of direction. What is south to one is north to the other. The perception of the double moon is due to unequal adjustment of the two eyes to the common object the moon. The defect in the organic apparatus is the cause of this illusion.

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\(^1\) Śrī Bhāṣya l.l.1. Pītaśankhādou tu nananavartī-pittadraya-sambhinnā nāyana-raśma-yaśśankhādibhi-samyujyate/


\(^3\) Darpanāciṣu nijamukhaḍipratītirapi yathāṛthā. Darpanādi-pratinatagatapyo hi nayanarasmayo darpanādidesāgrahaṇa - pūrvakam nijamukhāci grhnanti. Tatrāpi atiśālīgyād antarālāgrahaṇāt tathā pratīth
The fundamental principle then that emerges from this is that the actuality of the perception proves that some factors are real and these cannot be sublated by any explanations whatsoever. In this sense all experiences of states of consciousness are real in so far as they have a beginning in real causes which produce actual effects.

Illusions of the perceptive level are such that if they were to be sublated they should no longer be seen. The reality of the entire perception is proved by the fact of persistence of the perception, and this is an important fact. The illusionist who speaks for the unreality of the perceived might say that there is persistence of ignorance even after enlightenment through knowledge. Thus he might say 'The moon is one, and yet the diseased eye sees two moons. With the knowledge that there is but one moon may not the knowledge of the 'duplicated moon' continue to exist? To this we reply: 'this analogy does not apply to your case'. For the disease of the eye is a fact, whereas your disease viz., ignorance which produces the dualistic notion is a figment. Again the cause, viz., the disease of the eye, giving birth to the sight of the 'duplicated moon,' remains: whereas your ignorance has vanished! There is thus reason for the persistence of the 'double moon' though it must be conceded that stronger evidence existing in favour of one moon renders the diseased eye, a proof of little or no importance.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Gitā Bhāṣya : Śrī Rāmānuja: ii.12. parama-purṣasyā dhigatā dvaita jñānasya bādhitānuvṛttirūpam idam bheda jñānam dagdha paṭādvān na bodhakam ityucyeta naitadupapadyate maricikājalajñāṇādikam hi bādhitam amivartamānam najalāhanāṇādi pravṛtti hetuḥ..
This bādhitānuvṛtti, the persistence of the illusory cognition even after knowledge of its illusoriness, is a special feature of the doctrine of Advaita. The traces of the illusion of duality persist after the knowledge of the Identity. This is refuted by Rāmānuja on the ground that it is wrong analysis. The thing is true and its characteristic of similarity, sādriśatva, with any other object is in its very nature. That is the reason for the continuance of its nature after the distinctions have been made. The illusion does not persist it is only the nature of a thing to persist. Knowledge does not sublate the perception: it corrects the false identification of this similarity with the intention of another thing.

Personalistic thought, such as that of Rāmānuja which is also organistic, regards the soul or self as distinct from God and looks upon the world as a vast system of stimuli, which serves as a medium of communication between God and man, and between spirits in general. There is thus an 'inerradicable dualism' which cannot be dismissed by any efforts of idealism. If human thought is identified with absolute thought as in Hegelian Epistemology, it is impossible to explain error. Error must have its counter point in reality as well as in truth if idea equals a thing or object. Error is partial truth if idea equals a thing or object. Error as partial truth cancels error rather than explains it. And "if ignorance and illusion are to be accounted for, there must be a more distinct separation between the human and the divine than absolute idealism permits. The fact
of error is the Achilles heel in every monistic epistemology. Thus writes an excellent writer. And we can certainly agree with him in saying that the problem of error is crucial to any theory. A correspondence theory of knowledge certainly is naive and can only be substantiated if ever we can prove that there are two ways of knowing simultaneously one and the same object. It is this that has to be proved. The only test then will be of verification of the intention implicit in every Object. Not so according to the equally naive theory of monism which dismisses the object by taking it over into itself. There is no criterion of comparison or correspondence, but only of coherence. It is this simplicity and constructiveness of monism that has at once made it so ambitions and futile as an explanation. Thus personalistic thought confronted with the difficulty of affirming that the outer objects are not anything other than mere wave lengths and movements or changes of location or independent continuity of process, is yet capable of turning critical by means of the acceptance of real order of unity in and through the Divine Purpose which is affirmed by mystic experience. It is this mystic knowing that leads to the corrective of the purely empirical or phenomenal. The divorce achieved by the critical kantianism is removed without impairing its contribution to thought and knowledge.

IX

The Twofold Criterion and Falsity

According to the Philosophy of Rāmānuja we have seen that every cognition is of a real thing, that the truth of a sense-datum consists in itself, and that it can be determined
only by an attentive analysis of its reference in physical reality by its effects. The considerations which we have brought forward till now were those of real similarity between two things mistaken for one another, which have identical appearances, that is to say as between the genera that they represent or rather manifest when viewed in a manner that is without any consideration of the intent of reference to actual reality. Secondly, that these sometimes revealed that the sense organs were defective or else were due to certain real instinctive and emotional factors which blurred the distinctions between the factors constituting the perception of the real object. Thus we are forced to consider firstly the value of each sense datum presented on its own merits, and secondly, how far a physical object or sense-datum coheres with the experience of other objects similarly situated and perceived. This leads us to consider the value of each sense-datum, which ought to display or exhibit certain effects in order to be considered real. There are then available two criteria integral to one another that is, the perceptive and the consequential. This two fold criterion indeed makes the object an effective existence and capable of guiding conduct. This is the dynamic element in the doctrine of Knowledge. The philosophy of Rāmānuja is neither the static view nor yet the merely dynamic view illustrated by the radical doctrines of Buddha which culminated in an utterly self-negating Nihilism, and self-refuting conduct. It sees in the real the fulfillment of purpose as well as the fulfillment of knowledge, or rather the fulfillment of knowledge through Purpose and vice versa. Truth accordingly is that which is in accordance with the accepted conduct in regard to a particular object vyavahārānugaṇa-jñānam pramā. Vyavahāra for Rāmānuja means nothing other than that which
stands for the test of actual use of all or coherency in active life with the knowledge of other things and their utilities.

Thus the acceptance of the knowledge about a particular sense-datum would lead to certain initial judgments which would at once force us to carry out certain activities to meet the situation suggested or forced upon us by such a perception, because also of the urgency of the emotional situation. We act then us if the sense-datum is true and because it is a real occurrence. If the consequences of taking it as an objective factor, as a physical object or event, independent of individual sensing or being, do follow, then we consider it to be a real factor or true fact or reality, or else it is no less real but it has to be explained as an event in the physical order. That would mean that these two factors of sense-datum and physical existence which are both given in an identical perception form so to speak a complex relation of body and soul. But any distinction of subjective sense-datum and objective physical continuum both of which are united and form complete knowledge is possible relatively with reference to the activity which is not a subjective affair. But how is this sense-datum as a physical abject in an external continuum capable of fulfilling itself as a real effective entity, that is as an object in the external world of physical objects? Any discrepancy between sense and physical objectivity thus leads to the question of illusion. Thought means coherency, and as between physical objects, causal efficacy or relation or actual power is the important fact about them; thus an embodied being as a denizen of two worlds knows his complex truth or knowledge in a two-fold manner through sensation and conduct: In this connection we may use the analogy of
binocular vision. The tridimensional manifold is perceived. The physical property of motion in the objects themselves as different from the movements that we make are also registered by ocular adjustments of the ciliary muscles. Thus we find that the physical continuum cannot be separated from the sense-datum that we perceived.

Snake ceases to stand for a snake in consciousness as thought, though it continues to be a snake so far as the perception is concerned at first, but on second look it is found that the perception itself undergoes change from snake to a rope and what is residual in that experience betrays that quantum of similarity between the snake and the rope. Thus it seems wrong to hold that the perception stands as such even whilst the object’s reference or place in thought has undergone the change into a rope. This feature it is that makes many persons hold the view that illusion is due to non-observation. Even perception, the more it becomes deep and profound and interpenetrative reveals the sources of the illusory perception. What happens in the period is firstly the gradual loss of emotion and other disturbances. In the second period there is more and more analysis of the structure of the content of the perception and this is achieved by a vigorous explorative activity of the mind and involves utter freedom from emotional and memory images. Lastly, when it is found that all the factors have been analysed there is displayed the similarity that was the root of the illusion. This similarity is, the true cause, is real and cannot be annihilated. This similarity is proved negatively and positively. Positively through experiment and negatively, when it is superficial or unessential. Isomorphous substances need not also be isomeristic. Thus
though illusions may be due to non-observation akyāti, they are found to be also due to anyathā-khyāti that is inferring them to be otherwise because of previous associations. The emotion at the first moment is due to strong formal similarity and this is avoided or capable of being got over undoubtedly by more observation. But it is conduct of experimentation that abolishes the illusion. The criterion then of error is that it must be capable of being sublated and we must have the feeling of reasoned certainty because of its persistence in the form it is proved to be on second looks into it. Rāmānuja contends that the snake as Sense-datum was an actual experience which cannot be anything but real, but its falsity or error as a physical existence is due entirely to its not fulfilling the condition of coherency or intention of its nature in relation to other objects and persons.

It is on this point we have to see that the element of time is introduced into this definition of reality. It is certainly not repugnant according to Rāmānuja for a thing to cease to be and yet be real. Dreams are real and yet they cease to be. Things are real and they cease to be. Reality is a characteristic of all things without which they can never be even for a moment. To deny reality is to embrace the void. Rightly therefore Rāmānuja holds that no halfway arrangements or compromises are possible between the Void and the Brahman. Brahman is Existence. It is the central core of all existences and the fact about all creation. All things that appear or come into being and pass out of existence are as much real as any permanent, since they could not well appear without really

\[1\] Cf. Appendix on Viśiṣṭadvaitic Theory of Perception.
being what they are. Error consists in treating the appearance as real in a different sense than that it is. It is not explained by converting the appearance into an unexplainable mystery or myth or illusion.

Further the important fact remains that illusions are not all of the same type and have to be distinguished. If to distinguish, to analyse, is to create division, is to imagine differences where there are none, as evidenced by the attack on savikalpaka pratyakṣa, then truth is an impossibility. Now that we find that the way into the open spaces of Intuition is barred to this knowledge of the Undifferentiated, there is no other go except to accept the differences as facts.

The fact is that the physical order is common to all embodied selves, and they themselves form part of it, in so far as they are embodied. That there might be disembodied spirits need not be questioned, as that is irrelevant to the theory of knowledge that we are concerned with here. This objectivity might be brought to prove the validity or otherwise of a sense-datum. But merely because a number of persons say that the double moon is experienced, one cannot jump to the conclusion that there are two moons very close to one another (samantara) almost perhaps like double-stars of modern astronomy, and that they are moving round our Planet. Rāmānuja refers to an island inhabited completely by such people (timiradoṣa-grastha). This is likely but it cannot double the moon. When we make this statement there is the awareness within perception itself that there cannot be two moons and that one moon alone is the truth. The defect universal cannot prove a thing true. This makes it imperative
that the criterion in such cases must be found to be other than perception itself. Illusions of sense through sense-defects are adjusted because of the failure in conduct. This factor of adjustment negatively to a defect is a common fact of experience. The criterion of truth stands on the two-fold plank of discrimination and of conduct of verification, of intent suggested vyavahārānguṇa kriyā kāritva.

In this context it is apt to quote the views of Professor G. R. Stout in his Gifford Lectures:1 “The bare fact that pink rats seem real to the drunkard is of itself presumptive evidence that they are real. The bare fact that the oar dipped in water looks bent is presumptive evidence that it is in fact bent. But the presumption is liable to be weakened and upset or reinforced and established according as the seeming fact fills its place or refuses to fill its place in a coherent context with other facts for each of which there is independent evidence supplied by other perceptual appearances. Further the coherence required is such as will make possible successful action effective adaptation of means to ends.” “Why do we believe the oar to be straight although it looks crooked? For such reasons as the following. If I try to grasp it in the water on the assumption that it is really bent I miss my aim. If it is really bent it ought to seem so to touch as well as sight, but it does not. If it was really bent how could one successfully row with it. Again on the assumption that the oar is straight as it seems to be when it is out of water, it would not become bent and unbent merely by being dipped and ceasing to be dipped.” And we may add that in case it is said that it might

1 Mind and Matter; G.F.Stout. p.259, 1931
be like the rod of iron that is capable of being bent when in fire and incapable of being bent when outside it, then we say that bendingness and unbendingness are qualities dependent upon the conditions, and are real. In the case of the oar it is the refraction in water that is the matter about this bent-appearance, in the other case it is change in molecular arrangement in the iron rod brought about by heat in the atoms.

Judgments then must take into consideration the place, the conditions, the time and the nature of the structure available and its similarity and "intent", that is to say, what results must follow if it were the thing perceived.

Thus every event has to satisfy the dual tests, the intrinsic test that pertains to its nature: how far freed from the prejudice of memory and emotional disturbances, there are features of similarity which make their invariable appearance, and the experimental test (wrongly called pragmatic test), how far the object perceived as real is capable of fulfilling the obligations of its physical coherence.

Thus the object is a unity of sense and matter and between the two there is a coherence that is verified by the practical test or value. Knowledge apprehends this unity as such and there is nothing repugnant in an experience being real even when it is also misinterpreted.
X

Reality as content of all Cognition

From our study of illusions which are usually individual and belong to the individual embodied human beings, we shall now turn to the study of the nature of Cognition. Rāmānuja holds that there is nothing inherently wrong with our cognitive processes which should make us apprehend falsity instead of truth. What we know is that there are certain essential limitations of the normal senses. Our knowledge of the world filters into us through our senses. That does not and cannot be said to present unreality. If the world is false there can never arise the knowledge of the true and the real. Nor could we apprehend it. It may with rightness be said that if our senses are purified then we shall perceive really. Jainistic thought held the view that when the karma-matter that has gathered into the soul is slowly heated and expelled from it by tapas, austerity, then the soul becomes capable of real perception that is real. This they call pratyakṣa. Bergson agreeing with Socrates in Phaedo held the view that if there were no sense-organs or the body we shall see all as in direct vision, whole and entire. The fact remains that no one can quarrel with the view that the senses must be purified, and also that vāsanās, tendencies or habits or desires should not corrupt the seeing-mind. For it is the mind that is said to move towards the object and gather it up or shall we say that the light in the eye goes over to the object and gets back again so that the object appeals as erect, and not inverted as some psychologists contend these days. We know the world given to us in experience: making allowance for evil or unpurified thoughts.
and imaginations and habits or organic defects there is yet sufficient reality in these that cannot be overthrown. Knowing is the function of a real being. Consciousness is therefore a reality-giver. The cognitions that ‘are’, are likewise of the real objects. Imagination also is the real nature of the individual. It is the creativity of the individual self.

Imagination no doubt creates an ineffectual reality like artistic products and these are mostly untrue since they can never pass into actual effects. Imagination requires some substrate in general. Its manifestations are conditioned by the consciousness that it has. If it be perfect then its creations are of the real; and if on the contrary the consciousness is imperfect or ignorant it may not be able to create at all or if creating, those creations will be not true. The individual as finite is not at fault, it in his creative power of consciousness, *iccha-kriyā-śakti* that undergoes mutilation and perversion when it is ignorant. Because there is equality between the freed individual and the Supreme Lord in so far as knowledge is concerned, *jñana-sāmyā*¹, his creations then reveal reality.

¹ There is nothing repugnant in a real soul really creating anything, just as God Himself out of His magnificent will creates all creation. The limit of the finite, however, is the universe itself; total creation is possible only to the universal self of all. *Jagadvyāpāra* and *Janmādyasyaya yataḥ Sūtras* explain this standpoint. There is also nothing essentially wrong in considering that the Lord might not have brought out all creation of His infinite Being through Will. Even the Asat of the Infinite means only the Infinite Not-yet's of time. And time therefore plays a role in the scheme of creation. *Rāmānuja* tends to lean towardscretionism, but finds that an inner determination of the Divine Lord and the reality of the individuals and the objective nature make it impossible to reduce these into real creations of the Divine Lord.
The real is apprehended because it is the nature of consciousness to know the real: whilst contraction sankoca leads to partial visions, imaginary filling up of the interstices of experiences and reading into things falsify the real.
CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF UNITY

I

Unity between Primary and Secondary Qualities

We have seen that Rāmānuja consistently holds that what the individuals experience is a real experience and that this experience involves the cognition or recognition of both the subject and the object whose conjunction or compresence alone is the real factor constitutive of all experience. Consciousness is the function of an embodied being in knowing, and is not a function of a subject or mind as such (a fact which is rendered absolute even in the case of the Absolute intelligence or God as we shall show). It is only a self-conscious subject that is capable of apprehending its own objects. The subject whether in the case of subjective mental states (inclusive of emotional states which invade the mental) as in dreams or in the case of objective things and states as in prophetic dreams, apprehends reality as such with or without the help of the exteriorly-turned sensory organs. The subject is capable of apprehending the sense-organs since sense-organs are products of sensing rather than original organs which determine all sensing. They do not limit the perception, since all perception inclusive of the Divine is composed of sense-characters as sound, form, colour, touch and taste. The colours are seen, sounds are heard, touches are felt, and all these are present unambiguously in mystic dhyāna, and are
also presented without the mediation of sense organs. Thus Rāmānuja distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, indriya pratyakṣa and the divine divya or mānāsa pratyakṣa. The former is conditioned-consciousness in the sense that all experiences filter through the sense-organs, whereas the latter is free-consciousness in the sense that its knowledge is direct and without (or with ?) the mediation of or obstruction from sense-organs. The sense-organs are no bar to full apprehension. They serve the mind in an absolute degree by being more and more adapted to suit the demands of a wide and full and integral apprehension. In any case the reception of knowledge proceeds from and is sustained by the entire spiritual being.

Rāmānuja accepts the view that sense-organs do not create the sensory experiences nor modify the external world. The sense-characters are in the objects themselves and what our sense organs do is to grasp them. The sweetness of sugar is in the sugar and not in the mouth, since there are other tastes such as alkaline and saline and bitter etc. Nor are colours to be referred to the eye. The modern doctrine of primary and secondary qualities is undoubtedly a consequence of the representationalist view coupled with the theory of atoms of the homogeneous variety. The chemical theory is against the view that the qualities are in the things. But the fact that the mouth cannot but respond to a particular grouping of atoms in one definite way as sweet, in whomsoever’s mouth it might be reveals despite differences that are not to be exaggerated that there is this particular quality in the objective groupings themselves. The electronic or chemical theory cannot annul the findings of the objective
nature of the particular sensation. Invariable concomitance itself justifies the subject object unity of the primary and secondary sensations. There is a distinction undoubtedly but it is not a disjunction between the several kinds of sense-data. They form a unity. Their locus (ālambana) is in the object outside the individual's organism. The doctrine of exteriorization or projection of sense-impulses is made possible only on the basis of the object being 'covered' by the sensorium or light in the eye. This reading of the physiological situation in cognition is accepted also by the Advaitic view. Thus the cognition of the external object is made possible on either of the accounts. The objects have qualities that are perceptible and there is nothing to show that what they possess is other than what we see, in the form of structure or colour or taste or touch, though there may be individual differences and peculiarities that make doubtful judgments possible.

Some thinkers make karma the all-solvent, and try to make it the principle which helps the exteriorization of internal images. This theory is on a par with the hallucinatory theory of all perception. Creationism is not to be equated with such a theory since creationism involves real creation not delusive projection. Karma as a power or agency can do nothing more than expand or contract the ambit of perception of consciousness according as it is good or bad. It cannot create anything. Knowledge alone can create reality, neither ignorance nor unconsciousness. This is a central conception which cannot be given up under any conditions. Imperfection in creation means imperfection in knowledge.

If the virus of unreality is posited in consciousness itself,
then in Absolute Consciousness also, as in individual finite consciousness, we shall have to face pure skepticism and illusionism. The consciousness that we know or have is that of individual subjects, though it must be conceded that there are degrees of expansion and enlightened-ness that are far above the average. Such a consciousness we have always seen in embodied beings. It does not of course preclude the existence of dis-embodied selves. But even then Rāmānuja holds that they have bodies of another kind more amenable or suited to the higher functions of the consciousness, relieved from the strain and limitation due to a refractory and contracting body. In freed state, souls are said to possess an aprākṛta or non-material body of pure light. And un-freed souls on the other hand have liṅga śārīras, which are always related to them and which determine their future life-series. These are essentially modifiable by knowledge on the one hand, and on the other hand, also modifiable by actions of either kind, good or bad. It is this kārmic body that gets touched or infected. It is this that limits the dharmabhūta jñāna.

Nor can we ever conceive of a pure consciousness or mind divorced from any kind of body as Socrates and Aristotle conceived or even as some thinkers of modern times bold, and as Advaita Vedānta conceives. In Advaita, it is an imperative of its thought itself, but then such an acceptance imperils the nature of reality itself. Absolute consciousness is yet a consciousness which cannot happen elsewhere than in matter or a body however tenuous or purified or perfect for consciousness is a function of a subject and is not 'perceived apart from an embodied being. The fact is that in the case of the Absolute Consciousness, it is a consciousness which is a,
function of the Most Perfect Being, and in whose case the instrumentality of our five-fold sense-organs or even the manas or citta or any other organ of mind in its imperfect career are nowhere needed. There is direct vision. His perception is vision. It is perfect vision since it enfolds all infinity in its ken. In Him the senses are not the means of knowing or enjoying.

We find that the supremely intelligent mind’s consciousness is capable of creative action and possesses more completely the body which it governs. The limitation of consciousness is due to spiritual defect, or rather moral defect, which makes it impassible for it to function efficiently in a body which it holds. A higher morality or purity of living points to a greater and more facile control of the functions of the body. Thus reality does not change, the body does not become a barrier that has to be got rid of, but spiritual life gets deepened and intensified, or in other words, perfected. Consciousness as we know in the manner we know may enlarge itself and even get transformed into a super mind or Divya caksus but in its essential nature as a function (dharma) of a spirit it does not forsake its nature.

There are no degrees of reality according to Rāmānuja but only degrees of perfection. And perfection is measured by the completeness of control a soul has over its body and in the true creative feature of its functional consciousness. And

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1 Cf. basis of Realism: Alexander. "The prejudice against Realism lies in the confusion between the different ideals of Reality and perfection. Physical things are as real as the mind but not as perfect. When we speak of degrees of Reality we must be careful to ask whether we do not mean degrees of perfection."
creation in this sense means nothing more than making real the possible, thus effectuating its causal truth or will of God.

II

Śarīra- Śarīri Bhāva as the Typical Unity

Rāmānuja stands for the complete vindication of the holy soul relation even with regard to the Highest Spirit. A question may be asked whether God has a body in the very same sense that you and I have bodies? The point is not that God has a human body,—since, such a limitation of God's nature to a body like ours will entail a crude anthropomorphism and a limitation on evolution which make does not man the peak of creation. Surely He has a body which makes it possible for the Seers to see Him as having a body of light, auspicious and awe-inspiring, gracious and beneficent even as the Īṣāvāsyopanisad seer says, Yat te rūpam kāiyāṇatamam (verse 16). A body cannot be defined in terms of the appearance of the several types of bodies. A protoplasm has no sense-organs but it has a body; it has a nucleus which does animate the movements of its amorphous tissue. Thus a body cannot be defined in terms of the number of sense-organs or limbs or formations, special or general. What is the body then except that which functions or acts as an instrument purely and absolutely for the service of its owner which is said to fight out its life course in an environment? This serviceability to the animating life within or rather more precisely the soul within might he or any kind of enjoyability. Thus does Sri Rāmānuja define the body: 'A body is any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely
controlling and supporting for its own purposes and which stands in an entirely subordinate relation to it.\footnote{Śrī Bhāṣya II.9: Yasya centanāsyā yaddravyam sarvātmanā svārtha
niyantam dhārayitum a śakyam yaccheṣataika svarūpam ca tat tasey
śarīram}

Rāmānuja finds essential unity to lie in this soul-body relation. Metaphysical reality is of the nature of soul body. This is fundamental and from this we have to extract the view about the knowledge-relation. That the fundamental relation between subject and the object is a relation that is not organic in the sense that they are always and eternally inseparably tied to one another, need not be said. But it is also a fact that to speak about a subject is also speak about it as having an object. The objects change and vary and may be any number. The relation named cognition by the subject always remains except during deep sleep. Thus we find that we cannot affirm the subject-object relation to he anything more then what exists when the subject is awake or cognizing. A pure cognition without any object is a myth, though this also is granted by certain schools of thought, especially by Yoga which claims a state of cognition which is objectless. But even this is found to imply only that there are no objects of the outer world then but not objects of the transcendental kind, objects which are of divine origin. That is to say, to be conscious means to have some object, natural or divine, and the higher states of consciousness are those which have as their content the divine objects or objects which have God as their cause.

In one sense, however, we can yet speak of the cognitive relation as a soul-body relation. The object is enjoyed
and utilized and controlled by the subject who cognizes it. That is to say cognition leads on to the two further ways of dealing with the object, namely, that the subject enjoys and utilizes it or determines it. If the definition we have given of a body of the subject is accepted, then, there is every reason to treat the object as a body of the subject at that moment. The subject as such becomes the soul or self of the object. The subject-object relation thus reveals more than this relation in that it is possible to conceive all subjects as capable of holding the objects in an absolutely dependent relation. This however is not true as objects do not exist for the subjects as such, and many subjects are capable of beholding the same object. This may be a serious flaw in the Rāmānuja’s theory of relation of subject and object if we treat them as having sarīra-sarīrī relation. It would involver that the individual finite subjects must either be subjects or, souls or else fragments of as self or Mind, because they have no relation of this kind with the objects except their own bodies, and even then only in a limited manner. If the subjects are absolute subjects, the illusion of the many has to be accepted, in which case we Shall have to argue for one Self alone, or else we must argue that souls are real partial aspects of one Subject which is the real, but who are capable of enjoying and appreciating and controlling their objects in a limited manner. But then this involves the breaking up of the one self if it does not involve the view that the aspects have each an indivudality, real and inalienable. Either there are many partial subjects or finite subjects which somehow have come into being from one supreme Subject or Self or else the supreme Transcendent
Self itself has somehow illusorily presented itself in various ways which are phenomenally real but not transcendentally so\(^1\). Thus our problem of subject-object relation leads to the question of Unity or Oneness.

Before we take into consideration the problem itself, we shall discuss firstly as to what we do mean by a Perfect Subject and its infinity; and secondly as to what we do mean by the term infinity of subjects and things?

## III

### Infinity and what it means

A perfect subject according to Rāmānuja is exactly that person whose consciousness or dharma-bhūta- jñāna is full and complete in its range, without taint or fault or contraction. who wills the real, perceives the real and enjoys the real. The cognitive and affective and conative perfections are reached by such a consciousness.

\(^1\) Bhāskara’s is the first view and Śankara’s the second. In the Bhāskara doctrine the aspects even when mutually contradictory co-exist in space and time or without reference to space and time. This involves a view similar to the Jaina sapta-bhangi. If the views are related to space and time are not self-contradictory in that regard, since it is time and space that always cause this self-contradiction, there will be no difficulty about the acceptance of the Bheda-abheda view. Unfortunately this point of reference is lacking in their formula as such hence the futility of the identity and difference view taken unconditionally.
In actual experience we find however several degrees of perfection of this consciousness in different individuals. We may even think that there are different perspectives or grades which cover the entire range of perfection even as Leibniz conceived existence to be. There are infinite number of points of view possible and actual from which the universe might be telescoped or perceived by each one of them. There are no vacant spaces; or rather we should say there are infinite directions, diśah, and whilst it is conceivable that all the points of the circumference are occupied by some monad or other, it need not necessarily be so. Leibniz held that indeed they are occupied and then in order to explain change in this dynamic universe he proceeded to convert the straight line of progress to perfection into a circular movement, so much so every monad has to repeat its history of contraction and expansion of consciousness as it passes from the most luminous insight into the darkest contraction of unconsciousness. This according to him was necessitated by the fact of infinite perspectives occupied and innervated by the actual presence of monads at each one of them in the best possible of all worlds. Thus every monad seeks its fulfillment, as a monadas, monadum, but no sooner than it reaches it, it must make way for its successor who awaits anxiously its enthronement. This eternal recurrance theory is utter nonsense from the standpoint of true religion which seeks a perfection that is beyond the constant threat of fall. The Vedānta Śūtra, which echoes the words of the Upaniṣadic seer, says anāvṛttiśabdāt. It is because of the phrase that there is no return, no return to this cyclical existence, there is needed this effort at Realization.
Every pluralistic system has contended for the view that the things and selves in the universe are infinite in number. Vaiśeṣikas as well as Sāmkhya, argue for infinite soul; or puruṣas. What exactly does infinity mean? Is there any difference between numerical infinity and qualitative infinity? If so, what type of infinity applies to the souls? Do both avail? What type of infinity does the Supreme Brahman possess? These are important questions undoubtedly and interesting so.

Infinity means absence of finiteness or limitation. Limitation is of three kinds, limitations of space and of time and of distinctness or difference. All things occupy some space and all things occupy some part of time. They are thus limited by time and place. Similarly in so far as they are discrete and separate (bhinna) they are distinct from one another and therefore are capable of being counted or enumerated. These three limitations are thus available in regard to all created things.

Numerical infinity means that there are infinite number of discrete things. Infinite number means that they are countless or difficult to count. Thus the negative means only impossibility in so far as it applies to a finite self, not at all in the case of a self which could, and this Being is undoubtedly the Supreme Self of all. Though this assumption has its basis in the scriptural texts it is yet valid. An all knowing mind can comprehend all, and numerical infinity turns out to be a finity in regard to such a self. “The proof of infinity rests altogether...

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1 Śrī Bhāṣya: II.1.15
on the absence of limitation of space and time, not on account of the absence of substantial limitation; absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a hare?' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other hand the whole world as constituting Brahman's body is its mode, and Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things.¹

But this position is not what Rāmānuja is prepared to admit in regard to the limitation between the Infinite and the finite. Brahman surely is at once beyond spatial and temporal limitations and is transcendent to all limitations in so far as He is a unique Being capable of pervading all. Things of nature are limited by space-time and distinctions, and as such they cannot occupy the same space at the same time. They are non-intelligent and finiteness is their essential nature. Mustard seeds, beans, earthen pots and pieces of cloth are dependent upon their distinctions and are separate. Infinity is impossible where they are concerned. If numerical infinity is posited in the case of souls then the matter takes on an entirely new aspect. Undoubtedly occupying space they are numerically many but not infinite. Nānātva, manyness, is not anantatva, infinity. The numerical manyness in thus in fact in regard to the individual souls. But this is not all about the individual souls. Whilst having distinctions in their very nature, there is a particular feature of the souls which makes it possible for each of them

¹ Anāntatvād ātmanāmamūktāsca santīticet-kimidam anantatvam? Asaṅkhyaeyatvam-īticebbā, bhūyaśtvād alpajñāir asaṅkhyaeyatve piśvarasya sarvajñasya saṅkhyaeyā eva .. Anāntatvam-nāma-paricchedaráhitvatvam.

Ibid. p.39: Ānantyaprasiddhiśca deśakālaparocchearahitvatva-mātreṇa.
to be reckoned as an infinite or participating in the infinite. Infinity has to be conceived in a different manner. It must be conceived as absence of all limitation. Substantial limitation is inescapable in regard to the souls. Is it the case with Brahman? The pluralists consider that this is involved, since the Brahman could be conceived to have these finites as its modes and yet be different from them. If He is different then there is limitation. It is impossible to think of Him as a numerical finite, just one of the many. Thus we find that Rāmānuja is not prepared to accept the position developed by the dualist thinkers who speak about the substantial limitation of Brahman whilst yet granting Him a freedom from limitations of space and time. Transcendental in one sense, they find Him to be bond by this particular limitation. This obviously entails that Brahman exists as limited by the existence of other individuals and things. Taken along with the theory of plurality of separate existence, substantial limitation would lead to temporal and spatial limitations. All the selves and Brahman along with them would be limited by space and time, which would argue against all qualitative infiniteness. vibhūtva.

Whilst therefore we find that the individual selves are really independent existence if we hold them to be numerically many, we would he faced with the problem that there are not really infinite in number, and further that they are non-intelligent, since uniformity or number belongs to material differentiations. If on the other hand we define infinity to consist in the absence of all limitation it is found that bond selves are really bound by the limitation of space and time and, therefore are not infinite in that state.
We find that the objects this world must be really many and finite. We also find that the selves or souls which are embodied are many and finite in number. Infinity for the selves can only mean the highest attainment of qualitative perfection. But does this qualitative perfection involve absence of all limitation? If it does, it impugns the very occupation of a body. No embodied being can ever be at once substantially limited and yet be perfect qualitatively. The absence of all limitations leads to absurdities. It may be absence of limitations due to space and time and material refractoriness that pertains to having a body, but could it also mean absence of all relations, since relations connect things and individuals and argues for dependence of one on the rest? But "absence of such (substantial) limitation is something akin to the 'horn of a hare,' as the Brahmajānāvādin says, and is perceived no where. Limitation is absolute and nothing is capable of existing without any limitations whatsoever. The individual selves am not infinite in the sense that they are numerically infinite but that they are substantially limited by their relation to the highest Brahman. But this substantialia limitation is not of the same kind as limitation that occurs through space and time and nature.

No thing or soul is thus free from all limitations. All things are limited by space and time and substantial limitation: souls are also limited by substantial limitation. Thus both fall under the category of finite beings.
IV

Brahman, the true Infinite

Brahman is the only substance, the supreme subject who is free from all limitations including the substantial, or at least who surpasses the limitations from the stand-point of the qualitative transcendence. Transcendence over limitations even of the substantial involves mastery over them, hence, not limitation at all. By this concept of transcendence enunciated very powerfully in the Upanisads Rāmānuja solves the difficulty that confronts the dualist, who though lie found himself in a position not dissimilar to Rāmānuja was unable to solve the problem of substantial limitation, and accepted the position that Brahman too was subject to this substantial limitation. The relation that the things and souls bear to the Supreme Self is indeed a substantial relation of dependence, secondly they are objects occupied, governed and noticed and witnessed by the Supreme and fall within the category of elements that constitute the subject object relation. But the subject-object relation is not all, though undoubtedly essential.

The only subject far whom all are objects at all times and therefore eternally in the Supreme Subject

The importance of the meaning a: the term infinity in regard to the numerically many is found therefore to lie in a very novel explanation. Infinity consists in having all the many in one vision and beholding them eternally in one's vision. This
is possible only to the Highest.

There in however another meaning which is warranted by the Scriptures by the passages which show that the supreme Brahma is unreachable by speech or mind: \textit{yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha}. This indeed is the meaning of the word 	extit{Anantam}, infinity. His truth and being and nature and form and qualities are transcendent and immeasurable in excellence and superior. From that Being our mind returns baffled and falls into a consciousness of its own finiteness.

Thus transcendence is the real definition of infinity. But this does not abjure the initial recognition of its Superior nature. It is immeasurable and this is transcendence. The transcendent does not refute the finite nor the limited, it contains all the limits within it and yet is afar, it is here and afar, near and distant. As the \textit{Īśāvāsyopaniṣad} says: tadejati tadvaijati taddūre tadavantike! Tadanta rasya sarvasya tadu sarvasyaśya bāhyataḥ. The finite cannot contain the infinite fully when considered from the stand point of space and time and external relation, but when considered from the stand-point of spiritual pervasion it contains it. It is not a refutation of it, nor contradictory to it. It is within it as part and parcel of it. The element of transcendence it is that is all important, and it is this that makes the infinite the supreme subject of all experience. Reality is both subject and object and the infinite is composite of both. The doctrines that seek to reduce the subject to the level of the object or the object to the level of the subject are apparently doomed to failure. But this does not involve the giving up of the distinction in their status in regard
to one another. The real is knowable; even the unknowable is merely the statement of transcendence and nothing more. This view is implicit in the doctrine of superiority of the subject when applied to the Supreme Being. The Supreme Lord possesses all Objects as in their eternal nature in His ever-present vision. It is also true that He establishes all these in their real nature through years sempiternal. This is an important conception in so far as it shows that there is a fundamental distinction between the knowing and being in regard to Brahman the true infinite, the transcendent, and the finite and subordinate. The contradictions and antimonies raised between the finite and the infinite, the infinite divisibility of the infinite or the composition of the infinite of the infinites are all numerical devices which do not imitate but in fact, impugn the integrity of the infinite. Brahman is the infinite, that is the transcendent. The transcendent is the subject, the supreme subject who establishes all things in their real nature from eternity.

V

Consciousness and its Ideal Nature

The ideal condition of consciousness is its unlimited nature. Consciousness itself is a function, which undergoes contraction and expansion. In plants there is a widening of the scope of living as compared with metals and stones in which it is dormant and incogent. As evolution moves forward the individual body lets consciousness function more and more or rather the consciousness within breaks through the material confines and organizes its own ways and means of knowing. Freedom is thus assured and is dependent upon the greater and higher perfection of consciousness which is the function of
the soul. Perfection means the highest freedom of consciousness or conscious functioning of the self. The real is consciousness in the sense that whatever it reveals fully and intrinsically or illumines or whatever it grasps is real yathārtha because it is the real function of a real subject. “All cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects or cognitions and are themselves real, consisting in mantel certainty with regard to special objects. Reality is of the nature of any object which is cognized by consciousness and things that are false are sublated by proofs which consciousness itself provides and reveals, failing which ‘how it works’ in practical application or conduct proves the presence of effects. Some of these cognitions "may rest On defects which are themselves real; others spring from a combination of causes, real and free from all defects." The distinction between false and true is not a distinction that should be brought in between the non-existent Absolute which is the Highest category of intellect and the existent world of practical conduct, nor between the theoretical and the practical, between which there need be no opposition; but between features which thought itself in its variant phases and expressions reveals. If the real is to be judged from the point of view at pure thought which does not fulfil action, then there in no doubt that we shall have only a splendid fiction, unknowable and beyond thought. Thought is in its very nature capable of infinite discrimination, samkhya, so that it finally defines things. Things of the outer world are patently enumerable having number and are finite. Not withstanding their multiplicity, in their inner nature is revealed a supreme transcendence which is of the Real and the Spiritual. It is this infinity that is within the finite of the numbers. But to convert the principles, verifiable and functionally absolute in the realm
of the outer into principles of the inner and the unverifiable is to disrupt the integral diunity of the total.

The criticism that thought is not practical, a meaning less, for it means to deny the expression or manifestation and power of intelligence as intelligence. Illumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is antagonistic to it but also of defining things, thus rendering them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech. \(- na \ hi \ virodha-nirasana-mātram \ prakāśatvam \ api \ tvārthaparacchedah.\)

VI

Thing-in-itself

The criticism that thought is not practical is meaningless because it denies the expression of intelligence an intelligence it is. This primal or principal distinction which Kant recognized very clearly was by Śankara denied. That it did issue from knowledge he conceded, but that what it manifested, or resulted in was real was what he stoutly refuted. Such a radical theoreticism could only lead to mere phenomenalism and to solipsism. Even this is inadmissible because the Absolute is not a solipsist but an undifferenced Consciousness which is neither subject nor object and not even a thing-in-itself. To such an absolutely undifferenced Consciousness or intelligence not implying distinctions of subject or object, syayaṃprakāśatā (self illumining power) cannot possibly belong.

It may of course be argued that introspective vision will
grant us the nature of the thing-in-itself whereas the exterior type of observation can only grant us an external view which despite its verifiability and objectivity can never give us the nature of a thing as it is established in itself. The importance of the concept of the yathārtha, the inner truth of existence of a thing as it is in itself and not to another consciousness is a very important fact that can be explained only on the basis of the inwardness of the thing.

This process of introspective intuition is facilitated by the method or yogic intuition, or samādhi, and in that intuitive perception there is inward revelation of the nature of a thing as it is in itself. This is its essence which is always the subjective view of the thing not the object-view of thing. Can anything be known in the sense in which we use the term know, as it is in itself as subject; and not object? Can this shift be achieved except by means of the abolition of the objective status of the object and by making it know itself through our subjectivity? If it could be so known as even M. Bergson affirmed we could, then we shall know, not in the sense of subject-object relation but by abolishing the object absolutely and by being in rapport with the subject as an articulate self existence as it is in itself; this would be a supreme achievement of the seer and not of the subject at all. Then we shall be able to say that knowledge does not require a subject object relation absolutely and under all conditions. An external knowing demands this relation, not the internal seizing of the essence through making the object the subject itself. The important question that arises at this point is whether in this subjectification, the object does in fact, participate in the life and movement of the subject, or does the subject (namely, the person who subjectifies the object) lose
himself in the objects-subjectivity? Then, we are confronted with the problem of dual-subjectivity, between which it is difficult to find any identity. Thus the knowledge of a thing in itself is possible only to that thing itself and not to any other. Nor do we arrive at the knowledge of the thing as it is in itself when we reduce all objects to the nature of adjectives of the subject. But if we do reduce all the subjects (the so-reduced objects) to one single spirit, then the problem gets simplified and it is conceivable that we shall be in the presence of the One all-embracing Subject which shall know all as they are in themselves, because they are in it. At any rate, the above way of reasoning makes the concept of the Subject sans object, intelligible. It appears, then, that there is no other way except to accept the situation, as it is the only way by which we shall know things as in themselves, which is the intrinsic truth about them requiring no further confirmation. The object thus presents itself as having a subjective as well as an objective aspect. To deny either is to gain a fictitious truth. But as amongst the two, the more important is the thing in itself, which falls on the subject side and the knower has to identify himself with that part of the existence through intuition to gain access to it. The other aspect is freely gained through scientific Observation, but it requires the pragmatic test also. This is the parataḥ pramāṇa necessary for gaining the truth of the external relationship of the object with other objects in a common universe. How these two have to get reconciled in the unity of knowledge is yet a deep and profound problem bringing in as it does, the problem of dual reality or appearance and reality.

There is only one way or escape, a way that was indeed pointed out by the theologically inclined Berkeley, by the
logical Banquet and others, and that is to treat the Absolute as the solipsist. To take refuge in Him or It and to console ourselves in His ability to grant us sufficient objectivity, and feel that the truthful Being will not deceive us, is our only alternative. So far as the individuals are concerned their knowledge: as subjective experience is possible only through the Absolute, through which alone they could gain subjective thing-in-itselfness of the object. This is the seeing all things in the Supreme Divine, to see them all as having their self in the Divine. This is the possibility of seeing intimated by the pregnant words of the Īśāvāsyopanisad: Yahā ταθατότατον

vyadadhāt śāśvatibhyāḥ samābhyaḥ(8).

Direct intuition is impossible. Only intuition through the Supreme Being or Absolute is capable of granting us the inward reality of all things, their svarūpa sthiti and svasmait sthiti.1 Equally it follows that our knowledge true and right, of others or their minds is possible only indirectly through the Absolute. This is obviously different from the perception of their bodies or their movements in space, growth etc., all of which yield only a pragmatic reality but not the thing in-itself of the objects. It must in this connection be remarked that

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1 Prof Laird has raised a very important discussion in his masterly Gifford Lectures "Mind and Deity" as to whether God knows the knowledges of souls as they reflexively know it for themselves. The infinity or Omniscience of God either includes or excludes this reflexive (svasmai) knowledge of the souls. If it excludes, His omniscience is not omniscient, if he knew it, they would not be souls. Even if they be souls and God knew their knowledges, a further question arises whether God knows this knowledge reflexively or otherwise. These are difficult questions to which no answer can be given except to a very limited extent.
Rāmānuja has not touched the problem in this manner. It is however necessary to insist on this two fold manner of this cognition in order to shed the importance of the diunity stressed by him in his doctrine of śarīra-śarīri - relation. The intrinsic thing in itself in Brahman is the essence, the externality is the outer form of manifestation of that essence to other modes or subjects. Both go together and both of them are real.

VII

Diunity of Reality and Apprehension

Thus we find that the essential principle of explanation that needs must be understood in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja is this constant insistence on the two-fold unity or diunity of the nature of the thing. It is usual to find in this type of explanation the doctrine of identity in difference or identity and difference. But the theories of Bheda-abheda are by no means capable of answering the problems we have presented so far in regard to the intrinsic and external or objective nature of the self-same object. Bhāskara starts with a view that perilously lands it in self-contradictions. He states that the One Pure Intelligence or Consciousness distinguishes itself into subjects and objects which are real. That is, souls on the one hand and not-souls on the other art: fragmentations from the Consciousness. Thus multiplicity is derived from the unity,

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1 What has been sketched above is a possible development of his thought. The whole concept of knowledge of a thing is dealt with from the relativistic position and not the subjectivist position. Śrī Rāmānuja takes up the subjectivist position only in so far as the liberation of the functional consciousness from its limitations due to karma is concerned.
which is precarious once we consider the meaning or manner of differentiation. It is said that the universal undifferenced consciousness is stigmatised or else like the Fichtean 'Anstoss' posits its other, which acts as the limiting element (upādhi), giving rise to the appearance of several subjects and several objects. Bhāskara who holds this view is refuted by Rāmānuja on the score of arguing for a double aspect theory. There is no thing with two aspects Bhāskara "makes a distinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea of discontinuance distinction", but as a matter of fact there is no perception of these two elements in separation. Therefore the principle of Bhāskara's theory is grounded in false abstractionism.

Bhāskara contends that we are capable of distinguishing the difference and identity between dissimilar and similar characteristics in a thing when compared with another thing, and therefore we can clearly posit that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference belongs to the same thing viewed as effect and particular. This means that the two characteristics of difference and non-difference can be reconciled in one and the same thing. We find that the individual self in so far as it has intelligence belongs to the genus, Brahman, and in so far as it is finite it is different from Brahman. As against this view Rāmānuja holds that "if difference belongs to the individual and non-difference to genus 'this implies' that there is no one thing with a double aspect". On the contrary it means that there are two things which are conjoined together. If you hold

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1 Śrī Bhāsyā, I.i.4
that the genus and the individual together constitute one thing, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. Difference and non-difference thus cannot be predicated of genus and particular. The genus is merely a generic character which is not a real thing in the sense of an existent thing by itself apart from the particular, for it is arrived at by a process of abstraction. The individual is not a manifestation of the genus. For Bhāskara however to be a manifestation is to be identical with the genus. There is no difference except that the locus of its expression is difference.

But the individual is not a part of the genus since it has in itself its unique character of existence separately, which is exactly what the genus lacks in spite of its so called universality and eternity. The individual is the real thing from which alone the concept of the genus ever arises. "The species is a form of the individual and does not manifest the individual". Bhāskara by making the genus the most important, and by taking genus to be a real existent apart from or over and above the particular through which alone it has any plausible existence, has made the logical genus real, and the individual, the real imperfect manifestations of the Highest Reality or the genus. The identity or the genus-character, is extensive and infinite (here consciousness is infinite), it is more than the difference which is the particular. The Particular existence are perishable and fleeting. Therefore eternity is of the genus, and the perishing character belongs to the particulars only. Since therefore the genus is the identity, it is eternal and may be said to be the svābhāika nature of a thing. The limited character is the perishable character, and as such
is *aupādhika* or contingent character. This equally applies to the intelligence which is seen as differentiated in the finite individuals having contracted intelligences. The intelligence is the eternal infinite, the finite is also intelligent but so made finite by limiting conditions of the bodies. The finites are as real as the Infinite but not as eternal according to Bhāskara.

In Śankara’s doctrine these differences are unreal, caused indeed as they are by ignorance and because they are perishing existences, or because they could be sublated: in Bhāskara’s on the other hand, these difference are real, but not permanent. Already we find the recognition of the defect in the equation of the idealistic view namely that permanence is reality. Whether permanence is to be considered in the logical manner of non-self contradiction or in the temporal sense of changelessness, it is clear the former is correct and acceptable to all whereas the latter is not. We may accept the former but not the latter criterion.

Regarding the multiplicity which is equivalent to differences, the unreality of the differences or nānātva is important in the doctrine of Śankara. Equally so is it in the doctrine of Bhāskara. The nature of the conditioning agent is all that matters. Śankara was more right in so far as he regarded the Consciousness or the Supreme as indivisible, and if we do indeed find differences it is due to the ignorance, the conditioning agency and it is not to the substance that we should look for the defect. For Bhāskara the absolute identity has the capacity of becoming many in the presence of the conditions or limitations. Consciousness can become personal, characterised by power to become or create or produce or
diversify itself as the many. There are two tendencies which cut at the root of this philosophy. The one original consciousness is firstly revealed as the Absolute Identity having the power to become many selves. The one self becomes many selves in manifesting itself, though it is absolutely unconditionally real because it is its own nature. The many are limited manifestations which would lose their identity on becoming free from limitations. It is necessary to consider these limitations, upādhis, as the power of self-determination or self-limitation for the sake of play or whatever purpose might be credited to that absolute consciousness. The crucial point in Bhāskara’s theory consists however in his doctrine of Release. The formal character of Brahman becomes more and more pronounced and release seems to be the attainment of the full and complete formal perfection of the genus by the individual. The Platonic tendency thus is clearly traceable and becomes more and more patent when we emphasise the formal identity more than the difference which can never have permanent footing in the laps of identity. Once the permanent footing is found, release is impossible if indeed it is not necessary, since it is by the will of God, the Absolute, that this permanent footing is being found. Thus to manifest or not is not a matter for the striving of the individual at all. Mokṣa is not therefore explained. But what is really important in the analysis of the problem is his clear perception of the need to find a real relation of identity and difference between the many and the one. It is not release that should attract our attention in his philosophy because it is a hopelessly confused explanation that he gives, but only his rejection of the phenomenalists and illusionists. The individual is the essential part of the genus and is the condition a priori for the manifestation of the genus.
in actuality. In other words, the genus gets existence only under definite conditions of space and time and particularity apart from which it is only a conceptual abstraction, even then possessing a relation with a particular in the mind of the conceiving. The defect in his theory is that he could not but move towards the absolute, and this was facilitated by his stressing the identity and the genus more than the particular and the reality of difference. He did not see that the annihilation of plurality would annihilate the identity. The double aspect must be either a permanent feature of reality or else it cannot be a feature of reality at all. Multiplicity and unity or identity must be conceived either in an oppositional polarised manner or as integrally related to one another. To abolish them even as terms by declaring their illusory nature or unreality character, or to abolish one of them whilst maintaining the status of the other, is to land oneself in fruitless contradictions. Bhāskara no less than Śankara postponed the problem of unity and multiplicity. However it must be recognized that Bhāskara felt that there was a way of resolving the problem. But Rāmānuja it was who felt that an integral solution was possible, and that required the abandonment of the prejudice of opposition between the unity and multiplicity. The way to seek it is to take examples of such unities that enfold or contain or manifest or express the multiplicity whilst yet remaining unities that they veritably are and will be. The relation must not only be real, it has to be integral, incapable of dissection into terms, that is to say, the unity should exhibit the multiplicity and be itself the self and being of the multiplicity. In other words, it must be a unique or significant unity, the pattern of the unity that is exhibited on all prangs of reality. Then it would be the principle which will explain all relations.
that manifest unity or multiplicity. That all relations cannot be reduced to this one pattern most be accepted, but then there is no reason to think that this one should not be a special relation. This type of relation is universal in the sense of being available wherever there are permanent types of relations called specially aprthaksiddha, inseparable or organic. This is the type that is most manifest and useful in our conduct and existence. All other types of relation are distinct but subordinate to this type of relation.

The cognitive relation is not an interminable relation. Nonetheless it displays the specific quality of a dependent relation. The subject is superior to the object in one sense and in another sense it is the subject that is inferior to the object. This kind of dual position as clearly found in the experience of Beauty is such that it precludes the possibility of making the finite individual superior to the object at all times. Creative power of the subject might make the individual superior to his creations, the adaptive powers or man might make him the knower and adapter and inventor of new things but the apperception of Natural beauty enforces the attention and subordination and wonder and awe of tire individual in its presence. Thus it follows that the secret of Unity is not to be conceived of in any other way except through the perception of the relationship of permanent organic co-existence.

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IX
Organic Unity.

Rāmānuja finds that the unity which can hold multiplicity within itself must be significant, enfolding the multiplicity in a unique manner. Further the problem is one of dynamic multiplicity, a multiplicity that is growing, and full of contingent relations, in one word is one of ever increasing and renewing activity. In order to find in this growth, development and change, process and progress, it is imperative to conceive this unity in a special way. It is impossible to conceive of it in a mechanical one or a material one. As progress and evolution cannot be registered in them, we have to find out whether this is possible in a spiritual unity of love that is most logically explainable as organic coexistence.

All unity is not material or external unity. Indeed it is found that the best unity that we have in external unity is the chemical compound within which the individual terms or substances undergo a thorough change and are unreasonable. Disintegration brings them out of their transformation and makes them unique entities. Further an arrangement between the terms is also important and this could not also be disturbed without sheltering their individual natures as such. Not so the unity of an organism. The disintegration of the organism leaves us undoubtedly in the same state as in the case of compounds but the fact of development and reaction to stimuli are not features of the compounds. They specifically
belong to the organism, which is a growing unity, not a unity that comes into existence after and out of independent elements, but a unity that reveals at once a self-sustaining oneness through all the diversity of organisations.

The way our knowledge coheres with other items of cognition reveals a unity, a mental one, between all experiences. The way our food and other objects inhere and sustain the unity of the organism reveals physiological equivalence to it. The way all the organs of the body maintain and sustain a dependence on the life-purpose whatever this may connote in terms of human interests, such as artha, wealth, kama, needs, and moksha, freedom from limitations of ignorance, reveals the unity of the multiplicity that can never be surrendered. At times the multiplicity might be more pronounced than the unity, and this tendency is the visible sign of change. A growing multiplicity or multiplicity that is constantly in movement is the World of Nature which contains both the souls and things. The souls or selves are also changing in the sense of undergoing changes in their consciousness-function though not in their substantial nature as knowers. The fixing of the individual self to a significant connection or relation is never possible in the case of a growing individual who has to thrust forward and upward towards the highest aim. Not only is this possibility of connection between God and the individual one of constant alternation into several poses (and there are as many as there are fundamental human aspirations), but these several relations equally apply to every other relation between the several individuals themselves.
Absolute Unity must yet be a flexible unity that grants freedom or play to these fundamental human relations. And the most fundamental is that of love and sympathy or Grace. The Bhāgavata-mārga, which is that of Bhakti, is one of utter dependence on this one type of relationship that manifests itself as the typical centre of all other types of rasas. Change that is characteristic of the world of matter, partial change which is characteristic of souls (of one type at least such as the bond), and non-change in either sense of the eternals and the Supreme Being who is the Lord of Change and Unchange, all these require a demonstrable unity which is at once integral and flexible. Rāmānuja approaches the conception of the Absolute through this triplicity of entities.

The unifying principle must be a concrete spiritual Being and not merely consciousness or a generic Universal or concept or idea. It must be a person who persists in subordinating all the multiplicity to his will and pleasure and ordains its conduct. Whilst himself being permanent he should pervade all through his will and omniscience. In other words, the multiplicity is in one sense, and that in the fundamental sense, servile to the Unity, through which alone it lives and moves and grows and gains perfection. To say that this is an eternal pervasion and indwellingness means that this relationship is absolute. The unity is signified by the absolute Lordship of the Supreme Being. The multiplicity of real existences which are the several selves and things must be embraced within this single substance or Being or Person, wherefore He is called Puruṣottama.
THE PROBLEM OF UNITY

The argument for a single self alone is disposed of since multiplicity cannot but be. Such a theory could only dispose of all multiplicity. Nor can the conditioning theory through avidyā or māyā explain the multiplicity. The theory of degrees of reality abolishes all attempts at reconciling the reality of effort and attainment with the absolute identity or Oneness of Perfect Deity.

Rāmānuja affirms that the inequalities are inexplicable without real multiplicity, strongly recalling the views of Sāmkhya. Release would be purposeless if it is merely a refunding into Brahman’s homogeneous nature or into the causal substance. It is impossible to conceive of freedom as uniformity or homogeneity, since it is particularly the function of uniqueness and difference, and in the highest sense is the attainment of freedom from all limitations of this uniqueness of being. Multiplicity accordingly requires for its fullest expression freedom, and true freedom is fully realized in the attainment of freedom from all limitations. So does Kāśakrtṣna⁷ hold that the individuals can only be Brahman’s bodies since in spite of attaining equality Brahman abides in them. The immensity of Brahman and the immortal freedom of Brahman are essentially the differentia between it and the individual souls. Brahman is infinite, in nature as well as in consciousness-function; the individuals on the contrary are finite in their substantiality and limited in their consciousness-functions only during their evolutionary or bondage periods. The selves retain their

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¹ Śrī Bhāṣya I.iv.22.
distinctions even after abandoning their bodies, but they are all
the same pervaded by Brahman. A merger cannot take place,
since that involves the conclusion that limitation is unreal or
transitory, which means that true multiplicity in unity cannot be
sustained. Nor is it possible to hold that Pure intelligence such
as that of the Perfect Being could in any sense be obscured or
hidden by Māyā. Brahman abides in all souls; His identity in all
is the soul of multiplicity and continues to be so for ever, in
darkness as well as in light. All the difference is what is made
in respect of the individual souls themselves, whether they
know Him (or it) or not know. The Infinite resides in the finite
and is their strength, but they do not compose it. The doctrine
of Bhedābheda narrowly misses the conclusion of
compositeness by its theory of contradictory aspects. The
unity is non-disintegrative and non-disjunctive, is indivisible and
its wholeness cannot bear even surrender to multiplicity of
finites. The organic unity is made possible by the principle of
controlling indwellingness or pervasive power of God involving
a capacity to actually indwell each in certain ways such as
have been asserted by the Antaryāmi theory of the Vedānta
and Pāñcarātra,¹ Brahman thus is the indwelling person in the
several individuals composing or constituting the multiplicity
and forms with them an organic Unity, each of which apart
from the Highest and the rest can only be an abstraction.

Rāmānuja points out that the principle on which we
accept Identity is quite valid as it is true to say that the
knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of all, but the
One here is not any piece of stone, or Tennyson's "flower on

¹ Śrī Bhāṣya l.ii.11.19-21
the crannied wall’, or an individual soul, but the Divine Person, the Supreme Brahman who is the One who has no compeer, who is the source and spring and Life of all, who is the controller, destiner and goal of all things. When we refer to even a finite soul or thing, the reference is not to any one thing of the several things composing the multiplicity but to the One Person who is the significant self of all of them. The Tennysonian touch, in which Bosanquet revels, is available because it means that the Real is the whole and that the part only represents a unique permanent locus of the whole. The part reveals its own fragmentary character, that is to say, its dependence on the larger and vaster Intelligence is indicated to its consciousness all through.

The absolute Unity depends upon absolute knowledge of all, and is available to a mind which is in some measure capable of infinite apprehension or direct intuition. That is to say the singleness of Unity is perceived only when there is completest identification with its multiplicity, by a process of infinite condensation of perceived data. This is the unity that overflows and lives through the multiplicity. The two are different even in kind, and that is the reason why the multiplicity is incapable of abolishing the unity not to speak of its living in and through it, and why the unity is incapable of being true without a recognition of its inevitable association with the multiplicity. The individual souls or subjects which are substantial existences are also adjectivally related to the Supreme God, without their substantiality being impaired or reduced or sublated. Love or sneha is the principle expressed as the relation of this Unity (viśiṣṭaikīya).
XI

Summary

Summarising we find that true unity cannot be a generic character or a pure being which is the highest essence or abstraction, though it is said to be consciousness or awareness or the subject-aspect of the cognitive relation. The subjective consciousness is said to be not an individual consciousness but a vastly enhanced and extensive universal consciousness which is the static basis of all activity, mutations and multiplicity. The concept of such a base is no better, if not considerably worse, than the matter of scientists, which is the matrix of all stimulations of senses but which could never be known at all through the senses.

The subject unifies his experiences, just as his sense-organs and the brain condense infinite number of small stimuli affecting the sense-organs into qualified objects. The subject is the synthesizer of all these sensations into the unity of the concept. This is also, if we may repeat the expression, condensation of sensations. He is also the performer of the actions stimulated by the sensations and concepts. The subject in cognition is alert and vigilant. All Philosophies which concede the epistemological situation as important and seek to affirm the view that knowledge it is that liberates an individual from his ignorance, can, despite all other theories of release and metaphysical statements of the relationships which manifest themselves as genus-particular, substance-attribute, cause-effect, infinite-finite, and unmanifest-manifest, affirm the
uniqueness of the subject-object relation or the cognitive relation. It is this too that reveals itself as the psychological relationship of body and soul, as also as the relation of knowledge with other objects and minds and the Supreme Self also. Thus in this context of the cognitive relation should the problems of Substance and Attribute, Infinite and Finite, Unity and Multiplicity be considered. Though materialistic phraseology is not always wrong, psychological or spiritual phraseology is the more apt and capable of granting a better and fuller explanation.
CHAPTER VI

BRAHMAN--THE HIGHEST UNITY

From a study of the problem of unity we find that if ever a real and concrete unity is to be realized, it must be a Person who integrally sustains and manifests multiplicity of things and natures a real unity of concrete character or of concrete possibility. That this unity is affirmed by the metaphysicians of the type of Śankarsaṇa and Bhāskara in a being devoid of all character is what we have seen from the foregoing. The most abstract truth must find exemplification in the most concrete occasion of existence. The truth of the abstract lies in its infinite capacity to be concrete. That is why the Supreme and most transcendent Brahman, the Infinite, has complete powers of manifesting Himself in the present conditions. Śankara does not allow any concrete nature to the transcendent and noumenal Being which is real but too real to exist under the conditions of Māyā, though it has the supreme power of being the ālambana, ground of all the illusions. Bhāskara grants a Being which is concrete in so far as it is said to possess qualities, sāguṇa, but not in the sense of Spinoza's model and attributive qualifications or possessing concrete nature of extension and thought, but purely in the sense, that it has the power to involve itself in differentiations through self-limitation. But no sooner than he grants this power to proliferate, he declares that this is a limitation which is temporary, and which in fact must be got rid of by the seeker. By his theory of identity and difference he frustrates the spiritual characteristic
of significant infinity and makes it merely a generic infinity. Though Bhāskara thinks that his Being has essential intrinsic, svābhāvika, characteristics of power and perfection, he makes it at the same time an idea "beating its ineffectual wings in the void or grand Samsāri.

The Highest Unity must be a substance or Person as such and not an ideal or merely formal unity. It must be conceived as an organic unity and not as a mere conglomeration or compound. The relations in the organic unity are an ordered unity of relations and whilst the relations are not all of the same kind, nor the relata of the same kind, the unity realized as between all these divers kinds is one of the most concrete manifestations of the ideal of Unity. Rāmānuja holds that the notion of unity can never belong to anything except to the Spirit or Person who is not merely the material cause but also the operative cause of the continuing unity of organic existence. It is that alone which organizes unity in purpose, in works, in cognition, in enjoyment and in freedom. A material being like prakṛti can never organize, much less sustain the unity of its vital life.

The unity of subject and object is also expressed in terms of soul and body. The unity of subject or spirit in all activities is; a positive evidence of the continuity of the self, despite the fact that its several ideas and perceptions and cognitions have a fluxional nature. It is in mind or self that all experiences of objects and ideas and their solution or

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1 cf. Philosophy of Bhedābheda: P.N. Srinivasachari
2 Śrī Bhāṣya. II.2.3.ff.
integration and solace. The subject absorbs the object in one sense and understands it, and the more the absorption of the one in the other happens there is realization of the depths of the subject and object which now present a unity in experience. But this possibility is available not in mere sensation nor yet in mere comparison or inference, but only in the intuitional experience of reception of one another. Mutual reception is possible only when there is utter sympathy not mergence, *na not nirvāṇa*.

But what this really means is, that the subject must not stand over against the objects as something to be subjugated and ordered but as something to be understood as it is in itself, and truly this is impossible if the object were to be treated as only a phenomenal existence. The subject himself in introspection fails to discover himself as he is in himself, thus all the troubles he takes turn out to be futile. But when we find that this definition of Self or subject really and absolutely applies to the Supreme Being alone and that that alone is the Subject and Unity as it is in Himself we will he enabled to affirm that in His case there does not happen the difficulty of conceiving this Unity of the Organism.

The self as subject holds the multiplicity of its experience in it, unity. The organism contains the multiplicity of its organs. The subject expands its activities as more and more objects are brought within its circle of experience; its organism as constituted grows and increases in its dimensions through its various activities of absorption of alien bodies suited indeed to the needs of its growth and survival. The self, as we find it, is a real agent of all activity. Consciousness is
the function of this self, and in all attitudes it exists as its all-abiding function. Empirical evidence points to the existence of a number of selves and their existence seems to be necessitated logically also as proved by the theories of Sāmkhya and Nyāya, and Rāmānuja does not feel it necessary to refute the reality of these existences. On the contrary the individuality of each of these is guaranteed as unique and intrinsic, and impossible of identification with other units or individuals. They are distinguished by their bodies which are different, belonging as they do to any class, genus or species, caste or state. There is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience.

Nor is this uniqueness capable of being dissolved into the Unity of the One Intelligence, since such reports thwart the existence of intelligence itself. Apparent or real, the doctrine of deluding limitation upādhi, is self-contradictory.

The individual selves are not all-pervading but pervade only their bodies. It is true that their sizes are not variable according to the sizes of the bodies they occupy, as in the Jaina doctrine, but they pervade through power, even as the rays of light pervade the room which they occupy even though their source is limited to one place. In the case of the individual

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1 Śrī Bhāṣya II.iii.29,30,33-34
2 Śrī Bhāṣya II.iii.48. “Asantateścāvyatīkaraḥ.”
3 Brahmāmśatvādinaikarūpatve satyapi jīvānām anyonyabhedād anutvena prtiśāri rām bhinnatvā cca bhoga-vyatīkaropi na bhavati
4Śrī Bhāṣya (II.iii.49) Akhadaikarasa-prakāśamātra-svarūpasya-svarūpa-tirodhāna-pūrvakopādhipadopadana-hetur-ābhaśa eva. Pragāsai-kasvarūpasya prakāśa-tirodhānam prakāśa-nāsa eva
souls the place they are limited to and from which they exercise their powers is said to be the heart. Thus the individual selves are finite in their pervasive action, since they cannot extend beyond their bodies for direction or action: their finitude is still further affirmed by their characteristic locus in the life of the Divine⁷, or if we may use a modern word, the perspective. Since this perspective which is unique and impossible of destruction or alienation is only a point, the individual as spirit must be conceived as atomic, or rather, as a unit without parts, or a, unity without parts (sic), not in the physical sense but purely in the sense of a spiritual significant unity of direction and action and locus of the Divine All-Spirit. The number of these points are many, even uncountable by the individuals, but finite. Thus the individual souls are finite in quantity or number, and in pervasive capacity, (though they may, through the grace of the All-Spirit, enlarge their knowledge-pervasion to the limits of Divine knowledge), and finite in their initial limitation of action due to the need for doing creational duty. Rāmānuja of course points out that this last limitation does not include the freed and the eternally free souls, who have no creational duties like the gods Brahmā, Rudra and others, whom he considers to be bound to do the duty of creation etc. *karma vaśyas*.

The second consideration to which the former leads is, if the individuals are such absolutely eternal entities and subjects of experience, being spiritual in nature possessing cognitive activity, what must be the nature of reality which they perceive from their own unique points of view? Should it not be

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*Svadharma*
identical for all? This means that there must be one identical object for all individuals.

In the Philosophy Of Nature we usually see this objective identity to rest in matter. This is the sensuous realm of our experience which despite the differences registered in individual experiences, forms the one identity of universe in which we do our work and strive to realise ends and purposes. This indeed is eternal in the sense that it is something into which we came in the particular form we have and have to accept it as having been existent from primordial time. But we have also seen that this changing universe is altering every instant though constant in its continuous nature as the cause of our sensations and as the field of our activities. It is true also that our consciousness is not able to penetrate into its inner nature through the senses, and is tempted to deny its reality, because it finds that according to its own canons it is pointing to an ordering person and governing intelligence not perceivable in it as such. This sense objectivity or externality is common to all thinking minds. The denial or the external reality of sensuous objects has resulted in positing all the properties that have been found in the object in the inner reality of the self. The positing has been facilitated by the phenomena of memory and creative constructive ability belonging to conscious persons as such. Thus solipsism came into being as a reaction, intellectual at first undoubtedly, against the sensuous erraticism of Nature. But no sooner than this inner objectivity of self posited imagination constructions of objects is accepted, despite the fact that without any prior cognition through senses no imaginative constructions are possible, then the need for discovering the basis for the reality of the identical
universe for all beings becomes imperative and urgent. This identity can then be established in two ways. Firstly, we can affirm that since the laws of thought are identical to all intelligences, the constructions made by individuals independently will ipso facto be identical. Thus there will be constructed through out only one universe of reason though the constructions may indeed be many. We will thus be presented with similar and almost identical schemes of universe constructed through the efforts of the most pure creative thought. The diversity of the universes then will only he numerical but not logical. The differences registered in these universes must then be referred to the practical purity of the constructing intelligences and not to the Intelligence itself. The second view is, that all these intelligences are One only and the real objectivity of the Universe lies in this Oneness of intelligence rather than in the supposed ‘anstossed’ oneness of the material universes of sense. In either case the Oneness of Intelligence is the truth of the objectivity and not the multitudinous individual selves nor yet the sense-world of diverse objects. The second view achieves both the abolition of the sense-world and the manyness of the individuals at one stroke and thus in a more radical doctrine than the former. But looked at carefully the first view also is capable of being logically reduced to the second by the application of the principle of indistinguishability.\(^1\)

\[\text{But this purely rationslised account of the objectivity cannot explain the dual objectivity experienced by the individual in regard to the life he leads. The objectivity of the}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1} Leibniz's principle of Identity of indiscernables}}\]
sense-world, in general nature, is the externality, or otherwise, restrictive of the individual’s movement and life, conditioning him to time, space, life and death perils.

The objectivity that the solipsist seeks to install is the inner creative constructive logical universal spirit which is transcendent to his own finite limited logical, private, reiterative, reproductive activity. This Objectivity is the principle of Spirit which we have to discover in our inner Being as the Lord and self of our own selves, the Infinite which sustains the finite natures, the Ruler Immortal ruling and leading the feeble and dependent existences to His owe Mansions of Light and Life and Glory imperishable. This too is the truth of existence, this too the goal to which all creation moves. But the objectivity of this Spirit is indeed different in kind from the objectivity of the Nature that we apprehend through our senses. Both are true. Whilst the material world which is objective is a principle of externality, the inner transcendent Spirit is objective but is a principle which includes the souls in itself and thus is not an other in the sense of the former.

The real objectivity which every individual grants to sense-perception is to be taken as fundamental to the question of existence of objects without our minds or individual beings, and in that sense common to all minds. The characteristics of colour and sound, touch; and taste, and smell are refunded to Matter (the primordial principle) by Sāmkhya, though in a real sense they are responses made by the sensible (sātvic) cognitive quality of the sense organs to the vital or motional and gross and obstructive qualities of the
elements of light, air, ether, water and earth. The conscious embodied being perceives everything through his consciousness in five ways and his experience is characterised by the objectivity revealed by the sensations. Even in the highest Yogic consciousness which is held to be due to over-wrought imagination the object appears in one of these five ways and cannot altogether annihilate the object. To say that these colours and other sensations are impediments to complete knowing or pure knowing is to declare firstly, that matter as such is unknowable, and secondly that matter is an obstruction to knowing in its capacity as the body of the psychological subject. To bring in the representationalist theory of knowledge is to drift into the view that knowledge is knowledge of mental states, that is of our responses alone, and therefore it is an affirmation of the impossibility of knowledge of any outer thing, and that finally leads to the denial of all existence. To claim that intelligence is capable of manifesting creative-activity which has got sensorial character as in hallucinations and the rest, is to give the case away, because nothing is created by the individual except what he has once observed or experienced. Surrealism is not idealism. The individual gives unity to these impressions in so far as his own reactions are concerned for it is the business of an efficient consciousness to apprehend the real in its own uniqueness and unity, which is diversified and received in a five fold manner by the senses. As such the function of the mind in perception apparently is to integrate the disintegrated sensations. This is helpful in one sense to the activity of the individual as he can contemplate the difference in the object by individuated reception, but the whole object cannot but be apprehended as the unity that is essentially is. This perception
of its unity through the integration of its own sensations in the order of existence is the activity which leaves abundant scope for illusory superimpositions. Thus whilst the senses might not be normally wrong, and the perception thus essentially true, the kalpana, the interpretation of the individual features received through senses makes error. All creativity of the individual is only a recreation of the object in new symbolic forms. Thus also is made possible the infinite capacity for the forms of nature to stand in symbolic relations with profoundest psychological truths or truths of spirit.

Matter or the matrix of objective sense data is to be admitted. This matter is not identical with the scientist's matter which is said to be the substrate of all things but which can never enter into experience. Of course modern theories of matter which consider that the ultimate Material substance is not the atom, are nebulous. But the conversion of tile impenetrable substance into mere waves of radiant character by modern Physics is not a success for the idealist with his hopes hitched on the materiality of Spirit or immateriality of matter. Śāmkhya Prakṛti is the principle of objective experience of matter and it is the completest account of the psychophysics of objectivity. The self is that which perceives it directly without the help of senses. Organs which indeed come into existence only after it has been known. In some sense the direct perception of the object is fundamental to the process of evolution of matter itself. It appears correctly as the basis of activity, for Prakṛti means the beginning of activity. The Mahat or objective intellect is itself the first fruit of the practical tendency. The egoistic self affirmation of independent existence (as distinct from its status as dependent on the,
Supreme Spirit which is its svarūpa, intrinsic nature or quality), is also the second fruit. The cognition of object for the purpose of instinctive grasping and possession, implicit in the egoistic self-assertion, ahamkāra, which seeks to sway and rule and grow mighty-God Almighty one might even say¹- and the chitta or manas memory functions as the nucleus of this integration of knowledge in the interest of practical grasping, kāmyakarma, are the third stage of evolution. The senses also diversify themselves in the interests of selection of objects in the same manner. The functions of knowledge or cognition are secondary in this evolution and growth and manifestation. That is why it is affirmed that it is impossible to utilize these instruments of action, though at least some of these euphemistically are called jñanendriyas organs of cognition.

II

Brahman, the Śarīrī

We do not find consciousness anywhere else than in a body, though this consciousness be the most limited as in the case of the human or fully expanded as in the avatāras, the descents of the Lord as witnessed to in all religious literature, be it Hindu or Buddhist or the Christian. It is in a body, at least

¹ According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita it is not ignorance that is our difficulty but the ignorance that we are independent that is the source of all our miseries. Svatāntnātma-bhrama is the foundation of all other kinds of illusion. Once this is reversed, the instruments of action and even pseudoaction and cognition undergo a transformation and become implements of knowledge and not of selfish action. It is this reversal of the first causal ignorance that is absolutely necessary and is the greatest sacrifice.
as the locus or occasion, that the consciousness ever manifests or is active either in reception or creation. The self is aware of his own body directly, introspectively, as dependent on him for its existence, action, enjoyment as a body amongst other objects. Thus an objective and a subjective relationship are available in respect of one's own body. The individual is capable of creating certain things of having certain transactions with the physical world according to the body. But, find that it is very little and so trifling, that it can never explain how we can ever consider the entire reality or physical world which is space-time configuration (continuum) to have a subject who can hold it as its object. Nothing in this world has value apart from being an object of some kind (subject). In fact, we are considering a question of metaphysical value when we put the question in the same manner as Berkeley did, that it is inconceivable how anything could exist unperceived? But with a difference that anything that can be known must be capable of being an object to a mind, subjectively or objectively or subjectively-objectively, as śarīra-śarīrī. Since the total world of physical reality can never be apprehended fully but only partially by the several selves which are finite, it raises the question of a Mind or Self which can be the Absolute Subject of the totality of the objects. We have already said that to the real Infinite. The manifold universe or multiplicity is a finite number capable of being apprehended by Him. The antinomy between finite and infinite is possible only as between the terms conceived as quantitative, and not when the Infinite bears other qualities which are definitely distinguishing it from the finite.
BRAHMAN – THE HIGHEST OF UNITY

Further the necessity for the existence of the infinite Spirit is necessitated by the fact of the independence of ideas and objects cannot be created by the individual souls at all. It is one of the convictions of Sri Rāmānuja that consciousness of the finites in their stage of ignorant beings or bound souls, cannot create anything, as their power of true creation is almost nil. Thus dreams too are not the creations of the individual souls. They are the fruits of the karma of the individuals dispensed by the Lord, who is the Lord of all karma, karmādhyākṣa. Thus the subjectivity of the ideas even cannot be claimed by them, whilst they themselves will be capable of asserting that all ideas and things are objective but only in relative degrees. Thus whilst the subjective idealist, conscious of his or oblivious of his limitations asserts that all things are relatively subjective, the realist will assert that in view of the independence of the objects and the consciousness of the limitation on the part of the souls, there is only objectivity. Mental states are as much objective as tile objects of the outer universe are, since they appear to he independent of the individual’s wishes. This is a truth which Sāmkhya philosophy and Yoga have most clearly shown. To seek the aid of the Supreme Spirit to resolve the pathetic dilemma of the solipsist is not a, new one. It has been always the refuge of great epistemologists. Berkeley affirmed the existence of the Supreme Mind or Spirit or God as the necessary being who alone can vouch safe the objective independence of objects which he with ruthless analysis had deprived them of. The consolation was that they existed in tile Mind, and that did keep up the pretence of logicality even when logic was overthrown. Creativity of all things is possible only to the Divine. But does creativity entail the existence of these
creations in and through the Mind, or can it also mean the
dependent existence of all things, apparently held to be
independent, on the Supreme Self?

Rāmānuja at first view, like every theist, may be said to
hold views somewhat like Berkeley, without his solipsism, but
on closer inspection we find that he is not prepared to make
Prakṛti, the matrix of the physical world, a creation of God,
though he is anxious to make it not independent of God but
absolutely dependent on God. It is that which he has
established as real and remains real from years sempiternal.
The creationistic view is many times an interesting view in so
far as it seems to assure us with a monistic view. Then
everything becomes the stuff of God's will, perhaps an
emanation of the self-same Being, but it can never explain how
Matter, the substance of Nature, the inert substance can ever
come into existence out of Spirit. It is one thing to say that
unintelligence comes out of intelligence, quite another to say
that Intelligence controls and sustains and enjoys the
unintelligent. If this later relationship is realized in a, permanent
manner, than the chances in Matter can occur easily under the
central of the intelligent Self. Then creation will mean nothing
more than bringing about willed changes, forms of beauty and
delight, in the material foundation of Prakṛti which is utterly
dependent on the Supreme Brahman. Thus creation cannot
mean the creation out of nothing or creation from His own
Being, but the purposive bringing about of changes in Matter
which is His body. The purpose is not something like the
desire to gain or achieve anything that He lacks, but to enjoy
delight of manifestation of Grace towards the souls which too
are His body. It is for the pure enjoyment of self-delight that
the Supreme Lord wills the changes and manifestations. Thus Matter is not created nor are the souls created\(^1\) but the processes of creation as well its destruction\(^2\) are willed by the Divine Lord. The Lord then is the indwelling Self of all phenomena in so far as He it is who wills all the changes of creation or birth and death as also persistence without dependence on Him nothing can exist, can ever be.

Thus Sri Rāmānuja perceives that the true interrelation between uncreated things, namely the finites which are distinct in kind from the Divine, though they possess some likenesses like intelligence etc., and the uncreated Matter which is distinct and capable of changes in form as well as in nature, the unmanifest \textit{avyakta}, is fundamentally one of \textit{functional} dependence on the Supreme Spirit.

What is this dependence? It is not primarily a causal dependence but one of organic type. It is not like the ground and consequent relationship nor is it capable of being likened to the substance and quality even in the sense of rose colour bearing an inseparable relation to the flower rose. It is not a \textit{samavāya} relationship. This is of the organic type. The terms are apparently of the most distinctive kinds. Yet they are united, in some peculiar relation of dependence on the Supreme Mind or Personality. It is a personality because it not only supports, it controls and enjoys them for its own supreme purposes. This is what we know to be the characteristic relation of a body to the soul. But the relationship between the

\(^1\) Śrī Bhāṣya: II.ii.39 \textit{Utpattyasambhavāt}

\(^2\) Śrī Bhāṣya: I.i.2. \textit{Janmādyasya yatañāḥ}
souls and their bodies in not so simple as all that, since our souls are not absolutely masters of their own bodies, and secondly, the death of the body should mean the death of the soul also if inseparability be affirmed between the body and the soul. This difficulty is serious. But as can be seen it is not necessary and it is not conceded by Rāmānuja that the body we have are ours absolutely. It is yet on the analogy of the body to the soul that the organic relationship of dependence is being sought to be affirmed. God alone is the absolute self of all, who supports all forms of Matter, its unmanifest nature and its mutable existences, for He it is who destines their changes and transformations and as such is their master. The individual souls tenant bodies and are limited by them and on these bodies ceasing, the souls have to wander in search of others determined by their previous karmas. Dependant, existence cannot determine their own future or their existence. The finite souls though possessed of knowledge activity are not capable of fullest power so long as they are bound to their own karma and ignorance. The purest body that one can get will be that which comes after strenuous askesis of jñāna, karma and bhakti. That even is given up for the super-material, sūdha-sattva body which results on liberation and physical death (videha-mukti). It is just possible then for the individual souls

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The evolution of the soul to its fullest sāmya with the Brahman can be likened to the progress of the caterpillar through its chrysalis(pupa) state to its Butterfly career. The jīva is bound in the first state for it is a unidimensional material creature, and in the second stage it arrives at the state of yoga or Samādhi. After bursting out of this self-constructed self denying shell, the jīva arrives at the state of freedom. Thus videhamukti has an analogy in biology. This, it may be remarked, is more true biologically than the Bhramara-Kīṭa-Nyāya.
to be lords of their bodies, but then they themselves would have realised that they are bodies of the Lord, in the significant sense of dependence, entire and complete, that there is no occasion to claim their super material body even as theirs.

From these it follows that since the relationship between the body and the self is not of the samavāya-type of the Naiyāyikas, but is a unique relationship of dependence that does not annul the dependent but sustains it, Rāmānuja’s aprathaksiddha śārīra-śārīrī relation of great importance as at once retaining the Unity of the three as well as affirming the distinctive features of each one of them. It is in the human organism that we for the first time come across the consciousness of the ownership of the body, and the enjoyability of the universe and also the independence-notion of the individual. It is in this same manner that we are forced to realize that this body is not ours, that we are not our own, that both the body as well as ourselves are dependent on the Supreme Lord, who enjoys and supports and orders it and us. That this interpretation of the relationship between the individuals and matter and God is of greatest importance to philosophic understanding need not be gainsaid. The unity herein brought into existence between the Divine and the human is of the essence of religious consciousness, and the mastery over Nature by God shows that this unity is also of the same order of dependence.
III

Brahman, a Person

The subject of knowledge is a personality. More so when the subject is the Supreme Infinite Being, and not less so as some contend. Further as we have shown this Supreme Infinite Being has the world and the souls as His bodies or rather body, and thus in one sense contains them within Himself and in another sense is their support indwelling them through His pervasive power and lordship\(^1\). They cannot support the Lord, on the contrary they are supported by the Lord. The individuals selves are in one sense objects of the Supreme Subject, who is the perceiver of all things in the world through His supreme sustaining vision. We have no reason to think that these selves (which are objects dependent on the Supreme Lord) would become unconscious entities like the physical objects, an objection that the māyā vāda brings forward by its proposition that to be an object is to be a material unconscious entity. But Rāmānuja says "We do not apprehend other selves as unconscious " nor is " the proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object tenable"\(^2\). Na cāṇyāviṣayatvenanubhūtitvam. Further, according to Common Sense, when we are speaking to one another, we have what is called inter-subjective intercourse, we do not treat others as mere objects subserving certain ends which do not belong to them or lie within them. All intercourse is possible only on one consideration, that the

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\(^1\) Īsā Up. I. Edited by the author and Dr. T. Tatacharya S.V.O.I. No 5
\(^2\) Śrī Bhāṣya I.i.1. anubhāvyatve ananubhūtitvam ityupahāsyam

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person to whom we are speaking is one who is as much an intelligent subject apprehending the meaning of what we are speaking. We do not start with animism and later relinquish it, as some thinkers seek to do. On the contrary, there is undoubtedly an effort and a natural one at that, to distinguish between the sensible and conscient and the non-conscient and to deal with them in two different ways, errors notwithstanding. We cannot allow the contention that consciousness by itself becomes unintelligent like the physical objects by becoming an object of another mind or when ensnared by another mind. What is possible is that in knowing, the other individual appears to be more a body, a thing in the physical order, just like any other physical object, but then, we also apprehend him as a self who has a body of his own on account, of the perception of movements and other activities which places us in the presence of an embodied being. The perception or knowledge of other minds proceeds on a two-fold basis, firstly because of the objective resemblances to our activities and appearances, and secondly due to the subjective direct apprehension of the souls or selves or minds other than our own.

It leads to a certain kind of absurdity when we claim that Brahman or the Highest Being can be the goal or object of our knowledge, for such an object would by the very fact of its being an object turn out to be an unconscious entity. This absurdity the subjectivist cannot overcome by suggesting that the object is in fact the Subject and that there can only be subjective subjects rather than objects in regard to the spirit. For it is not the Self of all, of me and am I not of It, according the famous formula of Soham asmi? The doctrine which seeks
to transfer the object to the subjective status through the principle of experience of Identity is not altogether as wrong if it did not tag on to this theory of conversion into subjectivity, the faulty doctrine of objective consciousness. No doubt in a cognitive situation on relation, the intelligent subject is the principal Being (relatively speaking) having functional importance as against the subject he cognizes. The subject can view it in all ways and thus his independence is not lost\(^1\), but the object appears to have almost fallen into the hands of the mind for it to be turned round in any way he likes, provided of course the object does not hit back nastily, teaching the subject that he is a limited consciousness and a powerless finite existence. But admitting even that the other self or embodied being is being perceived, it cannot be affirmed without being gravely challenged that the other self which is the object is not also functioning or that is functionally not cognizing the subject or some other object. In ordinary behaviour this is so real that the animated conversations and discussions and movements we make are not to be treated as mere unconscious movements, movements lacking coherence and intelligence and consciousness. It is a complete travesty of facts to say that to be an object is to be (or become!) unintelligent. That there may be some objects which are unintelligent, does not prove that all objects are such. The major fault of Māyāvāda and Advaita has been due to such facile universal propositions derived from a few fragmentary experiences. To build on such frail foundations a grand superstructure needs a profound optimism in oneself, and that

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\(^1\) Even this statement has to be modified for the subject almost loses itself in this object for He is attractive, as in the case of Māyā.
optimism manifests itself in the great but misunderstood doctrine of So'hamasmi. What is not possible to the soul when it is indeed God? Everything is possible and this creative fancy which converts the object of consciousness into an unconsciousness is one such. It would have been more right to claim that all objects become conscious by falling into the mouth of the omnivorous consciousness as indeed Berkeley and Bosanquet and others have sought to do. Indeed finally it is into this theory that Advaita lands itself by its omniscient universal declaration that All is Spirit, is Consciousness and nothing else, but this is in the transcendental sense. This is something that we may not admit at the peril of unintelligibility. Even the illusion cannot save itself, and thus we are left alone when all intelligibility, the one criterion of logical and philosophical thought, is thwarted and denied its rightful place in the scheme of metaphysics, not to speak of epistemology. Epistemology cannot have a place in that kind of idealistic thought that finally culminates in the affirmation of the mere subject, albeit a universal self. A dualistic epistemology can perhaps go with monistic metaphysics but there cannot be a monistic epistemology.

IV

Brahman, the Supreme Freedom

We thus find that our analysis of the nature of the supreme subject yields us an intelligent Personality, and Infinite Being, who is capable of sustaining and controlling and enjoying all things which are in one sense objects of His eternal vision, inseparably belonging to Him, and who in another sense is also their One Supreme Object, whom they, because of their
finiteness, cannot perceive through their senses and their mind even, but who can he seen only by the special divine vision that is the gift of the Divine Lord Himself alone.

We have seen that to exalt the human consciousness or consciousness to the status dor: stature of a substance or to make it a permanent function that cannot but be always active is to make the facts of cognitive relation absolute, as if other facts of the conative or the affective life are not available. If the Divine Lord can be presumed to create or to withdraw from all creation, to enjoy or not to enjoy, if freedom indeed is the foundational fact about the Divine Existence or Being, then the power to know or not to know, to experience or not to experience are equally fundamental facts of this freedom. Thus; the theory that consciousness is the Lord Himself, that at no time it was not in function, goes against the fundamental principle of freedom, and one is reduced to the position that consciousness is a function, inseparable and inalienable indeed, of a person who can cognize or not do so. Thus the characteristic nature of the Divine Lord or subject is Will, the Supreme Will which is freedom, infinite in its power and range and kind, which nothing can lessen or shroud. Ignorance is itself non-existent in that nature, though this ignorance is capable of being engendered by the very infinity of the power of the Divine Infinite in an organic manner. Thus Māyā is the power of the Lord, wonderful, supreme, infinite, deluding those who do not find their dependence nature, but liberating those who do.

The nature of the selves as intelligent, but not always conscious, leads to certain significant affirmations. The
individual selves always seek an universal content, even in the particular ambit of their being. But this universal knowledge is possible, according to Rāmānuja, only when the individuals become pure, which they do on attaining liberation from their karmic bodies. For it is their karma that limits, restricts, dwarfs, depraves, deludes and diminishes their knowledge. It is the root-cause of the ignorance. There is a finiteness in the souls, a fundamental finiteness, which is a truth of their being. Also there is a sense of finiteness, a sense of being bound which gnaws into the vitals of one's consciousness, making it imperative to struggle against it, a sense of imprisonment which contrasts itself; with- the- existence of liberated souls. Egoism is the result. And once this egoism is present, there is an easy transition to the feeling of infiniteness and independence, which are indeed far from the truth of the finite soul, much as certain types Of mysticism affirm the same- It is one thing then to be finial and quite another to feel bound. That they may coexist and in fact do coexist, is not proof enough for their being identical or necessary to one another. Religious consciousness affirms the necessity for the feeling of dependence on the Supreme Lord and the recognition of the finiteness of the individual even whilst it affirms the need to liberate oneself through the knowledge of God. Thus it is one thing to be finite, quite different to be liberated. These two co-exist in the liberated souls. The souls may be even divinised by the conscious (or super-conscious?) grace of the Lord; they may assume the form and body of the supermaterial nature, but they can never be more liberated than they are, that is they are related in the dependent-relation of body to the Divine. Liberation means the sense of fulness that comes to the individual in his perfected state of being. He becomes
conscious of the Infinite within him, around him, everywhere and for all time.

These liberated beings may have enjoyment in the fullest measure, an enjoyment which is of the nature of truest nature and being of the Divine, the fountain and ocean of Delight, into whom they merge and engage in varied types of relationships of which the human is aware, and even change their very natures so, but of that power of controlling and husbanding the Universe they verily have none.¹ That is the distinctive mark of the Lord and all the rest are dependent on, subordinate to, the Lord. If the power of entering into significant relation with even his own body is denied to the individual, how much more when the whole Nature is concerned and all other selves are concerned? Thus even from the stand point of epistemology the individual finite being can never realise the extension of its power to infinity. Rāmānuja however grants this infinity of knowledge to the individual souls; but certainly not the power of creation. The individual can enjoy without let or hindrance all the worlds of the Divine Manifestation as easily and fully as God Himself, both the unchanging and eternal nitya-vibhūti and the world of līla, (all worlds of the Divine jagatyām jagat of theĪśāvāsyopanisad, which the Lord manifests and controls and dwells in). The individual gains the fullest plentitude of auspicious existence. Freed from all karma he enjoys all the excellent characteristics of the Divine Lord Himself, except one, that is the power of creation of the worlds, of being the

¹ Śrī Bhāṣya IV.iv.17 ff. ugaḍvyāpāravājam prakaraṇād asannihitvāccha.
sarvādhāra, sarva-niyantr, sarveśa, sarvāšeśin.¹

It is true that the height of Philosophy is fully and completely reached when the individual can have the fullest and completest vision of reality as his goal or ideal.

This ideal is granted to the individual from the philosophical standpoint of knowledge but not on the plane of action. It may well be contended whether one can stop with this, short of completest identity with God? But then this is something that unfortunately is incapable of being realized. Our inmost religious consciousness and the experiences of mystics have borne witness to this lack on the part of the individual. In all things he becomes equal to the Divine, except for the lordship over creation and other cosmic processes. Thus whilst the height of metaphysical knowledge may be attained by the individual soul, it does not follow that it can have also the fullest power of pervasion and governance and enjoyment of all things. The doctrine of identity may be achieved and substantiated in the realm of knowledge, because of the doctrine of identity of indiscernables, but this certainly does not grant that the individual can ever become the Infinite Subject. What happens is that according to Rāmānuja, the

¹ Srī Bhāṣya IV.iv.20... apahatapāpmaṭvādis satya-sankalpatva patyanto guṇaganaḥ pratyagātmanaḥ svābhāvika evāvibhūtaḥ: Tathāpi tasya tathā vidhatvameva paramapurūṣasyaitannityatāḥ nityeṣṭatvānityatayā vartata iti na kaścid virodaḥ. Evameva parapmapuruṣabhogopakaranasya īlopakaranasya ca nityatatyā śāstrāvagatasya paramapurūṣasya nityeṣṭatvādeva tathā vasthānamastitī śāstrāda vagamyate. Ato muktasya satyasāṅkalpatvam parampurūṣasāmyam ca jagadvyāpāravārjam.
dharmabhūta jñāna, the functional consciousness, which had been in a contracted state during the soul's bondage, on liberation expands to its fullest ideal condition of universal expansion. That this expansion of its size so to speak, which makes it also move in all the worlds of God's creation with equal wisdom and enjoyment, unfettered by any limitation whatsoever, is what is possible to the liberated soul. Nothing more. In which case there may accrue liberty without power of the infinite kind, and enjoyment of all without obstruction and attachment, for it is attachment, which is consequent on the fear of going without it, that is the seed of all ignorance and egoistic grasping. Into this sense of fear of losing enjoyment the individual never falls once he has attained that fullest consciousness. There is no danger of a fall into the bond condition once the soul is liberated. This is the promise of Upanisadic thought and the Gītā.

V

Brahman as Siddhōpāya

We find that the totality of phenomena is capable of being the object of the Supreme Subject, but only partially of the individual selves which are in very limited degrees subjects. Though these individuals may achieve in their liberated condition, muktāvastha, a range of perception which includes the whole range of phenomena without exception yet they are incapable of being Supreme Subjects, because there is a difference in kind between that and this in other respects.¹

¹ This indeed is an important point. we may ask two questions (10 is the infinity of the dharma -bhūta-jñāna of the freed soul of the same intensity
The very nature of the world as an order, a rational and spatio-temporal and causal order, requires an explanation in terms of a Spirit or Self, and no cause except the Highest Intelligence can make the world truly objective to the individual souls. It is impossible to assert on the plane of pure reason whether or not the world is an effect. The cosmological, teleological and the ontological proofs given to substantiate the existence of God are all incapable of showing the creator to be like anything we conceive of. That is to say, these proofs prove nothing. The finite cannot create the infinite, nor can the infinite be known through the apparatus of our perceptions and inferences. Kant may be right in affirming that the casual law itself cannot be applied transcendentally since it leads to antinomies. The moral law and the religious intuitions alone can grant sanction to this existence of this Ideal Subject of all Experience, the creator, the true infinite.

We arrive at the conclusion that the relation between several selves may be regarded as eternal as well as external, because the subject object relation between them though not impossible is not fundamentally organic. Whereas the relation between the world and the Supreme Subject is an absolute relation of dependence of the former on the latter, the relation

and kind as the dharma bhūta jñāna of the Lord? For Rāmānuja there is no difference. We can legitimately say that there is sāmya, sa cānanyāya kalpate. (2) Is not the effort to tag on to the finite being an infinite range in consciousness one more attempt at reducing the difference between the Divine Lord and the finite soul? That is the meaning of parama sāmya.

Cf. Udayana’s arguments for the existence of God, are shown to be weak by Sri Rāmānuja and other under Sāstrayonitvādadhīkarana.
between the Supreme Subject and the finite selves is a relation of exquisite internality\(^1\), which is also of the nature of dependence on the part of the latter, but made possible by the intrinsic nature of knowledge which is the quality common to both the Supreme Brahman and the individual souls.

The view that it is this inner presence of the Brahman within the individual that has made it possible for him to be even a subject, is admittedly a facile explanation\(^2\); but as already shown there can be no abandonment of the reality of the individual selves by this speculative assertion that the Infinite itself is the conscious principle in each body, and that the individual souls are false because mere partial predicates of it.

The Divine Lord therefore is a real unity, indeed the only Unity who holds within Himself all the multiplicity of the selves in an integral harmonious union making them more and more perfect in the light of wisdom, making them grow into the knowledge of the true and the real, making them realize their moral worth and religious status. He is not the substance in the sense of Spinoza. He is the unity because of His supreme

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\(^1\) antar-bahiśca tatasvarvam vyāpya Nārāyaṇās stihitah.

\(^2\) Cf. The idealistic view of Hegel and Bosanquet and others who hold that the reality of anything is in some senses accepted by Rāmānuja, because everything has its self in that Brahman, and when we speak of ultimate things, it is to this Self of all, which is the support of all, that we refer and not to the finite being. But Rāmānuja rejects their theories which reduce the real finites, soul and things to mere adjectives or a collection of adjectives, finding their ground in Reality. The souls are substances dependent, even as modes are, on the infinite Brahman.
power of control and power of enjoyment and power of knowledge. His Infinity-unity supports all and therefore subsists all existence. The attributive theory of Spinoza also cannot avail here. The Supreme Brahman is not what appears to the individuals in or under the forms of the two attributes of thought and extension whose respective modes are ideas and things. On the contrary, the Infinite Being as Being is beyond the range of our normal perception, but He cannot be apprehended except through His Grace.

The highest unity is thus realized in the Supreme Person, or Individuality, through which everything lives and moves and grows. The finite existences have undoubtedly a reality of their own, not as pure parts, āmśas in the materialistic and fragmentary sense, but in the sense of being related as bodies of the Supreme. This conception entails the view of direct relationship with the supreme Person. It means that the world consists of souls which are individually bodies of the Supreme, in the sense that they are sustained, supported, governed and led to the fullest experience of Himself, through Himself. This view is not to be confused with the view of Hegel that "ultimate reality is not a mere system, made up of parts, but an all including individual, constituting its members', and in which "the Individual has an existence fundamental, logically prior, to that of the parts or of the members. It is not separate from them, but it is distinguishable from them. It is fundamental to the parts, though they are real, are not absolutely essential to it: it expresses itself in the parts instead of being made up of them." There is so much in the system of Hegel when realistically and pluralistically viewed that makes his thought fall into line with the religio-mystical philosophy of Monotheism,
but then there is not that galvanization of that System by Spirit which could make it real. The system of Rāmānuja because of its fundamental loyalty to the truth of religious and mystical consciousness affirms the Unique Personality of the Divine Lord, who is logically and metaphysically the true abode of all things, whilst He Himself is neither composed or made up of or constituted by the parts, or bodies or partial realities. The souls are not partial realities, they are wholly real. They are however not those which live independently. But if this be considered to be the mark of reality then we can say that the One Supreme existence of Brahman can safely be called the Real. But it is not so. The ordinary meaning that we grant to the word real cannot be denuded of its meaning. What can be done is that these reals can be shown to depend upon a higher real. Thus we are enabled to call the souls as satya, truth, and the Supreme Self as satyasya satya, truth of the true. Thus whilst dependence-relation may make a thing incomprehensible except through that on which it depends, and so on till we reach that; which is Truth that is independent of others, the reality or existentiality of these selves cannot be impugned. Nor could a contradiction be raised between existence as actual and reality as ideal Truth, the truth that is independent of every thing but on which all other truths depend. Rāmānuja's protest against idealism is not against the claim that all things are dependent on One Infinite Spirit, whatever be the material or spiritual character of these dependents, but only against the view that reality claims degrees. Once this claim is admitted, then it logically follows this Spirit is the only really Real, whereas the lowest term, namely, matter which is absolutely dependent on it, and the souls also, become absolutely false or illusory or appearances,
and between these two extremes we shall have to admit that there are any number of degrees of reality.

Evolving from the crude unconscious life of the atoms, plants and the animals, the individual who has been embodied in matter (which acts as the body or structure into which the individual is placed according to his karma), grows into the human nature aware of his being the master to a certain extent of the body which is perceived by him to be his, in so far as it bears a peculiar personal interest to him, and aware of the environment which he comes across and modifies according to his needs and aspirations through volitions which are dependent on the needs of the body and its continuance and perpetuation. From this level of conscious recognition of his own fundamental unity enriched by the complex structure of his experience, the individual looks far ahead to that grandest of all structures the final perfection which he recognizes to be only in the personality which is real, embracing all the lesser personalities, whilst granting them value and individuality. This is the promise of the Divine Birth in mystic consciousness, when the individual feels himself as one with the Divine or at one with the entire cosmos as in pantheistic mysticism. Mystico-religious man finding himself to be inseparable from the Divine Life and personality melts into it and losing himself in it, emerges from it transformed and sanctified and made holy, capable of viewing all things in supreme ecstasy of perception sub specie eternitatis, verily with divine eyes of immortal vision. Such is the transformation of the individual into true
personality. We might even say that there is an osmosis\(^1\) in the contact of the Divine with the individuals, and the equality is established by the Divine. Such an osmosis does not exclude the reality of the individuals by themselves who compose the organic whole of reality. The individual farms an integral significant amśa, portion of the Divine. The truest definition of an amśa is the definition which keeps the soul neither aloof nor isolated but keeps it inseparably and inalienably integrated with the whole, without making it lose its individual character and emotion. The character of the part might undergo modification in so far as it becomes conscious of its dependence on the central self of its existence, and almost wear even a diaphanous coat or body which makes one see it as if it is indistinguishable from the whole. It may even perceive its own unity to be firm and thorough, so that it cannot see itself as existent apart from it. But the germs of its particularity and amśatva remain.

To modify a relation or character is not the same thing as sublating of an unreality or as getting rid of its nature as individual. Individuality has been the locus of the constellation of relations and as such the faults of these are referred to it.

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\(^1\) Osmosis The phenomenon whereby water passes through a semi permeable membrane with a push. The membrane is permeable to the solvent(water) but not permeable to the dissolved substance. The pressure with which this push is achieved by the solvent is called the osmotic pressure. "The osmotic pressure is the excess of the pressure on the solution side of a semipermeable membrane over the pressure on the solvent side". J.W.Mellor: Modern Inorganic Chemistry p.207. It is the principle at work in living tissues also. Cf. Loeb's Mechanistic Conception of Life p.99
Just as in the ease of an organism, the mind does not sublate the body, so also sensation is not sublated by thought. It is improved by it. Thought enters into things and makes them rich with concreteness in meaning, whereas abstract thought is made rich with images and thus made concrete by sensation. Thus the unity of the two is the fullest realization. The individual souls are permeated by the Divine Lord through His will and are transformed and not sublated by Him. They too live in the light of the personality integrally united in the Consciousness of the Divine devoted to Him. They are enriched by the perfect consciousness of the Highest, made now central in them through His grace. Whilst all the imperfections are theirs all the richness is His. Thus we can almost affirm that the individual finity is so built in this manner that it acts as the semi-permeable membrane which permits the solvent, God's grace, freely to move into the individual consciousness, whilst the imperfections and other frailties are incapable of passing over into the broad expanse of delight of the Divine Personality. But when the conscious unity is established, we find that the pressure and infiltration of the supreme consciousness are indeed great, so that it profoundly alters the entire personality of the individual, so that even his body undergoes a transformation so to speak and becomes completely divinised and diaphanous. So much so, the Divine peers through the individual. The individual becomes the Bhāgavata, God-dwelt, God possessed, and utterly transformed being.

The Highest Unity is maintained and sustained and enforced by the Divine Consciousness of God alone, who is
the Supreme Personality.

Rāmānuja finds in the Highest Personality, Puruṣottama not only the ideal but the Actual. It is impossible to hold for a religious and mystical consciousness that the ideal that it has before it is something that is carved out by its own consciousness out of the stuff of its own reality, or by the ascesis of the votary or tapas created out of the bosom of its reality. Such a view is entirely at variance with the profoundest beliefs and realizations of all seers. It is true that in some schools of thought the claim is made that the Ruler Immortal within can through mantra and tantra be projected outside into an image properly and correctly made so as to be the object of savikalpaka dhyāna, or saguṇopāsana.

Though Rāmānuja confesses that he cannot, and in fact no one could, prove the actual existence of the puruṣottama with proofs drawn from perceptual and analogical sources, yet it is to the common and un-contradicted conviction and belief and realization of the seers of all ages and times that in the last resort we have to owe our allegiance; Ālvārs and Rśis have with one voice affirmed the greatness of the Supreme Puruṣottama, His reality and His actual presence in each and in all. The voice of such, firmness and certitude

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1 cf. Pluralist Philosophies: Jean Wahl p.45. "The God of allows individual consciousness to live beneath him or by his side. The widest circle contains all the rest and yet each circle is as it were self contained. The finite mind remains immanent in God though still an individuality and even when it appears as though absorbed by the supreme individuality, it still retains its personality. Does a visual sensation cease to be itself because it enters at the same time as the other sensations into our greater consciousness?"
cannot be dismissed lightly. The highest truth is the transcendent Personality of the Divine, not the impersonal which is transcendent to the senses; undoubtedly beyond our ken, He is yet the most gracious Lord who enters into relations with the humans who surrender themselves to His will and follow Him alone.

VI

Brahman the Puruṣottama

The conception of the Divine Puruṣottama we have arrived at shows that in Rāmānuja's conception the Personality of the Lord has a two-fold nature; one of which is manifested in a personal effulgent, auspicious and utterly transcendent body of light and truth and power immeasurable, qualified with the six transcendent qualities of jñāna, aiśvarya, śakti, tejas, vīrya and bala. "He possesses infinite measure of Knowledge (jñāna) and ānanda, and is bereft of all bad qualities: He is characterised by knowledge and power and unlimited auspicious qualities. He has a divine auspicious form and has as his bodies the eternal and play worlds.¹ The infinite Lord has infinite qualities but "amongst these the following six, knowledge, strength, lordship, courage, power and splendour (tejas) are apprehended by all as useful to meditation. Sauśilya, Vātsalya, Saulabhya, these too are inherent in the nature of the Īśvara.

¹ Rahasya-traya-sāra: Śrī Vedānta Deśika ch.IV (Arthapañcakam)
We find that the meaning of śarīra undergoes a wide amplification; the personal body of light and strength, blazing with effulgence, blinding and of terrific power all these indeed constitute His form. It is qualified all the same by the sweet presence which He has, easy of access, of love and beauty. The manifestations of his two-fold empires and the eternal world of freed, free and divine natures, and the world of the bond and struggling and the world of manifestation of His Grace, exist mainly for His delight, though the līlā-world is created for His pure play. This two-foldness is made possible because of the definition of body that he has given as the only perfect definition, namely that which a sentient soul is capable of supporting, controlling and enjoying for its own purposes absolutely is the body of that soul. Thus the unity of many bodies is possible only to a single Supreme Personality like the Puruṣottama. The aprākṛta non-material, non-insentient, body is possessed by the Lord at the same time as He possesses the material, prākṛtic body.

Rāmānuja fuses the reality of the physical continuum with the spiritual reality which is capable of holding it always in its consciousness, and is capable of sustaining it. The embodied self is a unity of concrete character or Nature, and the unity of matter and mind if available in an embodied self. The moot-problem for Modern Psychology has been how the body and soul could exist together if they are such different substances as idealistic metaphysics tries to make them. Either they are one and the same or owe their inter action to a common matrix, namely matter (as the behaviorists hold in the

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1 Examples of Saubhari and others are sometimes given as instances.
correct scientific manner) or *elan vital* (as vitalists like Bergson and his school hold), but none is prepared to accept the origination of these material things from one spirit. Idealism has to find a way out through the theory of *vivarta* or illusion to get at matter or apperentential matter, the unconsciousness. Rāmānuja finds that the derivative relation is not capable of making for any clear explanation. Between the Sylla of Māyāvada and the Charybdis of Materialism, he undertook to solve it by the theory of psycho-physical organism. There is no physical event that has not been ordained by a spirit or controlled or enjoyed by one such, and thus there are corresponding causal situations in mental and spiritual consciousness. This dependent and yet non derivative relation is fundamental to reality from the highest to the lowest. Such is the manner by which the psycho-physical interaction is explained. The only proof for the assertion is its actual availability in experience. Mind controls matter, enjoys it; and even as the pregnant truth of Sāmkhya lies in its affirmation that Prakṛti exists for the enjoyment of the Puruṣa, this is a metaphysical truth. Metaphysics does not sublate physics but makes physics possible.

Matter ranges from the most obstructive to the least obstructive. The more gross matter is, the less likely is it for any intelligence to shine through it or to enjoy it. Or rather the more necessary is it for the intelligence to be perfect in order to enable it to utilise or control matter. Thus we find that whilst great minds are enabled to snatch the ideal truths of essences

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1 Cf. Aristotle arranged all things between the two limits of pure Matter and pure Form.
and meanings end all that there is not in them that same capacity for controlling and subordinating matter. In other words, till a particular stage in evolution, we find that matter and mind are in inverse ratio to one another. But when creative activity begins to manifest, as indeed it does, when the intelligence possessing the knowledge of laws of nature and of the mathematical and physical order is able to apply them to the conditions of life, then we find that it is possible, nay necessary, to speak of the realization of the ideal truths in existence. This supreme capacity for creative activity is of course something dependent on the perfection of consciousness or rather independence of consciousness from the trammels of ignorance. It is likely that we have gradual liberation, liberation in certain directions more swiftly than in others and hence there results the manifestation of creative activity in certain directions and not in all directions. The supreme capacity for creation of course in that of God, so much so perfect subordination of the most recalcitrant form of matter is available to Him, and not to any individual soul of whatever height or perfection. Two theories are possible in this context. Either the souls may be presumed to act creatively having been ordered or willed by God, the most Perfect Being, or else that God, the indwelling Lord in all beings, Himself creates through the individual. A third possibility may yet be envisaged. It may be said that greatest creative artists are possessors of bodies and souls which are receptive of the light and truth of God in the most perfect and purest way possible. Without a body of some kind there is possible no activity of any kind. Pure Intelligence is merely a ghost floating or beating ineffectually its wings in the void. Mere matter can never be anything apart from the soul or intelligence that enlivens it.
God is the supreme Being, the most perfect and infinite Intelligence, possessing infinite auspicious qualities,¹ whose nature is different in certain respects, through not in all respects, from the individual souls. But who whilst He may manifest Himself like the finite, yet never ceases to be the Infinite Being He ever is, auspicious, perfect and supreme His body or śarīra or divine form, divya-mangala vigrāha is of light, supreme, transcendental, excellent and auspicious, in which the souls can seek and find refuge in meditation. This is His special form, His personal form of beneficent radiance and puissant effulgence, which seeing no one can ever seek to look at anything else. The other forms are of the cosmic and terrific kinds. The virātsvarūpa described in the great Puruṣa-sūkta and the Bhagavat Gītā and that which Hiranyakaśipu in the story of Prahlāda saw just before he was killed are instances of these kinds. To say that God has no form only means that He is not having a form that limits Him; He is transcendent to all material forms. To say that God does not have a body, akāyam, only means that He has no body which is a result of karma. He has a body which is assumed by Him out of His own free Will for the sake of His līlā.

Each individual soul wears a body which is useful to it far the service of the Divine Lard. Every² soul is embodied,

¹ Cf Gadya-traya of Rāmānuja
² See however Śrī Bhāṣya IV.iv.10-14 (Abhāvādhikārana). In discussing the subject whether souls when freed have bodies or not. Bādarāyaṇa holds that the freed souls elect to have or not to have śuddha sattva bodies Bādari’s view is that the souls have no bodies, whereas Jaimini holds that they have bodies. Sri Venkatanatha in his Virodhaparīhāra a rahasya work in para 78 discusses the point and says that their
whether it be a body of karma or of śuddha sattva, pure super-matter: in pralaya, deluge, due to God's will, the bound souls, even like matter, lie strewn incapable of functioning because their consciousness-function is completely contracted and their karma-bodies are in a very subtle state. This state undoubtedly is the most pitiable, but necessitated by the foolish prostitution of functions by the souls. The most important function of the individual is indeed the function of dependence on the Lord for knowledge, growth, action, and enjoyment. It is manifested through service, kainkarya to God. It is not merely the possession of consciousness-activity of cognition that is important but also kainkarya, service to the Divine who is all.

It is the realization of ecstatic dependence on the Supreme, a trustful surrender to God that makes the cognitive situation pass over into the affective situation. It is not ultimately the cognitive that is soothingly to the human consciousness. It is the sense of Joy, of Delight of living under the sign and experience of the highest knowledge and God that matters. It is true to say that knowledge is very important, but what is this knowledge that is true and shall be true forever regarding the Highest Object of our knowledge, namely the Real, Absolute Being? The several individuals draw their life and light and being from its central relationship. The two-fold relation between these two can be expressed adequately only by saying that the Real is the Independent, which means that

possession of even the śuddha sattva bodies depend on the will and pleasure of the lord.

1 According to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika the souls during pralaya being divorced from activity and matter, lie strewn like stones, paśānavāt.
all are dependent on Him, and secondly, that all these dependents can realize or achieve that knowledge and enjoy their unity with Him. Thus the chief characteristic of the Absolute Personality or God is independence which sustains and improves the dependence of all souls on Him absolutely, whilst the chief characteristic of the individual souls lies in their utter and complete dependence on that One supreme Independent Personality alone. It is this mystic philosophy or more appropriately the religious philosophy, that makes it possible for the realization of knowledge in love, in that utter or complete consecrated love, whose concentrated movement is towards the central sun of its existence. The unity thus realized is sneha-bhāva; it is the central fact about the identity claimed and affirmed between the supreme and the individual. An identity which is not mere identity, since it reveals the relation of the conjointment between the Independent and dependent in the fullest embrace as śarīra- śarīri, dharma-dharmi, šeṣa-šeṣi.

Thus we find that the supreme cognitive situation between subject and object finally lead not to the superiority of the subject over the Object when that object is something conscient and independent, as in the case of God or total Nature, but to the realization of the utter dependence of the individual on the Divine Object of his life, a realization that is not merely of his knowledge, but also of his love and being.

The Highest Unity is of the spirit which is Infinite, which is also the Infinite subject, which is embodied and not void of any body. With this difference, however, that whilst the continuum of the physical world is apprehended in fragments
and as ragged edges showing reference to beyond themselves thus making for confusion of sense-data and physical objects by the individuals, in this case, there is no such conclusion or partial apprehension but only total and pure apprehension or knowledge. Thus His body is what He apprehends as His own in the same sense in which we view our bodies as ours as being connected in a unique manner with us, as dependent upon us more than upon others, as subservient to our wishes and desires and enjoyments than to others, as being a glory to our being as our expression and wealth. Our selves also bear the same relation to the Highest intelligence because we are equally dependent upon Him, subservient to Him and are guided by Him in our lives and actions. We are the bodies of the Lord. Every one of us is unique and yet every one of us lives and moves and has his being in Him who pervades all and is the source and goal, alpha and omega of existence who is the Ideal Being immanent and real in each and in all beings at once and for all time, without whom we cannot even exist.

Just as the ocean is composed of small drops of water, wherein each drop is in itself and yet finds itself in the ocean enveloped all round so as to be indistinguishable in it, so also every individual finds his own fulfillment in this great envelopment of himself in the Divine, inside and outside his being. This is the supreme union and glory and freedom. The complete pervasion by Divine consciousness is the summit of our fullness.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the highest unity is had in a real embodied person in so far as he holds the entire universe or reality in a subordinate relation absolutely and eternally. He is Spiritual and Infinite and Perfect.

The individual souls who are parts of the universe, though spiritual are units or monads within the Highest Object and thus form parts of His body, or if we may say form integral portions of that whole One. The Lord is the One supreme Subject, and Person, Puruṣottama, distinguished alike from the souls as partial subjects of experience, and from the world of matter, which is the pure or mere object in the epistemological sense. Through His unlimitedness and uniqueness of being he holds all the worlds as His possession, which He supports and pervades and manifests and enjoys. All relations are sustained by His love, which is the only power that is capable of being at the same time freedom.

There is no reason to suspect that this fundamental relation with the Highest Subject involves the lesser subjects in any imperfection. Imperfection is not entailed by dependence or subordination to the Highest. It is incident only on the involvement of the individual in his own egoism and in the world which he seeks to possess and enjoy as his own possession. Nor can it be said that the lesser subjects, being many and not unique in their activities, became inanimate
objects or things. Nor can it be said that these individual souls because of their spiritual nature could be dissolved into a vast ocean of Consciousness. The drops of the Ocean cannot be annulled even by the greatness of Ocean; the rays of light cannot be absorbed in the glare of their source; the parts cannot be surrendered even in the fullest presentation of the whole. The whole is a whole of parts, and this whole must be considered to be the body (śarīra) of the Lord in the very same sense in which we claim our body to be ours. The doctrine which makes God, a whole of parts, even like the Absolute of Western Idealism, is wrong since it is essentially a mechanical or pseudo-organic conception. Idealists labouring under the mistaken dualism of mind and body hope to resolve the world into mere foci of consciousness or souls fulgurated from a central source of light and spirituality, and seek to explain the souls as parts of one whole. The logical interrelation of these parts with the whole leads to that telescoping of all individuals into the bosom of the Absolute which now presents the spectacle of a metaphysical continent. It is impossible to grant this construction of an Absolute any life or movement or value since the Spirit is not traceable anywhere in it. It is just the body of the Lord that has been traced not the nature of the Absolute reality, the Spirit that sustains the interrelations of the Nature. There is thus presented the necessity of going ahead of the theist and the pantheist and of affirming that the Absolute of the metaphysical epistemology is just the Nature of Spinoza, for Rāmānuja's śarīra cannot exist apart from the śarīrin, the Lord and Supreme Person who realizes therein the supreme values of Truth and Goodness and Beauty, Auspiciousness and Supreme Freedom through Love. Instead of making the Absolute the complete and self-fulfilling and self-
fulfilling Existence of Ideal, it becomes necessary to make the Puruṣottama greater than the Akṣara, the immutable, and not, as the idealists contend, make God, less than the Absolute.

Thus it becomes possible to build up a clear and consistent philosophy of Religion on the basis of this organisomatic theory. Life instead of being depleted of all content and reality becomes restored to value and vitality and morality and realisation of beauty. Instead of having to reverse our conduct and deepest intuitions and criteria of reality and worth, we are promised here a great and intimate experience of God through the realization of our dependence on Him. Not experience merely of God but also abiding relationship, not merely the cognition or knowledge of all reality but also the deep elevating numinous consciousness rich with infinite radiance due to contact and co-existence and unity with the Divine Lord is the goal of human life. The Life of the individual becomes transformed and transfigured, and man achieves the Supreme Birth into the consciousness of that transfigured relationship of unity which emphasises without annihilating the nearness and fullness of the individual in his Self.

Rāmānuja is the first thinker of importance who laid stress on the relationship of body and soul as explaining the Unity-category. The unity category may manifest itself in various ways of identity, and identity and difference, but the truth about all types of Sāmānādhikaraṇya, co-ordination-relation is entirely the body-soul relation. Having accepted this relation of fundamental importance which saves the reality of things and facts and experiences there is no reason to expect that what is presented in consciousness to a subject is unreal.
On the other hand, reality is something that belongs to the Object also and cannot be referred to the subject alone, for it is the truth of the object that is in question not the subject's existence or experience. It is this reality of the object that is to be guaranteed by perception, inference and scripture (pramāṇāṇāi) and not the individual's existence. Further knowledge is the specific relation of cognition informing the subject about the object, and can never be divorced from its special function of intimating to its subject truth about the thing the subject has apprehended through its consciousness. Illusion is merely the wrong intimation due to defect in the subject, or object or in the medium itself. This has been discussed already under illusions of perception. The problem of illusion is the problem of how we are able to apprehend a thing other than what it is if we are unable to explain it we call it inexplicable, but not that it is ignorance that makes it inexplicable by over laying itself, or rather that the object itself is illusive ignorance. Such an anstossing of subjective ignorance to objective existence is a perverse way of going about explaining knowledge. Thus most kinds of idealism are not wrong in so far as they seek to affirm the transcendent reality of spirit or God, but wrong in the reasons they give. It was Bergson who wrote: "The truth is that there is one, and only one, method of refuting materialism: it is to show that matter is precisely what it appears to be."¹

There is no need to deny reality to matter and no need to convert it into a manifestation of spirit, or a perversion of spirit, or reversion or fulguration or emanation of spirit It is

¹ Matter and Memory, p.80
necessary however to point out that there is no inward occult power in it just as the materialists and carvākas claim, no inner power or vitality just as the vitalists and sāmkhyans claim for it, nor any other characteristics. Realism of the common-sense variety demands the acceptance of matter different in kind from Spirit. But then in regard to the problem of their actually available relation we have to state reasons that are acceptable. It is not a necessity of metaphysics to affirm that which is above the understanding of the common sense, or to discover ways and means of reducing the ordinary man's view to nullity and illusion. There is no such contradiction between physics and metaphysics as to make either metaphysics or physics impossible. All the same metaphysics shows that the fullest explanation of reality is discovered not only in the realm of ordinary experience but also in supra-physics supra-perceptual, supra-inferential reality of spirit. This level is the level of the Śabda, of scriptural testimony, which alone can give us knowledge of the Super-perceptual Divine Nature as also our own inward nature. That however does not entail the reduction of the perceptual and inferential and the ordinary man's world to illusion and ignorance. Rāmānuja thus finds it necessary to affirm the firmest and fundamental unity between the physical and the spiritual, between the world and God, souls and God, and nothing fulfils this realistic criterion of relationship better than the organic conception which is universally applicable on all planes.

Spirit is the Self, is master, enjoyer, destiner; matter is the body, is servant, enjoyed and destined and ordered. The souls too are subordinate, dependent absolutely on the Lord, existing for His enjoyment and service. Thus we find that
Rāmānuja does not make the world an object of illusion but an object of enjoyment and control and service to God.

It has been beautifully said that four persons went out on a walk to a garden. One gentleman said that the flower Rose was beautiful in form, another added that its smell was fragrant and another touching it said that it was wonderfully soft, and the fourth added that it has honey also within it. Thus each one of these later statements added to the richness of the experience. None of them contradicted the rest. Thus the reality of the integral Godhead involves the acceptance of the reality of every thing as related to Him integrally, that is organically as body to that Self. Multiplanal existence is God's, multidimensional is His Nature. The God of Religion is not the Absolute but more. He contains and manifests wonderous infinties and auspiciousnesess. He is the rich source of all bliss and fullness of perfection. From Him all freedom and creation, proceeds in the context of material and temporal existence. Reality is granted by Him to all, for without him nothing can even be.

Thus does metaphysics find its real basis in Religion. To Rāmānuja goes the credit of restoring Religion to its real status and revealing that the individual is not God or Brahman but that he belongs to Brahman and that he is dependent on Him alone. Rāmānuja restored to Vedānta its God, the Supreme Subject and Supreme Object of all knowledge and Love.
A CRITIQUE OF THE VISIŚTĀDVAITIC THEORY OF
PERCEPTION AND PERCEPTIVE ERROR

It is always requisite in correct knowledge to know how we know any object. The consensus of opinion with regard to this is that sensation (samvedanā) is possible only if there are objects, sense-organs and the perceiver who cognizes the object through his sense-organs. These three factors, then are the most important, as without the cognizer and his sense-organs, no object could ever be sensed, and without the sense-organs, it is impossible for any one to sense at all, lacking the instruments, so to speak cognition, and without the objects what one might perceive is certainly not a sensation, whatever else that-may be. These, then, are important, and no theory of perception can claim to have solved the problem of perception, if it did not take up the realistic aim of discovering these three factors. A metaphysical theory might, if so minded, claim that the one indubitable certainty about perception is the existence of the perceiver alone, or else might claim that the existence of the self or perceiver is only a reflective act due to the perception of the object experienced as that of subject. An empirical theory may claim to solve this quarrel by pointing out that both these, subject and object, fall within the sphere of consciousness, and as such both of them are but moments of consciousness. All these explanations, however, do not touch the core of the problem of perception at all or its reality and falsity.

In this context it is interesting to note that Professor George Santayana has luminously and with great philosophical insight stated the evolution of the error into its native truth. The
hidden truth is revealed as the emotion that gave the seal of error to it passes. "The error came from a wild belief about it; and the possibility of error came from a wild propensity to belief. Relieve now the pressure of that animal haste and that hungry presumption; the error is washed out of the illusion; it is no illusion now, but an idea. If you eliminate your anxiety, deceit itself becomes entertainment, and every illusion but so much added acquaintance with the realm of form..."

Truth must be self-consistent, and must be a proof of its own being. That is to say that, if we see truth, it must exhibit at once inner consistency and self-validity. It must fulfill the promises of its own being. In other words, even as the Buddhists, Jains and the pragmatist claim, the nature of truth is dynamic, and every truth exhibits purposiveness, which need not be specially that which pleases us or any one.

The nature of perception as a psychological process must be first understood. Indian thinkers hold generally that perception through senses (pratyakṣa) in due to the contact of sense-organs with the object. The process of this contact is not that the object stimulates the subjects sense-organs but that the subject's consciousness goes over to the object through the senses or rather through the instrumentality of the powers of the senses. For instance, the eye is the instrument of cognition of colours and forms, and it is claimed that the light-rays in the eye move to the object and apprehend the object,

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1 Scepticism and Animal Faith :p.304
2 Sākṣātkāri pramāṇa karaṇam pratyakṣam: Yatindramatadipika ed. Ādidevananda p.8
Indriyārthasannikarṣa janya jñāna pratyakṣam 1. Tarkasamgraha.
This a dynamic way of putting the case and is in consonance with the dynamic nature of psychology that has throughout characterized the Indian schools of thought. The importance of this contactual relation in any general explanation of perception and its validity can easily be understood, when we find that many theories have come into existence to explain the causes of error. Error in perception, or illusion, in effect that has to be reckoned with in our ordinary life. An escape from it is necessitated, because without correct knowledge there can possibly be no adequate action, not to speak of life itself. Our life is governed far the most part by the correctness of our perceptions: our inferences grow out of these perceptions; and indeed the discovery of the differences between one experience and another is the mainstay of civilized life.

What is it that the senses grasp when knowing an object in the manner we have stated above? Do the senses or rather the consciousness working through the instruments of sensation (jñānedriyas and manas) snatch the objects and bring back the impressions to the self, the substrate of the consciousness? Or does the consciousness in perception apprehend the object as having characteristics which are capable of being apprehended by the sense-organs? Whatever be the nature of the object as such whether it is a constellation of atoms or whirling wavicles the psychological fact of perception shows that these constellations of atoms or whirling wavicles, which are apprehended by us in perception, are found to possess the sensory characters that we receive from them. Therefore, we are forced to affirm, at the risk of being called naive, that the object's nature in fact has characteristics which are apprehended by us as sensory, and therefore we
can grant the same sense or sense-data to these features of the objects, provided it is clearly understood that these are not the mental ideas belonging to the subject, but rather belong to the object itself. Cognition or perception involves even in its most rudimentary phase, an act of holding together different views of the object gathered through the several senses. It is a process of separating distinguishing and comparing; and as such, errors are traceable in almost all cases to this discrimination of the several facts belonging to the object that is cognized. This view is accepted by Prof Dawes Hicks who finds that cognition does not mechanically piece up the several parts of the perceived content, and thus introduce an order that did not exist in the object, but it discovers the unity in it as belonging to it. It is only when, due to prior experience, we bring irrelevant or invalid comparisons that we commit error. But that error cannot be an error of perception, but only of the synthesizing activity by which we link up this particular experience with similar experience for the sake of our practical action, present or future.

As Prof. Stout states "The underlying principle is that physical facts are not separate and self-contained, but essentially incomplete parts of a whole within which each has its consequences and conditions more or less probable and sometimes practically certain. So far as what seems to be a physical fact in each of the several perceptions is a condition or consequent of what seems to be physical fact in the others, each being founded in its own immediate sense-experience, and so far relatively independent of others support and is

1 Cf. Hundred years of British Philosophy: Rudolf Metz. P 513

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supported by them. This is what is meant by saying, they cohere. Such coherence is the warrant for our ordinary confidence in the testimony of our senses.¹

Rightly does Prof. Stout point out also that "the sensory continuum of the individual is a partial extract from a world-continuum,........ in entire harmony with the seeming discontinuity between the immediate content of sense experience and the world of physical phenomena." Thus it is that we find that the difficulty of explaining the sense-impressions or percepts having sensory character apart from the object, is bridged by affirming that in perception, at any rate, we are aware of partial extracts from a world continuum, but due to its being extracted, so to speak, or delimited by the perceptual field from the world continuum, it does not lose its continuity with the entire world-continuum. Thus in perception we are aware of two things at once, namely, the sensum of the object as well as its "perceptual appearance ", which is its continuity with the world-continuum. The difficulty in this position is, that, it tries to explain the example of the car in water as bent by pointing out that though the sensum gives bentness to it, our perceptual appearance will dictate the belief that it is straight. Are we indeed aware of the two factors in perception? The belief that it is straight, a matter belonging to the realm of prior cognition that the car is straight, is a smṛti fact, and it is this that engenders the belief that the car is straight, and it is this that overrules the sensum ‘bentness’. Thus the account given by Prof. Stout, though valuable, has finally to explain the origin of the belief in the perceptual

¹ Mind and Matter Vol I. P.260
continuum, which is the physical aspect of the object, distinct in one sense, from the sensory aspect of it. It is criticising this view that Prof. A E. Taylor writes: "My difficulty is that (a) I cannot feel at all sure that, in the case supposed (the oar), there is anything at all which merely looks but is bent, and (b) that if there is something which is bent, when I try to say more precisely what this something can be, it always turns out to be a problematic something e.g. an image on the (retina) which is not sensed at all, since I certainly do not look at images on my retina—and is definitely physical and not mental.

Thus it is clear that in perception we have to accept that the perceived objects as a 'characterised that' which belongs definitely to the realm of the physical, and is physical. The perception is an experience of the embodied being belonging indeed to nature, and experiencing it. The sense impressions are indeed parts of the object and all that is being perceived is true. In one sense, we can go to the extent of saying that in perception we are in direct compresence with physical nature (sākṣātkāra) and what we sense is true and real. The facts of error or illusion must be discovered in almost all cases, in the nature of the object itself. This is what is meant by saying that it belongs to the physical order or continuum, or in one word Nature, despite what may be apprehended of it by the individuals. This is the central principle also of the Yathārthakhyāti of Rāmānuja, of Nāṭhamuni before him, and of Śrī Vedānta Deśika and other writers of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of thought.

That all knowledge is of the real is a general tenet of Prābhākaras, and this includes perceptual knowledge too. This
is what Rāmānuja points out as the view espoused by the knowers of the Veda -

Yathārtha sarvavijñāna iti vēda vida matam.।
śrutisṁrtibhyāḥ sarvasya sarvārtha manava pratītiḥ ॥ and following verses.

Yāmunācārya in his Ātma-siddhi writes that Nāthamuni, the first amongst the Acaryas of the Sri Vaiṣṇava School, held the Yathātha-khyāti view:

In the Nyāya pariśuddhi Sri Vedānta Deśika affirms that Nāthamuni and others held this view.

That this view is held and expounded by Śrī Nāthamuni in his Nyāya tattva also is stated by him in his Tattva muktākalāpa;

The criticism against a theory of this kind such as the yathārthakhyāti, wherein the illusory object, or rather the so-called object of illusory cognition (which is, by the way, a very misleading expression which predicates of the cognition itself falsity) that it has been accepted by all, in some sense, under the generous influence of memories or samskāras which unconsciously and instinctively encroach upon its' functions for the sake of practical activity. Further the theory cannot be accepted in the manner in which it has been stated by the Upanisadic theorists. The quintuplication of the primary elements as explaining the actual presence of all elements in all things, though in different proportions, may be or may not, be true. Aver that it is so, yet it is impossible to explain the formal
similarities which pertain to the genus characteristics, rather than to substantial characteristics. It is true that it is impossible to divorce the form from the matter in which it inheres, but our essential illusion is precisely when we do commit this divorce, and attribute the qualities that belong to a thing, to some thing else on the basis of the principle of accepted unity of quality with substrate. That is to say, on seeing a likeness of snake, we attribute to the substrate where it is perceived, the other qualities belonging to the snake over and above the actually perceived form. This is the principle of Anyathākhyātā', where in one thing appears as different from what it is. Critiques of illusion cannot and should not dismiss lightly this problem as a problem purely pertaining to the realm of sensory-illusion, and nothing more. The ultimate question has to be faced, and that is supposing we observe properly and investigate properly and experiment properly, what would be the causes, real and invariable, of the illusion which indeed has occurred? As Sri Vedānta Deśika' pointed out, we find that the Akhyāti theory, which holds that illusion is a matter referable to non-observation or non-discrimination between two perceptions (indeed one of the perceptions is not a perception at all but a recognition of a perception if not pure remembrance) is a very acceptable one, only because of its conforming to the principle of parsimony (lāghavam). But the Anyatā-khyāti theory, which indeed cannot but accept in some way the failure to discriminate in its theory of mal-observation or otherwise-cognition, is at once an efficient theory as well as conforming to the principle of parsimony (lāghiyasi'). Claims could be brought forward to show that one or other of these theories is

1 Nyāya-pariśuddhi: Sarve rūpyanyathakhyātīt dustyaḥ
more acceptable than the other, and we could indeed even accept the theory of indefinability of 'the object of illusory cognition'. It is, however, very clear that most Indian thinkers have not tried to enquire into the causes which have tended to bring about the illusion. The reference ultimately is to the object's nature, and this is certainly not answered by saying that the cognition of the previous snake is superimposed here, or that there are two cognitions, one of which happens to be only a real re-collection of a previous experience of real silver in a shop, which now interferes with the brilliance or tejas of the nacre, or that it is impossible to describe whether the thing, the snake taken as such is a real entity or an unreal entity, real because it has been experienced, unreal because it has been proved to be otherwise in action or thus sublated.

A correct understanding of the nature of the object is what is vouched by even error. Error indeed is the gateway to knowledge, because it draws our attention to certain features of the object which bears similarity to other previously experienced objects, though it is uniquely different. The doctrine of Yathārthakhyāti only points out that so far as our perceptual experience goes, it is impossible to explain away the differences or identities as false, for indeed they are not sublated. The rope can yet be utilised to frighten others in the twilight: the nacre can yet be palmed off, even as synthetic diamonds can be sold as diamonds. This is the essential point about the reality of the object, and obviously no mere perception can reveal the inner nature of the object.

An excellent survey of all the theories of error has been given in the Introduction to his edition of the Brahmāsiddhi by
Prof. Mahāmahopādhyāya S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, and this can be consulted. But whilst it is most excellently presented from the stand-point of Indian Schools, a constructive survey is yet a desideratum from the standpoint of philosophy which does not divorce the epistemological from the physical. Strict relevance in regard to perceptual theory which does not debunk any features of reality, however distressing this might be to settled convictions has always been the mark of progress.

Reality is said to be characterised by either eternity or persistency. Any inner contradiction in a thing due to its having parts will make continuity or persistency impossible, and therefore all things that have parts should be declared to be unreal. Under this principle all created things will become unreal. This war made the chief criticism by the Eleatics downwards to Bradley and other idealists, of all reality of change. As to eternity, shorn of all change, it would be just a self-evident and self-valid existence having what is known as internal coherence. But what about the ordinary things of life, which have no self-valid inner coherence? They have therefore to be treated as unreal. But these twin principles do not really explain the reality of change; and the reality of momentary states is the fundamental principle of Buddhism. So far as the problem of perception is concerned, we have to put to ourselves the question whether perception is a way to knowledge or is not? If it is a way to knowledge, then what it presents is real; if not, all that it presents will have to be deemed to be unreal and not merely a real overlain with unreality due to subjective ignorance. If it is objective ignorance that is said to delude, the uncovering of it will mean the more
and more clear understanding of the object's unity of characteristics, when in the specific characteristics may be said to have similarities in various degrees with other objects. The nature of the object is unique and it is this uniqueness that grants it the specific power to bring about results, or to cause anything, or to fulfil certain activities due to its relationship in the universe. Thus the practical efficacy or causal efficacy of objects is most important in determining once for all the reality of an object as an object amongst objects. It is this that is recognised in the schools of Cārvāka, Buddhist and Jain, Nyāya, Vaiśesika and Kumārila, and in Rāmānuja's school. Let me briefly refer to these theories.

The materialists (Cārvāka) hold that truth is available only through perception. It is the only source of knowledge for us. They do not admit that it is ever possible to have any other kind of knowledge, through any other medium. Reasoning cannot furnish truth, and inference has no place in the understanding of reality as an independent instrument of knowledge. It is clear from certain writings of the Cārvākas that they do not mean to accept inference at all.\(^1\) But the truth about the matter seems to be that they do not accept inference as an independent pramāṇa, source of right knowledge, for what it is dependent upon is the memory or impressions or perceptions of objects. It is true, of course, that since what we receive from sensations or perceptions are the material on which we act, and since these are of a transient nature, the Cārvāka cannot but finally deny the whole of reality. The intention of the Cārvāka thinker, on the other

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\(^1\) cf. Lokāyata-vāda-bhanga: Vedānta Desika: Trans., Dr.K.C.V
hand, seems to be, that despite himself, he was prepared to be inconsistent enough to say that there was a metaphysical possibility of the world consisting of four elements. Even here he holds that perception is all and is all-sufficient for our purposes. To go beyond the perceived is to land oneself in speculative fictions. Reasoning should confine itself to interpretation of sensations and nothing more. Once however this standpoint is taken, it is important to know as to whose perception is valid: whether it is one's own perception, or should we arrive at a consensus of opinion in this matter regarding the nature of the object? How can subjectivity of perception be overcome so as to yield the consensus of opinion which is a kind of objectivity? Cārvāka theorists only assert that all that one perceives is true for that individual, under the circumstances.

That which furthers or advances their pleasure is truth, and that which does not is false. Truth is the pleasant, is that which is adequate and easy of performance, and is that which does not cause sorrow or distress. Therefore an affective-criterion of truth and a frustration criterion of truth are given. The frustration-criterion, as I shall call it, really is a veiled pragmatic test of practical success or that which works, artha kriyākārita. It is what the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika system calls the extraneous or extrinsic test (paratah-pramāṇya). Whether it is necessary to consider this to be a test extraneous to the object's reality, is a matter very much under dispute as some

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1 The progress of the materialist school in the East, as in the West, has been mainly in the direction of scientific progress, despite all theocratic criticism.
hold that the object's reality includes its effective existence which can only be discovered in and through its reactions; The intention of an object is as much important as its actual state, and is part and parcel of the sensation itself. This theory then already envisages the need to study the purpose or dynamic quality of the object as already being given in the perception, though what is plainly sensed through the senses is just an integral portion, so to speak, of the object. it is not enough to affirm that an object is merely its sensed-content, for it is also a dynamic object in relation to the purposes and promises it enrolls in its being. This fact it is that is discovered in the illusion. Illusion is possible only because there has been non-discrimination of the pure sensation from the 'intention'; or rather, illusion occurs where-ever the intention has been affirmed of a thing which indeed does not possess this 'intent'. Illusions of perceptions, then, need not be purely sensory; and indeed the perception is, provided all things or factors are in a healthy condition, always true. What makes a true sensation false is not the sensation in its intrinsic nature, but the wrong 'intent' that we predicate of it. This wrong 'intent' is affirmed of it because of previous experience having gone along with similar sensations of such objects, and which are recalled through spontaneous memory (śmrṭi).

Thus the doctrine which affirms that all that is perceived is true or true existence or really existing, is correct. But it may be asked whether this 'intent ~ or dynamical possibility of the object sensed is not something that is perceived along with the object? Obviously not, since the sense organs relate themselves not to the inner dynamics of the object but only to the outer form and colour, and perhaps even location. The
object, unless it is related to some interest on the part of the individual, will remain opaque, so to speak, to the individual. But if it be an object related to some inner demand of the individual, for example, an instinct, then we find that the 'intention' of the object gets revealed in the reactions of the individual to it. But this 'intention' need not always be awaiting the need of the individual, and is certainly not dependent on it. For it is found that though it is exhibited to the individual only when it is presented to him, it is sought for and attained by the individual, and as such remains extrinsic to the individual, though more surely intrinsic to the object sensed. The materialist’s claim, then, that satisfaction or fulfillment of a demand is truth, is true not in respect of himself as he would like to have it but in respect of the object.¹

The difficulty in respect of the pure Yathārtha-khyāti theory is, that it holds that whatever is perceived is true not merely in the sense of actually existing as perceived as the sat-khyāti view that Jainism holds, but also in respect of substantial existence, that is to say, in the case of nacre and silver, the ‘silver-ness’ is said to be actually present in the nacre, but only in lesser quantity so as to be almost useless for the purpose of transaction in the monetary sense. The presence of snake in the rope is real in a substantial sense. This view is not likely to be accepted except to those who bank on the metaphysical theory of the Upaniṣads of Pañcīkaraṇa quintuplication of primary elements, wherein the gross elements are, each one of them, said to have all the


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other elements in them, but only in lesser degrees. Thus the Yathārtha-khyāti explains the illusion by saying that there is no illusion at all, but only wrong desire or some such mental factor which makes the percept ‘intend’, something it cannot fulfill. Thus the criterion in the Yathārtha khyāti vāda is the efficacy in actual experience - vyāvahara. Yathāvastita vyāvahārānuguṇa-jñānam pramā. "All knowledge is true in a sense that it has an object always corresponding to it", or what has been precisely described by Vedāntācārya that all cognitive characters (illusory or otherwise) universally refer to real objective entities as object of knowledge". The general maxim is that the idea which corresponds to any particular kind of behaviour is to be regarded as a true representation of the object experience in behavior-

Yatarthavya ānuguṇa ya dho sa Naya-Dyu-Maṇi

Thus the correspondence between the object ‘intended’ and the actual realization of that intention or causal efficacy, which, by the way, is to be recognized always as the Buddhists will put it, as ekārtha-kriyā-kāritva, cannot but be accepted as clear. This correspondence is not in any sense equivalent to the representationalistic theory which is impossible to sustain in the Sautrāntika system of the Buddhists and in the theories of Locke and Des Cartes.

Whether pragmatism of this kind is something to be refuted is an important point. It is, in the excellent words of Prof. A. N. Whitehead. "an appeal to the wide self-evidence".

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1 History of Indian Philosophy; S.N.Dasgupta, Vol III. p.246
2 Ibid. p.244
"Pragmatism is simply an appeal to that self-evidence which sustains itself in civilized experience"\(^1\). It is not an extraneous test except that it is extraneous to the senses or rather this relevance or correspondence is of the practical order arising from the theoretical impression. In experience such a divorce between the practical and the theoretical cannot be sustained, for all knowledge is purposive; and action in turn, as even erroneous perception and erroneous action reveal, makes knowledge rich and effective. Such action is subordinate to knowledge, and therefore enriches it and becomes effective in conduct.

Truth is dynamic, because reality is dynamic, and the \textit{Yathārtha-khyāti} only reveals the inner necessity to accept the reality of all experience, so that we could disentangle the mis-relationships that happen due to a variety of cause, mainly pertaining to wrong intentions.

\(^1\) Modes of Thought; pp 144-5
A STUDY OF DREAMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SRĪ RĀMĀNUJA

Dream in the Veda

It has been said that much of what passes for Indian Psychology is speculative and mystical and not experimental; that it is, more often than not, primitive and anthropomorphic and superstitious. It is certainly true to say that more speculation in psychology, as in everything else, is false. The question is whether there could be any speculation apart from experience; though it is true to say that the experience that we start with should be first tested and carefully studied. The facts alone are the final arbiters of any theory, and no theory that does not stand the test of experience can be considered to be true at all. The experience that is the test of all truth, the vyavahāra that is the final arbiter of any knowledge, is not the uneducated statement but statement that has been made after due understanding of experience, carefully sifted and analysed and synthesized. Scientific observation, thus, is the essence of any theory. Indian Psychologies of Dream are prompted by the question regarding the autonomy of the psychical life. What is the special characteristic of dream-life? A question similar to this was addressed by Prof. Hollingworth to his study of the psychology of Thought from the stand-point of dream-life. This question is very significant, since it seeks to discover the special characteristic of dream-life. There are several views and no one formula seems to fit in with facts. in this paper, at the very start, let me dispel the illusion of one formula or explanation underlying most theories.
The Indian Psychology of Dreams naturally takes its start from the Vedic period. The first view that we glean regarding dreams is from the Rgveda. The dreams are manifestations of evil spirits, and they are said to be removed by the activity of spirits that dispense justice, of spirits of magic. The earnest devotee prays to Lord Varuna to protect him from the activities of evil spirits.

This is not the only view however. Dreams are said to be due to the manifold activities of the mind itself "Avaunt, thou master of mind, depart and vanish far away. Look on destruction far from hence. The live man's mind is manifold." (Rg veda X. 16.). The suggestion that mind has manifold functions that it executes in all states, is valuable psychological insight. But there is the fear of being under the influence of dreams. However pleasant in parts, they were deemed to be placing the individual under the influence of external forces. "Even if, O child of Heaven, it makes a garland or chain of gold, the whole bad dream, whatever it be, to Trito Āptya, we consign." (Rgveda VIII. 47.15). There is as yet not the consciousness that they are dream-creations of one's own making. It is just possible that such an idea did not find a place in their psychology. But that these dreams were held to be, in some sense, results of their own bad actions is clear, since the appeal is to the Lord of Rta, the Law-giver, and they also prayed to Him to transfer their evil dreams to those who

1 Yo me rājan yuyio vā sakhā vā, svapne bhayam bhīrave mahyamahā I
   Steno vā yo dipṣati no vṛko, tvam tasmād Varuṇa pāhyasmān II
   (Rg Veda II.28.10)

2 Apohi manasaspatepa krāma paraścara I
   Paro nirṛtyā cakṣva bahudhā jīvato manah II
deserve it, namely, the evil-doers.

This view finds full expression in the incantations of the Atharvaveda. Dreams are fashioned in sleep. Sleep thus becomes the embryo of dreams. It is the source, the yoni of all dreams. In other words, it is during the period of sleep, when all the senses are lulled, and when one is alone with one's psychic being, the buddhi or antahkarana, there happens the influences of other psychic forces. It is the influence of psychic forces that leads to dream-consciousness or experience. As the Atharva-veda says, it is then that there happens within the individual stimulations of the vital forces, the lair of the asuras, as the expressive phrase runs.

1. "Out of Yams's world best thou come hither: with mirth (?) dost thou, wise, make use of mortals; knowing, thou goest in alliance with the solitary one, fashioning sleep in the lair (yoni) of the Asura.

2. The all-vigorons bond saw thee in the beginning, in the one day before the birth of night; from thence, O sleep, didst thou come hither, hiding thy form from the physicians.

3. He of great kine (?) turned unto the gods away from the Asuras, seeking greatness; to that sleep the three-and-thirty ones, having attained the sky, imparted overlordship.

4. Not the Fathers, and not the gods, know it, whose murmur goes about within here; in Trita Aptya did the men, the Adityas taught by Varuṇa, set sleep.

5. Of whom the evil-doers shared the cruelty, the well
doers, by non-sleep, (shared) the pure (puṇya) lifetime,-thou reveal'st in the sky with the highest relative; then wast born out of the mind of the practising fervour.

6. We know all thine attendants (?) in front; we know O sleep, who is thine overruler here; protect us here with the glory of the glorious one; go thou away far off with poisons " (A. V. XIX. 56, trans. Whitney).

One fact that has to be noted is that the word svapna meant two things, the state of sleep as well as what it contains, the dreams. Therefore in the whole Hymn above quoted, we have to understand sleep in its two-fold connotations.

The first verse tells us that sleep which simulates death, is a creation of Yama, the lord of death, and fashions sleep in the places of action, that is, creates rest and stoppage of action.

The second verse shows that the nature of sleep and dream could not be discovered by the physicians, and though outer symptoms are lacking, yet there is full activity of the mind in dream-sleep.

The third verse takes us further into the nature of the dream-sleep. He, who is possessed of powers instead of using the exteriorly-turned waking forces and sense-organs, now began to use the Gods, the creative energies within, seeking greatness, being more than these. The power that made these dream-creations is something over and above the
psychic powers or forces interior to the individual.

The fourth verse describes the nature of the inward action of that Power that seeks greatness through them, about whom neither the fathers, nor the gods know. It is in the Trita Āptya, the men taught by Varuṇa, the lord of Rta, set sleep. This is indeed very abstruse since the Adityas as the shining ones taught by Varuṇa, are said to have placed sleep in Trita Āptya. The symbolism implicit in this species of Gods needs further elucidation. They belong to the level of the highest inner state of deep sleep, of suṣupti. The other term referring to the gods called Dvīta is related to the Trita god in some as yet un-understood symbolic manner.

The fifth verse is indeed very significant. The evil-doers were created to enjoy cruelty, and the well-doers the non-dream, and they reached the plane of consciousness which rightly belongs to the Highest. Such a highest state has occurred as a consequence of pure deeds and self control-practicing fervour means such self control and a life-time of puṇya.

The last verse clearly reveals that the over-ruler here is the Glorious one, the one who sought out the gods leaving the asuras, in order to manifest his Greatness.

The next hymn where there is reference to the dreams is a magician's incantation to make dreams trouble the mind of the God-reviler, the mocker, of one who is not of us that is to say who is our foe. Therein Sleep is described as the "embryo of the wives of the gods, instrument of Yama"! , the excellent
dreams being the progeny of the creative forces, namely, the gods. The evil dream is cast out and sent to those who are foes.

Embryo of the wives of the gods, instrument of Yama, excellent dream; evil (dream) that is mine, that do we send forth to him that hates us." (A.V. XIX. 57.3)~

The next verse that follows this is admittedly a difficult one for which Prot Whitney does not stand surety for correctness. His translation runs after amendments made by him thus:--

"Thee that are 'harsh' by name, mouth of the blackbird (śakuni)-- thee, O sleep, we thus know completely; do thou, O sleep, as a horse a halter, as a horse a girth, scatter him who is not of us, the God-reviler, the mocker."

The important part is 'the mouth of the blackbird krṣṇaśakuni'. The inner meaning of the blackbird is that it is a sign of omens too. The word śakunam indeed proves that the art of prediction took its cut from the signs of birds. The dark omen predicted by the dreams is a favourable interpretation of the passage. Further, sleep, like a horse that throws off its halter and releases itself from its girth, scatters the evil dreams. There is thus freedom granted to the dreamer to shake himself off from the limitations of his evil dreams and to enjoy good ones.

The fifth verse prays that the God-reviler, the mocker, one who is not of us, may wear the evil dreams, as if it were a necklace.
The last verse is again very abstruse and is a magical formula.

Our tentative study of the Vedic concept of sleep-dream shows that the distinctions between light sleep and deep sleep was made by the seers, and whilst deep sleep was almost like death, light sleep was the period of enjoyment of good and bad dreams. The creative power that works in dreams is the God's power, which seeks His greatness after abandoning the powers of Prāṇa or asura, and takes up the task of creating god-like creations in sleep. The magical formula in the fifty-seventh hymn of the Atharva-veda is the statement of the principle that Mantra can make the dreams pass over to others. But the power that must be made to do this is undoubtedly the Supreme Lord of Rta. He could be appealed to only through prayer and mantric incantation.

The human being is constantly under the control of the powers, external to him, internal to him and External experiences of objects as well as internal of the powers of the shining beings, ādityas, gods, manifested in dreams, are prophetic or pleasant, fear-striking and terrific and evil according to the Law of Varuṇa, who is the Moral Dispenser of Justice.

The psychological theory of dream gets an ethical justification here. There is realization of ends or the results of such desires as have been made in the waking state under the moral dispensation of the Lord. Moral causality thus is in the forefront. Secondly, the power of dream creation is relegated to the psychic powers independent of the individual. We are
here in the land of theocracy. The reason is not far to seek. It is because these thinkers found themselves helpless. They could not get their own wills to create what they wished for. The dream refused to fall into their scheme of what is good, and man experiences both evil and good dreams, despite of himself. If he were to be the creator he would never dream a bad dream at all, as his own prayer to Lord Varuṇa reveals. That no physician can cure the evil dreams, is another fact that makes him conceive of dreams, good as well as bad, as creations of forces other than himself. He is however aware that they come to him because of his evil mind and action, and prays therefore that in return to his being good, God would "scatter them to their foes, like the horse its halter, like the horse its girth."

The Dream-theory of Śrī Rāmānuja is almost similar to the view proponnded above.

II

Dream in the Upaniṣads

The above theory is accepted by the Upaniṣads, though, there is more elaboration. The question is whether it is the individual soul who creates, imagines, or God who creates through His greatness, mahima, His splendour and His justice.

In the upaniṣads we have many references to dreams. It is the stage known as the intermediate state. Sāndhyam trīyam svapnasthānam (Brh Up. IV. 3,). In this stage Yājñavalkya says there is self-projection.
"He projects for himself tanks, lotus-pools, streams, for he is the creator" (IV. 3. 10); "He makes many or God who creates is the stage known as forms for himself" (13); "He goes wherever he pleases" (12); "It is his private pleasure-ground" (14).

In the Chāndogyopanīṣad, (VIII. 10. 1.) it is mentioned that,

"He moves about happy in dream. He is the self. That is the Immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman."

In the praśnopanīṣad, (IV 5.) we have the statement that in dream or sleep God experiences greatness as we saw in Atharva-veda XIX. 56, 3.

There in sleep that God experiences greatness. Whatever object has been seen, he sees again, has been heard, he hears again. That which has been severally experienced in different places and regions, he severally experiences again and again. Both what has been seen and what has not been seen, both what has been heard and what has not been heard, both what has been experienced and what has not been experienced, both the real (sat) and the unreal (asat) he sees all. He sees it himself being all.

This passage is crucial in the explanation of the theory of self-projection and self-creativity. It promises to explain all dreams, as if they were representations or reproductions of objects of the waking-state in the state of sleep with such additions as will display its greatness. But the last sentence
clinches the whole description with the sentence "He sees it himself being all." This has more relevantly reference to the Supreme Being who is All, and not to one who imagines oneself to be god, and all. The explanation of the passage accordingly should be that though the imagery be those that have been once seen, heard and tasted and felt by the individual, their recurrences in his consciousness are nor by any means due to the activity of himself but due to the Divine Being, who is the Inner Ruler Immortal. The reality of the dream as well as its prognosticating or prophetic nature (non-existent or asat nature) are due to the will of the Lord, who is the Master of all Reality and Power of creative māyā. The Kaivalyopaniṣad says however that the good and evil enjoyment is due to the individual’s creation only, of his own world: Svapnesa jivaḥ sukhaduḥkhabhokta svamāyaya kalpitaviśavaloke....." (Kaivalya Up. 13).

But how could the individual create for himself anything so hopelessly miserable as these dreams, and then seek to transcend these by annihilating all? It may be that dreams of fear and evil are creations of ignorance. With an ignorance coupled with a state of utter loss of consciousness when one is helpless, call any one create anything? Some thinkers deem it possible, because, following the general principle enunciated by the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad, they refer the Taijas activity of the second plane to the individual soul and not to the universal Self. But such a reference, whilst, at first looks right and flattering to the individual, is not seen to be correct. The creators of dream, even according to modern psychologists, are not the individual’s imaginative wills but some force, described as Elan Vital, Unconscious, libido or some other
deep and primitive force that seeks to make man regress into animal life in dreams. This is not the individual's nature taken as such, but what in his biological adventure, he has gathered as the heritage of evolution, which it is his conscious aim to disgorge and transcend. Undoubtedly, this has its modern touch, the egoistic touch, but the explanations of the dreams, despite the fact that some dreams are explained by same recessive experiences or, by some deep and unexplained complexes and repressions, are on the whole as much speculative in their explanations as the ancient view that refers these to psychic forces or Force which is of the moral Lord-Self within the individual. Infinite capacity for a finite mind is the paradox that results from the theory which holds that dreams are individual self-creations.

The physiological aspect of dreams is dealt with in the minor upaniṣads. The Paingalopaniṣad says that the Svapna-state is that in which the senses are at rest, and wherein there is manifestation of the knower and the known along with the affinities of (things enjoyed in) the waking state: Kāraṇopame jāgrat-samskarārta-prabodhavad grāhya-grāhaka rūpasphuraṇam svapnavasthā bhavati. (II. 12.)

This clearly supports the view that the contents of the dream-experiences are sensory, and are nothing new because they are already experienced. But nonexperienced features or correlations or suggestions might crop up in the dreams. These must be conceived to be due to the power of the inward Ruler immortal, who dispenses moral deserts for each individual.
The Śārīrakopaniṣad lays stress on the fact that the senses, internal as well as external, are inactive, though the antahkāraṇa which consists of memory, affinities, selfness and buddhi, is active in dream-state: -

\[\text{Antahkaraṇa catuṣṭayaireva samyuktah svapnah(14)}\]

This does not conflict with the view already enunciated. Though the organism which is utilised in dream experiences is identical with that used during waking state, the spirit that uses it, is not the individual self but its Inner Lord, who is also the Lord of all souls, sarvaniyāntā.

The Śārvasāropaniṣad declares that in dream the ātman experiences subtly through the fourteen organs (the five organs of knowledge and the five motor organs and the four fold antahkāraṇa) associated with the affinities of the waking-condition, sound, and other objects which are of the form of affinities, created for the time being, even in the absence of (gross) sound and others: Tadvāsānāsahitaiś caturdaśa karaṇaiḥ sabdādyabhāve'pi vāsānāmayāñchabdā-din yadopalabhate tadātmanah svapnam (4)

This view is clearly understandable as granting a physio-logical basis for the sensory reproduction of past experiences.

The Varāhopaniṣad (ll. 61) declares that "The moving about of buddhi in the subtle nādis constitute the dreaming state. In me without the act of moving about, there is no dreaming.".
Śūkṣmanādiśu sañcāro buddeḥ svapnaḥ prajāyate
Sañcārarahite mayi svapno na vidyate

This is a description of dream, nor as the state of utter in action and fatigue or rest, but as a state of dynamic movement or exploratory activity of the self in its cognitive experience, namely, _buddhi_ exclusively.

The _Hamsopaniṣad_ says that the dream occurs when the jīva moves on the pericarp of the heart-lotus, and when it enters the centre of the lotus, then there is deep sleep. This merely substantiates the view that it is during the period of the soul’s moving out of its 'lair of deep sleep' that there happens dream. The intermediate state mentioned by the _Brhadāranyaka_ is recapitulated in terms of mystic description of the heart-lotus as the place of Īśvara, as is spoken of in the _Bhagavad gīta_.

The _Maitryopaniṣad_ propounds the view that "In the three a quarter of Brahma moves, a three quarter in the last. For the sake of experiencing the true and the false, the great Atman has a dual nature. Yea! the great Ātman has dual nature."

The _Maṇḍūkyya_ affirms the greatness of Brahman in the Svaṇa-state. The state is entirely subjective, but it is not the individual subject who is the creator. That function indeed belongs to the Supreme. For in this dream state there is duality of subject and object.

The _Kaṭopaniṣad_ states that "He who is awake in those
who sleep......That is the Bright, That is Brahman, That alone is Immortal. All worlds are contained in it and no one goes beyond:"

Ya yeṣa suptesu jāgarti kāmam kāmam puruṣo nirmimānah I
Tadeva śukram tadbrahma tadevāmṛtaam ucyate I
Tasmin lokāḥ śrītaḥ sarve tadu nātyeti kaścana! Etadvai tat.

This clinches the issue about the discussion between the individual and the Supreme Being as to who the creator is. As for the physiological state of the organism during sleep and the psychic apparatus in action during sleep and dream, there is nothing that prevents the individual experiencing directly the psychic external forces, and certainly there is nothing that prevents the individual soul from experiencing any experiences granted to it by its own inner and yet transcendent Ruler.

III

Dream in Śrī Rāmānuja's Philosophy

We shall see in the following pages that Śrī Rāmānuja holds the view that dream-state is a state intermediate, that it is the period of experiencing moral deserts, that the creations are by the Supreme Lord for the enjoyment of the individual soul as reward for such activities as are of minor importance, that it is that which leads to the deep sleep-state. The prophetic quality in dreams such as are mentioned in the Chāndogyapāniṣad is due to the characteristic activity of the Supreme."
The intermediate states is described by the Brhadaranyakonishad (IV. iii. 1) thus

"There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he creates chariots, horse and roads. There are no blessings, happiness, joys and so on. For he is the creator."

To whom does this power to create belong? The Vedanta sutra (III.ii.2) states the purvapaksa that the individual soul is the creator (III.ii.2.). The next sutra refutes it, and says that there dreams are due to Maya, are created by the Lord through His Maya. The supreme person, and not the individual soul, is the creator, for the individual is a creature and not a creator. He who is awake in those who sleep, He is the person who creates all. The dream is not illusory experience. It is a real experience, it has a meaning and an ethical purpose. The Maya 'transforms' the experiences and makes them more or less pleasing to the individual. This transformation is not wrought by ignorance but by intelligence that is just and good. The theory of Mahima, greatness, is identical with the theory propounded regarding Maya. It is the activity of the Supreme Lord through His creative power of great wonder and power. It is not an illusion-causing power, though such indeed may be the power of a blinding excellence and transcendent effect. It is a phrase that expresses wonder, aścaryavāci conveying the sense of imperiarpower. It is true that the individual might experience this Maya in a two-fold manner, one being an experience of wonder, and another of illusion.
Further the individual self being bound, cannot do anything. It is through his growing sense of intelligence that he could, in some measure, reach up to creativity, till finally, on release from his body as well as all material conceptions, he becomes, though not master of Māyā, at least capable of creating something by the grace of the Lord. It is fundamental to all creativity that he who creates must have divine intelligence. The unconscious can create nothing not even dreams. It is said that the slighted dream protests more vigorously than the objects of the waking-state, but at least in waking-state the individual is in exercise of his limited intelligence and consciousness, whereas in sleep he is unconscious. The dreams that occur to such an individual, according to Srii Rāmānuja, could only be there that the Lord wills him to experience through his own psychic apparatus (of which also He is the Lord). The individual’s capacity being utterly limited, and the dream-experiencer being avowedly far beyond his awakened and waking capacities, it is necessary to affirm that the Supreme Lord alone can grant him such visions. Therefore dreams partake of the quality of visions and not of hallucinations. This is a very important difference. That some of these experiences might be such that have been reviewed by the individual, or so made to be reviewed by the Lord, is due to the important moral appeal and retributive nature of those dreams. But there are dreams of prophetic quality, dreams such as almost any Hindu knows, and about which there is sufficient literature in almost all religions, which are said to convey the commands of God. The whole literature of Ājvārs is full of such experiences. It is true that these dreams require careful study. But one thing is certain, these dreams become true. Individual’s dreams can never have, despite
intense sañcalpa or volition or desire, this realising quality. As a matter of fact individual creative imagination has a de-realizing quality. That deep volitions could invade dreams is not unlikely, but that they should get realization is not due to intensity or to overtaking things by storm, but because their sources are adṛṣṭa, unknown, in the words of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika. If we ask what this unknown principle is, we find that it is a cloak to hide ignorance. Rightly Sri Rāmānuja says that the creator of reality being the Supreme Lord, the dream creations are creations of the Lord, granting pre-pleasure and hopes of realization. It is not wish-fulfillment, for indeed the individual soul is a beggar who wishes to ride. "That which depends on one's own wish can have no prophetic quality; and as ill-fortune is not desired, the dreamer would create for himself only such visions as would indicate good fortune. Hence, the creation which takes place in dreams can be the Lord's work only". (Śrī-Bhāsta III. ii. 6.) Svapnādhyāyāvidāsca svapnam śubhāśub ayossūcakam ācaksate. Śūcakatvam ca svasañkalpāyattasya nopapadyate; tathā ca śubhasyaṁiṣtat vācchubhasya sūcakameva śṛṣṭvā paśyet. Atah svapne śṛṣṭir; iśvareṇaiva kr̥ṭa.

Thus the arguments for the dreams being creations of the individual being baseless, since much of what an individual deems to he his imaginations come to him with an objectivity and reality and transcendence not traceable to him, though they are expressed or presented in terms that he could personally more than any other understand, the creative activity of the Lord through His Mirya is clearly determined. Further, the state of his psychic life during dreams, precludes his creatorship since he is more a receiver of impressions than
the maker of them. He might even be the hero, as he is intended to be, of his dreams, but that does not mean that he is the creator of himself. The d'ams have the nature of being the fruits of the individual's actious; they are the results of his karma in iris waking-state, the fruits that are daily dispensed, since they refer to minor deeds.

We can now sum up the Indian Dream psychology according to Sri Rāmānuja:

1. A finite, unintelligent or ignorant being, and asleep, can create nothing not even self-delusions and illusions. An infinite Being, absolutely intelligent and eternally awake, alone can create Reality that is Sat because it is cit and ānanda, the creative sign of Perfection and utter transcendence. (Tait-Up Ānadavallī). Reality is made or created by Īśvara only. None else except those whose intelligence is informed by the Lord and who have got rid of their material natures and bodies can ever create anything that is real.

2. In the universal function of creation as whole there is no place for the individual. (Srī-Bhāsya vol. 1. 2,) The self illusive power is one of ignorance. But it cannot be called creation or manifestation because its function is to hide, to veil, and not to manifest. The entire real creative activity, jagadvyāpāra is of the Lord: as it is in Prakṛti or Nature, so it is in the case of dreams, which are creations within the individual.

3. All dreams are real, because they are not
subjectively called by oneself. They have prophetic character as well as ethical justification. They evoke feelings of joy and sorrow and ecstasy and pleasure. Good dreams leave after-results of bodily fitness, whilst evil dreams leave one physically weak.

4. In so far as the individual becomes selfcontrolled and participates in the life of the Divine and leads a moral life of self-consecration and self-surrender to the Divine, he would get himself freed from evil dreams. And if his moral life increases in its intensity, the dreams themselves lead to real experiences. That is to say, the true dreams, dreams that are bridges to reality, occur. Such a man’s dreams become true. Mind becomes the bridge to the supreme consciousness. When the dream is said to happen at twilight, the sandhya, between the waking and the deep sleep, between the jāgrat and the susūpti, what is suggested is that it leads to the ultimate transcendence which is by way of making the consciousness in dream essentially receptive of the Divine Creative manifestation within oneself, a creative manifestation that is at once of joy and bliss, of reality, and prophetic of the future.

5. In the quiet recipient mind alone there happens, and can happen, true creation; it is then that it is the "pleasure ground" of the Lord. In that, Bliss is the Master. Dreams are true and objective and are essentially moral deserts of minor actions, good and bad.
This is the conclusion that Sri Rāmānuja arrives at. Without taking into consideration the mainly theological explanation of the dream-state given by Sri Rāmānuja and limiting our criticism to two fundamental postulates of the theory of dreams propounded by him, we find that:

(i) Not all dreams are of the prophetic type. It may be that the prophetic type of dream is the dream that would be really true and valuable for human conduct. It may be that we ought to demand of our dream-experience more and more conformity to this type. The fact that our normal experience does not conform to this one type is sufficient criticism against its complete acceptance.

(ii) The second type of dream is that of retributive nature. This retributive view might be held in one of two ways or even both, according to the intensity of conscience at work in dream-states.

Dreams might be reactions, terrific and explosive, of waking conscious behaviour, as in the case of Lady Macbeth, Richard III, or even as in so many cases of murderers, where sweet sleep refuses to come in to drown the impressions and leaves them in night-mares. The dream nightmares are sufficient punishments for misbehaviour. What hallucinations are to waking life, that is nightmare to the dream life.

That the reactions are certainly not the autonomous compensations of the nervous system or individual's conscience, is certain. Explanations are not wanting in referring this to the social 'super-ego', and other such mythical entities.
The *Karma* theory of retributive justice wherein there is not only a code of penalties for transgressions but also rewards for conformities and good behaviour, is capable of explaining the principle of retributive dream. The only rub is that the Dream penal Code is not available anywhere. We feel in our hearts the presence of the law. We perhaps have sufficient belief in God's justice and Goodness to feel that right shall have its rewards and wrongs their punishments; but the law of retributive action is the law that is beyond our understanding in so far as actual connections between punishments and their causes are concerned. The theory that general happiness and general deterioration of consciousness result from good or bad deeds is not acceptable at least in the sphere of dream interpretation.

Further, the moral theory of dream as deserts for minor mis-demeanours or good offices is quite welcome, only the language of recompense and retribution is speculative and appears to be unreal. It remains a mystery how *Caraka* was able to link up certain dreams with diseases of a particular kind and certain other dreams with successes and recovery. For that matter, the *Chāndogya*’s interpretation of dream of woman as meaning success is also inexplicable. Perhaps the only truth behind these is that these theories are due to the ‘consensus of opinion’ at that date. Varying cultural environments lead to varieties of interpretations.

The eloquent tribute that Prof. C. G. Jung pays to Indian psychological insight bears reproduction here. "Our western air of superiority in the presence of Indian Understanding- is a part of our essential barbarism, for which
any true perception of the quite extraordinary depth of those ideas and their amazing psychological accuracy is still but a remote possibility.\(^1\)

Despite this, it is clear that the distinction between the inner creative power of the Divine and the individual is not clearly marked out by these thinkers. At any rate, we find that the symbolism\(^2\) underlying the several interpretations leaves much scope for future research. The general principle that no creation of the real experience ever happens without real power or creative power endowed with intelligence is absolutely correct. Illusions might be created by individuals, due to their individual defects of the organism, excitement, or due to really existing similarities in the objects enjoyed. The hallucinatory theory of dreams is not warranted by facts of the normal order. To explain the normal by means of the abnormal is a modern hobby; but the normal is a more complex phenomenon than what the one-sided theories originating from the sphere of the abnormal make it out to be.

Even granting that some dreams are no better than illusions, we might say that the dreams are real, because they have real causes. Physical stimuli, psychological stimuli, moral causes, psychical influences in the receptive state of dream are real and do actually produce results. Dreams possess causes and have certain definite ends: either to be defensive mechanisms, or to be the moral fields realizing happiness or sorrow for the individual. Anything that has a cause and a

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\(^1\) Psychological Types P.262.  
\(^2\) C.G.Jung; Psychology and Alchemy
consequence or end is real. Dreams undoubtedly possess this characteristic. It may be contended that another criterion of reality might vitiate this view. But what else is the criterion of reality? It cannot be momentariness or non-eternity merely. Dreams are necessarily links between several planes of consciousness and possess diverse qualities or phenomena, namely, (1) facts of the presentative order, (2) of the representative order, (3) of the creative order and (4) of the physiological order. Therein lies the difficulty of giving a single interpretation for these phenomena. Sri Rāmānuja's view in so far as it focusses attention on the moral and the prophetic views, which clinch the issue between the individual and the Divine creationisms, is a contribution to the study of further possibilities of a truly creative consciousness. It is not ruled out certainly far an eternally vigilant consciousness, in its periods of intensive manifestation, to create for itself dreams, but then such a state might well cease to be a dream-state. The dream-state thus gets abolished finally.

IV

DREAM IN INDIAN MEDICAL SCHOOLS AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

So far I have shown that the theory of dreams of Sri Rāmānuja is an enlargement of the Vedic view. I shall now show that the theories put forward by the Indian physiological and medical schools converge towards the theory propounded already and also that modern theories are not so very advanced as they at first sight appear to be.
The nature of dreams generally has been studied, not from the standpoint of view of psychology, but mostly from the stand-point of the theory of knowledge in the several schools. The study of dreams, however, is necessarily a question not merely as to what they are as processes of the mind, but also as to what the contents of such experiences are. The physiological and medical school of Indian thought, as found in the writings of Caraka, definitely studies dreams from the stand-point of how and why dreams occur.

The "learned know that dreams are of seven kinds, namely, seen, heard, felt, desired, imagined, prognosticating, and faultborn." says Caraka\(^1\).

Thus the dreams are of sensory-kind, of volitional kind and of the imaginative kind, and in addition to these we have the pathological dreams\(^2\). There is the authority of Ribot\(^3\) that there are dreams wherein taste as well as smell predominate. We know from our experience that there are dreams which clearly are of the gustatorial kind, as well as of the olfactory. This theory corresponds with the view that there are types of men whose perception is naturally of any one of the five or six kinds of sensations, That is, there are people who see songs, taste songs or smell songs, just as there are people who hear

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\(^1\) Indriyasthāna V.42. cf.

\(^2\) W.Lotoslawski mentions another class of dreams in his *Pre Existence and Reincarnation* p.90. "Short of complete reminiscence, certain dreams may imply forgotten lives. Sometimes, people and places known from dreams are met later or in the waking state recognized."

\(^3\) *Psychology of Emotions* p.142
or taste or smell or feel a picture and so on. They are known as auditory, visual, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual types. Therefore it is, that some people have dreams wherein there are auditory or visual etc., images in prominence.¹

The sensory, the volitional, and the imaginary are normal dreams. The abnormal are the pathological and the prophetic dreams. The pathological state might itself be capable of being the seat of prognosis. Prophetic dreams occur under peculiar physiological conditions not usually normal. The pathogenic types are due to dissociations of memory, and physiological diseases. The prophetic types of dreams are indeed the most significant part of dream-life. No theory of dream is acceptable unless it could in some definite manner explain the prophetic dreams. Pathological dreams could be explained perhaps as due to the "interference of the nādis (nerves) that carry the impressions of the external objects to the sensorium or the mind by the three faults of wind, bile and phlegm." (Caraka). They may be due to the chief cause, as asserted by the modern thinkers and psycho-analysts who have revolutionized our ideas of dream life, namely, dissociation. This dissociation is a common enough phenomenon as William Brown has affirmed in his Science and personality, as could be seen in the very ordinary acts of classification and regulation of daily work. We dissociate as well as associate our experiences in order to establish order and efficiency in our life. Without some sort of planned grouping, it is impossible to be mentally or even physically

¹ It is also possible that people of any one of the above types might experience other types of imagery as compensations in dream state. That is one the reasons why dreams appear as uncommon and novel.
efficient. To emphasize dissociation and not to take into account association is wrong. What exactly happens in dreams is that some tendencies which are fundamental to life, like self-preservation and self-perpetuation which in waking as self and sex, have the power to attach consciousness appear themselves to their respective experiences of the waking-life and to appear always in that specific grouping. This is the association and the dissociation that happen in regard to specific interests. Thus attachment becomes more firm through exercise. Finally there is no life or being for the interest apart from its amplified experiences, nor for the experiencer apart from the nucleus of interest. This is the meaning of specificity in William McDougall’s phraseology, of instincts in animals, and of interests in humanbeings. This specificity is generally useful for the preservation of human life and action. Each of our actions is individual, that is, the end each seeks is different indeed from those of others,

But when is dissociation, or association its correlative, pathogenic? It is when there happens obstruction of a serious nature incapable of being faced by the individual that the dissociation which was helpful in organizing life, becomes a serious menace to the unity of the organism. The struggle for unity or for self it is that disjuncts interests, seeks reorganization of life’s several experiences on the basis of new wants and for the sake of meeting new situations. Either we plan our life afresh or we perish. When, however, it is found that the individual is incapable of making this adjustment of his mental life, by breaking the groupings in order to bring about a new order, there happens what is called mania (monoideism), melancholia and depressive insanity, hallucination and other
diseases. The source of this incapacity lies in the emotional life of the individual. Every instinct or interest has, as it were, a quantity of energy for its fulfilment. McDougall made this point rather clear when he said that every instinct has its specific emotion. When Professors James and Lange stated their much criticized, and perhaps even abandoned, theory of emotions, that we run and then are afraid,—the truth which they attempted to establish was that fear is the psychological state of the body, whereas its counterpart was the motor act of running away, that they are one and the same thing viewed, of course, from two not mutually irreconcilable standpoints. So we find that the energy of performance when impeded, finds its dissociation (or association) emphasized in the mental sphere. But as has been pointed out by Prof. Holiingrsworth, in his Psychology of Thought, this dissociation or association, which he calls 'redintegration', is not something exclusively of the dream-state. The very fact that such 'redintegrations' do normally occur even in the waking-state, where also the life-interests dominantly seek to play their roles and achieve or realize their goals, shows that the processes, said to be specially of the Unconscious, are not such. Of course, there is possible the explanation that what we knew of reality in the waking-state is just a segment, the central umbra of consciousness, the others shading off into the subconscious and the unconscious. Such indeed is the explanation of most of our biological theories. Consciousness is the smallest fragment of the Unconscious that has become conscious due to life-interests finding no other way of meeting new situations. Consciousness, it has been said by one great writer, is a

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* Studied via dream experiences.
consequence of interference, or rather it is consciousness of interference.

We shall not be able to canvas the above theories in all their details at this place. Suffice it to say, that the theory is not specially of the dream-consciousness. Because dream-consciousness is also a state of unconsciousness or an 'intermediate' stage between deep sleep and the waking, the theory of the so-called Unconscious cannot be said to avail. Further the Unconscious is not such an unconscious, because we know something about it. Obviously, that is the reason why the Unconscious is said to be dynamic Unconscious, that is, an Unconscious that is seeking to become conscious, an unintelligent that is seeking to become or parade as conscious intelligence. Indian thinkers have already come across a theory like this. It is not a new discovery. It is the prakṛti of Sāmkhya, the Māyā of Vedānta of Śaṅkara, the Ignorance of Buddhism.

The new point about this theory is that it speaks of the experiences of the past or the constellations of interests that have been in some manner relinquished in waking-life as undergoing 'transformation.' What is this transformation about? Into what does it transform itself! These two questions are important. The transformation occurs on account of two facts. Every sensory stimulus does get its reaction or response from the body. When the body is awake, or rather, when the sense-organs are alert, then there is correct reception of the outer stimulus. If on the other hand, the sense organs are asleep, that is to say, when they are either closed or inattentive, as in the 'Intermediate State' or the twilight of
consciousness, we have the reflex activity of the sense-organs taken up by the brain-centres directly. There happens confusion\(^1\), vikāra, transfonnation, constellating or grouping of past similar experiences around it, and, thus, we have the primitive formations of symbols of new types, distinct indeed from the ordinary analogous substitutions of the waking-life\(^2\). As already said, symbols are the life and soul of all thinking, but in dream the symbols are not merely the life and soul, they are the stage also of their entire drama.

The principle of transformation is a well-understood fact in Indian Psychology. Objects of the waking consciousness recur in dream state; nothing that was not in the waking occurs in the dream-state. The presentative theory of dreams which holds that there in no dream without some outer or inner stimulus of the sensory kind which, so to say, starts the process of dreaming, is held by the Nyāya thinkers. This is said to be the reason for the particularity that is the characteristic of dreams. It is possible to think in general terms or in terms of generality, but it is impossible to dream in terms of generality. All impressions are particular and represent general ideas. That is the meaning of the word 'symbol', and however much these symbols might be made to stand for a class of objects or impressions of experiences, they are particular and refuse to be converted into general ideas. The function of these transformations or correlative references or symbolic substitutions is suggestion. And suggestion though it is

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\(^1\) "Desire, confusion, anxiety and recollection of sense objects, these are the four kālas that belong to the dreaming state". Lalitā-sahasranāma

importantly dealt with in Aesthetics under the concept of dhvani, is indeed all in the dream-land. A faint or sharp and intense gleam of light affecting the closed eye in sleep kindles, so to say, the images of Moon in the bright half of the month, and assumes colours and fantastic forms that dreams only can conjure up. A faint rustle or a whistle perhaps calls up the imaginary train, or of thoughts and impressions of the beloved, and so on, according to the predominant mood or state of mind that is anxious to catch at something to feed upon and enjoy or be afraid of and wild in terror. In this sense, the dream-state is very near artistic life. Whereas the control on the artist's mind is conscious and deliberate, possessed of the dominant idea which he seeks to paint or chiselle or carve, the dream-state at least has not that conscious aim. Gonzalo R. Lafora says "Dreams, like artistic creations, are attempts of the Unconscious mind to dominate and to overcome the conscious, that is to say, they are attempts at returning to the the primitive life in which the individual satisfied his desires without regard to the interests of the species."

This view is not altogether warranted, since it speaks about the dream as if it were entirely an escape-phenomenon, an escape from our moral and cultural life to the primitive self sufficient egotistic life of self-satisfaction. It is enough to call this position as not true to all facts. Animals are as much gregarious as ourselves; and as or primitive men, studies into primitive culture, do not reveal that egotistic thrust, at any rate, to the extent that Lafora claims for them. Studies of Frazer, of Bartlett and others clearly show that the social life of the

* Don Juan and other Psychological Studies. P.173
primitives has certainly not abnormally stress on the egoistic, and in spite of the system of aboos and totems which social life amongst them has enforced, they are not people who suffer from dreams to the same extent as modern men suffer from. Dreams in the primitive society are few. They are dreaded. They have made the dreamers be considered as equal to the witches. Dream is a deep disease and not a common ailment. The reason is not far to seek; the symbolic redintegration in the life of the primitive is un-developed or under-developed, just as in the case of infants. Dreams involve high suggestibility, correlative frenzy as it were, that makes them phenomena of a different order than what Psycho-analysis on the basis of any one fundamental instinct like sex (Freud), or superiority neurosis (Adler), or as actions of a radical or Universal libido (Jung) ca explain. The importance of dream-study lies in its showing its efficient and abnormal correlative synthesis. Psychologist effects tend to exaggerate the neurosis set up by the suggestibility of correlations between experiences and objects that usually do not tend to be grouped or analogued.

The state of dream in which such frenzied correlations happen is not the deep sleep, espite Du Prel who holds that deep sleep alone can give us an intimate cue into the dream life of the self.

Now, therefore, one conclusion at last emerges, that sensory stimuli undergo transformations in the dream-state when the outer reception through the sense-organs is not available. The nervous system responds as a whole in the reception of the stimuli, even though otherwise non-active.
The second question that we addressed ourselves to was into what does a stimulus transform itself? Certainly into images. The content of the dream-experiences is not different from the experiences of our waking state. That is, the images appear to be just what we have already experienced. The visual, auditional, gustatory, and tactual impressions convert themselves into images, and all our experiences appear to be representations of our waking life. No new and unknown things, that is to say, images of things that we have not seen ever occur. In other words, as the representative view of dreams holds we do not get new knowledge through dreams. The past unrolls itself before us in our dreams. But this is not altogether true, since we know that we do perceive new correlations worked out by the active explorative symbolic action of the mind, and it is affirmed by very many investigators that they do get at new knowledge in dreams. Also dreams that are prophetic are new, and do not depend upon man’s unconscious volitions. Man unfortunately can create nothing without knowledge; and the ability to create without knowledge is the basic principle of Unconscious activity. The view that Bergson upholds that there is no sleep-state at all, that we only get limited views of reality through the selves of senses, and that in dream we are nearer the care of the ubiquitous reality, and are, on the whole, incloser touch with the outer reality, is, assuming it to be true, incapable of being justified on the basis of the inner symbolic references and transformations that happen to reality in our dream-life. The senses are said to be externally active in the waking state, and interiorly active in the dream state according to Udayana and writers of the
Nyāya school, because the objects in the dream-state appear as if they are external to the individual just as in waking experiences. This position is utilised by certain other thinkers to say that the objectivity that we do find in dream is not real objectivity, but a subjective positng, a placing outside so to say, and as such unreal or subjective creations. This view it is that is upheld by the Vijñānavādins; and added to their theory of perpetual momentariness, it means that they have characteristic shifts of correlations, and as such they are momentary, not merely in the sense that they cease on our waking up, but also in the sense that they are, even within dreams, not of any duration.

The upshot of the whole discussion is that in dreams we have sensory images, and the Contents of the experiences do not go beyond what we know. Representations of past experiences happen, and no objects other than what we know appear, though there might happen new correlations. Bergson’s view of dream is unacceptable, since the dream-state is a state of recipience. Though there is a type of activity that apparently is free from the limitations of the waking consciousness and the contraints of external objects, the dream-state suffers from limitations, indeed, more serious than the previous, in so far as it is not a conscious-state of life. That it possesses a rationality of its own, that the associative processes in the dream-state are governed by certain fundamental interests need not be gainsaid, but that that it reveals the creative activity of the individual as such, is not substantiated. Therefore Mrs. Arnold Forster’s view that in dreams there is reasoning or a rationale might well be accepted; we find that only when we retrace or carefully
recollect the dream. The dream-poetry of Coleridge, the dream-novel writing of R. L. Stevenson, are recollective visions, and as Mrs. Arnold Forster herself affirms, there is an objectivity of the dream which it is difficult to refer to the individual's intelligent or creative action. The phenomena of induced drowsiness cannot be called dreams.

Further, "If it is sometimes hard to believe that the actors who took part in these dreams come, not from without but from within our own consciousness, the belief is even harder in the case of dreams which seem to give back to us for a little while the presence of those whom we have loved and who are parted from us. They come to us in 'clear and solemn vision'-we do not question how they come; their presence seems for the moment as real as the comfort that they bring."

The theory of two selves is interesting. She calls the other self the guide, the infallible helper of her dreaming consciousness, once we accept him and take shelter under his wings. The status of Antaryāmin in Indian Dream psychology comes readily to mind. The individual in sleep seeks rest in the heart-lotus, where dwells the Lord within. The Inner Ruler Immortal has His home in the heart of all creatures. As the Hamsopanisad says the soul moves in the pericarp of the heart-lotus in the intermediate state of dream prior to sinking into the centre of the lotus. The function of experiencing, cognizing and enjoying is yet with the individual, deprived though he is from the volitional or active motor functions. The cognizing function continues yet in a very subdued state in the third state, but no longer does the individual experience his experiences, past or present. It is in the second state, as the
Māṇḍūkyopanīṣad says, the individual revels in emotional experiences. The prānic forces help actively perceiving experiences but without their motor concomitants. This state cannot be said to be comparable to the ideational state of exploratory imagination, the trying out of alternatives on paper or by diagramatic representations, prior to action. Dream may be a child state of "the enchanted tower", but it is not the state of primitive regression, except in pathological cases of frustration or exaggerated self-egoism or shock.

We have .aid that there is a guide in tile state of dream, the friend who helpfully takes us into the tower of wonders, the 'ivory tower' of poets to which they go for refuge from the bustle and hustle of active life. Of Moral life there is no evidence, but there quiet and joy. As Brhadāraṇyaka said, It is a pleasure-house of toys, chariots, horses and what not. But there are also the evil dreams which we have to experience, since of such is our active life in the world made. Moral life makes dreams happy, immoral life brings about dreams that are of fear, terror and misery. Fear is at the root of most dreams that are unhappy. Fear is at the root of moral delinquency, and the conquest of fear it is that conquers dreams that are evil. In this conquest trust in the Lord, as in the case of Yoga which counselsĪśvarapranidhāna, is absolutely necessary. The sustaining hand of a guide in the distress of mere emotional outbursting of inner life at the mercy of outer forrs, psychic and physical, as well as inner force, of habitual nature, it is that thwarts evil. What citta vyrtti-norodha achieves in Yoga, that is what is also sought to be achieved by devotion to the Divine Lord. The quiet resigned attitude of the individual finite soul towards the fruits of karma dispensed in
waking life as well as in dream-life of the form of joys in waking life and pleasant recreations it dream-life, leads finally to the transcendence which grants utter felicity.

A higher consciousness that knows more and not less, a power within us that is superior to us, which whilst individually in each is transcendent in all, that alone can explain the prophetic dream. Dream in its fullest significant sense can only be this, according to some thinkers. It is not the so-called dream that is not different from the day dream, or the imaginations, but the prophetic, dream that makes the future true, that is significant of the dream life. Secondly, if wish fulfilment is said to be that which is achieved in dreams, as compensations for failures or successes during the waking-state, more or less intense reflexions of waking experiences and their psychic retro activities, then it is not true in regard to all experiences. Sometimes, or rather, more often than not, we find that we dream not at our will, but at the dictation of some other self.\footnote{Buddhism holds that dreams might be due to clairvoyant influences. Compendium of Philosophy, S.Z.Aung p.48}

No doubt the dictation might come from the pathological state moving in its own manner, or it might be from the physical or physiological condition at a particular moment. All the evidence that we have shows that dreams, even wish-fulfilments, are not to be had at our will; they are not made to order. Mrs. Arnold Forster though holding the view that dreams could be created by her, finally says that she even was not able to get dreams when she wanted them. In this case, dreams like mystic inspirations or inventions, as Prof. Monmasson has shown in his Inventions and the Unconscious
do not wait on our will; rather we have to wait anxiously for their coming.

Viśiṣṭādvaita as pointed out earlier holds that the Divine Lord in every individual does all. In dream-state He Who is awake when all are asleep, Who is the master of creation, never devoid of intelligence, and Who has fullest Vikāsa grants such dreams as the individual can understand and appreciate in terms of his own experiences. This is the reason why the contents of all dream-experiences are within each individual. The intimations of new things also are possible because the Lord within is transcendent to all individuals. The experiences through having peripheral stimulations undergo transformations according to the deserts of their actions. The moral view taken up by Viśiṣṭādvaita is in keeping with the Vedic view which says that Varuna knows all that happens in the secret places of the heart and dispenses justice. The power of projecting the subjective facts outside is impossible to the individual antahkaraṇa, buddhi or memory, since in the state of dreams, despite their activity, they are receptive and not self-active.

The illusive power is not so much the power to illude as it is to grant the individual enjoyment that he could understand and wish to possess. It is the granting of what he wishes to have that gives pleasure, the deprivation of what he wishes to have causes misery. Frustration is the lot of all. But even to achieve for the good acts one does, however slight they might be, deserts that are pleasure-giving, is to enable the individual to strive to do more good. The impossible (?) theory of karma that posits that one present birth is consequence of our past
activities, wherein the nature of the relationship between the act and its desert is not clearly indicated as in the Penal Codes of our human making, is in some manner mitigated by the *karma*-theory of dreams wherein we get our pleasurable deserts in our sleep.

Caraka and other writers on *Svapna-śāstra* give us indications of a good dream and good life;¹ and there is a famous passage of the *Chāndogya* which says that if one sees a woman in dreams success he there may recognise (V. 2. 9). Confucianism posits that dreams of snakes forebode daughters, though it is found that this is not true. On the other hand, certain experiences show that they forebode abortion. The dream of Mahā Viṣṇu for Śri Kṛṣṇadevarāya meant, according to certain of his astrologers and interpreters of dreams, "acquisition of more women" (Amuktamālyada. I-18). The interpretation of dreams is as difficult as it could be. But the Psycho- analysis of Freud has not made the task easier. Here is another case of new mythology, but it does good in so far as we are forgetting old ones!

Our individual wills operate undoubtedly in dream in a negative manner, a purely biological manner, of keeping watch over the body. The entire physiological system though at rest is aware indeed of itself. We know that when an unknown danger occurs we are awakened at once. But this does not warrant a complete statement of absolute creative activity of

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¹ Caraka-samhitā Chapter XII Indirasthāna; cf. Rāmāyaṇa Sundarakānda: ch.xxviii 9-24. Trijata's Dreams to success to Rāma and disaster to Rāvana. The descriptions are identical lending colour to the view that Caraka copied from the Rāmāyaṇa.
the self in dream. The psychological truth is that we are aware of our sleep-state, that is, that we were asleep, and that we slept soundly. But no more.

Dreams thus form a very interesting study of our mental life, its receptivity to outer forces, psychic (that is even of other higher powers perhaps) and physical, though the normal dream is of the ethical type, due to the granting of pleasure or pain as deserts for our minor good activities by the Lord within. The more the dreamer becomes moral, receptive and capable of self-control, the more true would his dreams become, that is, they more and more conform to the prophetic type of communion with the Divine. One's dreams get realised in a truer sense than one's wishes are said to get realised in the doctrine of Śāṅkalpa-siddhi.
Almost all the schools of Indian Thought hold the view that the primal mistake that man had committed and which has been the cause of his present migratory and ignorant existence was due to an original ignorance which is of the form of a perceptual illusion, known as dehātma-bhrānti or bhrama. The explanation as to how it ever happened has not been properly explained, and it is therefore necessary to investigate the causes of this original illusion or present persistent delusion. It would not be an answer to say that since we now raise the question that there is a body or mind apart from the other, and therefore are aware of their difference the illusion that the one is the other is now irrelevant. The philosophical schools excepting the cārvākas or materialists who did not have this problem at all, since they did not distinguish between the body and the soul, but only held that the soul is itself a product of the activities of the body and perhaps their constellations with certain nuclei of the combinations of atoms of four kinds, have decided that there was this illusion, bhrama which can be resolved only by extricating the characteristics of the soul from the body with which it has been identified. Thus in Buddhism we have the need to discover the atta, the permanent\(^1\) consciences or the real from the flux of congregates or aggregates (skandhas); in Jainism the soul has to be freed from the karma-matter that

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\(^1\) The original doctrine of Buddhism was Vaibhajya-vāda, which held the above view
has infiltrated into it and has restricted or limited its consciousness inside every way; and in Nyāya Vaiśeṣika the soul has to be perceived as having other characteristics than those of the other categories; in Sāmkhya the self, the passive witness consciousness, has to realise itself as the passive witness it is and not the active buddhi or prakṛti in which it finds itself to be mirrored; in Advaita Vedanta, the soul has to know itself as always free from the avidya which has somehow enveloped it; and in Bhedābheda the soul has to be known as different from the upādhis or limiting adjuncts which limit its self luminosity; and in Viśiṣṭādvaita the soul must know itself as self-luminous in itself though its cognitive functional consciousness is contracted by karma and by the body subject to or product of avidya-karma. In every one of these cases, we have to discovering how the soul deludes itself into believing that it is the body that is itself? The judgment ‘I am stout’ sthūloham is a statement about the physical body, and cannot be considered to be a judgment that reveals the dehātma-bhrama, whereas it may be considered to be ātma deha bhrama. And this will be the conclusion that will be forced on us as we proceed with the analysis of this problem. But before we try to investigate as to how that is even possible, we shall have to enquire further into this posing of the problem, which almost all thinkers have done.

How does it ever happen that the characteristics of the soul are perceived as belonging to matter or to the body. This is the main problem. To answer this question, we have to enquire into the nature or the soul. The difficulty is precisely here If we knew the precise qualities which are exclusively that of the soul and not of any substance other than the soul, we
should be able to state it more clearly. The soul, it is agreed, is a consciousness cum self-conscious entity having selfness (pratyakṣa) oneness (ekatva), and agreeableness (anukūlatva). The self consciousness of the soul is of a luminous nature, which is its eternal characteristic. These three qualities are features of the ahamartha `I’. These characteristics or qualities are in respect of the soul like the ‘silverness’ of silver.

In the illusion that the body is the Ahamartha or self, what we find is that the body possesses these characteristics of selfness and oneness and agreeableness. At least these characteristics are found to be in the ensouled-body, even as is the case of ‘silverness’ in the nacre. If this were the case, the judgment that we make will have the form 'This is conscious ', 'This body is a unity', 'This body is enjoyable', and therefore the body will seek to live and increase and enjoy. This is precisely what we do in our actions; and seek to hold on to the life in this body; we seek to increase and grow, and we cling on to the body as the most enjoyable thing in the universe.

These judgments are it might be noted, not of the same kind as ‘I am stout ‘I am starving’ 'I am so and so'. The body in dehātma bhrama is seen to have the attributes of the soul, by a kind of a transference of attributes belonging to the soul to the body. Thus nacre is mistaken for silver. What essentially belong to the one are considered to be essential of the other. What are the causes of this transference? Is this transference of attributes of the one to the other due to perceptual defects or mental impositions or transference of previously experienced attributes to one that is similar to it in
some manner? Is it a case of akhyāti, non-perception of the difference between perceptual content and the memory content, or of anyathā khyāti, the mistaken perception of the same order as rope-snake, or is it a case of akhyāti again of the form of crystal and rose, which gives the colour to the crystal as in the Sāmkhyyan explanation?

Conjoint perception of body and the soul, even without similarity is said to be the cause of this illusion. It is presupposed, perhaps, just like the conditioned-reflex theory that the presence of one factor alone will bring about the reaction specific to the other. This explanation is ingenious but it cannot alone solve the problem of transference. The conjoint experience of stoutness and selfness as in the ātmadehabhrama, and the conjoint experience of selfness and its attributes in its embodied state as in the dehātma-bhrama, are less explanations of the phenomena than descriptions. For it is clear that in the case of nacre and silver, there is a perceiver extraneous to the body who experiences their togetherness and in conditioned in his responses whereas in the case of the dehātma-bhrama is by oneself of oneself with one’s body which one utilises and experiences. There is thus no possibility of explaining the self introspective activity implicit in the attribute of pratyaktva as belonging to the body. It is difficult to experience the fact that the body is in itself self conscious, even at the first look, which is precisely the locus of the illusion. Further the joint apprehension of subject and object in consciousness or cognition is not the special characteristic of the illusory experience only, but of all experiences. Thus this cannot be an explanation of the dehātma-bhrama. A further difficulty in all perceptual
explanations of this dehātma bhrama is that the terms here are not perceived by the senses. Thus the difficulty of even considering that this is a bhrama. More truly it can be called bhrānti — a hallucination, the projecting of one’s thoughts into the perceptual field by innervation of consciousness. But this alternative seems to be unacceptable to all schools.

Further the main characteristic of an illusion is not a manufacture of new entities, but rather it is the accentuation of certain features of an object which are superficial, to the level of importance and value. Thus the form of the snake, the reflective nature of the nacre, the penetrability of light rays through transparent crystal are real facts. There are possibilities of similarity in objects belonging to one particular order, and that is why illusions are paired, that is to say it is a rope that looks like a snake, it is nacre that looks like silver, it is crystal that looks coloured, and not all other objects. This pairing-phenomenon is of great value. This theory thus realizes that there are real factors in illusion: a thing is an illusion not because of absence of the factors which make it look like another with which it is mistaken, but because such similarities are frankly useless for the purpose of action or realization when taken as the other. This is the Yathārtha khyāti theory in a nutshell. But this view cannot he an explanation for the dehātma-bhrama, for it would he pleading for the real possibility of mistaking the body for the soul because of the actual but useless similarity between the two soul and body. This indeed it cannot admit for the metaphysical theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita upholds a radical distinction between soul and matter, the one being material, unconscient, and the other always, conscient and self-
luminous possessing the attributive consciousness-function. (dhārma-bhūta jñāna).

There is, however, here a possibility of holding that it may not be the pratyaktva that occasions the illusion or the unity of characteristics but its other attribute anukūlatva, agreeableness, which is the cause. Thus in analysing the characteristic attributes of the soul which identifies itself with the body or rather which later finds its own characteristics in the body and thus considers it to be the self, or soul, we find that the illusion has its basis in anukūlatva rather than in conscientness, jñārtya. For the fact is that perception is always of that in which we are interested or that which is agreeable, and is decidedly, as in nacre not interested in the thing but in the silveryness which it mistakes for real silver. The personal interest for satisfaction of the physical demand and spiritual demand is thus clearly available in all activities that man does. The ānukūlatva of the soul, agreeableness that it finds in itself, is reflected also in the body which subserves the pleasure-principle.' It is this perception of the agreeable and serviceable ānukūlatva, that is the cause of the illusion. The soul and the material world and the body that one has are, all enjoyable things serviceable to the Lord, this is the common denominator in their qualities. This is the reason why the soul is capable of aligning itself with the body, and thus deluding itself into believing that there is no difference between itself and the body. The failure of the body will lead to the failure of the soul, and thus it can be seen that any illusion is based not only on the actual contactual relation in which the body and soul are found, but also on the actual perception of qualities, special to the soul being found to be available in the body itself. For
instance the body has also *pratyaktva*, an individuality, differentiation, from the surrounding objects with which it may share materiality, but which are never interpreted to be itself. Similarly there is the unity, *ekatva*, the oneness which is in this case not mere oneness of conscious existence but the oneness of unity of diverse organs. Thus the actual illusion has sufficient reason to occur. Thus we find that illusion has a real ground an the illusion is due not in so far as there are not qualities or attributes the self has in it, but only in so far as those qualities are not particularly its, that is to say, *asādhāranatva*-attributes, attributes which belong to it exclusively and not to others. It is this particular attribute-ness or *asādhāranatva* of these three attributes of *pratyaktva*, selfness, *ekatva* and *anukūlatva* that now have to be investigated. Of these *pratyaktva* is special to the self in a manner in which even *anukūlatva* is not.

Thus when we say that we perceive the self as the body, *dehātma bhrama* is due to the fact that we perceive the attributes of the soul in the body and thus mistake it for the soul. But this position, whilst explaining the illusion and its possibility does not really answer the metaphysical or epistemological proposition as to how the self, a cognizing entity, which is, according to all thinkers, a conscious and self-conscious entity, *svasmai svena sadā bhāsmān*, ever gets this kind or delusion or illusion that it is the body which it occupies and controls. This is impossible. What is possible is that the body is perceived by the self itself as its own, its *prakāra*, as belonging to it and sharing its perpetuity; unity, selfness and serviceableness and agreeableness. The attribute, namely, the body, is perceived as the substrate, the
ground, viṣeṣya. Thus the original illusion must be due to this ātma-deha-bhrama rather then due to dehātma-bhrama. This is precisely what makes it possible for us to understand the transference of self-characteristics to the attribute or prakāra. But it may be asked as to whether even this is possible, since self-conscious entity can never be without its self-consciousness?

This is certainly an important question, and requires to be investigated. If the self-luminosity of the self is something having reference to the manifestation in its consciousness of the entire world of objects including its own body, then no illusion can possibly occur at all. For everything will be perceived as the content of the subject’s consciousness. The transference of its own attributes or specific qualities to the body will be impossible. Thus self-luminosity can only mean the perception of itself alone as a conscient being having the characteristic qualities of pratyaktva and ekatva and anukūlatva, and not anything else. This will not even include the perception of the asādhāraṇatva of these qualities in relation to itself, for these qualities alone in their bare quality-ness (viśeṣanatva) are perceived. If so how is it possible for it to know that these qualities are specific to itself and to nothing else? The self or soul in its selfness thus is cognizant only of its selfness and unity and agreeableness to itself, because it is not mere nirviṣeṣa-vāstu that it perceives, such perception or experience being impossible. But knowing that these qualities are specific to it alone, asādhāraṇa comparison with other experiences or relations would have to be had, and this is achieved by it not as a self-luminous being but as a being having consciousness as an attribute, dharma-bhūta-jñāna.
This is the fundamental distinction between dharmi-bhūta-jñāna and the dharma-bhūta-jñāna. Thus it is that dharma-bhūta-jñāna helps not only the understanding of the objects outside the individual, the perception of the body and its states, but finally its acts reflexively in so far as it reveals to the soul its own qualities as specially related to it. The illusions then are to be referred to the dharma bhūta-jñāna’s activities rather than to the dharmi-bhūta-jñāna. The asādhāraṇatva or specificity of these three attributes of selfness, oneness and anukūlatva is the one thing that has to be discovered, and it is the one thing that is not perceived at once, and thus there occurs the illusion.

Thus we find that the true source of the illusion called ātma-deha-bhrāma consists not in the veiling by primeval adhyāsa, or ignorance, nor yet a beginning less karma, but in the two-fold limitation of the soul; (i) the privateness and exclusiveness and self-enjoying nature of the dharmi-bhūta-jñāna which does not even apprehend its anutva, or kartva attributes but only its pratyaktva, selfness, and ekatva, oneness, and anukūlatva, which makes it impossible for it to know that these attributes are exclusively its own rather than of the body it tenants, and (ii) the dharma-bhūta-jñāna which due to limitation due to beginning less karma and its consequent avidyā, does not apprehend this specific exclusiveness of these attributes pratyaktva, ekatva and anukūlatva and jñātva and others of the self, and thus causes the delusion or illusion that the body is the self or soul.
Negation

The problem of negation is an important one since it has a bearing on the nature of truth itself. Negation involves 'firstly the denial of something and it cannot be said to be mere denial. The denial of something involves the apprehension of something that is other than that which is denied, whose place it has taken, or it might be it is the denial of the existence of the something merely without any reference to any other thing's existence or presence. Secondly, it might mean the apprehension of the absence at some place and time of something already experienced, and as such it is definition or determination of non-correspondence with the past experience merely without a detailed investigation of the present experience. Negation taken as a judgment even does not and cannot escape the reference to the negative fact, so to speak, of the actual apprehension of a thing's absence. If we inspect this phase of negation, we shall see that absence as such is experienced to be the nature of the situation, and as such perception is the instrument of our cognition of absence. It may be said that perception can only give the 'given,' the presented objects, and cannot present non-absence of the objects, and as such we must have a different instrument of cognition such as non-cognition or non-perception, anupalabdhi, to prove non-existence (abhāva). But this is all right so long as we take this non-existence presented in the so-called non-apprehension (anupalabdhi), (for it is indeed an apprehender of the alleged abhāva),¹ to be a mere abhāva, an uncharacterised somewhat and not a positive entity of

¹Vedānta Paribhāṣa
absence. Carefully inspected we find that the situation or position taken up by the Advaitin is similar to his position in regard to the nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa, a bare and un-inspected or unimagined or integrated experience of absence because of non-perception of anything determinate over there. There is an element of contra-definition or counter correlative which is defined more or less clearly even in the most incipient perceptual experience of negative fact or absence, which precisely reveals the difference.

The Prabhākaras hold that non-existence has no reality apart from that as an existent thing⁷. The Nāyāyika view is that non-existence of a thing in a particular locus is not identical with the locus but adjectival to it, for we always say that the ground is characterized by the non-existence of a jar that was previously there. This involves the view that non-existence as such can become an adjective or višeṣaṇa of the sound. This is so to speak non-sense except when we hold that there is a negative predicate in judgement about the existence of a thing. The adjectival theory suffers from its in capacity to see that the loss or absence of thing cannot be an adjective, for, it is not a fact that has any-thing but a difference to the original locus. Nor should we say that višeṣaṇa as particular difference is an adjective as something marking out a difference from the original experience that was characterized with the Presence of

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⁷ Bhāvāntaram eva bhāvāntar pekṣayā abhāvaiti vyavahṛyate: Saptapad ārth, p.76. Uddyotakara held that abhāva is apprehended by sense organs abhāvam indiyena gṛhyate and Kumārila Bhatta agrees with above view. It is something additional to the ground wherein there is non-perception of pot: adhiṣṭhānātriktam tattvam cf. Six ways of knowing: D.M.Datta p.159ṣṭa

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a thing, say, a pot. Nor could a general theory which holds that the counter-correlatenes of negation of pot is cloth and what determines its counter-correlateness is clothness as genus differentium be right, for there are cases, individual to be sure, which may have both pot and cloth and bench or chair, but the absence of one thing does not entail the counter-correlateness of others. We should therefore see that whilst it may be perceptually right to say that A was where B is now at the same place and therefore B is the counter-correlate of A, it will not reveal the neccasitl/ of some ons thing say B being the counter-correlate of A, so much so we may be able to affirm the inference in the form of a negative judgment or judgment of affirmation.

Sri Rāmānuja's views on Negation are those closely related to the concept of non-knowledge or ignorance. The question between the Advaitic and his own standpoint was whether non-knowledge was a positive entity or otherwise, whether indeed it was perceived, whether also it was absence of knowledge and as such a vacuum, or whether it was positive power that illudes or veils knowledge or abolishes it. Rāmānuja points out that knowledge and non-knowledge are contradictory only in so far as they refer to one and the same object: Jñānajñānayor ekaviṣayatvena hi virodhaḥ. He points out the importance of recognizing the content and locus of the negation, for it is in special respect of these that our ignorance (avidyā) has to be defined. A universal ignorance is not at all what is being affirmed when we say that 'I am not knowing'. Ignorance is not a positive entity, it is only absence-an

1 Sri Bhāṣya: I.i.1
absence that may hinder the action needed and in that sense positive. But this cannot be proved either by perception or by perception aided by reasoning or inference: Ahamajñō mām anyam ca na janāmi ityatropapattisahitena kevalena ca pratyakṣena na bhāvarūpam ajñānam pratiyate yastu jñānaprāgabhāva-viṣayatve virodha uktaḥ sa hi bhāvarūpajñāne pi tulyaḥ. 1 Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent non-existence, in either case it comes out as what the word indicates, namely, non-knowledge means either absence of knowledge or that which is other than knowledge or that which is contradictory to knowledge, and in any of these cases we have to admit that non-knowledge presupposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge. 2 Bhāvarūpasyā jñānasyāpihyajñānum iti sidhyataḥ pragabhāvastiṣṭhāviva sāpekṣatvam aṣṭeya. Tathā hi ajñānam iti jñānābhāvas tadanyas tadvirodhi va? Trayāṇam api tatrūpājñānāpekṣa vasyā śyaśrayāṇiḥ.

Taking the first, it is not true to affirm that negations are all of the same kind. It is on the contrary correct to err on the side of pluralism by affirming that there are different kinds of negation. Negation can be of existence; negation can be of meaning; negation can be of context in time and place and relationship with other objects. It is this last type of negation that is usually mistaken for the former two. Obviously it cannot be correct to affirm that the negation of existence of a particular thing is also negation of its meaning unless this meaning is something that is involved in its existence. If idea involves existence, then the denial of the one can be the denial

1 Sri Bhasya i.1. p.110
of the other also. If, on the other hand, existence is a predicate, if to mean a particular meaning is not identical with its actuality in time and place, then the negation of meaning need not be the negation of the existence, or the negation of existence the negation of the meaning as well.

Existence is characterised by the features of time and space and also of relationship with other objects. This relationship may be of the causal type as well as other kinds of relationships such as genus and particular, āti and vyakti, and therefore there can be no existential occasion without the characteristics of space and time and causal nexus. Negation of existence means the absence of existential predicates. Negation however in not absolute since it depends on these considerations of space and time and causal relationship even like existence itself. Thus to exist means to exist at a, certain place, and time and causal relationship with its antecedent, lacking which, it must be presumed to have no existence then and there and under those conditions.

The main defect of most thinkers arises from the fact that unrealistically they tend to identify or subsume all negation under one omnibus negation which does not distinguish between previous non-existence, present non-existence and future non-existence: but all things are characterised by these three features of time. To affirm that they are characterized by these three features of reference to time is also to affirm that whilst a thing is at one place it cannot at the same time be at another place also. Thus the negative judgment that 'A is not at a particular place' only negates A's existence at that place and at the time the judgment is being made, and not that at
any future time A may not go over there at all. Thus the negative judgment is not definite except in relation to the time and place that it exhibits at that moment.¹

It is true that all things are not of the same temporal duration. And some of the entities may have a coevality with time itself, so as to be called timeless or eternal, like the souls (as in Vedānta), and like some other things which whilst undergoing transformation or becoming their essential materiality may not be denied at any moment. The absolute negation of matter's existence, or rather the affirmation of ultimate non-existence leads to absurd consequences or compromises with existence. In these cases whilst change is predicated of things, what is negated in their contexts is not their materiality nor eternality as such, but only the particular state which they enjoyed at any prior moment. Change thus is relative to the previous state, even as destruction is relative to the previous state. Thus we find change and destruction to be mutually interchangeable terms, and these have reference to the permanent thing in itself, or to the previous states of things and their consequent states. The buddhist view that if there had been previous nonexistences and if there is to be a consequent non-existence, there could never be a present existence sandwiched between the two² is answered by the reference to the state or a thing rather than to the thing itself which is the fundamental reference and base or locus of all

¹ It is moot question whether negative judgement(sic) is an inference based on non-apprehension of an expected or sought for subject at a particular place and time.
² Māyāvāda considers such a sandwiched existence to be unreal or illusory.
change and time and space. Thus non existence instead of being a perpetual and anxious dragon awaiting the mergence of existence to gulp it up and leave nothing behind but the Void, is a myth and unacceptable. The doctrine of momentariness or flux is 'relative to the subjective apprehension, and the moment is not to be treated as a mathematical moment having no duration at all. Bergson's observation that nothing is not is appropriate.

Mere, or bare non-existence as we have said has no locus and is neither dynamic nor fertile. Dynamic negation entails the concept of destruction, a thing which causes disintegration; and even to speak of a thing disrupting itself is possible only on basis of a real entity causing another to disintegrate. Do we find this concept of dynamic disintegration within the scheme of negation as represented to us by the schools of thought? It is true that the Buddhist schools speak of negation as itarstara bhāva or paraspara apekṣatā, which is intended to convey the relativity view. The concept of destruction of being by non-being so as to lead to a realization of Becoming or change is not so clearly available in Indian Philosophy as it has been found in Hegelian dialectic. On the other hand, we find that negation as a category of existence with which it is related in relation to which alone it has any meaning. Negation means, in the perceptual sense, the perception of emptiness of otherness than what was exhibited at a previous moment and what was anticipated to exist at that place and at that time. The concept of abhāva
non-existence, is thus closely related to the doctrine of relative occupation or non-occupation by a thing and the sense of prior occupation and present non-occupation or future non-occupation. The feeling of vacancy is thus a positive index to the judgment of negation. The perception of black as the absence of white in psychology is equivalent to the perception of the vacancy space or other occupation of the identical space. To say thus as the Naiyayikas say that Non-existence, abhāva is a perceptual fact is correct. Further that it is positively a contrast experience can be proved. On entering into the house where previously children were playing and finding that no children are there we declare that none is there, though there might be elders. In the darkness loneliness is a positive experience of sensing of emptiness or absence. Thus negation can be both negative (or passive) and positive (or aggressive, or painful or pleasant).

Thus the experience of abhāva does not mean that it is an entity, but that it is the experience of an absence of a previous entity.

Sri Venkaṭanātha points out that negation is related to and defined by the conditions or limitations (upādhis) of time, place and causality.

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1 Whether abhāva can be equated with anupalabdhi is an important point. Abhāva as a category in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is an apprehended absence of things, and in fact, undoubtedly dependent upon the apprehension of things prior or after, ideally anticipated or perceptually directly known. But to say that abhāva is anupalabdhi will lead to the doctrine of solipsism; esse est percipi non-esse est non-percipi
NEGATION

The mention of causality involves reference to other objects that have been, with which it is related in a necessary manner as consequent. Thus the non-existence of a cause at the time when the consequent comes into existence is a necessary condition, just as much as its existence at the previous moment was necessary to bring about the effect. Thus we find that though such existence appears to be undefined: in so far as it is in-itself incapable of being described as existence, since it is its absence, it is defined by limits or conditions. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that negation of A involves only the non-existence of A at a particular place, time, and as a cause or effect and not that no other thing is there, nor that it would not be there later, nor that it was not there previously.

Negation is thus distinct from destruction; things might be destroyed and suffer change. They need not on that account be considered to be unreal. The criterion that the momentary is unreal is not of the school of Buddhism which is realistic enough to affirm reality to be such. Nor is it that of the realist. Negation is a principle of contradiction which makes it a logical weapon that limits and circumscribes a universal judgment.

So far we have been showing that the experience of absence itself is definitely of the relational type. For when we deny the existence of something or affirm its non-existence, (though to affirm appears to give the case away not because the very possibility of affirmation lends colour to the view that there is something over there clamant for affirmation) three questions arise. Where? When? and What? about that which
is negated. Thus writes the author of Nyāya-kulīśa in his chapter on Bhāvāntarābhāva-vāda. Thus Negation may mean either mere absence of an object or entity which was looked out for or suggested by prior experience of the particular place, due to destruction of it or the passing away of it. In this case it merely intimates non-presence of that which was anticipated to exist. The reasons for its non-existence at the present moment or moment of apprehension of negation are not relevant as such. But this too was investigated by some later writers who have seen that negation is due to the perception of a special modified nature of the entity in which the negation is affirmed: prati-yogi-buddhau vastu-viśeṣa-dhir evopeta nastiti vyavahāraḥhetuḥ says Vātsya (Nadathūr Ammā1). Ātreyā Rāmānuja holds that there is no need to posit negation as a separate entity, for indeed it is only the perception of difference between the previous and the present, or the present and the future occasion. Negation is that which, is antagonistic to a positive entity and there is no way in which a negation can be conceived by itself without reference to a positive entity. Abhāvasya tad-rū-pam yad-bhāva-pratipakṣata naivam adyāpy asau yasmād bhāvottirṇena sādhitaḥ.2 The difference between the positive entity from another is regarded as negation. The last view takes up tile notion of viśeṣa, uniqueness of difference as the content of mutual exclusion. This is stated to be at the root of the concept of otherness. Thus we can see that there are three types of negation; the later writers tended to reduce all types into one and made negation identical with otherness. Thus suppose we take the

1 cf. History of Indian Philosophy: S.N.Das Gupta Vol III. P. 353
2 Journal Annamalai Uni, vol X pts 2&3 Prameyamālā

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word Avidyā, it may mean non-knowledge or contradictory to knowledge according to Rāmānuja; whereas in the later systems non knowledge is distinguished by an otherness to knowledge, whether absence or contradictory. Even in the case of otherness, Rāmānuja was prepared to see in it not general 'otherness'as in the case of horse being other than a table, but rather a special 'otherness' that is, that which is relevant to the topic.

Thus the experience of abhāva is not that it is an entity so-called but that it is the experience of another entity different from this. Sri Rāmānuja refuting in the context of Nyāya-refutation speaks that "non-existence (abhāva) is clearly conceived as special state of something actually existing: Abhāvasya vidyamāna padārtha vasthāviśeṣat-vopapādanāc- (Sri Bhāṣya II, ii. 23.) This means that A-vidyā when used in the context of Upāya to the realization of (God will mean action which is usually the other upāya than vidyā. Sri Vekaṭanātha speaking on the notion of Avidyā as identical with karma under the mantra 11 in the Īśavāsyopanishad-bhāṣya writes:

Avidyayā vidyāṅgatayā coditnkarmanā mṛtyum jñāna- saṅkocarūpa mṛtyuhetum prakta karma... iha tu avidyāśabdaḥ prakaraṇādaucityācca vidyāṅgakarmaviṣaya ityabhāṣī Bhāṣyakāraiḥ: Atrāvidyā śabdābhihitam varṇā śramavhihitam karam iti mṛtyu-taranopāyatayā pratītā vidyā vidyetarad vihitam karmaiva iti ca. Vidyāṁ paryudasyannayamavidyā-śabdhaḥ kṣatriyādi viṣayabrāhmaṇaḥāsabdādidad āsanna-tadanantara-vṛttir-āṅgakarma-viṣaya iti bhāvah.
The term avidyā which excludes knowledge, having to mea that which in proximate and next to it, like the words abrahmaṇa and others which denote ksatriyas and others, refers to works which are intimately related (to knowledge).

Thus according to Śrī Rāmānuja no negation as such can be made without it at the same time intimating some thing about that negatived something which because of the negation means that it is different from what was previously apprehended or what was expected to exist or else what was relevant to the need to make this negative assertion. Taken thus the negation is a definite enough statement so far as the modification of the situation goes but is indefinite about what is affirmed to exist as different from that which is being denied.

The transition from the negative to the determinate judgment of assertion of the other is perceived by the observation of the conditions of the Otherness, and this Rāmānuja and Venkaṭanātha consider is easy enough to find when they limit it to proximateness, relevance and purpose of the negation and close relation of subsidariness to it - āsannatva, tad-anantaravṛttitva and aṅgatva.

The third type of negation referred to by Śrī Rāmānuja is that which was contradictory to the existenoe or contradictory to the smerganae of a hing intoienetience. They may be designated as prāgabhāva and pradhvams-ābhāva but the dynamic quality of the opposition is not brought out into clear relief. If the previos type of negation revealed the distinctive and subsidiariness (aṅgatva) of the negation expressed by such a phrase as avidyā (that-is karma), in this we have the actual conflict between the two: when the one
exists the other cannot exist, just as there is conflict between Good and Evil; though to be sure—we come across many persons who are good in some respects and evil in others, but certainly not good and evil in respect of the same aspect. Equally the terms Sambhūti and Asambhūti mean birth and non-birth (vināśa). But taken in the context of their usage in the Upaniṣad (Īśā 14) we find that asambhūti means the destruction of impediments to birth into Divine life. When we look at the philosophy of Hegel we come across the oppositional character of negation though this type of negation can only be reduced to the level of contradictory negation of one force by another or ruling out of one force by another.

There is still a kind of negation affirmed at—the levels of mystic consciousness—the state of total transcendence. The Asat of the Upaniṣads and the veda is quite a positive Existence but about that nothing is humanly measureable or knowledgeable." Negation is that to which we come at the end of all the researches of reason and faith to a dark night, and enter there ‘to unite ourselves in wise ignorance with Him who dwells in the shadows’ says Gerald Venn writing about St. Thomas Aquinas’s central reaching on Negation. Is it also Buddha’s (though not the buddhist’s) Nirvāṇa,

It is the description of the unknowable, but that too is a positive and most real experience of Deity as mystics have continuously affirmed. This truly is the only place where the content is undefinable or indeterminable—with the help, upādhis or conditions: but its otherness, or even organic otherness to our experience is definitely available. Thus Rāmānuja clearly points out the central truth of negation to lie in its
determination of the 'other existent' which is proximate and near and in accord with it, in respect of existence, or value or purpose.
THEISM AND ILLUSION

The approach to a proper understanding of the theistic thought must be sought in the actual postulations of the seers who have in some measure enjoyed the Holy Presence. It will be admitted that the two great seers Śankara and Rāmānuja have diverged sufficiently in regard to the experiences of the Ultimate or the Absolute or the Brahman, and the theistic mind of both the śaiva and vaiṣṇava varieties has grasped at the truth of the Rāmānuja’s statement rather than that of Śankara. The main bone of contention between the two can easily be said to be the theory of Maya or world-illusion or total illusion which the one denied and the other affirmed. The Māyā theory may be considered to be an off-shoot of the non-creationist theory of Gaudapāda, (aṭāvāda), a very legitimate conclusion trying to show that if the perfect being is to be, it cannot evolve or create or change, since such processes would impugn the perfection and eternity and reality of such an Existent. In Indian Philosophy, the Sānkhyā System almost affirmed the absolute unchanging reality of the Puruṣa but explained the existence of the world as due to the reflection of Puruṣaa in prakṛti, triguṇi, which because of its changing nature, makes the Puruṣa appear to be changing. We may in this context think of another thinker of highest repute, Plato, who admittedly affirmed an Unchanging Reality for the Idea, inferred by us through inductive inference and at higher stages by intuition into the essences of all things. This for him culminated in the grand Being which was the Good and the God, and the Archetype. The perceived universe was considered by him to be an imaginary world, that is to say, imaging the archetypes in manifold ways in perishing things,
The world of Matter, acts as the imperfect soiled mirror, a muddy pool, that reflects the One Supreme Arche-type, the Real, as many imperfect images. The parable of the Cave which illustrates this truth, hints subtly that so long as one gazes on the images one cannot know anything, but once one reverses the gaze and seeks the conceptual or essential reality of these within oneself, then one may be in the very presence of the Ultimate. The theism of Plato consists in his placing God not in the outer imaginary universe, or universe of ideas, sans sense, but in accepting God who is the object of inference and deep vision, through pure thought that reaches vision. All inference in one salient is the pursuit of the reminiscence of the 'Idea'.

In one sense essence and existence are strange contradictories. There cannot be any existence without essence, but there cannot be essences without existence.

Thus God should be considered to be an object that cannot be approached by the senses. On this issue every one agrees except perhaps the materialist. But whether God can ever be inferred or apprehended through the process of inferential intellect alone is the other question. Nyāya and Vāśeṣika schools try to prove God through inference. We also know how Śankara and Rāmānuja refute these arguments, and show that whilst we may infer a being who might be the creator of pots and other creations, we cannot apply the logic of our intellect to the apprehension of the Creator of the entire Universe. Nor would inferences based on the ontological arguments, (that is, an idea, of the perfect involves its existence,) prove any thing except that there is such an idea in
our mind, but cannot guarantee the actual, eternal, total cause, namely, God. In European Philosophy, this ontological argument was refuted by Kant, but it has always tried to recur in some form or other, as an intuition into the identity between Thought and Being, as in the Philosophy of Hegel and other idealists. But it was clear to both Śankara and Rāmānuja and their respective followers that God or the Highest Being cannot be proved by inference tied as this is to sense perception. A question however arises: Are there references not so tied to sense-perception? Plato's view that induction will lead to the apprehension of the Deity Was however thus refuted. And no doubt Dr. S. Radhakrishnan wrote "The absolute as pure being (Śankara) and absolute person (Rāmānuja), the intuitional and intellectual representations of the one Supreme fact. (MIND 1926, p.153). We have to ask ourselves this question: What is the one supreme fact of which these two are representations? For, we are here shown by Dr. Radhakrishnan that the apprehensions of both intellect and intuition either reveal two contrary natures in a single substance, or that both of them are incapable of revealing to us the nature of that which stands like a Transcendent colossus which cannot be apprehended at all. In the former case, there is an acceptance of the anekānta-vādi without the possibility of declaring that these two representations exhaust the nature of the Supreme Fact, and in the latter case, both of them, even like the attempts of Plato, Udayana and others, have failed to prove the existence of God, the ultimate substance or Supreme fact. No Wonder then that it is not intuition nor intellect to which Rāmānuja and Śankara appeal but to the śruti. The revelation of the Seers of ages past, whose words carry with them the solid experience of intimate reality, due to
a capacity granted to them by the Supreme Itself. Thus the statement that the philosophies of Śankara and Rāmānuja are representations from the intuitive and intellectual plane respectively is not warranted at all. What is very likely is that the organon of interpretation of texts by these two might have been largely restricted to the use of the intuitive and intellectual apparatuses of man, and the divergences that have resulted might be referred to these differences in the use of the investigating and understanding apparatus. Inference in the Mīmāṁsās subserves interpretation of texts and intuitions of seers. Sense has been substituted by scripture.

This raises very important questions. What are the rules of laws of intuition? and what are the laws of intellect? Are there no points of agreement between these two on major issues? Does intuition refute causality, multiplicity, relationship, particularity, perceptual and intellectual categories, whilst intellect, accepting all this, creates a fictional world? Is Reality a continuous stream of Spiritual Energy or a perfect unmoving, unchanging static intelligence? Is it matter that is static, or spirit that is passive? Does intellect crass-sect the flowing stream of consciousness of reality apprehended in perception or intuition of the perceptual level, or is it intuition that reveals the differences whilst intellect identifies all the categories and arrives at the concept, the sāmānya or jāti, generality or species or idea, jñānakāra, universals, concrete or abstract?

So long as modern Indian Philosophers do not definitely take their stand on these issues, the interpretation of the ancient texts must for all time be confusing and turn out to be difficult. Tendencies of thinkers must be surveyed in respect of
their standpoints and conclusions. It would not be enough to say taking the popular fallacy of general assent, vox populi, that intuition is what grants reality whereas intellect gives falsity. The intuitions too may give false conclusions if they are neither integral nor total nor vouchsafed by independent experience of others even when its own delivereances be autocratically authoritative for itself. And when the intuitions of such Philosophers like Śankara and Rāmānuja, Buddha and Mahāvīra Jaina, Heraclitus and Parmenides, and Plato and Socrates differ radically as to the true nature of reality or the absolute experienced by them as supersensory and transcendent which somehow the perceptual and sensuous experiences affect or infect in a radical manner so alter its very nature, as to present a world of imagination, of imperfection, of evil, the modern philosopher finds himself in an unenviable difficult situation. No wonder then it is not the ordinary realistic thinker also who quarrels so much as the idealistic intuionist visionary for the former is atleast conscious of the possibility of his view being false.

Are then intuitionists subject to the environment whose opposition they represent? Do they give us an integral interpretation of reality or do they merely throw out wide suggestions of a reconstruction on lines that have not been properly presented by the then existing philosohies or religions, which it is their special vocation to emhasiae? such a vocation of a Śankara or Rāmānuja, Buddha or Mahāvīra, Rāmākrṣṇa or Vivekananda, not to speak of the great Seers and prophets of the West, would soothen our misunderstanding a wee-bit, but nothing more than that could be expected. For the major metaphysical issues would
not have been answered, and is it not precisely the purpose of a philosopher neither gifted with the vision of the one nor of the other to synthesize laboriously those loose ends?

The present attempt is to show that at any rate, the Absolute of Advaita by all the descriptions that have been made answers to the highest of the Concepts. A philosophy of Absolute Reality entails a Philosophy of illusion, which then must he traced to its source. The reason for this illusion or degradation or perversion must be sought in the very nature of reality which it is the business of reality to unfold. It would be perhaps proper indeed if we did seek outside Reality a foreign power, an alien force, an archetypal illusion which opposes the good of God by the evil of its Evil. The truth of Truth the falsity of its falsehood, the beauty of the Beautiful by the ugliness of its ugliness. But it is seen that if Reality includes philosophically both sides, nothing can be outside Reality comprehensively considered. What then is illusion or illusionary power? What does it illude? and Whom?

There could certainly have been no more brilliant exponent of vivarta-vāda, than Śankara. No one could have shewn the actual content of experience to have been inferred with fallacy, disunity, due to our very finite and truncated nature and activities. But, there is a suspicion that his vivarta-vāda had no sanction in the Veda or the Upanisads; that his Absolute is finally rationalised, though in itself an Absolute Experience it is identical with the most abstract product of philosophising; that evolution interpreted as vivārta cannot be evolution but emergence; and finally Māyā is not an illusory power except to one who is illused, but a real miraculous
power of God, to display His utter transcendence. It is the concretizing principle of Reality itself.

Further if the ultimate reference of Ether, Air, Fire, Water, Earth, Sun (Aditya) be Brahman, how could it happen that Māyā could have the power to be potent enough to shroud or veil or hinder it from manifesting, unless it be said that the Brahman, is the Absolute Concept or Idea which subsumes or sublates all the rest of the ideas of ether, air, fire, water, earth and Sun under it, even like the satta of Nyāya-logic? Thus the ultimate reference of everything to Brahman may happen directly because of the pantheistic assertion that it appears as such, or indirectly through the archetype or jñanakāra of those which in turn are imaged on the canvass of the temporal?

Can it not be likely that Śankara’s meaning of evolution as an illusion (vivarta) was based on grounds of intellectualising rather than intuition? That this is a suggestion likely to be fruitful, though by no means acceptable to all, may be inferred from the fact -that no one has attempted to explain the subtle intellectual subterfuge which had taken the place of intuition, so that essence (idea) has been mistaken for existence and

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1 Māyā means abundance. (i.i.13,14,15). Māyā in Brhaddevata is described as sorcery, magical power. II.43;VIII. 75&76; VVII.86; crafty power VII.88 adbhuta Sakti; Māyāśabdo hyāścaryavci; Paramapuruṣa srṣti : Śrī Bhāṣya III. ii.3
2 Śankara’s Brahma-sutra-bhāṣya: I.i.23,24.25 etc
3 Śrī Bhaṣya : I.i.5 Māyāmātram tu kārtsnyenena anabhiivyakta svarūpatvāt. cf. Viṣnu Sahasranāma-Bhāṣya: Parāsara Bhatta (12th)
essence was converted into an existence. Sankara clearly had seen that the phenomenal World and the Isvara are actual existences and the actual being less than the non actual or ideal, he makes the assertion that God is less than the Absolute and phenomenal world is an illusion, not indeed an illusion as between the Phenomena, themselves for which it appears to be real, but to one who has transcended the categories of existence. But there was the demand for the realization of the inwardness, the conceptual or ideality of the Absolute, and no category of existence according to him, even as in case of Plato, could give him that. The radical difference then between sense and thought, was transferred to that between existence and essence, phenomenal and the

century). Under name 303 Naika mâyâ : Gives the following quotations and observations.

1. Mâyâm tu Prakṛtim vidyāt : Śvet Up.4.6-Anekārtha kriyākārinam prakṛtu
2. Māya vayunam jñanam
3. Sānkhyatā deva Māyāyā
4. Viśvānideva vayunāni vidvān it ca jñāne(Īśa.18)
5. Tena Māyā sahasrām tat, šambarasyāśu - gāminā : I Bālasya rakṣatā dehām, aikākaśyena sūditam. Varāhe Purāne) II
6. Megodayas Sāgarasannivṛttur vindorvībhāgasphūritan ivayoḥ Vidyudvībhagotam uṣṇaraśmir vicitrāḥ prabhavantī Māyā

7. Aranyaparvāni Mārkandeyoṇa vaṭadejasyānādyaścaryam uktva.
   "Tato me prthivipālavismeyas sumahān abhūt,
   Lokāndrśtvā samastamsca, ilyuktvān tarhi,......
8. Māyā is rendered as "maternal measure", from ūma=to measure. Well might be rendered as Mother’s activities where ya is a krit suffix. Cf. A.K.Coomaraswami
Absolute, vyāhārika-satta pāramārthika sattā. That existence was predicated of both can only mean that so far as Śankara was concerned the fact of actual knowledge of any one of them at any time granted to that reality. And thought and existence thus become synonymous.

The radical difference that existed between the two spheres of sense and action, thought and reality or knowledge was made the pivotal principle of explanations. Between these two phases of the Absolute, one or which has been made or given the status of illusion, appeared a conflict that resulted in the affirmation of God Himself as an illusion, undoubtedly real to the deluded but false to the enlightened. Dr. Radhakrishnan speaks of the duality of Śankara’s standpoint which manifests itself as the Absolute and the Relative. But this is not indeed relative to the Absolute, but relative to the relative entities of the phenomenal universe. We would be more than unjust if we followed the western philosophers in interpreting the Philosophy of Śankara, and affirm that what he did teach was an Absolute against the back ground of a relative universe. Rather what he did teach was the radical opposition and non-existence of the relative Universe, once the absolute was realized. When a man became identified with the Absolute and thus ceased to be, then the relative universe and all its Gods are nothing to it and finally are nothing. The illusion has passed off; This is nisprapancikaranam. The Self alone remains Absolute. The relativity theory would be

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1 ibid.o.187. of Santayana's joke, " We are to be idealists only notth, north west or transcendentally; when the wind is southerly we are to remain realists". 

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inapplicable, and what might legitimately be affirmed is that the relative universe is relative because of its being related as a counter-pole of the Absolute, whose imagination it is. According to whatever metaphysical view be it idealistic or realistic, the realm of Being can only consist of features or factors ultimately pertaining to existence, though by no means utterly and in every sense void of essences: and the realm of being cannot be also dynamically actual. The real then as experienced by man through his vitality and senses is the world of space time and limitation or ignorance, and the Real as experienced through his thought and knowledge and introspection is the turya, the truth free from all types of circumscribed fields or experience.

This would be correct, if the descriptions of the Upanisads and of the other scriptures of Brahman were confined to the inward vision and thought. On the contrary, the affirmation that Brahman is all this and all that exists beyond the sensor, makes it impossible for us to divide the spheres into those of reality and illusion. The mention of dark spheres (asura namo lokāḥ) in the Upaniṣads lends clear justification for stating that all are real, and not that all that exist are unreal. The affirmation of an original Asat only intimately the utter transcendence, the original causal oneness of the Divine over everything that we know of and does not affirm nihilism. There is a radical distinction between the nature of the individual and of the Supreme, it is because of that that Brahman participates completely and without exception in every existenc. Thus the Absolute is not a mere parsive spectator Consciousness but a caitanya, a personality. Despite the fact that Sāṅkara attempted a dichotomous division of the scriptural texts, he
could neither deny existence nor essence to Brahman. Pure Being of Brahman had to be at once unchanging and eternal and unmodifiable, while yet controlling and sustaining and ordering the universe. The absolute had to be everywhere in everything as everything and yet be the pure Unqualified Being or Essence. The apprehension of a contradiction between these two sets of attributes resulted in the need to postulate the principle of Illusion which because of its double-edgedness can play the role of existence and essence to perfection.

Western thinkers like Hegel affirmed the dialectic of opposition as a solution of the problem. Whether this could be achieved in a logical way or not, whether it is necessary to affirm this in terms of the logio of perception or other sources of right knowledge were his next issues. He affirmed clearly that this is possible only to a certain extent.

The classic criticisms of Rāmānuja against the principle of Illusion are well-known. He asked the very pertinent question whom should illusion delude? (i) Is the illusion of Brahman Svasmai, for Himself or Parasmai, for others? If all are Himself then parasmai becomes svasmai. In any case, in ontological view the first operation precedes the second operation. (ii) If it is God's power that deludes, then God some purpose, which acts in such wise as to delude the egoistic beings but illuminates the inner being of the nongoistic devotees. But if this principle is used as the power of deluding the perfect Being of knowledge, Brahman Himself, whose power is it? (iii) Can knowledge delude itself and permit delusion even though it may will these? If the nature of the Absolute is pure knowledge, how can it survive the illusion
without being annihilated? (iv) If it has no beginning how can it have an end? (v) If there is only One Absolute Real, and the souls are but reflections or imaginations of the Absolute, how did they originate to become unreal? (vi) Is not the Māyā itself another entity, apart from and distinguished radically from the Absolute, even like Evil from Good, Devil from God, Falsity from Truth?

We may see that these objections all stem out of an attempt at abstract monism but it is a radical dualism that has been exalted to the position of Monism. Monism to that end seeks to annul the existence of souls and all from the metaphysical standpoint. All these attempts only reveal the endeavour of Advaita to intellectualise and thus to abolish or sublate or cancel the many through a recourse to generality having arrived at the final idea of Being, which because of its utter comprehensiveness possesses only the most general nature of having no nature at all; it asserts this too to be a product, not of hypostatization but of vision, anubhūti. The mystics claim priority to Experience of Vision. The mystic's effort is an effort to transcend all limitations, and it was perfectly clear to him that so long as the experience of the body as the need for action, and names and forms remained, there could never be fullest experience of liberty or freedom. Freedom from the limiting body is the aim of all mystics Vedantins, Jainas and Buddhists alike. Socrates and Pythagoreans also held the same view. This craving results in mystical Solitariness, miscalled Oneness or undifferentiated identity, and it is this self same revulsion from sense and manyness and privateness that results in the ideal unitary universal Experience of the Abstract.
conceptuality, the Absolute.

For a theist, on the contrary, such a situation is an aberration, intellectually unjustifiable on the basis of the experience that we know of God. The religious consciousness rejects the solution of Māyā, though not of other worldliness or freedom from body.

In the words of one of the modern writers on the Philosophy of Essence, George Santayana, "Pure Being, when hypostatized into a substance is a metaphysical spectre, matter congealed, arrested, emptied and deprived of cosmic fertility... Pure Being is not an existence or - power, therefore not a God of theism or pantheism". Truly therefore also does Śāṅkara refuse the name of Īśvara to his formless, qualitiless, nirguṇa, Being, which he does not speak of as utter transcendent but utterly other and as such "not this, not this" neti, neti, which we know in and through any pramāṇa. Buddhistic thought when it affirmed the Śūnyatā did some such thing when it revealed that the neti, neti, is something very identical with non-existent itself.

But it found in it transcendence over circular or repetitive process. The categories and qualities of our experience are alien to that state or Bhāva or Being. Nothing could be more remote to the Theistic mind than to offer a glorified Concept, however much one might attribute to it peace and glory and eternity. Buddhistic psychology that reasoned and reasoned and thought and thought, finally discovered in every concept of existence an inner contradiction which impelled it to deny to them any ultimate reality, till finally
it discovered that all that exists is self-contradictory. Equally
the logic of finite experience collapsed in the school of
Gaudapāda and Śankara. But Śankara with more vision and
clarity of perception found the immanent existence of a
permanent, abiding character, indescribable and transcendent
to everything that we know, of which the whole list of existence
is a pale shadow, a delirium, an error, a diversion and a
mirage. The inner seer was thus discovered as the central
core of Reality, but the attributes, the negations and the
character of this atman, made it impossible for it to be a God.
The Self was discovered but God was abandoned. It may be
correct mystically to say as M. Romain Rolland says "I do not
believe in one personal God...-. But I believe that in all that
exists including joy and sorrow and with them all forms of life in
mankind, and in men and in the universe, the only God is He
who is in perpetual birth." And again "I do not need to
enclose God within the bounds of a privileged man in order to
admit that the Divine dwells within the soul and that the soul
dwells in everything"

The intellectualistic attempt then is at the back of the
discovery of the absolute. The process of discovering this
Absolute is not very much different from that of the Socrtean
effort of induction which discovered the being or the Naiyāyika
effort to find the Sāmānyā, the widest possible generality. But
then how can we explain the existenps of the particulars
'viśeṣas', if the God that is alleged to have created the
universe is a figment of imagination or a postulation by the
souls of an adorable object? Śankara on the one hand is
committed to the logical Absolute, the concept void of
qualitative and quantitative content, or the common
denominator of all content, but on the other hand, Śankara recognizes the infinite quality or aesthetic fulfilment of Union or Identity with the Divine, which verily absorbs the individuals absolutely into it. The separation from such a Being appears to be a veriest dream, even as some times our own miseries appear as dreams after they have been overcome or have passed away. By thus explaining the quality of the aesthetic and the logical Absolutes and by seeking to identify them whilst at the same time abjuring the world and its experiences as radically false and dream like illusions, Śankara has in reality revealed the principle of Māyā as the principle of mystical valuation. In other words, Māyā or the wonder of the universal appearance, which is the curtain on Spiritual life, deluding and revealing by turns the ignorant and the wise, is also the principle of manifestation of the Divine Self. The mystical aspirant sees the delusive Divine power and is afraid of it and thus runs away from it unable to stand the light, through intellectual prepararion, and solid hypostatization to the realm of Pure essence; the religious seer on the other hand, seizes on the fact of mystery and sees in that the glory and greatness, aisvarya-bala, tejas-virya, jñana and šakti of the Divine playing in an infinity of planes and sustaining them through His existence and reality and delight, saccidānanda. Reality appears as īīlā, the play of grace and love. This consciousness and knowledge vision of the nature of the Divine comes to the religious seeker through devotion.

A belief in the rationality of the universe, however unintelligible to the intellect or even tointuition, as it appears in the case of Śankara and other mystics, is the very basis of all investigation and criticism. Though we may not prefer to
assert, as some critics do against illusionists and nihilists, that their own systems and views and ideas are also illusory or non-existent yet it appears that there is real truth in that assertion.

Our struggle is real in this universe. The facts of our bondage and our consciousness of it are also facts of capital importance. The need for crossing over the turmoils of life, tortures of bondage, and limitations of intelligence are decisively clear. The promise of the illusion-theory is that these are all unreal, and that one should discover the inner Being, the Self of transcendent light, which is ever shining in our hearts. This metaphysical reality of the Self in us does one thing, it somehow grants us that strength of possession already of that which has to be attained, and as it were, shows out a suggestion that untruths and falsities and illusions are more easily got rid of rather than real obstacles. How far this face-saving illusion is helpful in this direction, one cannot say, but it does promise hope, for a psychological outlook that makes life liveable under such conditions and hastens the preparation for realisation. Its value must be considered however not metaphysically but psychologically, for we have shown that metaphysically it is not quite an explanation. And as for the other assertion of advaita of the One universal Spirit as the underlying fact and Reality of all things, that is certainly not denied by any religious seer; On the contrary the religious seer makes God the One Supreme Fact, and matter of all and establishes a brotherhood of all souls. Such a God would be truly Superpersonal, atimānuṣa-vigraha. As Professor Tennant writes "Personality can be conceived as divested of conditions and limitations that are specifically human, and the resulting concept may been be relevant to the Deity without being
THEISM AND ILLUSION

exhaustive of the Divine nature. If no more than transcendence such as this is meant by 'super-personal', theism can appropriate that term. But if it connotes something essentially different from all that we mean by human personality, such as an agency that is non-volitional, non-purposive, and non-ethical, the expression becomes synonymous for 'impersonal', and must be rejected. For God as used in theism, is not a name for universal reason, ineffable being, or even for absolute morality or a tendency that makes for righteousness, but rather for a determinate spirit, who is an artist and a lover as well as a geometer. Theism professes to be based on indications apart from the satisfaction of religious experiences, that God stands in 'personal' relations with creatures which may literally be said to be partakers of the divine nature, in the sense that they possess the potency of indefinite advance in fellowship and communion with Him.\(^1\)

Theism does not merely mean the belief in God. It means the acceptance of God as intimately related to the individual soul in an infinite number of ways, as the truth of his existence, as the good of his life, as the beauty of his experience or anubhava. In theism unlike as in Deism, where God is a transcendent Creator or originator who is utterly removed from any human relationship to the soul, there is reciprocal communion, on the side of the soul, dependence, submission, service, intelligent devotion, absolute consecration and on the side of the Divine, grace, power to help and the will to rescue, mastery and good government, increased activity and permission to communion and intimate relationship that is

\(^1\) PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY; Prof Tennant, Vol II p.167
realised by the individual soul as the Unity, Identity, sāyujya, sarūpya and samatva in every respect except in regard to the Lord ship of cosmic Creation. It means the realisation of personality, freedom and love, Creatureliness remains as the fundamental differentia between the soul and the Divine, but this does not prevent equality of enjoyment in the intimacy of unity in freedom. No doubt some theists hold that equality of enjoyment will be a misnomer in so far as there is bound to be difference between the enjoyment of the Lord and the enjoyment of the dependant soul however free and intimate their relation. But this is clear that thre is overwelling fullness of blissful experience, that has no touch or taste of the miserable and the sinful,

If then we accept the reality of the experience of Religion and the underlying truth of the mystical effort at a state of utter liberation, divorced from the fallacies of intellectuality and search after the Absolute Generality (Sāmānya) or Absolute Idea, or Absolute Essence (which is asserted quite inconsistently as Absolute Existence in a logical sense, then we can conclude that Māyā is a wonderous power of the Lord,¹ that this is unfortunately identified with illusion-causing function. It is a mystic valuation of the union or

¹ LIFE DIVINE; Sri Aurobindo, Vol I.P.174, “Maya is the power of the infinite consciousness to comprehend, contain in itself and measure out that is to say, to form for form is a delimitation-name and shape out of the vast illimitable truth of infinite existence. It is by Māyā that the static truth of essential being in which all is all without barrier of separative consciousness emerges the phenomenal being in which all is in each and each is in all for the play of existence with existence, consciousness with consciousness force with force, delight with delight...”
communion with the Supreme Object of mystico-religious Consciousness, God, the super-personal Creator and Master of all Existence, and as such Himself the Eternal Ground and Substance of all. The planal difference apprehended with such light makes the world and all that previously appeared in the other consciousnesses and conceptions as utterly valueless. So much so the dualism and the unspeakability of the nature of Māyā are not to be considered to be anything other than the real wonders aghaṭana ghaṭanāśakti and it is in this sense that the concept of Līlā had been added to explain the apparently diabolical nature of the world for the sinner and the ignorant, even like like wonderhouse created for Yudhisthara by the Divine craftsman Maya, that made Duryodhana and his kind suffer from illusion.

In the words of Nicolas Bardeyev "There can be no greater error than to interpret mystical experience in terms of monistic metaphysics. Monism postulates Rationalization a mental process rather than experience. " Monism is in all its manifestations a false and sterile doctrine."
LOGIC OF

THE ORGANIC MIND
LOGIC OF THE ORGANIC MIND

As contrasted with the mechanical mind that seeks to analyze and put together the separate parts to form a whole as in the case of a machine, the organic mind does not find that the analysis will help the reconstitution of the whole. Reality is much less a machine than it is an organism. Machines are inventions which are dependent on the two fold processes of making parts of a whole and of a whole that works through the parts. Indeed an invention is an activity of making a whole by making parts. No doubt the whole is not merely a Sum of its parts but that which has a particular activity or function which is not contained in any one of the parts as such. A clock or a motor car is not seen in the screws and bolts or springs. Therefore Indian Thought spoke of a whole, avayavi which is more than the sum of its parts, avayavas.

The human organism is not a machine. It is not made out of given parts. It has growth and expansion. The whole is not merely greater than the sum of its parts but is that which controls and sustains and utilises all parts for its own purposes. At the beginning the purposes of the whole may look as if they are for the preservation of the parts also. Secondly, it is seen that each part is a whole involving intricate functions and when out of the whole capable of living its own life. Therefore the human organism or for that matter any organism is a whole of organisms which range from the minutest to the vastest. To quote Ronaid Collin 'We have had to suppose a philosophical Absolute in which swam; so to
speak, infinite number of galaxies. Similarly within our own
galaxy or Milky Way swam innumerable suns. Within our
solar system swam planets. Upon the surface of our planet,
the Earth, swam the world of organic life. Within this world of
organic life swam individual man, within man cells, within cells
molecules, within molecules electrons." (Theory of celestial
influence, pg. 42) There is an organic interdependence
between all this vast Absolute, which presents a pattern of all-
organized existence. It is clear that "Each world or cosmos is
commensurable with the one which contains it. It disappears
in the greater one, becomes invisible in relation to it. The
higher cosmos contains infinite possibilities for the lower, is
god for the lower....ibid). In this sense every world may be
taken as absolute or as god for the smaller scale of entity. Yet
man, by his extraordinary complex nature, is apparently
endowed with the power of apprehending not only the world
immediately above him - that is the world of organic life of
which he forms part - but many higher worlds, the Earth, the
sun, the Milky Way, and he can even philosophically suppose
an Absolute of absolutes. So that man has many absolutes or
gods from which to choose" (ibid).

This is a vast picture of the Universe as Organism, in its
actual condition. All indeed are interrelated in one manner of
subsumption, absorption and growth. These three principles
are operative - the higher older includes or subsumes,
reorganizes and orientates the lower which merges into it. The
higher Self or God or Consciousness is different in a radical
manner from the lower in so far as it integrates and shapes the
lower according to its own law of being. Remarkable studies in
this process have been made by the Ouspensky School as well
as the Bergsonian schools. The logical principles involved in the concept of the Organic are (i) the organism is supported and organised and utilised by a conscious self for its own purposes. (ii) An organism cannot be without a conscious self. (iii) The conscious self that organically operates the organism is higher than that which it organises because it is seen that lower selves can be organized for their own sake of survival by the higher. Therefore, the lower becomes the 'body' of the higher Self. This may go on *ad infinitum* till we arrive at the Highest Self which supports the totality of Nature or selves and is called the Philosophical Absolute. It is true that normally we find that a body is that which is a body only till a self resides and operates in and through it, and disintegrates when the self departs from it. This disintegration is in one sense a fall to a lower condition, which prepares for a regrouping of the same into a new organism.

The principle of subsumption, reorganization and growth and existing for the purposes of the consciousness or Self which so does subsume the other elements or organisms or consciousnesses or selves is absolutely necessary to recognize as the principle of integrative action. That the higher consciousness will do this in the light of its own vast resources of inner being is a fact that has to be clearly recognized.

Any unification of the mental, vital and physical life cannot merely juxtapose these and hope for the best. An inherent difficulty exists in their mutual relationship; which is inevitable for the three are in a sense inseparable even like the three forces of *sattva* (that which makes for being) and *rajas* (activity) and *tamas* (passivity or static being). Existence is
the challenge between activity and passivity, and it is in the supreme balance of the system of the organic (samana) or the homeostasis there is found the principle of organic synthesis or system. To interpret then this dynamic process of Reality in terms of mechanical inventiveness is to apply a lower principle to explain a higher principle. Indeed the Consciousness of a higher order is such that its laws are not apparent to the lower and indeed which may appear to be contradictory to its own. In other words, it is in the organic that we discover levels of consciousness which differ from each other radically but none-the-less Characteristics of it, and we also find the actual integrativeness which our logic of the mechanical mind or intellect or ignorance refuses to recognize or is chary of accepting.

The organicistic views of reality then take seriously the fact of life and growth and subordination of life to life, of mind to mind, of matter to life and mind and so on.

The recognition of this organic order or hierarchy of being is very important. It may be one way by which we can conceive of a dynamic growing Absolute or System, that is capable of revealing real existences and values, which absolute idealism has been unable to do.

Through the organic conception we return from barren intellect to Being; from dialectic of oppositions and polar opposites to integration of systems of growth. Biological science indeed has shown the way towards psychical integration or rather has pointed out the principle of subordination, absorption and transformation in being, function
and unity which entail growth or development. But there is one important feature also that has to be recognised. The fact of degeneracy decay, and 'entropy' so to speak which leads to death of the organism. It is precisely the ideal of organic reality to seek transcendence over this decaying and disintegrative tendency of organism by a will to reorganise itself in higher systems of longer duration. Such is the concept of Real again. It is just one more step to the logic of the infinite which is the promise of a further goal of philosophy.

The Divine Evolutionism has to include the truths of both the organic mind and the infinite Consciousness-Being. The integration of all the lower planes of being in and through the organic principles of subsumption, organisation, enjoyment for the purposes of the higher leads through degrees of organizations in the very texture of the organism. The very many systems of the body, such as the bony, muscular, glandular, nervous, lymphatic, and circulatory, with all their different kinds of cells in continuous change is a revelation of the oneness-manyness principle from the microcosmic and intra-cellular to the whole. The unity as well as diversity progress in an integrative manner and reenforce and support each other. If this is so in the lowest pattern of existence even in the ignorance, it is in the conscious organisation of our consciousness with higher consciousness of higher worlds or Gods that helps the ascent to a higher kind of being or life. A transcendence over the human does not mean the disintegration of the organic evolution. No doubt it is kept an open question as to whether the person who so evolves as a member of a higher or highest Consciousness would develop a higher type of organism or higher
mechanisms in his present organism that would reflect or reinterpreted creatively respond to the higher worlds. The supersensory or para-sensory facts of life do lend some promise of such developments it would yet be limited to the lower by the drag that may be placed on the higher powers even as the vital and the physical and lower mental of ours acts as limiting and interferent principles over our own present higher mental intuitions. A higher than the human consciousness or radically different from it, would demand a discarding of the many organs of the present human or perhaps entail different creative functions for the same. The infinite is an ever advancing and pregnant Reality throwing up immense Realisations.

LOGIC OF THE ORGANISM

The Samkhyyan seer developed an inductive logic of causality mainly. But the implicit recognition of the threefold forces or qualities of organic prakrti such as Sattva, rajas and tamas gives a cue into the logic of the logic of the organism. These three are described as Harmony or existence as organic unity (sattva), the motion or activity or origination or agitation, and the rest or the end of activity, or laziness. The first is said to be of the nature of illumination or light, the second of redness and the last as darkness of black. Sattva is white, rajas is red and tamas is black. In all prakṛti or organic being (Nature) these three processes are present. Rajas is Activity, Tamas is its opposite and these two are blended into Sattva or becoming. Hegel was conspicuously the one philosopher who propounded a logic of two forces called Being and Non-being resulting in the synthesis called becoming, which in turn
becomes the being for the next movement. Growth of the organic life is seen to be comprising the processes origination, sustention which is the preservation of that which is born from dying at once by resisting death, and the third force that leads to death. This in turn leads to another birth or rebirth. The Hegelian view postulated only two forces opposed to one another. The organic requires a third force that regulates the two and brings about the synthesis.

There is an illustrative story of the three functions in a mythological form in the Mahabharata. Brahma the creator was given the work of creating life (rajas) and Rudra was given the job of destroying. So as soon as Brahma created Rudra was destroying so much so Brahma found that he was not able to create at all any thing. He was naturally sore and appealed to the supreme Godhead that if creating is given to Rudra he will be spared the sorrow of finding his creation destroyed no sooner than born. When Rudra was given this creation work then compassion came into him and he appealed to the supreme Godhead that every creature in this world should be given a duration - a period of life so that nothing will be killed at once but only at the end of the period allotted to each creature. Man was accorded one hundred years. Thus came the third force the Sattva that determines the duration. Vishnu became the upholder of this third force or what we call as living.

This mythical story illustrates the basic necessity to have triple forces - being and non-being and living. Though all things are stated to have these three forces or gunas or threads
yet it is in the organic that the third force plays an important part and that is closest to the soul or spirit, or the purusa.

Naiyayika Logic is entirely devoted to the ascertainment of the pramanas and the use of those for determining the ultimate categories. However, the interest in ascertaining truth or reality is apparently secondary to the logic of debate. Not nyaya but tarka seems to be aim of all thinking. Logic was thus reduced to the level of art of debate. The categories of tarka, jalpa, chala, nigrahasthana show the means adopted to win a victory in debate. So too vitanda. The attempt to modify or purify the processes of tarka have been very many and properly designated as hair-splitting.

The true forte of the Nyaya system lies in its attempt to give a logical explanation of the process of relationship between the dravya and its adjectives necessary for description and definition of a thing. Further it also aims at defining the relationship between the whole and the parts the manner of their unification and the division. Avavyava-avayavibhava or whole and part becomes acutely incapable of being explained in respect of the organic or life processes. Thought seems incapable of penetrating into the nature of life - the origination, sustenance and destruction or end. These processes are continuous at every instant of life growth or life history.

Nyaya logic and of course the Vaisesika logic are useful in respect of determining mechanical relationships or external relations. They refer to mathematically divisible parts also such as atoms or points without extension or further divisibility.
Logical atomism has been rightly said to describe the naiyayika logic. But the goal of interpreting reality as a whole has been beyond it. Its application has been very much reduced in scope. It cannot become a universal logic. The logic of the Whole or wholes has not been successful and the interpretation of human experience has been unsuccessful.

Naiyayika logic further is deductive though it gives concession to inductive procedure in the discovery of the vyapti (universal middle term) that connects the Subject with the Predicate, as in the Logic of Aristotle. Its analysis of the vyābhicāra and other fallacies is indeed very valuable but the field of application seems to be the field where external relationship is dominant - the field of the non-living:

The espousers of the Organic theory of reality (Visistadvaita) (svara-sarri-bhava) following the logic of Naiyayikas have not elucidated the dynamic and continuous operation of the principle of Spirit that supports, sustains, regulates the manifold parts of the organic whole by the involved forces of time and growth and breath, mind and sense and motor activities. They were content to state that sarira is not to be defined as something that is destined to disintegrate when life or spirit goes out of it. Though Visistadvaita realised that the Spirit is the self that upholds the entire organism as a unity and it is a conscient being supporting and maintaining it and enjoying it exclusively, yet a logical form for that was not given.

The Samkhyan system as well as the later Vedantic systems which admit the three force or triguna nature of
phenomenal reality and prakrti, really shows that thought does not move merely in terms of thesis and anti-thesis of which the synthesis is a third but shows that the third is more the point of truth. When two polar opposites clash truth is said to result from the clash, whether it is in debate or discussion or seminal or symposium, provided one is looking out for that truth or reality emerging from the clash of the opposites. Rationality emerges as a result of the irrational impacts. We begin to see reason as the debate proceeds. The judicial process is one such organised institution for discovering truth. Similarly the organic logic is the logical procedure of the emerging organism which sustains itself by discovering truth or tatva. It is in the purification of this logical process the possibility of realisation of man's freedom from irrational forces arises.

In the Samkhyan system the logic of experience demanded the acceptance of three forces or modes of activity alone. In the puranic mythology also the threefold forces or qualities were held to be sufficient to explain the organic processes of origination or birth of sustention and destruction (janma- stema-bhanga). A fourth category was however needed the soul or conscient spirit by Samkhya. This was to explain the experience of the enjoyer of these three forces. It was the awareness of the organic that demanded one who was other than the three. There was also the necessity to explain the condition of what happens after death which may herald the birth in another form. This may be karma or some desire (kama) for further experiences not exhausted in the organism that has tensed to with and this needed a fourth entity - a soul or purusa. Thus beyond the being and non-
being and synthesis there has to be a desire or purpose which becomes apparent as a different type of consciousness that is associated with the triple forces operating within the frame work of the organism made by their functions. The individual seeks to surmount the defects of the triple movements (tridosas) and seeks to enjoy their interplay (Bhoga) but discovers that they always produce misery as the consequence of enjoyment of their functioning. This consciousness is pure thought that awakens the transcendence or movement towards its liberation from the organic itself.

Visistadvaita Organism however claims that the Divine supra-Prakritic category which is pure transcendence has the power of holding or supporting the organic at all levels as well as the inorganic. All this world is His body - both the moving and the unmoving, inorganic or inconscient and the organic conscient. Thus one discovers the God-head as the supreme One category that sustains and utilises and enjoys all for His own transcendent purposes. This reveals that the sarira need not be just something that disintegrates but that which is unified and functioning as One organic with God - as the unity of God, soul and Nature.

The Divine has both the immortal as well as the mortal as His body and as such the term sarira as derived from the root stryate iti sariram is not fully correct. It is not its true import. Sarira bhava emphasizes the use of the body for the purposes of the self and as existing for that soul's enjoyment. However, some Visistadvaitins consider that sesatva or dependence on the self is the characteristic of the body. Sri
Ramanuja, while recognizing the dependence of the body on the soul within it emphasizes the superiority of the soul or self for whom this body exists. In a sense he realises that whatever might have been the first state of the body the final and perfect condition of the body is to be means of enjoyment of the self Sariram adyam khalu dharma sadhanam - the body verily is to be protected for the fulfillment of one's dharma.

Thus the Organic is a series of different kinds of bodies each becoming more and more appropriate to the Divine enjoyment and the perfect body is that which is entirely existing for Him alone and for none else. Whereas in our case the body has a double loyalty to God as well as ourselves, when the individual soul also realises that it is a body of God then the whole organism comprising both the triple sattva-rajasa-tamas prakriti, and the soul the conscient being in the former, there is perfect tranquility and existing for God.

This condition is also the state of peace with Nature and other souls as a whole. Every individual lives for God, by God and in God, and is at peace with the One supreme. A philosophy of Society or Sangha is thus possible which internally unites all that are externally discrete. But mutual organic relations may develop in a different manner than what we usually have under the rational and psychical order, as is seen in the samghas of rational religions or humanistic analogical organisms of the idealists including the Bosanquetian variety of absolute idealism.
PHILOSOPHY
OF
VISISTADVAITA
Visistadvaita as a Philosophy of Synthesis

One of the most important aims of philosophising in the earliest period of Ancient India was the attainment of a comprehensive synoptic insight into the nature of the multiplicity that confronts the individual in all directions. The sense of unity which is nowhere to be beheld by the eye or the senses was found to be the occult secret of reality which defied the senses and the mind. Indeed the reason for philosophical enquiry then as now and for ever would hinge round this central realisation of the nature of the unity which relates the many and procures for them a basic sense of reality which they seem to deny. The several formulations of the problems of philosophy are but approaches to the unravelling of the secret nature of the unity which holds the multiplicity together and maintains their nature too.

In one word, the word Synthesis or samanvaya which may express this intention is the basic need of philosophy.

Undoubtedly the samanvaya may start with the critical appreciation of the evidences of experience based on several modes of apprehension. Thus it has been well-known that an epistemological enquiry should precede an ontological enquiry. The inspection of our tools of knowledge, pramāṇas, occupies quite an important part in any synthesis. It is only after we have inspected the status of each pramāṇa and the limitations of each we might be enabled to find the order of importance or even the relative fields of their autonomy and the possibility of their giving us the truth. But even where we have much
certitude we are to be warned against a too strict compartmentalisaiton of the spheres of epistemology and ontology, because the relative ability of these pramāṇas to grant truth is finally to be determined by the reality (tattva) which discloses itself to that pramāṇa.

The pramāṇas that are usually accepted are pratyakṣa anumāna and śabda. Pratyakṣa belongs to the sphere of sensory perception usually, anumāna belongs to the sphere of reasoning and śabda to the sphere of revelation and knowledge got at by transcendent disclosure and transmitted through those who had devotedly preserved them (āptas). The relative value of these means to knowledge is one of the profoundest issues between philosophers. The senses give knowledge of the sensory order; reason or intellect gives knowledge of the relational order; where as śabda gives knowledge of the suprarelational or synthetic order or the transcendental order. Each has its appropriate field: senses mainly concern themselves with the empirical or phenomenal order of individual facts and their spatial and temporal location (as distinct from relation): the veridical nature of these facts would depend upon facts of proper observation, which means without committing errors of omission (akhyāti) and commission (anyathākhyāti). If the senses are in good condition without defects, and if the mind is peaceful and pleasant and alert, then the knowledge that may be got through the senses may be said to be true. There is nothing to, say that any knowledge is false unless it is sublated by a later experience, but that would lead us to comparison between two sensory experiences separated by time (and possibly space). This would show that no sensory experience
can be retained apart from the operation of reason or comparison between it and other experiences. Man is a composite or complex being and his senses and reason are in constant interpenetration and mutual criticism. The growth of knowledge is achieved by this mutual, reciprocal dynamism. They apparently contradict each other, for each looks out for the material which it is capable of getting: senses get facts which are fast moving, changing, perishable and deteriorating; the sensorium gathers and garners these facts in the form of ideas and stores them all as impressions; the reasoning seeks to discover the permanent and the eternal both in the nature and in the relations which could be called permanent or law. Thus most sciences proceed on the basis of integration and discovery of laws of a permanent character in the fleeting perishing impressions. A contradiction however is raised between these two by some philosophers who are seized with the extraordinary disparity between them. And the illusoriness of sensory experiences accentuates their difference into an opposition. This has been one of the earliest causes of philosophising. A Synthesis between these two realms or spheres of experience seemed not only remote but also impossible. There seemed to be no way by which the gulf between them could be bridged.

A new development took place in the history of thought. Systems which owed allegiance to sense were divided from systems which owed allegiance to reason or intellect. Concrete systems or realistic systems arose alongside idealistic systems more or less abstracted from sense. But briefly we find that Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems were more inclined to grant reality to sense and its
deliverances and built up systems allowing for the claims of sense and reason. They are also pluralistic in so far as they recognise the multiplicity so very patent in experience in every field. They were in one sense nearest to the materialistic view which denied even the operation of reason as merely instinctive and illusory. The extreme opposition to Monism is pluralism; the extreme opposition to spirit is matter; even as the extreme opposition to being is non-being and to change is permanence. The integration of the two opposites has been the perpetual task of philosophy. The Sānkhyān system sought to move a little nearer to the discovery of the single principle in respect of matter, with its own peculiar theory of triguṇas, whilst maintaining the plurality of souls or selves. It had sought to divest itself from the deism of the Vaiśeṣika - Nyāya which sought to provide a cause who could bring together disparate elements of spirits and matter into some kind of explicable order or architectonic. It sought an occult contact or compresence between matter and each soul thus building up different universes or organisms for different souls.

Yoga almost followed this path with this difference that it saw the necessity for a spiritual superior to the souls, the Īśvar who would be the inspiration and reason for the struggle for freedom which the soul in fact experiences, for which no reason could be adduced in the earlier systems. A mere psychic or physio- psychic mechanism or process could never give an account of the eternal impulse secret in every soul to seek freedom from its conditions whether physical or psychical or psycho physical; Vedanta, thus was the natural corollary for the explanation of the freedom-impulse in the soul.
The rare search for happiness beyond the terrestrial through rites and sacrifices which was also another important urge within each soul for happiness and freedom in the world and beyond was taken up for consideration by the Pūrva Mimāṃsā of Jaimini. The last two systems were devoted to the systematic clarification of the two portions of the Veda, namely the Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas on the one hand and the Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad on the other. These show a natural evolution of the schools catering to the explanations of the physical, psychical and spiritual attitudes and factors in man and the cosmos. But this synthesis is too simple in one sense it is a process of growth through criticism of the lower forms of the epistemological and the ontological thinking. Any way the earliest criticisms of their systems which culminated in the formulation of the Advaita theory proceeded on this tarka-pāda mode of the Vedānta Sūtras. The division of the universe into the phenomenal and the noumenal (vāyavahārika and pāramārthika), or empirical and the spiritual standpoints led to a clear-cut analysis of the categories of epistemological and ontological statuses. Every experience is real in one plane whilst being unreal in the other, and by a device of holding that the spiritual is real and the empirical is unreal, these categories could and indeed have been reduced to the level of being relatively true or real in the empirical level. Ultimately the empirical is not merely meaningless and worthless but illusion in respect of the transcendental.

Advaita synthesises the several views in a radical critical manner. The plurality of sense experience is true of the empirical, but monism is true of the transcendental: the parinama vāda (satkārya-vāda) is true of the empirical, but
vivarta-vāda (ārambhavāda) (asat-kārya-vāda) is true of the transcendental. Phenomenally akhyāti-vāda is true in the explanation of illusion but transcendentally a variety of anyathā or viparīta, or anirvacanīyakhyāti is the explanation of the error which has need to be transcended or sublated. It uses all the apparatus of Logic of intellect in the empirical but refutes all of it transcendentally. This is a synthesis in disjunction but so closely linked up are the two sets of disjunctions that we are not able to shake away any of them.

This is a critical synthesis¹.

The other types of synthesis are now briefly to be considered. The Hegelian theory starts indeed with the same type of dualism of the opposites. It does not however consider that either of them is relative to the other unreal. On the contrary both share in the same reality and imply each other. The disjunction of the two is a logical disjunction through implication. Growth of thought moves by means of a dialectic of process. Plato showed how the dialectic is the process of explication of the implied. Every notion, or idea includes or implicates its opposite and as such all determination is negation and conversely all negation is determination². This synthesis of opposites is the reality. Indeed so true is this concept or discovery that it is inconceivable that one could affirm existence without denying its apposite nonexistence, or affirm God without denying its opposite Non-God, and so on. But this is made more significant by Hegel by introducing the

¹ The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant is called 'Critical' and by parity Sankara's Philosophy could be called and is here called 'Critical'
concept of logical evolution from the root beginnings of Being-Non Being and tracing it to the most wide ramifications of our physical, psychical, and spiritual institutions: and this is what he calls the objectification of Spirit in the process. The great discovery of Hegel is this pattern and the possibility of the Spirit, the Absolute, to objectify itself and thus realise itself.

The synthesis of Hegel includes the opposites and is constantly and endlessly, shall we say, positing its opposites so as to ensure a process of continuous synthesis. This process has been characterised by some eminent thinkers as 'ballet of bloodless categories'. The profoundity of this dialectical process of opposition lies in its laying its finger on the acute logical analysis in controversy and debate.

The synthesis of opposites however is not the one and only manner. We have seen that the critical synthesis and the dialectical synthesis are in one sense moving in the direction of a dynamic process in opposition and conjunctive dichotomy, as against the disjunctive dichotomy of the dualists and pluralists.

A different but no less true synthesis was attempted by the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce. He recognized that not all difference is oppositional or polar and antagonistic unity. He recognised that there are 'distincts' which are in fact implicated in synthesis. Thus feeling and thought are not opposites but one is the need of the other. So also theoretical knowledge (logic) and practical utility and good are not opposites, for there can hardly be any practical life without knowledge, since practical conduct includes and is inspired by
the modicum of knowledge. Hegelian thinkers would oppose feeling to thought and thought to practice. But this is belied by experience. Feeling or intuition is basic to thought as thought is basic to act. They are not opposites but distincts which imply each other in a distinctive manner. In one sense we would say that feeling is the body of thought even as practice is the body of thought or adopting Indian terminology, sensation and reason are always together. Pratyakṣa needs anumāṇa and anumāṇa needs pratyakṣa though not in the sense, even as jñāna needs karma and karma needs jñāna though not in the same sense. This synthetic process gives a clearer though complex account of the double synthesis in process in experience. Thus we have to be careful in evaluating the nature of the synthesis we term 'organic' which includes this double process of synthesis that explains the resistance to its opposite and ensures an integration in the scale of values and emergence of higher forms. This is the best of the logical efforts to explain the integrative process, and the emergence of the higher forms of value.

The organic synthesis explains the unity of all forms of the dialectic. It is some thing more than merely syncretistic. It is an integral conception when taken in the widest sense of embracing all kinds of process. Further the organic view will enable us to emphasize the interrelated character of all elements constituting the totality even when not all of them are compresent at any one time or space. They are ideally present in every time and every space, and every event is the actuality of this ideal presence. The dialectic only presents ‘an event’ as actual though ‘ideally all are present in each occasion’. The Leibnizian view as modified by A.N.Whitehead will furnish the
organic unity of the entire reality. Plurality is the condition of the actuality but it does not exclude, in fact it is determined by, the totality of the whole which is dynamically presenting it.

We have thus briefly shown how the synthesis we seek has been sought in diverse ways. The Synthesis which Sri Rāmānuja presents is the Organic in which the relationship of all plurality or manyness whether of things or spirits or souls (monads) to the One is taken to be that of a śārīra, a body. The One is the Self the principle which upbears the distinctions and supports them as such without which support and upbearing they literally cease to be or fall to pieces or lose the dynamics of living and existence. In one word they become asat. The One Self of all grants them sattā, the little unities they have and sustain themselves on. The progress of the soul from asat to sat is no less due to this Self as it is that that moves from darkness to light and from mortality to immortality. It is because of this double function (in fact we shall be able to speak of, quintuple function of the Self) which makes for the spiritual dialectic so to speak of the Organic or inseparable relationship between the Divine One and the multiple souls and the nature.

The problem of reality is the problem of permanence and change: matter and souls change but the Spiritual Principle which upholds them continues to be unchanging and permanent and unaffected by their changes. The Multiplicity and Oneness are in firm integral relationship as can be seen in the aggregates of organisms which form at once a unity or One and comprising parts which are in perfect relationships of interdependence. Multiplicity does not refute
the Oneness but only falls apart when the oneness that confers their interdependence and harmony passes or is annulled or subordinated. And it is this feature or pattern or logic of unity that Śrī Venkatanātha calls the chief distinguishing feature of his system: *pradhāna prati-tantra* – the organic relation of Soul and body to avail between the Brahman and Souls on the one hand and Brahman and Nature on the other. "Yasya cetanasya yad dhṛvyam sarvāt manā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakṣyam, yac-cheṣataika- svarūpam ca tat tasya śārirum" (S.B.II.1.9)²

The above view gives us a clue to the relationship of body and the soul: that the body is incapable of being a body without its connection with the soul: that the soul is incapable of being what it is without its connection with Brahman as its

² śārira is not to be taken in its rudi or general or common meaning but in its yoga meaning etymological significance: i.e. not denotatively but connotatively. This concept of the organic includes the maintenance of the unity in the whole of parts by a principle which pervades all of them. It is different from the concept of the avayavā which is an emerging principle other than an immanent principle which confers and maintains the unity of the parts. Further it is also present in every part and is never separated from it brooding over every movement of it so to speak. It goes beyond the conception of the Vaiśeṣika view of atoms and ātmanas. In the logical theory of objective idealism of Bosanquet we have the force of the organic brought as much nearer as possible to the śarira-śārir concept or pattern or notion of Śrī Rāmānuja.

It is because the organic unity is so very logical and metaphysical that it becomes possible for the identification of one term with the other which cause in one sense ignorance and in other enlightenment and enjoyment.
body: and nature is incapable of being Nature without its connection with Brahman as its body. In other words this inseparability is in respect of the dependents on Brahman not in respect of Brahman in respect of those dependent on Him. Change and all process depend on Brahman's will (iccha). All gain their status because of their being what they are in relation to Brahman. In one sense it is compared with the relation of an attribute to the substance: in another sense it is stated to be the relation of a prakāra to the prakāri. But this relationship is not one which dismisses either term as an illusion. Both the Soul and the body are real: but the peculiarity of the relation is that the soul upholds the body: so God upbears the world, Nature and Souls. God is thus not identical with the universe nor apart from the universe. He is immanent as well as transcendent to the universe.

This can metaphysically be represented only in the manner of substance that is more than its attributes and is whilst being expressed in and through them supporting them. Spinoza's exposition of the nature of the substance as that which whilst being itself is the substrate of the attributes and is known through them gives a clear enough account. But even Spinoza insisted that the sum of attributes does not exhaust it. This is the principle of Self enunciated by Śrī Rāmānuja who has given a clearer idea of the nature of Reality as spiritual essentially for it is spirit which can control and sustain and enjoy the many and the multiplicity uniquely for itself. The harmony of the many is thus essential and inwardly maintained by the Self through its inward law and pervasion and presence.
Then we call see that Śrī Rāmānuja's theory is the realistic but not materialistic appraisal of the principle of Oneness. It also can be seen that his is not a pluralistic world even as Leibniz's would be without the Oneness of God. Leibniz's God almost resembles a deistic being who has arranged the multiplicity in an order of pre-established harmony and inner mirroring waiting on no outer power or principle, even as two perfect watches need no further attention once they have been set up in harmony or synchronous existence. Grace would be the external principle necessary when the harmony in any sense gets disturbed. But it is grace itself for the monads to be set in harmony and appetitively urged to harmonious progress towards the fullest expansion and clearest mirroring of the entire universe within itself and for itself. Śrī Rāmānuja'a philosophy goes beyond the pantheistic monism of Spinoza and the pluralistic monadism of Leibniz by rendering the relationship between the Self (God) and the attributes and modes (souls and Nature) organic and also trans organic (panentheistic). This means that the Divine self or God is not bond to the relation, though the (aprathak-siddha) relation inevitably binds the souls and Nature to Him. God is not God because of His relationship to the souls and Nature but they are souls and Nature because of Him.

This is the metaphysical meaning of the term 'śarīra', though its variant meanings may metaphysically include the organic biologically. Śrī Rāmānuja'a use of the term śarīra in respect of the souls and Nature is but the biological but the metaphysical in so far as it includes conscious souls and their inconscient bodies and not merely Nature, the inconseint.
Thus we are the bodies of God in so far as we cannot be even units without His presence and controlling and directing power within: we would fall to pieces even as the body of ours falls to pieces and disintegrates when the soul has from its tenement fled. This is the experience recorded by Mystics (as well as lovers of God) to whom the dread of separation from the Divine or Self is very real. (This is known as parama-bhakti, which includes not merely the ardent love of the self but also the dread of separation from Him).

The Unity of the Divine Self is the most central fact in the 'Organic' Theory understood in its metaphysical form than the biological form. It must however be pointed out that the metaphysical grants meaning and significance and extension to the biological unity and does not refute it.

Modern evolutionary theories are in one sense organic theories, for evolution is organismal implication of the higher levels and lines of Mind and life on the base of Matter. We may assure ourselves that the mind and life are emergents in Matter due to several factors of reciprocal interaction of the parts of Matter; or that they are already implicit in Matter but evolve due to their nature, svabhāva, or that Matter in fact is but concealed or congealed Spirit which is gradually evolving so to speak from its homogeneity to heterogeneity or that Matter is the formation of Spirit which is really its memory acting as the condition of its forward impulse. In any case Matter is a category which we have to accept, and evolution is the process of a double synthesis of the diversification which take place in it in respect of functions and purposes which bring out higher and higher forms of activity of the Spirit. Matter and
Spirit (whether polar opposite; or inseparable terms both in immanent and oppositional format are the minimum requirements and are in organic relation: they are not however of equal worth and function: Spirit is the active transmuting and organising power and Matter is the organised world and organism. An occult relation (called transcendental relation Sāmkhya) exists between them which Śrī Rāmānuja calls 'sarīratva', or 'śeṣatva'. Doctrines of Māyā and Avidya try to explain this relationship but unless the categories are held to be real, the development of the Organic and its Evolution can never be adequately explained. Thus Spirit requires the Ignorance and Matter for the deployment of its own occult process, the building in of the eternal and the immortal in the temporal and transitory forms of being. The eternal is real: no less real is the temporal: the Immortal is real: no less real is the mortal. But the eternal is the meaning of the temporal, even as the Immortal is the meaning of the transitory and the mortal forms revealed in History.

Thus it becomes clear that Śrī Rāmānuja gave a living generating' insight into the process of the evolution by means of his concept of śarīra'. Even the supra-organic, which does not refute the organic, will metaphysically be an organic unity.

It is clear that the greatest contribution to constructive philosophic thought made by Śrī Rāmānuja is the 'Organic' in its metaphysical and not the metaphorical form to which alone his critics have paid attention.

The problem of Matter and Spirit has been resolved but the problem of multiplicity of the souls would yet remain. This
is not merely a problem of multiplicity but the problem of finites also. The Infinite is the unity of the finites and the multiplicity, not again due to the principle of summation but due to the 'organic' conception. This has been already intimated in the earlier Upaniṣads. The infinite is not either the sum of the finites (for it could yet be commensurable number) or the negation of the finites (for it is not a polar opposite eternally implicated but never becoming it in any sense including the organic). Even the possibility of relationship between one finite and another or between the elements and the finite soul is due to this inner principle of Infinity which is the meaning of the finites. In this sense then the phrase 'enjoyment' existing for the Divine or Infinite solely and exclusively becomes significant in the definition of Śrī Rāmānuja (šeṣataika-svarūpam).

Thus the Upaniṣad passages Īśāvāsyam idam sarvam; na vā are patyuh kāmāya patih priyo bhavati ātmanastu kāmāya patih priyo bhavati; yastu sarvāni bhūtany ātmany evānapāṣṭi sarvabhūteṣu ca ātmānam tato na vijugupsate; sarvan khalvidham, Brahma, yas sarvesu bhūteṣu tisthan sarvebyo bhūtebyontaro yam sarvāni bhūtāni na vidur yasya sarvāni bhūtāni sarīram yas sarvāni bhūtanyantaro yamayatyēṣa ta Ātmāntaryāmy amṛta ityadhībhūtam (Brh. Up.); all intimate the selfness of the Divine both in respect of 'ideal presence' and 'actual presence', immanence being as well emphasised as transcendence and above all giving the meaning which Śrī Kṛṣna later expounds that all are strung together in Brahman, sūtre maniṁaṇā iva, though this is but a cloudy metaphor of the significant 'organic' relationship that individually and collectively the souls and Nature bear to the infinite, ineffable, Immortal and Undeteriorating Perfection of
the Divine-Saccidananda.  

Śrī Rāmānuja finds that the mystical concepts or notions or intuitions have all to be reconciled not only as between themselves but also with the intellectual formulations that mankind has been making and the facts of the perceptual order. The primacy of the spiritual and metaphysical is in no sense abrogated or challenged by this effort. Samanvaya or harmonisation of the texts is not only possible but necessary since Truth though perceived and known and entered into seriously is One only. The aikakanthya (one voice-ness or coherency) of the scriptural texts ought to be arrived at. To dichotomise the texts as dualistic and monistic is to condemn some to lower orders of reality or illusion. Synthesis is one of the most important functions of Philosophy and a synthesis cannot dismiss much less disregard the differences which challenge our synthetic impulse. Ekam sat, Ekam, eva advitiyam, Tat evam asi, Soham asmi, and so on are to be explained alongside the dualistic texts: dva suparṇau and so on. This the mediating or ghataka śrutis are said to do. The two extreme points are to be explained by means of the principle of samanvaya: the organic conception metaphysically construed, rationally explained in terms of aprāthaksiddhi sambandha, and perceptually seen as in the savikalpaka pratyakṣa which holds the many in the configurative unity of the single field, all point out to the significant necessity of the organic conception of spiritual togetherness and unity.

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The Divine is sat because He grants Sat existence and sense of it to the soul. He is cit because he grants cit to the soul and He is Ananda because He grants Ananda to the soul. As the Kena, Up. says. He is therefore Satyasya Satyam etc.
A hierarchical arrangement of the pramaṇas there always will be, but every higher would interpret and integrate the meaning of itself with the lower till all planes of consciousness and knowledge grow into perfect luminous illimitable fullness. pṛthvī-vikāsa. The principle of sublation is not always the only way for the principle is really to be samanvaya; not bādha but samanvaya should be the principle of understanding. Error is not so much a matter of omission or commission or sublatability but is due to extreme opposition, being brought to bear upon terms: in other words extremism is the cause of error when there is refutation of the other utterly and without reservation.

The problem of knowledge is whether we could ever know Reality and fully and completely. Also how the individual soul can know the Infinite Reality if it is finite.

It is clear that speaking about varieties of knowing we have each pramaṇa giving us one aspect of the Reality, not always or invariably interlapping. In one sense they almost appear to be interrelated in order to intiate the fundamental identity of that which they interpret variously. Thus no one pramaṇa can give us the knowledge fully or adequately: nor could it be said that Reality can be known fully by putting together these various apprehensions; it is not the sum of these knowledges either. Reality or Brahma as Transcendent or immanent is beyond the range of the pramaṇas even as the Kenopanisad has stated. One who thinks he knows, knows not and one who thinks he does not perhaps knows. In either case it cannot be instructed as to what It is. Only when It
delivers (or confronts) itself to one does one know it. The individuals cannot know it completely for its infinity is inexpressible. But it can be known and entered into when it chooses, or reveals itself to one, but that cannot be inexhaustibly or without remainder. It is seen here that one who knows God, becomes God, or Self or Brahman is to be reconciled with the view that one can never know it. The reconciliation becomes again possible because the Transcendence and Infinity of God is not a forbidding transcendence and infinity but a participatable one. Thus God's nature does not refute the individual's knowledge but reveals itself to it. The doctrine of knowledge through tanmaya, of becoming filled in by God as in knowledge soaked in devotion, or knowledge of the form of bhakti (bhaktirupāpanna jñāna) lets one into the expanse of God's infinite, illimitable, indivisible (anantatva and akhandatva) Nature. Man's knowledge is not a process of looking on at God, but by the process of participation his knowledge becomes slowly capable of grasping the manifold unity of the Divine Nature closed to the other forms of knowing. The integral universality of God's Nature is beyond the perceptual and inferential modes of approach, and only the direct revelations of the Rṣis (śāstra) is capable of intimating to us both the nature of Brahman and the means to know Him.

This lends us to still more important elements of ontology as to the Nature of the Causality. We have already discussed this point under the conception of the 'śarīra'. Suffice it to say that the upādāna and the nimitta kāraṇas are to be referred to the Brahman, for in every other case the upādāna, and the nimitta karaṇas are two different factors or
conditions, one which assures the continuity of the material and the other which confers the new form to the material so received. In the case of the Divine Lord or Creator or Brahman there is a unique unity of the two causes, indeed we may be enabled to include the Aristotelian four causes also into this picture. This unity cannot be arrived at through the attempts of logic of the finite reason. Indeed we know we cannot even think of the first cause except as the limiting concept of the finite intellect as a matter of logical necessity in order to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress. The organic conception however resolves this difficulty for we can see that the continuity of the mental goes along with the changes in the physical (memory acting as the principle of unity); and volitions of the divine are the causes of the changes in the physical, which pass from the subtle to the gross manifestations, from the potential to the potential. Thus the Divine as guiding and supporting the śarīras qua self is the nimitta karaṇa and as the self of tile embodied which cannot exist apart from Him is the material cause of the changes as well. The Vedānta Sūtrakāra has indeed so wonderfully expounded this di-unity of the Cause, so much so that it lātēr includes even the final causality (upeyaphala) and the 'upāya' (means) which is unaffected by the process.

The integration of these causes whilst maintaining the purity of the spirit or keeping it really transcendent to process unaffected by it in any form and having no end for itself as such except the divine process of Grace, is one of the most successful attempts at a time of scholasticism.

The relation of subject-object is again an important
problem in any theory of knowledge. The object is reduced to the level of a mode of consciousness even as the subject is reduced to the level of a mode of consciousness and thus one mode of consciousness is said to know another mode of consciousness as against it and as existing for it. This reduction of the subject and the object to the levels of modes of consciousness or consciousness simply is open to serious difficulties as all knowledge-relation is infected by this dualism of subject-object relation. Indeed epistemological idealism is at pains to show that knowledge is possible only because they are both modes of consciousness. To be an object merely is to be unknown for how can consciousness know an object external to it or other than itself? This important question of the ontological status of the object has been unanswerable. The realistic answer that the subject does know or grasp objects however different from it ontologically though contained in knowledge or rather as experienced in the medium of consciousness does not answer the real position of the object on the one hand or the subject on the other and the knowledge-relation. The object is not pervaded by the subject in a substantive manner; or, to express it in other words, the subject does not cover or enter the object either in a spatial or material sense. There is only an activity of the subject's consciousness which enjoys the object and explores it. The object qua substance is but an impression carried by the consciousness which explores it and as such the consciousness as activity which is in a special relation as function (dharma) of the subject is the activity that brings about the relation called knowledge. It is of course not unlimited in its nature for most subjects, but its infinite possibility of expansion (vikāsa) is assured when the subject is freed from
the bondage due to its location and action and ignorance. (anādi karmavidyā). This is a unique doctrine of dharma-
bhūta-jñāna, which reconciles the infinite expansive possibility
of knowledge so as to be divya-jñāna (samānajyotis) with that
of Brahman, universal in its import and true in its knowledge,
and unconditioned in its action.

The conception of the dharma-bhūta-jñāna, is
analogically made from the source of light and the light that
spreads about it illuminating all kinds of objects, both conscien
t and inconscient, cit and acit. It is itself not self-conscious for
that is the quality of the subject and not of his consciousness
which throws light on objects and for the purpose of the
subject. The subject because he is the source of this light or
knowledge (consciousness) is substantively self-conscious
(dharmi-bhūta-jñāna) and not merely potentially conscious that
is becoming conscious in contact with objects as vaiśeṣika
system conceives even as an epi-phenomenon or responsive
reaction, (native to the subject or soul even as fire in the faggot
or flint). Dharma-bhūta-jñāna plays an important part in this
synthesis of subject and object. It is that which undergoes
limitation and expansion, not the subject. Its is capable of
existing for the finite subject and yet grant unlimited knowledge
when that subject or soul is liberated that is participates in the
Divine Self as its Self conscious śarira (body). The liberation of
the soul itself consists in this illimitable expansion of its
dharma-bhūta-jñāna which will coincide with that of the Divine
with this difference that the Divine or Godhead is also
substantively infinite, as well. The individual soul thus has the
unique opportunity of being able to experience God fully
through its knowledge function and be co-terminal with God in
this respect without the unique divine function of Infinite presence directly and substantially. The individual loses this ego which is the sense of limiting knowledge function but not its individuality as a finite centre or atomic point of view or monad, as that is inalienable.

The Advaitic conception that the soul loses even its essential individuality in the process of release from ignorance misses this double poise of the individual’s dharma-bhūta jñāna and dharma-bhūta-jñāna which makes it possible for us to explain its present status of bondage or its later possibility of freedom (which the theory of Maya cannot explain at all if it affects the dharma-bhūta jñāna)\(^4\). The dvaita conception that the monad or soul can never attain the extensity and fullness of Divine knowledge is corrected in so far as the substantial nature of the soul as cit is incapable of being modified into vibhu (infinity). Thus the two extreme views are gathered into the significant conception of the dharma-bhūta-jñāna. The direct possibility of knowledge which is pure and true in respect of all objects and subjects in their mutual togetherness and in relation to the Divine Godhead is one of the assurances of this conception. In this sense it is clear also that the Upaniṣadic teaching that the Divine can be known and entered into becomes possible.

All these poises of the Self and soul and Nature are possible only because of the guiding conception of Organic Unity understood and interpreted in a metaphysical manner.

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\(^4\) Śrī Rāmānujas conception of Dharma Bhūta Jñāna avoids the pitfalls of Advaitic conception of consciousness which he refutes by his Saptavidhanupapatti in his Sri Bhasya.
Thus it can be seen that Viśiṣṭadvaita has tried to synthesize (1) the pramaṇas: pramaṇa-samanvaya: and (2) it has synthesized the prameyas: prameye-samanvayas. It is not a critical or dialectical synthesis but an organic synthesis in a metaphysical sense which includes and interprets the biological synthesis of evolutionism. Thus the name Viśiṣṭadvaita which is translated into English as modified identity does not bring out the meaning of the conception. It is not modified monism but a unique type of monism: distinctive monism. It is different from the identity and difference theories, Bhedābheda theories, which assume the substantial Monism or the final annulment of the distinctions or differences. Bhaskara did not accept the theory of Māya but yet held that the differences would pass away at mukti: Yadava Prakasa held that the Brahman fulgurated into the triple categories of God, souls and Matter and the goal of freedom is the restoration of the Oneness of God. Almost all schools of thought of the idealistic pattern had finally seen that the Ultimate condition of freedom is the attainment of the annihilation of the self and nature (niṣprapañcikaraṇa) and of the sole experience of Brahman.

As against this there is the dualistic affirmation of the continuous immortal existence of the Soul as distinct from God, and of Nature too as distinct from God and the Soul, and the souls as distinct from one another.

Whilst it may be maintained by some that the alternative to Monism is the Philosophy of Difference, yet it is clear that differences have to be held in unity to prevent chaos by means
of the postulate of One Godhead who controls and conditions and orders their existence; and dependence on Him is the only conceivable relation. Monotheism is said to be the alternative to Monism. Even this monotheism however can never perfectly link the several factors of existence simply by the concept of dependence. Just as identity is not sufficient to explain the process and unity of distinctions and differences, so also dependence is not capable of revealing the inner pulse of unity that threads and links the many. Therefore the organic conception of śarīra-śarīrī understood in the metaphysical sense adequately explains the two: by conferring the status of Monotheism to the system, since all the gods of the pantheon of man’s anthropological and mystical experiences are shown to be but ‘bodies’ or ‘powers’ or manifestations of that one Supreme Being.

Again there is another synthesis that requires our attention; for the Divine Nature is not a mere bare Being, impersonal and beyond, and void of any quality or determination. The Divine Nature is certainly beyond the limiting categories of existence, and void of the qualities of the material and psychic nature of sattva, rajas, and tamas. No predication can be made of it but it does not mean that there are not actually positive predicates such as Truth, Intelligence, Infinity, Purity, Delight or Bliss. The Personality of God is rich with this double quality of being free from all material and psychic qualities (heya-pratyāniḥ-akṣara) and of being full of infinite auspicious attributes which cannot be true of any one else (ananta kalyāṇa-guna paripūrṇatva). This is the uphaya-liṅga nature of God, which makes Him because of the other excellent attributes such as aśvaya, vīrya, bala, tejas, jñāna
and śakti the supreme worshipable Niyanta and Self of all; thus the personality of God is not a mask but a manifestation and presence of omnibeneficent character by which He upholds the world of dharma.

Personality for man is a mask but for the Divine it is a perfection. The divine Godhead is an infinite personality for all perfections are in Him. He is the source of all law and of everything. He is perfectly equal to all (sama) and in Him there is neither imperfection nor cruelty. He is the Self of all, pervading all both within and without, He is unique. He is adorable and lovable as well, for in Him is supreme love for all by which He upbears all.

Śrī Rāmānuja’s conception of the 'śarīrī' is a synthesis of all views about Brahman in the sphere of ontology and epistemology. God is not only Transcendent (Parā), He is also the God who is the creator, sustainer and destroyer-redeemer, the Lord of all processes and ruler of all the categories (vyuhas). He is the indwelling Self (antaryāmi) of all souls and Nature. He is in addition to these tri-unity or trinity (of Absolute, God and Self) the Historically descending Godhead for the redemption and rescue of saints and good men and for the establishment of righteousness (dharma) and annihilation and extirpation of adharma and evil, (Avatār). These four poises of the Absolute, who is God and Self and Avatar, are true and perfect and make God what he is. And in addition Śrī Rāmānuja intimated a fifth poise known to the Mystics to whom the Divine in His infinite compassion reveals Himself in an effulgent form for worship and adoration, (arcā).
These quintuple forms of the One Supreme Being are to be known and realised for the purpose of an integral knowledge. This however is the most difficult part of the logical intellect but this difficulty could be overcome only through bhakti, the devotion that is the fulfillment of knowledge and is a form of knowledge.
Viśiṣṭādvaita as a Philosophy of Religion

In the previous chapter an attempt was made to explain the nature of the Reality. It was shown to be a unique unity of the three categories of Īśvara, jīva and prakṛti, the first among them being the supporter, controller and sustainer and享有er of the other two, and in that sense being their immortal self, inner ruler. Technically they are known as the śarira, body of God or Īśvara. Inseparable relationship subsists between the prakṛti and Īśvara, on the one hand and between the jīva and Īśvara on the other hand. But the relationship between the jīva and prakṛti is not of the same kind. This of course must be considered at length and shown how two inseparable attributes of a particular substance can be separable from each other. This of course it is not difficult to show in a logical manner. All P is M, All S is M: and it cannot be concluded that All P is S because there is what is known as the fallacy of the undistributed middle. Accordingly there is no necessary relationship between prakṛti and jīva.

The entire process of religion then is the process of realizing that one is different from and ought therefore withdraw from prakṛti. Prakṛti or Nature is the source of misery and bondage to the soul (jīva); whereas Īśvara is the source of joy and freedom and the soul should seek to realise its eternal inseparable oneness with Him. If this view is held then the process of realising this goal or end becomes the main preoccupation of the human individual. This is the puruṣārtha and the means most fitted and adapted to realise this goal are called hita. Religion is thus the consideration of the means and ends. This knowledge involves five things: firstly the
nature of that which is to be attained; the nature of the attainer; the means, the fruits and the obstacles to be overcome. These five are known as the artha vañcaka. One who knows these five is a knower.

God is the object of our knowledge, with whom we seek union. It is clear that this Godhead whom we seek to know fully must be known in His substantial nature as well as in His model nature—that is its related inseparably with his modes (jīva and prakṛti). His substantial svarūpa is transcendent saccidānanda and Lordship (īśitṛtvam). It is through the qualities of satyam, jñānam, ānandam, anantam and amalatvam that we know God as God. These are known as svarūpa-nirūpaka dharmas. By another set of qualities we do recognize the Godhead—these are attributes of aiśvarya, vīrya, tejas, śakīt, jñāna and bala these are found in the Godhead; these are all in immeasurable measure in Him. That is why He is ananta. Surely also these are kalyāṇaguṇas auspicious in so far as they bestow utter beatitude to the knower, auspicious in so far as they reveal the Divine Godhead as refuting, all degrading and inauspicious things in Himself and wherever He manifests Himself (heyapratyanīka). He is easily accessible to those who surrender to Him (Pranata saulabhyatvatvam.)

But God has further statuses, being 'a personality not an impersonality. He is saguṇa and not nirguṇa. He is above all our knowings, ineffable, inexhaustible beyond every category of our mind and senses. He is described as nirguṇa, nirākāra niranjana, akāla, guñatita. He is nothing that we know as such and such. Unless he reveals Himself to us we hardly
can know Him. He is thus Para: Transcendent.

But He is also known as the creator, sustainer, destroyer according to the synoptic sūtra: Janmādyasya yatah (V. S. I i. 2). All these creative and other processes are His doings even as play for His own enjoyment: lokavattu īlā-kaivalyam (V. S. II i. 33), and as the Viṣṇu Purāṇa says: Kṛdā Hareh idam sarvam: kṛdāto bālakasya eva. God as the origin of all manifests or conceals His mode, which are eternally present within Him and are of Him. They are in two possible conditions or states of either sūkṣma or sthūla, subtle or gross, otherwise called kāraṇa (causal) or kārya (effectual) states. Thus God is the cid-acid-viśiṣṭa-Brahman.

He is thus the material as well as the efficient cause of the Universe. The supreme power resides in Him or is immanent in Him. It is in religion that this philosophic concept of the Brahman becomes more dynamic as revealing this power to be the power of Grace supporting all the processes of creation, sustention and withdrawal and redemption. The experience of Brahman reveals the ever present factor of Grace of God, the śrī-tattva which is the supreme grace-principle of God over and above the svarūpanirūpaka and nirūpita-svarūpa factors. Śrī is the inseparable companion of the Divine Nature and Personality, not easily identifiable with the two modes (prakaras) Prarti and Jīva(Puruṣa).

Experience of the revelational order (śastra. or śabda) alone is capable of revealing the identity between the philosophic Absolute (Causal) and the Religious Redemptive Absolute (Śrīyahpati).

The third status of God is certainly the nearest to the
religious experience of the Selfness of God in oneself and of oneself and also of all things that are. The immanence of God is the intimacy of union, but it is an immanency which reveals itself in the philosophical and ethical statuses of the individual at the beginning. One feels oneself to be entirely dependent on the inner principle or presence and thus as a mode of that Presence. One experiences and listens to the voice of this presence as the conscience or deamon, the categorical imperative, or guide of Goodness. But in religious experience one confronts this inner principle as the vīrya, by which one lives and moves and has one’s being. All activities seem to find their source and inspiration and guidance not from oneself but from that One Self of all things, the cosmic and transcendent One Being, the Antaryāmin, seated in the hearts of all.

The fourth status of Godhead and the fifth are more nearly related to the objective world of experience. The historical experience of Godhead who exalts and restores the truth and goodness and sense of real values to their real relationships with Himself, and intervenes whenever these are about to be lost, is a very vital one for the social life of the universe. The Descent Avataraṇa of God from His exalted transcendent and cosmic statuses to fulfill and establish dharma (divinely ordained cosmic order) in the world is an epochal thing. It has the purpose of arresting if not destroying all movements which tend to disrupt the Rta and Dharma, and to protect all who stand for them. It may even go far beyond these known results, but substantially it is to restore to men who seek the good life, the confidence in the ultimate triumph of satya and dharma: satyam evo, jayate: dharmād eva prabhvati sarvam. These avatāras are innumerable, though ten
of these are considered to be most important. These occurred at the most crucial periods in world-history and form the subject matter of the purāṇas and itihāsas. These descents are either temporary or permanent.

The fifth status of the Divine is called the Arcā: the worshipable, auspicious, excellent, accessible object of Meditation, dhyāna. This is the pratīka— the God who is facing the devotee as Grace, one who has become amenable to the devotee's desire for an object of adoration and love, one who confronts the devotee as the be-all and end-all of Life. These forms are again innumerable and historically amenable for installation in the shrines in the forms of pañcika-loha, or wood or stone specially selected for their spiritual worth. These forms are those which the devotee who instals has experienced as his object adorable, capable of leading him to the highest experiences of the Para (transcendent), vyuha (cosmic), hārda antaryāmin (inner ruler immortal) and vibhava (historical descents). Thus we have shrines spread allover with images which at one moment, were real experiences of the sages or saints or devotees, and which now do the same duty for posterity.

The first three forms are in a sense amūrta, whereas the fourth is mūrta. The Agamas have expounded the manner of attaining to the mūrta experiences and how to make and install and worship them.

The fifth form is the murta form *par excellence*. Most religious thought moves between the extremes of the formless and the formed. But truth lies in the reconciliation and
understanding of the integral unity of both the Formed and the Formless, even as there should be the understanding of the inseparable unity of the personality and the impersonality of the Divine. This is the meaning of the Viśiṣṭādvaita insistence on the Udbhayaliṅga nature of God. The bi-unity is only more fully explored and explained as the quintunity of God.

It is necessary to emphasize the aspect of the Arcā a little more. The Arcā is a supreme exemplification of the Grace-descent for the sake of the individual devotee in response to his continuous meditation of the intensest kind wherein he gives himself unto Him. The devotee attains the revelation of God. The supreme form of God is revealed or opened to his vision 'tasyaiśa ātmā vivṛṣute tanūm svām' (Kath. Up.;II. 23). Once this presentation has happened, this supernal form of illumination got through adhyātmayoga, becomes contemplated upon and even represented in matter. Temples grow round these images and these images become objects of grace-distribution to all people. There is a sharing of the experience of God with all who could rise to the levels of religious experience, further the aesthetic aspect of the experience of God becomes dominant. It is a creative aesthetic enjoyment and not merely a passive receptive enjoyment, and in one sense the yearning for beauty in the antaryāmi-experience finds fullest representation or objectification in the Arcā-experience. This theory of the growth of the temple is mystical as contrasted with the anthropological theory of the modern day. Arcā is the unique contribution of the Southern Seers to religious History, though its existence in the Vedic and Epic periods cannot be seriously contested.
The unique experience of the simultaneous reality of the fivefold Divine is again a contribution of immense magnitude which Viśiṣṭādvaita has made. It is the great merit of the entire system.

The Ālavārs have laid a great test of realisation, fully and completely as far as human powers or rather the powers of the soul are concerned, that is, that a knower or seer is one who has experienced the simultaneous presence of the fivefold Divine. Every hymn of the Ālavār could be scanned and shown to contain the immediate confrontation of the fivefold Divine. Yamuna and Rāmānuja have made this the cardinal test of religious experience and thus brought together the sundered unity of the Godhead in philosophic speculation. Any one who perceives in these difference perishes. 

_Ekam sat viprāh bahudhā vadanti:_ The Truth is One, men speak of it variously. This is truly a synthesis in the nature of the Godhead which makes for the synthesis of the individual in relation to the Divine. Religion arrives at an integral synthesis only in and through the awareness of the unity of the many forms of the Divine as well as of Nature and the Souls, who are in several degrees of bondage and liberation.

The Hita or the Means to the experience of this integral Oneness which was possible to the Ālavārs (who were known as the divers of the Deep of God) is God alone, even as the Goal to be reached (puruṣārtha) is God alone. But the human individual (or soul) has several modes in him, which are jñāna, (cognition) affection, and conation. Through his association with Nature his qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas, purity, activity and inertia begin to predominate. Theses have to be
regulated in such a way as to increase the purity and decrease and eliminate the other two. This process is also called Yoga. Thus there are many means or yogas which take care of the physical, vital mental and other parts of the body. There is no doubt that these practices all insist on purity in every way. Satya, asteya, aparigraha, ahimsa, tapas, <i>śouca</i>, <i>brahmacarya</i>, and <i>Tśvarapraṇīchāna</i>, are important ingredients of all yoga. The Yoga sutras divide these into yama and niyama: self-control and observation (discipline). Then there has to be the practice of Āsana (posture) and praṇāyāma (breath-regulation or control) which help the increase of energy of meditation. Senses then come under regulation in pratyāhāra and the mind under dhāraṇa. Meditation (<i>dhyāna</i>) begins really at this step and passes on, when directed towards God-contemplation through love, to samadhi which is characterized by two steps: one in which the Personality and the powers of the Supreme Self and God become realised as in antaryāmi-vidyā and this is savikalpaka samādhi, and the other step is nirvikalpaka samādhi when the realisation is of the supreme Self as the self of all things and in whom one finds one’s union by losing oneself in the Divine, even as the waters of the rivers mix with the Divine Ocean. Many thinkers however interpret this experience differently, but dhāraṇa and dhyāna require the love of God or bhakti or priti in order to get ordered fulfillment. If not, they lead to bondage to the powers of Nature. This Yoga of bhakti is superior to and indeed necessary for the other two yogas of jñāna and karma. In a sense it is that which renders success on these lines possible.

Karma yoga is the practice of selfless action, rites and rituals and other activities prescribed by the scriptures. Such
actions cover a wide field of nitya and naimittika, daily and occasional, works. They are the dharma, righteous or right actions which liberate man from bondage to matter (prakṛti) and its formations (vikṛtis) and bring about jñāna and ātma-sāksātkāra. Jñāna yoga is the practice of knowledge of self which leads to self realization - Viśiṣṭādvaita following the teaching of the Bhagavad Gītā reconciles jñāna and karma (Sāmkhya and Yoga) in bhakti, for bhakti includes God-devotion and God-service exclusively for the sake of God-realisation alone. Further the synthesis of philosophy and Religion is Followed up by the synthesis of Knowledge and works. As the Īśāvasyopanisād chants: both should be practiced together in order to give fundamental results of crossing over death and attainment of the Immortal. Thus Śrī Rāmānuja clearly envisages also that some people may be devoted to God and practice bhakti without the saving knowledge-mūcha bhakti. But the saving bhakti is that which knows who the Ultimate savior and God is. Thus devotion becomes right devotion only when it is devotion to the Supreme Being described as capable of being the fivefold sovereign of all existence. It is that which is supported by the knowledge of the relationship of dependence which one exclusively has to the Divine [śeṣataikasvarūpam]. This is the minimum required at the beginning, for it is basis of faith which leads one on to the richer experiences of the nature and form and body of God. Once selflessness grows as a consequence, it leads to selfless action and such selfless action even shares the quality of altruism for God who is the real alter ego. Karma-yoga naturally flows from bhakti even as jñānayoga becomes firm and secure in the knowledge of the One Divine who is the Self of all and in whom all have their being. Divyadrsti
becomes possible as a matter of Grace of the Divine and one sees all as in Him as His body [tanūm]. This is the synthesis of para-bhakti, parajñāna and paramabhakti.

A shorter route open to all people who have neither the ability nor the fitness nor the time nor the idealism to know God in His plenitude is available thanks to God's infinite mercy (karuṇa and dayā). Religion is an open door to the Infinite to all and not only to some. All will enter the Kingdom of God and nobody is for all time thrown out of it. God as the Self of all is equally merciful to all. The distinctions that exist are there for the different purposes of service rather than differentiations based on partialities of treatment. But this path is for those [shall we be right if we said exclusively for those]? who have lost all sense of qualification and fitness, who are weary and afraid and lonely and lost, who have no other refuge, and who therefore throw themselves at the Feet of God for being protected. It is for those who have no other refuge, ananyaśaraṇa, and no other way out of their distress-ananyagati.

This is the path of falling down [prapatti] completely and in all one's parts without any reservation at the feet of God who is known as the one sure and unfailing means to Himself. Thus means and ends are reconciled in God alone. The one means to God is God alone, and the attainment of fearlessness [abhaya] and freedom from sin results out of His grace.

This is the prapatti-yoga or śaraṇāgati yoga which Viśiṣṭādvaita counsels. It is God-dependent and God-conducted Yoga, unlike the self-dependent and self-
conducted yogas of jñāna and karma and bhakti, which require fitness and suffer from limitations arising from individual finiteness and ignorance, and possible egoism. In a sense ultimately the recognition of the individual’s impotency on the path and consequent surrender to the Divine become necessary. Individual effort waits on the Divine Grace and needs self-renunciation too. This problem of individual effort and divine grace has been exaggerated by some of the schismatic thinkers but each has a place. Individual effort directed towards deserving God’s grace, and God’s grace not measuring the quantum of the individual effort but supremely giving itself to the individual who has thrown himself at the feet of God are both complimentary. Even as a doctor has his client carried to the ward but after restoring him to health makes him walk and indeed orders him to take exercise regularly and in a regulated way, God takes up the soul and restoring health to him puts him on a regimen of exorcise, duty, worship and service, which are the yogas taught in the earlier part of the Gita. Thus the earlier Vaiṣṇava thinkers symbolised individual effort (yoga) with the Divine Grace and made all God’s, own supreme Yoga. Thus by the twin concepts of saulabhyaatva (accessibility) and antaryamitva (indwelling Lordship) of God, the Means have been synthesised. This is the synthesis of the Means (upāyasamānvaya).

The Upēyasamānvaya (the synthesis of Ends) is of deep concern. The paramapurusārtha, is Mokṣa or liberation. But it has meant so many different things. The paramapurusārtha or mokṣa in one consideration includes in a systematic sublimated way the liberty from and of the other three
purusārthas of artha, kāma and dharma. In another consideration we pass beyond all these three ends.

The reconciliation which Viśiṣṭādvaita offers is that real freedom comes from the full and complete and spontaneous realisation of God who is the meaning and abode of all these values (ends). Real value comes only in and through God, and all things participate in values only through their being serviceable to God. We should remember the definition that Śrī Rāmānuja gives of the śarīra (body), yasya cetanasya Yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyam tat śeṣataika. svarūpam ca tat tasya śarīram ; and every thing in this universe exists and gains value only by being for God: yatheṣṭaviniyogārham śeṣaśabdena kathyate.

The great meaning of the passages in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad wherein Yajñavalkya emphasises that not far the sake of the wife or husband or anybody is she or he or it dear but for the sake of the OneSelf of all, immanent and manifest in them, are they dear: na va are patyuhkāmāya patih priyo bhavati Ātmanastu kāmāya patih priyo bhavati.....precisely emphasizes the axiological reality of the Self which grants value to all else and as such one should know the Self, serve the self, dedicate oneself to that Self and realize the real freedom.

We have at this point just to contrast this view of Freedom with the similacrum of the same given to us by Hegelian thought, Being concerned with the principle of Reason as the highest category of Reality (the rational is the real, one’s freedom consists in obeying the dictates of reason,
VISISTADVAITA AS A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

the God so to speak or the Absolute within each. But it promises in the context of the political state nothing more than obedience to the dictates of the State which is said to be objective Reason, the Absolute itself in realization. This view is very meagre and even cynical for man is more than the subjective and objective reason, the institutions and traditions too whose confrontation the world is. Real freedom is a fundamental participation with God in all levels of one’s being which may entail a complete transformation of his vital and other irrational impulses also.

This leads us to the next important problem of realization or mukti. The ancient teaching in this matter has been that final and ultimate freedom from the transmigrating existence and that it is to be had only by a complete cessation of contact with any body (material formation) which is due to karma, and avidyā. The freedom from the body (videhamukti) is the goal of liberation. All persons who have performed the yogas of jñāna, karma and bhakti and even prapatti have to endure the body which would fall away from them after the allotted span of life and then enter the presence of God guided by the Divine messenger (amānava puruṣa) through the devayāna, and arcirādi marga. They never return to this world of karma-avidyā. Some great thinkers however hold that one could really feel and be free even in this body and in this world because of the extreme disjunction which they have practiced and attained between the soul and the body. The body works on according to its own make-up, whereas the soul looks on without being affected by it. This is called jīvan mukti. Of course the final samādhi happens when the karma has been exhausted completely and one passes on into the
Ultimate Being or the Absolute Brahman. There have been other thinkers who have seen that a richer and fuller meaning must be given to Jīvanmukti than granted by Advaita. The real liberation is a free movement in the mansions of God and an infinite capacity to live for God without any sense of bondage. The yogasiddha, claims this; but it is in the achievement of the experience and indwelling of oneself in God and of God in oneself in a steady and uninterrupted manner that makes for the fullest experience of Freedom in this life itself. The Viśiṣṭādvaita seers found in the glorious lives of the Ājvārs this supreme living and moving and having their being in God with such spontaneousness, and care-free delight of being which was characterised by sac-cit-ananda, that this tanmaya-bhāva was almost acclaimed as jīvanmukti. This is transcendent to the body-consciousness, for the body itself is realised and reorganised as the body of God within which one moves without being bond by its ignorance and limitations.

This God-filled existence is Jīvanmukti. It is not merely the life lived in the world but untousched by it even like the water-drop on the lotus-leaf padmapatra iva ambhāsā; it is not merely to be like a sāmkhya puruṣa who has turned away from the seductions of prakṛti; it is not merely to be a sage wrapped in the silence and depths of one's own soul or in God alone. It is to be one who make discoveries of the infinite glories of God in His Body which comprises the entire prakṛti on the one hand and the innumerable souls on the other. It is to this great experience of God's Nature and Body referred to in the Upaniṣad as the tanu that God opens the individual soul to whom he has chosen to reveal Himself: vivṛṣṇute tanūṁ svāṁ(Katha Up.) This is the real freedom which is at once
transcendent and immanent and thoroughly illumined sustained and served by devotion and service (niṣkāmakarma or kainkarya)

Thus the Vedic hope of experiencing fully the Divine both here and hereafter gets a possibility in divine experience.

Thus we can say that Śrī Rāmānuja in his philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita includes the most important synthesis of Religion which stand clearly as capable of being most satisfactory. The synthesis of the five poises or statuses of Brahman satisfies all the levels of experience divinised by the yearning for the Divine presence even on the physical, historical, immanent, cosmic and causal and transcendental levels of human consciousness. This satisfies the unconscious urge as well as conscious reason and transcendental hope (smṛti, jñāna and apoha). The saving truth is that knowledge must be devoted to the discovery of the Divine as the Self of all, to the perception or intuitive illumination of the One Supreme Lord who is worshipped through Oneness and Manyness is All-faced: ekatvena prṣṭhaktvena bahudhā viśvato mukham mām upāsate (B.G. IX. 16). This is interpreted by Sri Venkatanātha in his Tāt-parya-candrika as referring to the five-forms of Pāñcarātra Agama.

Jñāna and Karma and Bhakti gain finer strengths directed to the integral experience which includes the mind, the body and the actions, for it is to be realised that the one energy that operates in and through all is the supreme self-Ātmanā vindate viṛyam. Thus a society of souls divinely impelled, sustained and manifesting Divine Nature becomes
possible. The distinction that is drawn between the two worlds becomes more and more removed not by the compromise of the ideals and natures but by the infusion and transformation of the human world owing to the power and plenitude and light that belongs to the Divine. Neither hell in abolished nor punishment rendered impossible as statuses but that Heaven and its spirit of light and love begin to pervade the human world which is in the birth throes of the Divine Nature; and all souls have in them the possibility of ultimately attaining divine beatitude. Vaikuntham and Venkaṭam are the words coined to designate the eternal realm of God and the equally divine realm on Earth.

Thus far we have seen briefly the remarkable synthesis that Viśiṣṭādvaita. Has achieved in the sphere of Religion. The problems of the past continue to be modern problems also despite the different phrasings of the ages. Man has need for the inner guidance as well as reason which almost helps the discovery of the ultimate ground. All philosophies tend to emphasise one aspect of the totality either in respect of tattva or hita or puruṣārtha and a real integration is impossible unless some type of organic conception informs it. But the organic conception can suffer from serious handicaps either because it is interpreted too biologically or too abstractly or metaphorically and symbolically.

Criticisms of Viśiṣṭādvaita can come either from the pure monistic stand-point which dichotomises reality only to dismiss one of the terms as negative or illusion or from the dualistic stand-point which denies inherent relationships that do exist and forge a unity between the many. The problems
undoubtedly raised by the pluralistic thinkers are serious. But what is the necessity for the experience of togetherness of all devout souls even in God and is not an 'ought' which entails an 'is'? 

The dilemma proposed by the dvaita-philosopher that either monism is true or dualism is true is unfortunately not a cast-iron dilemma. It suffers from the peculiar reality of the organism which is the unity of the multiplicity, a unitas-multiplex. We escape between the horns!

Further it is certainly valid to argue that metaphysically we cannot comprehend fully the nature of Reality which seems to refute all limitations. The transcendence of the metaphysical to the rational is a fact of extraordinary importance to the proper understanding of the supreme reality. It is not mere intuition nor intellect or reason that grants this insight into the nature of the unitas-multiplex organic. It is necessary to go behind the mere perishing organic conception which is an imperfect but none the less fundamental rendering of the metaphysical truth. It is necessary to go behind the fear that sustains the yearning and search for freedom from matter and organic existence itself (samsāra or bhava-sāgara).

Viśistādvaita does offer a profound solution which could be taken out of its purely scholastic past and made living by the application of the multifaced consciousness and awareness of the Divine to the most ordinary ways of life. Even here it moves as a power of unity, the unity which sustains the increasing diversity of life and all its aspects. Though mainly theistic and depending on God alone for all things and actions,
yet it recognizes the profound necessity to treat every other thing and person as an embodiment of the Divine and as such intrinsically valuable—an end-in-itself to use the language of Kant. This profound moral principle is at the back of most types of humanism, but in Viśiṣṭadviṭa, as in religion truly speaking, it is that which grants meaning to humanism itself. Man is valuable because of God indwelling in him and not merely as a possible step to Divinity or as a divine possibility in evolutionary nisus.

Undoubtedly too there are many problems which modern philosophers have raised. I have discussed these at length in my works and in certain contributions I have made to Journals. One such problem is clearly connected with the distinction that one makes between the spiritual life and the divine life that one leads beyond the restrictions and limitations of society of whatever age or character and climate, namely varṇa, āśrama, free and bond, aristocratic and plebian, capitalist and labour and black and white or red or yellow (coloured and white). The spiritual seeker looks forward to the ideal and finds its incompatibility with the present and presses onward to the realisation of the ideal and struggles and suffers and in many cases lives only in hope. The ideal of course gradually stirs the minds of others and grants them the incentive to pursue and realise it. Equality of all, freedom for all, and brotherhood of all are excellent mystic ideals which men cannot help pursuing in the midst of all that contradicts them. The humanist appeal is to show that such ideals are truly to be sought and should become the 'ought' of moral and political and social life. But the spiritual attitude is not merely an 'ought' of the humanist conscience, but a 'desirable ought' which
grants the hierarchy of values and their slow transformation without, 'liquidation' and annulment or abolition. Thus the orders of existence with its grades gain a perfect equality in equal opportunity to grow by fulfilling the standards and tests of each grade and level and function. Thus the dharma of the society is not merely an objective spirit which compels obedience or primacy of allegiance but is a necessary condition for the subjective spirituality awakening to the Divine voice within; and both these are not irreconcilable opposites. The saint can set at naught all norms and grow beyond good and evil only in the sense that he has arrived at a deeper core of the transcendent-al-immanent Self of all (pañcamūrti) as the sage Manu has stated. Otherwise he sets them at naught at peril.

Morality gains a fuller and richer meaning in Viśiṣṭādvaita than it does in Advaita or Evolutionism as such or in Dvaita.

The question of degrees of reality in respect of the Divine Personality or principle can he said to have no meaning especially when we affirm that in each status of the Supreme Being the other aspects are not suspended or veiled but more and more fully exemplified and expressed. All forms are equally real and equally perfect. It is in respect of the world and the souls this problem is pursued and even here it is seen that the inner Presence in all things it is that grants them their reality (satya) existence (satta) and power to be or become or experience the delight of being. All things are real in their relative statuses, and obviously if any one takes any partial status or point of view the rest may gain more practical reality
due to utility or circumscribed purpose, and so also develop
the quality of illusoriness or worthlessness or worthiness. It is
true that on this point modern thinkers like Sri Aurobindo have
thrown more light. But it is clear that Viśiṣṭādvaśta
unmistakably was the first to point out the need for the organic
conception of an integral reality through the Divine.

The third problem of some interest is the problem
regarding whether God knows our knowledge or us as we
know ourselves. We know ourselves partially thanks to our
ignorance of our unconscious states. God may know us more
fully since it is He who established all things in their real nature.
Would He know us as we know ourselves—subjectively
(svasmai⁵ svarūpajni nam)? Could we also in our transcendent
state of freedom know God as God knows Himself and us?
This obviously is possible only when the identity between the
Divine and ourselves becomes a fact or is a fact. It is
impossible if God and the soul are absolutely different in kind
as Dvaita holds. Thus we can never know God except in so far
as He reveals Himself to us—that is externally—parasmai—jnāna
in Dvaita, and God would truly be transcendent, unknowable.
Advaita is the other alternative and yet it cannot explain the
parasmai—jñāna as illusory or relative. Viśiṣṭadvata shows that
this is possible when there is the 'opening out' of the individual
to the Divine and the opening out of the Divine to the
individual, which could happen only in the tanmaya state as I
have already pointed out. It is an inexplicable experience, that
is to say one cannot speak about it with any amount of

⁵ I have used svasmai and parasmai almost as equal to inner subjective
intuitive and outer (bahya) objective and perceptual knowing.
communicable knowledge. But it is an experience even as the Vedic seer Vāmadeva was capable of declaring that his consciousness had become one with that of Manu and so on. One experiences an inward, svasmai, knowledge, as if it is one's own in regard to other's experiences and knowledge. This is what Sri Aurobindo called the knowledge by identity. In his cave this is rendered possible through the metaphysical view of the soul being in its highest form (jīva) the multiplicity albeit eternal of the Īśvara (Brahman)-it being the parāprakṛtir jīvabhūta. But this yet leaves the main question of the experience of the two statuses and the third viz. of the individual as one of the multiplicity who is the expression and manifestation of the Divine as prakāra (body). It does not behold the double poise of the svasmai and paramai knowledge of each thing (the subjective and the objective view of things) in the single experience of the Divine except as a result of this unveiling of the Body of God by an act of Grace, which is not however a single act but an eternally continuing action. Professor John Laird's problem of inter-knowledge or the knowledge of the subjective knowledge or awareness of another soul gets a fuller solution and meaning by the concept of tanmaya in bhakti- which is of the form of knowledge-śemūṣī-bhakti rūpa or Jñāna-rūpāpanna bhakti.

Fourthly, the place given to anubhava in the philosophy of Viṣiṣṭādvaita rescues it from being merely a philosophy of intellect and makes it a philosophy of life, which is growing and expanding. It claims to include the anubhava of the Supreme by all in the unity of its consciousness of Organic Monism. Whatever may be the present view about the function and part played by this philosophy of Viṣiṣṭādvaita, warped by many.
considerations, religious and cultural, its rich emotional (spiritual) unity has influenced all later Saints and has appealed to people all over the country.

Fifthly, modern philosophers have sensed the importance of the principle of organic relationship between the parts and the whole; especially we find this in the writings of Bernard Bosanquet. Identity in difference implies difference in identity however and bhedābheda seems to have been accepted as the "logical" version of the "organic", which is said to be more metaphorical. But metaphors surely can be applied from either level, for we could well speak of the identity-in-difference as the organic version of the logical. This has been clearly recognized by writers on philosophy. Further as Professor P.N. Srinivasacharya has pointed out in his outstanding work on the subject of Bhedābheda, Bhedābheda had attempted the task of doing justice to the two divergent aspects of reality, its oneness (ekatva) and its manyness (nānātva). This two-fold standpoint, even like its avaidic prototype Jaina anekāntavāda, multiple-standpoint theory, can be infected with serious contradiction, as Śrī Rāmānuja showed, as two contradictory attributes cannot simultaneously and in the same sense be applied to anything including God. This is a serious defect even in the Recalled bhedābheda attributed to Śrī Aurobindo who holds that eternal Oneness is eternally many because of the omnipotence of God which includes the coexistence of opposites - aghatita-ghtanā śakti or adbhuta-śakti. The Organic conception of Śrī Rāmānuja, whilst not denying the infinite possibility and power of God which includes the omnipotent power appealed to solve the problem of coexistence of opposites, appeals to the very
significant principle of śesatva, as the principle of inherence of the contradictory real attributes of cit and acit, ekatva and nānatva, anūtva and mahatva, etc. The logic of the finite can be surpassed not by posing a logic of the Infinite as such but by showing also how that logic of the Infinite operates in and through the Organic and comes to terms with it. Reason is helped to transcend itself through the organic conception considered as a metaphysical solution.

In so far as it is not purely a biological concept it is nearer to the mystical organic concept adumbrated by the Āḻvārs and Yajñavalkya.

There is one more problem and that the last, namely the good life aimed at by every one is a godly life of dedicated devotion. The ancient teachers of Viśiṣṭādvaita were called pañcakāla parāyanāḥ observers of the five times of worship, of the Divine in His fivefold forms, everyday. The aim was not to become gods but godly, not supermen but God’s men—haridāsas. Such a possibility of becoming gods of the earth (bhūsuras) was available in the ethos of the people. But whether Viśiṣṭādvaita can ever realise the Aurobindonian ideal of the superman or not, must fully depend on other factors than the individual who strives after the Divine experience and ultimate freedom. It is clearly the Divine who decides the evolution or transformation or mutation or conversion—a gradual progress may be as truly significant as the sudden mutation. It is essentially God’s Yoga, and the individual becomes a perfect instrument aware of the splendid infinity of the One integral Divine. Good life is life in God, for God and by God. This is the first condition of the supramentalisation. It is
something dependent on integral surrender.

An individual so completely absorbed in God is not a social liability but turns out to be a social ornament. A soul that has not seen the real presence of the Godhead in all or has not even become darkly aware of it can never be truly social, cooperative and loyal to the values which keep all together. The dual loyalties so frequently met with in the lives of small groups and castes and clans and tribes and nations too, only disfigure our social life. Almost all find that moral life is the conflict between these two loyalties which may not be equated with either egoism or altruism. Society is not antithetical to the individual but its collective wisdom can never have primacy over the individual wisdom growing out of a close relationship with the immanent Divine. Society cannot abolish the individual much less can one individual abolish all and the society. But every individual participates with love (self-giving delight) in the corporate collective unity of all or the community of God. This participation is a fulfillment of freedom not its restriction: it is the kaivalya of the individual which is the līlā of God. Society becomes perfected in and through the individuals who have realised that all belongs to God and form His eternal body. All could attain happiness.

Thus Viśiṣṭādvaita provides a fundamental metaphysical synthesis which is in accord with the demands of Religion and Philosophy. It is its general pattern which makes it a growing and sacramental reality fully in accord with the deepest aspirations of man.
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